JUDGMENT Hon’ble D.P. Singh, J.—Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ashok Mehta for the respondent No. 3, the Official Liquidator and the learned Standing Counsel for the other respondents. 2. The relief claimed in this petition is for a mandate to the respondents to absorb the petitioners in any Government Department in pursuance of the U.P. Absorption of Retrenched Employees of Government or Public Corporation in Government Services Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Absorption Rules, 1991). 3. The petitioners claim to have been appointed on Work-charge basis on various Group-C and Group-D posts in the erstwhile U.P. Cement Corporation Limited prior to 1.10.1986. it is also pleaded that in pursuance of an order dated 1.10.1980 they were absorbed against regular posts. However, the said Corporation was wound up by an order of this Court dated 8.12.1999 which was upheld by the Apex Court vide order dated 31.7.2000 and the petition filed by the Trade Union of the Employees of the Corporation was rejected. 4. Identically placed certain employees of U.P. Textile Corporation Limited, which had also retrenched its employees, approached this Court for grant of benefit of the Absorption Rules of 1991 and in Writ Petition NO. 1795 of 1998, Bageshwari Prasad Srivastava and others v. State of U.P. and others this Court vide its judgment dated 29.4.1999 held that such retrenched employees, like the petitioners herein were entitled to absorption in other Government departments under the Absorption Rules, 1991. However, the petitioners herein took no action by approaching this Court earlier even though the right for absorption had accrued to them on 8.12.1999. Nevertheless, certain other employees of the Cement Corporation including Sri Shailendra Kumar Pandey and others in Writ Petition No. 63344 of 2003 approached this Court claiming the benefit identical to that granted in Bageshwari Prasad Srivastava’s case (supra) and this Court vide its order and Judgment dated 6.1.2004 directed absorption in any vacancy outside the purview of U.P. Public Service Commission. Similar Judgments were passed in the other cases also. 5. Similar Judgments were passed in the other cases also. 5. However, the petitioners kept quiet and now after such prolonged delay have approached this Court with the explanation that they are residents of under developed place and when they came to know about one of the Judgments rendered in the case of Ramvir and another v. State of U.P. (Writ Petition No. 70878 of 2006) decided on 17.1.2007 they have approached this Court. In Ramveer’s case the petitioner had approached this Court earlier when the petition was disposed off with a direction to the State to take a decision in their case, but that is not so in the present case. 6. Though, no limitation is prescribed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to approach this Court, the aggrieved person should approach it within a reasonable time. The Court is very loath to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a person who has slept over his right for years together, in the present case, the petitioner did not approach this Court even after rendering of the Judgment in Bageshwari’s case (supra) on 29.4.1999 and even after the Judgment rendered in the case of Shailendra Kumar Pandey on 6.1.2004 and Madan Lal Gupta on 1.8.2005. No doubt some writ petitions were filed and disposed of with a direction to the respondents to consider their claim, but it cannot be taken as a precedent to open a can of worms and give handle to all those sleepy retrenched employees to stake their claim whenever they feel like. The other explanation is that they made repeated representations. However, no details have been given and only a copy of one representation dated 5.4.2006 has been annexed which also does not give any details of the alleged earlier representations. Mere filing of repeated non-statutory and unsolicited representation cannot be taken as a defence or explanation for laches. The Apex Court about two scores of years ago in K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty and others v. State of Mysore and others, A.l.R. 1967 S.C. 993 and again reiterated in Gyan Singh v. High Court Punjab & Haryana, A.l.R. 1980 S.C. 1894 has held that such explanation for inordinate delay and laches cannot be a ground for exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This view has again been reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, 2006 (4) S.C.C. 322. 7. The Apex Court in Harvinder Kumar v. State of U.P., 2001 (13) SCC 300 had laid down a law that the employees of U.P. Jal Nigam would superannuate at the same age as the Government employees and, thus, the retirement at 58 years was illegal until the Rules of U.P. Jal Nigam were amended. This led to filing of large number of writ petitions before the High Court by even those employees who had retired earlier claiming the benefit of the law laid down in Harvinder Kumar’s case (supra). The High Court entertained those petitions and since it was bound by the said Judgment granted relief even to those petitioners who had approached the Court much after their retirement. The matter was again taken up before the Apex Court, which, in the leading case of Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another (Civil Appeal No. 4790 of 2006 decided on 10.11.2006) though approved the law, but posed a query in the following words : “So far as the principal issue is concerned, that has been settled by this Court. Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only question is grant of relief to such other persons who were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ petitions after the Judgment of this Court in the case of Harwindra Kumar (supra), whether they are entitled to same relief or not?” 8. After examining a large number of its earlier decisions and also relying upon Halsbury’s Laws of England, it held : “In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents has acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent” and went on to deny the benefit to all the petitioners except those who were vigilant enough, in the following words : “Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others." 9. This decision applies on all fours to the present set of petitions. 10. But the question still remains, as to what happens to those who had approached the Court within a reasonable time or are awaiting decision of the Government on their application for absorption? 11. As noted hereinabove, the Apex Court in Bageshwari Prasad Srivastava’s case (supra) had rejected the Special Leave Petition on 18.3.2002. The petitioners of the writ petition Shailendra Kumar Pandey and others, who were similarly placed as the present petitioners had filed their first Writ Petition No. 38534 of 2001 which was disposed off vide order dated 20.9.2002 with a direction to the State respondents to consider their claim in accordance with the law laid down in Bageshwari Prasad Srivastava’s case (supra). However, the claim was rejected on 30.6.2002. This was subjected to challenge in second petition in Writ Petition No. 63344 of 2003 (Shailendra Kumar Pandey and others v. State of U.P. and others). In the meantime the State Government rescinded the Absorption Rules of 1991 by the U.P. Absorption of Retrenched Employees of the State Government and Public Sector Corporation in Government Service (Recession) Rules, 2003 from the date of its promulgation on 8th April, 2003. At the time of hearing in Shailendra Kumar Pandey’s case specific objection was raised on behalf of the State respondents that after the recession of Absorption Rules 1991, those petitioners could not claim its benefit. At the time of hearing in Shailendra Kumar Pandey’s case specific objection was raised on behalf of the State respondents that after the recession of Absorption Rules 1991, those petitioners could not claim its benefit. However, the learned Single Judge vide his Judgment dated 6.1.2004 rejected the contention holding that those petitioners had applied for the benefit under the Absorption Rules of 1991 prior to 8.4.2003 and their first writ petition was also disposed off with a direction to decide their claim within two weeks vide order dated 20.9.2002. Thus, it held that their rights had crystallized and thus, they were entitled to the benefit of the Absorption Rules of 1991. However, it did not consider those cases where the application itself was moved after the Recession Rules came into force. 12. Black’s Law Dictionary (VIth Edition) defines “rescind” as—annul, cancel or abrogate from the beginning. Random House Dictionary defines it as—to abrogate, revoke or repeal. Thus, after recession of the Absorption Rules, 1991 no fresh claim can be raised as by the recession. Rule 3 has been removed from the Statute book. The intention of the Legislature by rescinding Rule 3 of the Absorption Rules of 1991 is also clear that all rights of such employees who did not approach the Government or the Courts for the vindication of their right prior to 8.4.2003 stood extinguished. 13. This aspect can be examined from another angle. 14. All these employees were retrenched in 1999 but they did not approach the Courts for enforcement of their right under the Absorption Rules 1991 prior to 8.4.2003. Judicial notice of the fact can be taken that they survived for all these years and thus, it would be safe to presume that have been gainfully employed or engaged. Judicial notice of this fact can also be taken that today the problem of unemployment of our youth is beginning to take a epidemic shape and denying them employment at the cost of such sleepy and half spent force would be arbitrary and would also tell upon the performance of the administration. For the reasons above, this is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rejected. ———