J U D G M E N T The fifteen appellants herein are A-1 to A-15 in Special Sessions Case No.38 of 2002, on the file of the learned 1-Additional Sessions Judge, Kadapa. They were all convicted for the offence under Section 3 (1) (xiv) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for brevity ‘the Act’) and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years each and also pay a fine of Rs.1,500/- each, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a further period of three months. They are questioning the said conviction and sentence in this appeal. 2. The accused and the de facto complainant as well are residents of Thuadumadinne of Khajipet mandal in Kadapa District. There is one Siva temple constructed by one Subbi Reddy and the temple is being run by him. The accused belong to Congress Party while the de facto complainant P.W.1 Chatla Kondaiah and others belong to Telugu Desam Party. PW - 1 contested for the post of Sarpanch against one Bushanam two months prior to the date of alleged commission of offence in this case, which is 24-11-2001. P.W-1 lost the election. The successful candidate Bushanam belongs to Mala community while PW-1 and others belong to Madiga community. 3. As per the prosecution case, on 24-11-2001, when PW-1 and others were performing bhajans in the aforestated Siva temple, all the accused entered into the temple, scolded PW-1 and others in the name of their caste and threw away the bhajan instruments such as harmonium, tabala, cymbals etc. PW-1 lodged a complainant - Ex.P-1 and after completion of investigation, the accused were charge sheeted. Thus, the sumum bonum of the prosecution case is that PW-1 and others were prevented from carrying on bhajans in Siva temple and thus they were prevented from using the temple a place of public resort and thereby the accused committed an offence punishable under Section 3(1) (xiv) of the Act. 4. At this juncture, Section 3(1) (xiv) of the Act, to the extent relevant, shall be quoted for proper appreciation. 4. At this juncture, Section 3(1) (xiv) of the Act, to the extent relevant, shall be quoted for proper appreciation. “(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx xiv) denies a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe any customary right of passage to place of public resort or obstructs such member so as to prevent him from using or having access to a place of public resort to which other members of public or any section thereof have a right to use or access to; xxxxxx Shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine”. 5. On appreciation of the material placed before it, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xiv) of the Act and accordingly convicted and sentenced all the accused, as stated supra. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants / accused addressed arguments elaborately. The points raised by him are: 1) A temple is not a place of public resort to fall within the ambit of Section 3(1) (xiv) of the Act; 2) Under the Rules framed under the Act, an offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police while the person who investigated into this case is the Sub-Inspector of Police and thus, an officer who is not competent to investigate had carried out investigation in this case and the same vitiates the proceedings; 3) Admittedly, there are two groups in the village, one group belong to Telugu Desam Party and the other group belonging to Congress Party and the case is foisted against the Congress party people by Telugu Desam Party people as PW-1 admittedly lost the election for the Sarpanch post in the Panchayat elections held two months prior to the alleged date of commision of offence and he wanted to wreak vengeance of his defeat against the accused that way and the case is a false one. 7. 7. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor contended that a temple is certainly a place of public resort; that the investigation is carried out by the Deputy Superintendent of Police only and not the Sub-Inspector of Police and the case is an outcome of a true incident that occurred in the village where the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes were prevented from carrying bhajans in the temple. 8. Now, I shall take up the three points urged before me. POINT NO.1: IS SIVA TEMPLE WHERE THE COMMISSION OF OFFENCE TOOK PLACE, A PLACE OF PUBLIC RESORT FALLING WITHIN THE SCOIPE AND AMBIT OF SECTION 3(1) (XV) OF THE ACT? 9. Before this question is answered, since it has emerged in the evidence that it was constructed by one Subbi Reddy, a primary question as to whether it is a public temple or private temple may fall for consideration. 10. As per the evidence of prosecution witnesses, one Subbi Reddy constructed the temple. The accused in this case belong to Uppara, Dhobi caste etc., while the prosecution witnesses and others belong to Madiga Community. The evidence discloses that people belonging to all castes are entering into the temple. Thus, all castes of Hindu community are having access to the Siva Temple constructed by Subbi Reddy. 11. The Apex Court in GOSWAMI SHRI MAHALAXMI VAHUJI V. SHAH RANCHHODDAS (1) held that to determine the true character of a particular temple, the Court has to address to various questions such as: 1. Is the temple built in such imposing manner that it may prima facie appear to be a public temple? 2. Are the members of the public entitled to worship in that temple as of right? 3. Are the temple expenses met from the contributions made by the public? 4. Whether the sevas and utsavas conducted in the temple are those usually conducted public temples? 5. Have the management as well as the devotees been treating that temple as a public temple? 12. On the facts of this case, the learned counsel for the appellants / accused has fairly conceded that the temple in question is a public temple. Therefore, the temple has to be treated as a public temple. 13. Now, coming to the main question: the expression ‘place of public resort’ is not defined anywhere under the provisions of the Act. On the facts of this case, the learned counsel for the appellants / accused has fairly conceded that the temple in question is a public temple. Therefore, the temple has to be treated as a public temple. 13. Now, coming to the main question: the expression ‘place of public resort’ is not defined anywhere under the provisions of the Act. Therefore, the answer to the question depends on the interpretation of the meaning of that word. 14. It is well settled that where the definition of a word has not been given, it must be construed in its popular sense if it is a word of everyday use. Popular sense means “that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it. (**) (2). 15. Construing the word ‘vegetables’ which is not a defined expression under the provisions of Orrissa Sales Tax, the Apex Court in MANGULU SAHU v. SALES TAX OFFICER. GANJAM (3) ruled that it should be understood as in common parlance and a word which is not defined in the Act, but which is a word of every day use must be construed in its popular sense. 16. In REGIONAL EXECUTIVE, KERALA, F. W. F. BOARD v. M/s. FANCY FOOD(4), the Apex Court ruled that where a word has not been defined in the Act its meaning has to be gathered from the context in which it has been used and it may not be justified reading the definition of the word in question as defined in another enactment. 17. A statute is not to be interpreted merely from the lexicographer’s angle. The Court must give effect to the will and inbuilt policy of the Legislature as discernable from the object and scheme of the enactment and the language employed therein. A beautiful passage in the decision reported in SUPDT. & REMEMBRANCER LEGAL AFFAIRS TO GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL V. ABANI MAITY (5) is worth quoting here: “Exposition ex visceribus actus is a long recognized rule of construction. Words in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. They are therefore, not to be construed in isolation. For instance, the use of the word “may” would normally indicate that the provision was not mandatory. Words in a statute often take their meaning from the context of the statute as a whole. They are therefore, not to be construed in isolation. For instance, the use of the word “may” would normally indicate that the provision was not mandatory. But in the context of a particular statute, this word may connote a legislative imperative, particularly when its construction in a permissive sense would relegate it to the unenviable position, as it were, “of an ineffectual angel beating its wings in a luminous void in vain”. “If the choice is between two interpretations”, said Viscount Simon L.C. Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries Ltd., 1940 AC 1014 at P. 1022 “ the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result”. 18. It may not be out of place to make mention here that “The Madras Places of Public Resort Act, 1888’ was adopted by the State of Andhra Pradesh under Andhra Pradesh Adaptation of Laws Order, 1961. It was enacted to provide for the provide for the inspection of places of public resort and entertainment and for licensing of the same by competent authority. Though the said Act also, which is a provincial legislation, does not define the word ‘place of public resort’, a saving clause was inserted excluding churches, temples, mosques or other places of public worship from the purview of the Act. It is obvious therefrom that the Legislature had foreseen and thought that a contention may be raised that the places of worship such as churches, temples, mosques also fall within the meaning of the expression ‘places of public resort’. In other words the Legislature was conscious of the fact that a temple or a mosque or a church would fall within the ambit of the expression ‘places of public resort’ and therefore enacted the clause excluding them expressly from the definition. 19. Reference also may be made here to Rule 74 of Order XXI CPC where we find the expression ‘place of public resort’. 19. Reference also may be made here to Rule 74 of Order XXI CPC where we find the expression ‘place of public resort’. The said Rule reads as follows: Sale of agricultural produce; (1) Where the property to be sold is agricultural produce, the sale shall be held,- (a) if such produce is growing crop, on or near the land on which such crop has grown, or (b) If such produce has been cut or gathered, at or near the threshing floor or place for treading out grain or the like or fodder-stack on or in which it is deposited. 20. Provided that the Court may direct the sale to be held at the nearest place of public resort, if it is of opinion that the produce is thereby likely to sell to greater advantage. (2) where, on the produce being put up for sale, (a) a fair price, in the estimation of the person holding the sale, is not offered for it, and (b) the owner of the produce or a person authorized to act in his behalf applies to have the sale postponed till the next day or, if a market is held at the place of sale, the next market-day, the sale shall be postponed accordingly and shall be then completed, whatever price be offered for the produce. Obviously, the intention of the Legislature there was that the agricultural produce of the judgment debtor sold in public auction shall be allowed to fetch the maximum price. Therefore, discretion is given to the Court to direct the sale to hold at the nearest place public resort. What the Legislature meant there was that the Court may provide for the sale of the agricultural produce at a place where there is movement of general public. 21. Section 3 of the Act deals with several offences against persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It employs several expressions such as ‘within public purview’, ‘public purpose’, etc. 22. My learned brother Justice V.V.S.Rao had an occasion to interpret the word place within the public view’ occurring in Section 3(1) (x) of the Act which term is also not defined in the Act. Dealing with the word ‘public’, his Lordship in GOLUGURI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF A. P. AND ANOTHER (6). 8. The term ‘public view’ is not defined in the Act. Dealing with the word ‘public’, his Lordship in GOLUGURI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF A. P. AND ANOTHER (6). 8. The term ‘public view’ is not defined in the Act. In English language ‘public’ is a term, which is used both as a noun as well as an adjective attributing something to a noun. The people in the community at large are compendiously called the ‘public’. In contradistinction with the term ‘private’, the term ‘public’ gives different meaning, which is concept of plurality. For instance. private purpose is distinguished from public purpose, which means that if some thing is done in the interest of the larger body of community, it is for public purpose. 9. In Words and Phrases (Vol.35 Permanent Edition, by West Publishing Company) the term ‘public place’ is defined in various ways. A public place is a place where the has a right to go and be. Public place is one attended by public for business, entertainment or similar reasons, A ‘public place’ which is a place where the public generally are permitted to assemble. In a prosecution for distributing a public assemblage, an instructioin was given that a public place is any place at which people assemble, or to which people commonly resort for the purposes of business, amusement, recreation, or other lawful purpose. 10. Section 12 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, defines the word ‘public’ as to mean ‘to include any class of the public or any community’. Therefore, the phrase ‘in a place within the public view’ may be taken as a place where ordinarily the public visit for some purpose or other than with uninterrupted regularity though not continuously. Any place where a Government office is located, any market, a place of public entertainment and the like, where people are expected to go and are invited is a place ‘within the public view’. An office or an office room where the head of the office sits is also a place within the public view but the private ante chamber of such officer cannot be treated as a place within the public view because except the personal servants of the officer, nobody can enter the private chambers. Similarly, an officers house is not a place within the public view. Similarly, an officers house is not a place within the public view. If a person opens any shop be it for selling services or be it for selling feed for prawn culture; opens such a shop with an implied invitation to the public to visit the shop for purchasing the feed sold, such a shop must be given a public character and is certainly a place within public view.” 23. The word ‘place of worship’ is also employed in Section 3(2) (iv) of the act which runs as under: “whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, - xxxx xxxxx xxxx (iv) commits mischief by fire or any explosive substance intending to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause destruction of any building which is ordinarily used as a place of worship or as a place for human dwelling or as a place for custody of the property by a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Schedule Tribe, shall be punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine”. That expression is also not defined under the Act. That temple is place of worship. A temple is better known as a place of worship and that expression finds place in plurality of enactments. For example, in the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955, whose earlier title was Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, Section 2(d), defines the word ‘place of public worship’ as under: “place of public worship” means a place, by whatever name known, which is used as a place of public religious worship or which is dedicated generally to, or is used generally by, persons professing any religion or belonging to any religious denomination or any section thereof, for the performance of any religious service, or for offering prayers therein; and includes (i) all lands and subsidiary shrines appurtenant or attached to any such place, (ii) a privately owned place of worship which is, in fact, allowed by the owner thereof to be used as place of public worship, and (iii) such land or subsidiary shrine appurtenant to such privately owned place of worship as is allowed by the owner thereof to be used as a place of public religious worship” 23. The above enactment is brought into existence to prescribe punishment for preaching and practice of untouchability for the enforcement of any disability arising therefrom and for matters connected therewith while the present Act is to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and to provide for special Courts for the trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of victims of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 is still in force. Section 3 of the said Act prescribes punishment for enforcing religious disabilities while Section 4 prescribes punishment for enforcing social disabilities. Section 3 is very much relevant for our purpose, which reads as under: 3 Punishment for enforcing religious disabilities: - Whoever on the ground of “untouchability” prevents any person (a) from entering any place of public worship which is open to other persons professing the same religion or any section thereof, as such person; or (b) from worshipping or offering prayers or performing any religious service in any place of public worship, or bathing in, or using the waters of, any sacred tank, well, spring or watercourse river or lake or bathing at any ghat of such tank, watercourse, river or lake in the same manner and to the same extent as is permissible to the other persons professing the same religion or any section thereof, as such person; shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than one month and not more than six months and also with fine which shall be not less than one hundred rupees and not more than five hundred rupees. Explanation 24. For the purposes of this section and Sec.4 persons professing the Buddhist, Sikh or Jain religion or persons professing the Hindu religion in any of its forms or developments including Virashaivas, Lingayats, Adivasis, followers of Brahmo, Prarthana, Arya Samaj and the Swaminarayan Sampraday shall be deemed to be Hindus.” 25. Under Section 3(b) if any person prevents any other person on the ground of untouchability from offering prayers or performing any religious service in and place of public worship shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than one month and not more than six months and also with fine. 26. Under Section 3(b) if any person prevents any other person on the ground of untouchability from offering prayers or performing any religious service in and place of public worship shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than one month and not more than six months and also with fine. 26. In fact, the de facto complainant and his group people who were thrown out of the temple belonged to a community which was considered to be untouchable at one point of time. The purpose of the Act (Act 22 of 1955) was to prescribe punishment for preaching practice of untouchability and to remove the social disability arising from the said practice while the object and purpose of bringing out Act (33 of 1989) is for preventing commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Various types of atrocities being perpetrated on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes are grouped and detailed in Section 3 of the Act, which prescribes punishment. The objective of the Act (33 of 1989) is more broader covering the entire gamut of atrocities. It may be contended that if the Legislature intended to include prevention of any member belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from having access to a place of worship like temple, the Legislature would have specifically inserted the word ipce of worship’ at least in Clause xiv of Section 3, as it has employed the same word in sub-Section 2 (iv) of the Act. The answer is the word ‘place of public resort’ is a broader term taking within its ambit all the places where purality of people gathers. Temple is certainly a place where plurality of people gather. A temple is a place of worship for Hindus. Hindus constitute a major chunk of population in this country. In other words, they constitute a major section. In Clause xiv of Section 3 of the Act, the wrod ‘section’ is also carefully inserted. Thje words employed are ‘a place of public resort’ to which other members of public or any section thereof have a right to use or access. Therefore, a place to which a section of public have acces also is a place of public resort. Thus, a temple used by a section of public i.e., Hindus or section Hindus, also can be termed as a place of public resort. Therefore, a place to which a section of public have acces also is a place of public resort. Thus, a temple used by a section of public i.e., Hindus or section Hindus, also can be termed as a place of public resort. The word ‘public resort’ is defined in Words and Pharases, Permanent Edition, Volume 35, published by West Publishing Company, as under: “Public resort”, as used in Rev. 1874, c 43, 2 S.H.A. III ch. 43 183 note, providing that a person not having a licence to keep a dramshop, who shall sell intoxicating liquor in any quantity to be drunk upon the premises or in or upon any adjacent room, building yard, premises, or place of public resort, shall be punished, etc., means a place frequented as ale houses or the resort of the idle and dissolute. Webster gives as definitions of the word “resort”, act of visiting, assembly, meeting, concourse, frequent assembly”; and hence a street or alley adjoining a brewery where beer was sold, not used as a driveway, where from six to twelve persons were in the habit daily of congregating for the purpose of drinking beer for amusement and conversation, was place of public resort within the meaning of the statute: 27. As per the definition, a place where a few people are in the habit of congregating also can be termed as a ‘public resort’. 28. The Advanced Law Lexican by Ramanatha Aiyar defines the the word ‘public resort’; public resort, place of and `place of public resort’ as under: “Public resort: A private house and garden where a sale by public-auction takes place is for the time a ‘place of public resort’. The place need not be a place of resort all the year round. Public resort, Place of: place at which the public assembles or to which they retire .” Place of public resort: A place does not cease to be a place of public resort because the public have to pay to go there. Tettarsall’s enclosure of Goodword racecourse during a race meeting is a place of public resort every though a person has to pay 30s to go there. 29. Tettarsall’s enclosure of Goodword racecourse during a race meeting is a place of public resort every though a person has to pay 30s to go there. 29. Wharton’s Law Lexicon gives the meaning of the word ‘resort’ as under: “Resort: A court whose decisions is for the particular case before it final and without appeal is, in reference to that case, said to be a Court of Last Resort. The House of Lords has been especially so spoken of. 30. The same dictionary gives the meaning of the word ‘public place’ as under: “Public Place: A public plce would seem to include a place to which the public are accustomed to resort without being interfered with, though there is no legal right to do so; see per Lord Coleridge, C.J. in R. v. Wellard, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. at p. 66. But for criminal purposes the attribute ‘public’ will apply to many other places, e.g., the roof of a private house within the view of many persons (R. v. Thallman (1863) 33 L.J.M.C. 58); and a railway carriage at the time it is used for the purposes of travel is an ‘open and public place’ (Langrish v. Archer, (1982) 10 Q.B.D. 44). 31. What can be gathered from the meanings given above is that a place of public resort is a place where few people can gather even though three is no legal right to do so. The Siva temple in which the commission of offence was allegedly committed is considered to be a public temple, people belonging to all castes are using it for worship. Atrocities described in Section 3 of the Act can be committed on persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, more particularly, on Scheduled Castes some of which are considered to be untouchable, especially in templates, that too when members of Schedled Castes try to worship in a Hindu temple. Atrocities described in Section 3 of the Act can be committed on persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, more particularly, on Scheduled Castes some of which are considered to be untouchable, especially in templates, that too when members of Schedled Castes try to worship in a Hindu temple. However advanced we are technologically, and socially, it is a fact that the members of Scheduled Castes are not gaining entry into the temples in the villages even in this 21st century, though Article 15 of the Constitution of India prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, as follows: “Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth - (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race caste, sex place of birth or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability restriction or condition with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, or (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of general public. (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. (4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes) 32. The Act is a step in the right direction in implementing the rights conferred under Article 15 of the Constitution of India and other fundamental rights, its aim being to prevent any type of atrocities perpetrated on the people belonging to not only Scheduled Castes but also Scheduled Tribes. Though there is no untouchability practised in Hindu community against the people belonging to Scheduled Tribes and they are not prevented from entering the temples generally, instances are not rare more particularly in rural areas where on the grounds of their inferior status, socially and economically, the upper castes in the Hindu community express reluctance to see them in temples. Though there is no untouchability practised in Hindu community against the people belonging to Scheduled Tribes and they are not prevented from entering the temples generally, instances are not rare more particularly in rural areas where on the grounds of their inferior status, socially and economically, the upper castes in the Hindu community express reluctance to see them in temples. Therefore, the object of the Legislature must be construed to mean to prevent such type of atrocities being committed on the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. As already pointed out earlier, the interpretation shall be made in a popular sense meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. There cannot be any second opinion that in the social scenario existing in India particularly, in rural areas, it is the intention of the Legislature to take the temple, which is a place of worship also within the ambit of the expression ‘place of public resort’. Thus, in the context of the purpose for which the Act ( Act 33 of 1988) came to be enacted, there is no place in my opinion to give any interpretation other than the one given above. The construction placed by me is inconsonance with the objective of the enactment. The construction is permissive. Even otherwise when there is a choice between the two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve, the manifest purpose of legislation should be avoided. A construction, which would reduce to futility and would defeat the purpose, has to be avoided. In that view of the matter, I am of the clear opinion that the place of public resort as employed in the Act would take within its meaning, a public temple also. POINT N0.2: INVESTIGATION BY A POLICE OFFICER WHO IS NOT COMPETENT TO INVESTIGATE: 33. Rule 7 of the Rules made under the Act lays down that a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate into the offence committed under the Act. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Proddatur is examined as P.W. 5. He claims to have investigated into the offence. But. Rule 7 of the Rules made under the Act lays down that a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police shall investigate into the offence committed under the Act. The Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Proddatur is examined as P.W. 5. He claims to have investigated into the offence. But. the learned appellant/accused has drawn my attention to the P.Ws.1, 3 and 4 who stated that they were examined by the Sub-Inspector of Police, and contends that the investigation was carried out by an Officer not competent to investigate. He relied upon the ruling of this Court in MALLELA PEDA VENKATESWARA REDDY v. SUB-DIVISIONAL POLICE OFFICER, KANDUKURU (7), where investigation was carried out by Sub-Inspector of Police and it was verified by the SubDivisional Police Officer, it was held that verification is not equal to investigation and the investigation was vitiated not being done by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, as mandated by Rule 7. In the case on hand, as per record, it is the Deputy Superintendent of Police who investigated into the case. Even assuming that the Investigation was done by the Sub-Inspector as contended to by the counsel for the appellants/accused, a Full Bench of this Court In YANNAM SATYANARAYANA v. STATE OF A.P(8) took the view that mere investigation conducted by an officer other than the one who is contemplated under Rule 7 of the Rules made under the Act, cannot be said to be totally vitiated unless prejudice is shown to have to have been caused to the accused and it is open to the accused or the party aggrieved, at the Initial stages, to raise such objection on the investigation conducted by an officer other than the one contemplated under Rule 7 and invite a decision before commencement of trial itself and the same cannot be taken advantage after completion of the entire trial, more so in the absence of showing any substantial prejudice. No objection was taken at the time of the trial in this case nor is it shown that any prejudice is Caused by the irvestigation done by the Sub-Inspector of Police. The objection taken hy the accused at the time of appeal now cannot be entertained. Even otherwise, as per the record, it was only the Deputy Superintendent of Police who did the investigation. The objection taken hy the accused at the time of appeal now cannot be entertained. Even otherwise, as per the record, it was only the Deputy Superintendent of Police who did the investigation. Therefore, I do not see any force in the contention advanced by the learned counsel on this point also. POINT No.3: CASE IS A FALSE ONE: 34. It is an admitted case that there are two groups in the village, one affiliated to T.D.P. and the other to Congress Party. P.W.1 belongs to T.D.P. while the accused belong to Congress party. P.W.1 lost the election for the post of Sarpanch just two months prior to the date of commission of the offence. As there are admittedly factions in the village, the Courts should be very careful while assessing the evidence and determining the guilt of the accused, as there is every scope to rope in the innocents by P.W.1 to wreak vengeance. As per what is stated in Ex.P.1-report, about 10 harijans were doing bhajan in the temple, then all the accused came into the temple at about 9.00 P.M., abused them in the name of caste. It is alleged that the accused stated, “You Madiga fellows do not come into our Shiva temple. Do not attend to our work. Do not come into our village. Do not board our tractor. Why did you not carry the carcasses of our cattle when we asked to do so”. Saving so, the accused threw them out. They also threw some cymbals, harmonium and tabala outside and locked the temple. 35. Now, we shall see whether the above allegations made against the accused can be believed or not. 36. We have to scan the evidence of four witnesses, P.Ws.1 to 4. P.W.1 claims that all the accused entered into the temple, scolded them and threw away their instruments and scolded in the name of caste. His evidence runs as though the accused straightaway entered the premises and did the above acts The other witnesses alsocorroborated the evidence of P.W.1 to the extent of the accused entering the premises, throwing their instruments out and sending them out from the temple. With regard to locking of the temple, P.W.2 did not state that it was locked. About reporting to the police, there are conflicting versions. With regard to locking of the temple, P.W.2 did not state that it was locked. About reporting to the police, there are conflicting versions. P.W.1 states that they went to Khajipet police station on the same day at 11.00 P.M., constable there refused to register the case as the Sub-Inspector was not there. On the next morning at 8.30 or 9.00 A.M., they gave report to the police in the presence of Superintendent of Police. PW-2 says that they went to Khajipet police station and gave complaint on the next day at 8.00 A.M. PW3 says that he went along with P.Ws.1 and 2 and some others to the police station, complained at 11.00 P.M. and he was examined on the next day morning by the Sub-Inspector. The version of P.W.4 is that elders went to the police station on the night of the date of commission of the offence itself. Thus the evidence of P.W.2 runs as though the complaint was presented on the date of incident itself while the evidence of P.W.1 runs as though the complaint was presented on the next day. P.W.2 does not state anything about the date of presentation of the report. The evidence of P.W.4 is that all of them reported before the police at 9.00 P.M. on the date of the incident itself. P.Ws.2 to 4 belong to the group of P.W. 1. Their evidence is certainly interested. As already pointed out, the incident occurred two months after the election in which P.W.1 lost. as Sarpanch. There are as many as 15 accused. It is not alleged that PW-1 and others resisted the accused and continued the bhajan. Their evidence runs as though the accused came straightaway into the temple, threw away the musical instruments and sent them out of the temple. It is not as though any one among P.W-1’s Bhajan group was beaten or injured in the incident. They were also 10 in number. It is not the first time they were doing bhajan in the temple. If really 15 accused entered the premises and asked them to go out P.W-1’s group would not have kept quiet, having regard to their number. The would have asserted their right and a melee would have followed, but here the allegation is that the accused straight away entered the temple, threw their musical instruments and locked the temple. If really 15 accused entered the premises and asked them to go out P.W-1’s group would not have kept quiet, having regard to their number. The would have asserted their right and a melee would have followed, but here the allegation is that the accused straight away entered the temple, threw their musical instruments and locked the temple. When there are two groups and the elections took place just two months prior to the alleged date of the commission of the offence, a tussle would have ensued between the two groups in the temple, but the evidence does not run so. Therefore, it is very much doubtful whether the offence as alleged had taken place. If the accused verbally demanded them to go out of temple, it is a different thing. If they pushed P. W-1’s group, it can be taken note of seriously. The evidence does not show that any quarrel took place between both the groups. As already stated, there are two groups in the village and the tendency of a factionist would be always to rope in as many persons as possible belonging to the opposite party in the complaint. I am sure even if the incident is true, the false implication of some at least must be there, in view of the fact that P.W. 1 was defeated in the Sarpanch post just two months prior to the alleged date of the commission of the offence. Then each mans’ participation must be proved. Except the ipsi dixit of P.W. 1 and his followers P.Ws.2 to 4, there is no other independent evidence let in, in this case. As there is every possibility of P.W.1 implicating innocents as he lost election just two months prior to the date of the incident, unless there is independent corroboration by temple priest or some other independent devotee, believing the evidence of P.W.1 and his group people whose evidence is not consistent with regard to the time of presentation of the report is fraught with the danger of miscarriage of justice. Therefore, I am not inclined to give credence to the evidence of P. W s.1 to 4. The provisions of Act 22 of 1995 are given overriding powers over the other laws. Punishment prescribed is serious and heavy. Therefore, the standard of proof required in cases of this type is very high. Therefore, I am not inclined to give credence to the evidence of P. W s.1 to 4. The provisions of Act 22 of 1995 are given overriding powers over the other laws. Punishment prescribed is serious and heavy. Therefore, the standard of proof required in cases of this type is very high. Mere allegations of two or three witnesses belonging to one group cannot be trusted, that too when their evidence ridden with contradictions. A great deal of caution is necessary to be exercised by this Court before coming to the conclusion that the accused are guilty. Therefore, the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 is doubtful as to the accused throwing their musical instruments and locking the temple. As such, the accused are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Accordingly, they are entitled to be acquitted. 37. In the result, the appeal is allowed setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the lower Court. The fine amount, if paid, shall be returned to the appellants/accused. --X--