JUDGMENT Hon’ble Barkat Ali Zaidi, J.—The facts giving rise to this application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. are that an application under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C., was rejected by the Magistrate, against which a revision was filed. The Sessions Judge, who heard the revision gave a finding that in view of the provisions of Section 401(2) read with Section 399 (2), Cr.P.C., it was necessary to hear the 6 persons against whom the F.I.R. was sought to be registered because according to the aforesaid provisions, no order could be passed against these persons without giving them an opportunity of being heard. 2. It is against this order of the learned Sessions Judge that the present application under Section 482, Cr.P.C. has been filed. 3. Section 399 (2), Cr.P.C. is as follows : “Where any proceeding by way of revision is commenced before a sessions Judge under sub-section (1), the provisions of sub-section (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to such proceeding and references in the said sub-section to the High Court shall be construed as references to the sessions Judge. 4. Section 401(2), Cr.P.C. is hereunder : “No order under this section shall be made to the prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader in his own defence”. 5. The argument of the Counsel for the applicant is that at the stage of 156(3), Cr.P.C., it is not necessary under Law for the Magistrate to listen to the accused. The contention of the Counsel for the applicant seems justified and was upheld in the case of Brijesh v. State of U.P. and others, 1997 (34) A.C.C. 687. 5. The argument of the Counsel for the applicant is that at the stage of 156(3), Cr.P.C., it is not necessary under Law for the Magistrate to listen to the accused. The contention of the Counsel for the applicant seems justified and was upheld in the case of Brijesh v. State of U.P. and others, 1997 (34) A.C.C. 687. This was also a case of Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. and following observations were made in Para- 5 of the judgment : “So far as the second contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant that the applicant was not afforded opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order is concerned, the Magistrate is not required under any provision of law to afford an opportunity of hearing to a proposed or alleged offence before the cognizance of the offence is taken or the case is registered, as such, he has committed no illegality in ignoring the objection raised by the applicant before he passed the order directing the police to register the case against the applicant”. 6. In the case of Father Thomas v. State of U.P. and another, 2002 (22) ACC 143, which was also a case under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C., following observations were made in Para-25 of the judgment : “Where an order is made under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C., directing the police to register F.I.R. and investigate the same, the Code no where provides that the Magistrate shall hear the accused before issuing such a direction, nor any person can be supposed to be having a right asking the Court of law for issuing a direction that an F.I.R. should not be registered against him." 7. It will thus, appear from the aforesaid pronouncement that the accused need not be heard at the stage of registration of the F.I.R. under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. The position of the accused in relation to an order under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C. is analogous to that of an accused in a complaint at the stage of Section 202, Cr.P.C. At the stage of Section 202, Cr.P.C, the accused has no right to participate in the proceedings as has been held in the case of Chandra Deo Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose and another, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1430. The following observations were made : “Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure and an accused person does not come into the picture at all till process is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a Counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. But since the very question for consideration being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation he has no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. It would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person. Of course, the Magistrate himself is free to put such questions to the witnesses produced before him by the complainant as he may think proper in the interests of justice. But beyond that, he cannot go. It was, however, contended by Mr. Sethi for respondent No. 1 that the very object of the provisions of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to prevent an accused person from being harassed by a frivolous complaint and, therefore, power is given to a Magistrate before whom complaint is made to postpone the issue of summons to the accused person pending the result of an enquiry made either by himself or by a magistrate subordinate to him. A privilege conferred by these provisions can according to Mr. Sethi, be waived by the accused person and he can take part in the proceedings. No doubt, one of the objects behind the provisions of Section 202, Cr.P.C. is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinize carefully the allegation made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support the allegation made in the complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support the allegation made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interest of an absent accused persons, but also with a view to bring to book a person or persons against whom grave allegation are made. Whether the complaints is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be determined on the basis of the material placed before him by the complainant. Whatever defence the accused may have can only be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under Section 202 can in so sense be characterized as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be only one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the enquiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry.” 8. The right of a person of being heard before an order is passed against him is not an absolute right. In law as in life, there are no absolutes. There are exceptions to prove the rule. The accused cannot raise the banner of breach of the right of being heard at certain stages in legal proceedings. That is the scheme of things in law. 9. In view of what has been discussed above, the impugned order dated 26.9.2006 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Shahjahanpur in (Criminal Revision No. 129 of 2006) cannot be upheld and is set aside. The learned Judge, is directed to decide the revision on merits. 10. Petition allowed. ————