JUDGMENT Honble Ashok Bhushan, J.—Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Madan Lal Srivastava for the petitioners and Sri Vishnu Pratap, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. By this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order dated 31st May, 2003 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Anpara allowing the review application filed by the Forest Department of the State of U.P. and directing for including the plots in question in notification under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Another order challenged by the petitioners is the order dated 30th June, 2007 passed by the District Magistrate, Sonebhadra informing that applications of the petitioners for grant of mining leases cannot be considered since in view of the order of Additional District & Sessions Judge dated 31st May, 2003 the land in question has been treated as reserved forest and is proposed to be declared as reserved forest under Section 20 of the Indian Forest Act. A writ of mandamus has also been sought directing respondents No. 3 and 4 to decide the applications of the petitioners for grant of mining leases. 3. Facts giving rise to this writ petition, briefly noted, are; the State Government issued notification under Section 4 of the Indian Forest Act (hereinafter referred to as the Forest Act) notifying that it has been decided to constitute the land mentioned in the notification as reserved forest. The land included large number of plots situate in Gram Billi Markundi, Tahsil Robertsganj, district Sonebhadra (earlier district Mirzapur). Various objections were filed before the Forest Settlement Officer by different persons claiming different rights, which also included the claim of certain persons that they have been granted mining permits/leases, hence the land be excluded from the reserved forest. The Forest Settlement Officer passed orders allowing various objections, against which matter was taken in appeal before the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Anpara. Certain objections had also been rejected by the Forest Settlement Officer. The appeals were decided by Additional District & Sessions Judge. Various review applications were filed by the Forest Department including certain persons. The review applications were decided by order dated 31st May, 2003 by the Additional District & Sessions Judge. Certain objections had also been rejected by the Forest Settlement Officer. The appeals were decided by Additional District & Sessions Judge. Various review applications were filed by the Forest Department including certain persons. The review applications were decided by order dated 31st May, 2003 by the Additional District & Sessions Judge. The appellate authority by the said order allowed the review applications, set-aside the orders in the appeal and held that the land in question was to be included in the notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act. The review applications filed by certain individuals were also rejected. Some of the petitioners had filed objections on the basis of the mining leases/permits granted in their favour for limited period. The Additional District Judge allowed the review applications and held that those persons, who were granted mining leases/mining permits cannot claim any bhumidhari right nor they can claim any right in view of the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. The District Magistrate vide order dated 30th June, 2007 informed the petitioners that the applications for grant of 10 years mining leases cannot be considered in view of the order of Additional District & Sessions Judge dated 31st May, 2003 taking the view that the land is to be included in the notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act and is proposed for issuance of notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act. 4. Petitioners case in the writ petition is that petitioners were doing mining on the plots situate in village Markundi, Tahsil Robertsganj, district Sonebhadra. By order of the Additional District & Sessions Judge dated 30th May, 2003 the orders of Forest Settlement Officer dated 27th August, 1994 and 30th September, 1994 were set-aside. The petitioners case further is that against the order dated 31st May, 2003 a writ petition being Writ Petition No. 29546 of 2003 (Ved Prakash Garg and others v. Additional District & Sessions Judge, Anpara, Sonebhadra) was filed in which this Court directed the State to file affidavit. An affidavit was filed in the aforesaid writ petition to the effect that a decision has been taken in the meeting dated 6th December, 2004 under the Chairmanship of Commissioner, Industrial Development that the land in question should be treated as a land belonging to the Revenue Department, hence the mining operation thereon should be permitted. An affidavit was filed in the aforesaid writ petition to the effect that a decision has been taken in the meeting dated 6th December, 2004 under the Chairmanship of Commissioner, Industrial Development that the land in question should be treated as a land belonging to the Revenue Department, hence the mining operation thereon should be permitted. The Government decided to implement the opinion of the learned Advocate General to the effect that Additional District & Sessions Judge/appellate Court did not have power to review. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of this Court in Ved Prakash Gargs case (supra) in which writ petition the learned Single Judge of this Court after noticing the decision of the State Government, as noted above, that the land in question should be treated as land belonging to the Revenue Department, directed that application for renewal of the mining leases of the petitioners shall be considered. The petitioners case in the writ petition further is that petitioners were under impression that order of the Additional District & Sessions Judge dated 31st May, 2003 has been quashed, hence they did not file any writ petition against the order dated 31st May, 2003 (paragraph 8 of the writ petition). Petitioners case is that on their objections the Forest Settlement Officer submitted a report dated 18th July, 1994 excluding the aforesaid plots from the purview of the notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act, which finding of Forest Settlement Officer were placed before the appellate authority in accordance with the directions of the Honble Apex Court in Banwasi Seva Ashram v. State of U.P. and others, (1986)4 S.C.C. 753 and the Additional District & Sessions Judge by the order dated 30th September, 1994 approved the finding of the Forest Settlement Officer for excluding the said plots from notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act, which order of the Additional District & Sessions Judge has been subsequently reviewed by judgment and order dated 31st May, 2003. 5. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioners, challenging the impugned orders, made following submissions : (1) The Additional District & Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to review the judgment and order dated 31st May, 2003 is without jurisdiction and nullity. 5. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioners, challenging the impugned orders, made following submissions : (1) The Additional District & Sessions Judge has no jurisdiction to review the judgment and order dated 31st May, 2003 is without jurisdiction and nullity. (2)The State Government having taken a decision dated 6th December, 2003 in the meeting held under the Chairmanship of Commissioner, Industrial Development that the land in question should be treated as land belonging to the Revenue Department and the mining operation thereon should be permitted as earlier, the land cannot be treated as land belonging to Forest Department and the petitioners are clearly entitled for getting mining leases over the land in dispute. (3) When, this Court vide its judgment and order dated 14th February, 2006 in Writ Petition No. 29546 of 2003 (Ved Prakash Garg and others v. Additional District Judge, Anpara, Sonebhadra and others) has quashed the order dated 31st May, 2003 and directed for considering the lease applications, it was not open for the District Magistrate to reject the applications for mining lease. (4) No notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act having yet been issued, the land cannot be treated as reserved forest under the provisions of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 nor any prohibition in granting mining lease shall operate. 6. Learned standing Counsel refuting the submissions of Counsel for the petitioners, contended that facts and issues raised in this writ petition are fully covered by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Smt. Pyari Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 2004(96) RD 27 in which similar writ petitions filed by petitioners claiming mining leases with regard to the land covered under the notification under Sections 4 of the Forest Act was dismissed. Learned Standing Counsel contends that Division Bench of this Court in the above judgment has taken the view that Additional District Judge has jurisdiction to review the appellate order and the review order passed by the Additional District Judge was upheld. It is further contended by learned Standing Counsel that Division Bench having already held in the above case that no mining operation can be undertaken in the land covered by notification under Sections 4 of the Forest Act, no error was committed by the District Magistrate in rejecting the application for grant of mining leases to the petitioners. It is further contended by learned Standing Counsel that Division Bench having already held in the above case that no mining operation can be undertaken in the land covered by notification under Sections 4 of the Forest Act, no error was committed by the District Magistrate in rejecting the application for grant of mining leases to the petitioners. It is further contended by learned Standing Counsel that the judgment of this Court in Ved Prakash Gargs case (supra), which is a judgment by a learned Single Judge and is subsequent in point of time, does not notice the Division Bench judgment in Smt. Pyari Devis case (supra) and the learned Single Judge has committed error in accepting the submission in the said case that Additional District Judge has no power of review. Learned Standing Counsel further contended that in view of notification having been issued under Section 4 of the Forest Act, the bar under Sections 5, 6 and 9 shall come into play. 7. I have considered the submissions and perused the record. 8. The first three submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners being interrelated, are being considered together. Before proceeding to consider the above submissions, it is useful to look into the scheme of the Forest Act. Under Section 3 of the Forest Act, the State Government has been empowered to constitute any forest land or waste land. Section 4 of the Forest Act contemplates issuance of notification whenever it is decided by the State Government to constitute any land as reserved forest. Section 5 provides that after the issue of notification under Sections 4, no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification. Section 6 provides for proclamation by Forest Settlement Officer when notification has been issued under Section 4. Section 7 provides for an inquiry by Forest Settlement Officer regarding all claims duly preferred. Section 9 provides for extinction of rights. Section 17 provides for appeal. In the State of U.P. appeal has been contemplated to the District Judge. Section 20 provides for publication of notification in the official Gazette by the State Government declaring a land as reserved forest. Section 22 provides for power of the State Government to revise arrangement made under Section 15 or Section 18. 9. Section 17, which provides for appellate forum as amended in the State of U.P., is as follows : "17. Section 20 provides for publication of notification in the official Gazette by the State Government declaring a land as reserved forest. Section 22 provides for power of the State Government to revise arrangement made under Section 15 or Section 18. 9. Section 17, which provides for appellate forum as amended in the State of U.P., is as follows : "17. Appeal from order passed under Section 11, Section 12, Section 15 or Section 16.—Any person who has made a claim under this Act, or any Forest Officer or other person generally or specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may, within three months from the date of the order passed on such claim by the Forest Settlement Officer under Section 11, Section 12, Section 15 or Section 16, present an appeal from such order to the District Judge. Explanation.—In this section and the succeeding sections of this Chapter, District Judge means the District Judge of the district in which the land is situate, and includes an Additional District Judge to whom an appeal is transferred by the District Judge." 10. Section 17 thus contemplate an appeal to the District Judge. Explanation defines the District Judge as District Judge of the district in which the land is situate and includes an Additional District Judge. The District Judge is, thus, appellate forum. It is relevant to note that when notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act was issued in district Sonebhadra a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed, namely, Banwasi Seva Ashrams case (supra) in the nature of public interest litigation claiming that Adivasis and other backward people living within the Jungle using the forest area as their habitat and means of their livelihood will be deprived in case the State Government is permitted to declare the entire land as reserved forest. The Apex Court entertained the writ petition and issued certain directions with regard to consideration of claims of the persons. The Apex Court directed for appointment of adequate number of Record Officers and further directed that there shall also be five experienced Additional District Judges. The Supreme Court further directed that Forest Settlement Officer shall forward the requisite papers to the Additional District Judge even though no appeal is filed and the same shall be scrutinised as if an appeal has been taken against the order. 11. The Supreme Court further directed that Forest Settlement Officer shall forward the requisite papers to the Additional District Judge even though no appeal is filed and the same shall be scrutinised as if an appeal has been taken against the order. 11. In Division Bench judgment in Smt. Pyari Devis case (of which I was also a member) the above issue was raised and decided by the Division Bench. The Division Bench noticed the scheme under the Forest Act and also directions of the Apex Court and held that the Additional District Judge had power to review. The Division Bench in Smt. Pyari Devis case concluded that the order of Additional District Judge of review cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. It is useful to quote paragraphs 31 and 32 of the said judgment : "31. The next submission of Counsel for the appellant that the Additional District Judge has no jurisdiction to pass order dated 3rd June, 2003 is also required to be considered. The submission of Counsel for the appellant is that Additional District Judge exercising the appellate jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Forest Act is not conferred power of review nor the power of review can be read by the necessary implication, hence the order is without jurisdiction and it cannot be said that the said order was passed in exercise of jurisdiction under any Central Act. The submission is that bar of Chapter-VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court will be applicable only when the order has been passed by a Court in exercise of any jurisdiction under U.P. Act or Central Act pertaining to matters included in Concurrent List. There is no dispute that Section 17 of the Forest Act as applicable in the State of U.P. confers the appellate power on the Court of District Judge/Additional District Judge, thus, the judgment dated 3rd June, 2002 is a judgment passed by a Court. The submission which has been raised by Counsel for the appellant is that there is no power of review in the Court of Additional District Judge has to be considered. The submission which has been raised by Counsel for the appellant is that there is no power of review in the Court of Additional District Judge has to be considered. As noted above, under the order of the Apex Court dated 20th November, 1986 ( 1986 (4) SCC 753 ) the findings of Forest Settlement Officer with requisite papers shall be placed before the Additional District Judge even though no appeal is filed and the same shall be scrutinised as if an appeal has been taken against the order. The aforesaid directions are extracted below : "III. After the Forest Settlement Officer has done the needful under the provisions of the Act, the findings with the requisite papers shall be placed before the Additional District Judge of the area even though no appeal is filed and the same shall be scrutinized as if an appeal has been taken against the order of the authority and the order of Additional District Judge passed therein shall be taken to be the order contemplated under the Act." 32. In the same case, the Apex Court passed order dated 18th July, 1994 in which the Apex Court specifically directed the Government to implement the decisions given by various Additional District Judges in various appeals and reviews decided by the learned Judges. Last two paragraphs of the said judgment is extracted below : "It has been stated by Justice Loomba in his 14th Report that an area of about 26947 acres in about 12 villages, covered by Notification under Section 4 of the Indian Forests Act, has in fact been dealt with under Section 54 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. We direct the Revenue Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, to set up Special Officers to deal with this area in terms of our order dated November 20, 1986. We further direct the Revenue Secretary to implement the decisions given by various Additional District Judges in various appeals and reviews decided by the learned Judges. We close the proceedings in this case. We, however, give liberty to the parties to approach this Court as and when it becomes necessary to do so for obtaining necessary directions." 12. From above directions of the Apex Court, it is clear that Apex Court directed the State Government to implement the decisions given by various Additional District Judges in various appeals and reviews decided by learned Judges. From above directions of the Apex Court, it is clear that Apex Court directed the State Government to implement the decisions given by various Additional District Judges in various appeals and reviews decided by learned Judges. The aforesaid direction clearly directs that judgment of the review has also to be implemented. The Apex Court itself having directed implementation of the reviews the submissions of Counsel for the appellant that order of Additional District Judge passed in review is without jurisdiction cannot be accepted. In fact, the Divisional Forest Officer brought this fact before the Apex Court that several errors have been committed by the District Judge while deciding the appeal and he be permitted to review and review be directed. The aforesaid fact has been noted by the Apex Court in its order dated 4th October, 1993. Relevant extract of the order of the Apex Court dated 4th October, 1993 is quoted below : "Mrs. Abhay Kumar Singh, the Divisional Forest Officer, District Sonebhadra has filed an affidavit wherein it is stated that during the physical verification made by the Forest Department, certain cases have come to light where wrong orders have been passed. We seek directions from this Court for the review of those cases. The Forest Department may bring those cases to the notice of the Additional District Judges who shall consider these cases in accordance with law." 13. From the aforesaid, it is clear that Apex Court permitted the applications and ultimately directed implementation of judgment passed by Additional District Judge in review which clearly means that Apex Court has accepted filing of review and implementation of the said order. The argument of Counsel for the appellant is in the teeth of the aforesaid direction and cannot be accepted. The judgments of the Apex Court are binding for all Courts under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 14. Much emphasis has been laid by learned Counsel for the petitioners on the subsequent judgment of the learned Single Judge in Ved Prakash Gargs case (supra) in which the learned Single Judge in view of the stand taken by the State quashed the order of review as being without jurisdiction. 14. Much emphasis has been laid by learned Counsel for the petitioners on the subsequent judgment of the learned Single Judge in Ved Prakash Gargs case (supra) in which the learned Single Judge in view of the stand taken by the State quashed the order of review as being without jurisdiction. The judgment in the said case cannot help the petitioners in the present case due to following two reasons : (a) The attention of the learned Single Judge in Ved Prakash Gargs case (supra) was not invited to the earlier Division Bench in Smt. Pyari Devis case (supra), which categorically laid down that Additional District Judge has power of review. It is relevant to note that judgment in Pyari Devis case was with regard to same notification under Sections 4 of the Forest Act in which notification the land on which petitioners claimed right of mining lease was also included. The Division Bench judgment having held that Additional District Judge had power of review was a binding precedent and the judgment given by learned Single Judge without noticing the said judgment cannot be followed as good precedent. (b) Learned Single Judge in Ved Prakash Gargs case (supra) has decided the case on the basis of concession made by the learned Advocate General at the bar that the Additional District Judge has no power to review its own order. The judgment was thus, in fact, based on concession given by the learned Advocate General to the effect that Additional District Judge has no power of review. The decision is based only on the said statement and does not lay down any ratio to be followed that Additional District Judge has no power of review. It is well settled that decision given on the basis of a concession by any party cannot be said to be laying down any ratio or precedent to be followed. 15. One more contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners needs to be considered. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that order dated 31st May, 2003 passed by Additional District Judge allowing the review application having been set-aside by this Court in Writ Petition No. 29546 of 2003 (Ved Prakash Garg and others v. Additional District & Sessions Judge, Anpara and others), the order dated 31st May, 2003 impugned in this writ petition be also treated to have been set-aside. The order dated 31st May, 2003 was passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge in 134 cases including the review application filed in Ved Prakash Garg and others case, which is mentioned at Serial No. 61 of the order dated 31st May, 2003 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition). The number of review application in Ved Prakash Garg and others case was 183 of 1997 and the number of the appeal giving rise to the review application was 1203 of 1993, which is mentioned at Serial No. 61 in the order. It is true that the order dated 31st May, 2003, which was challenged by Ved Prakash Garg and others, in Writ Petition No. 29556 of 2003, has been set-aside and that order is final qua Ved Prakash Garg and others and the Forest Department. Ved Prakash Garg and others filed the writ petition challenging the order dated 31st May, 2003 of the Additional District & Sessions Judges and their writ petition was confined to the order passed in the case of Ved Prakash Garg and others. By setting aside the review order dated 31st May, 2003 on the writ petition filed by Ved Prakash and others, it cannot be said that the order passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge in all the cases stood set-aside. In case the above was the consequence in Ved Prakash Gargs case, there was no occasion for the petitioners praying for quashing the order dated 31st May, 2003 in the present writ petition. The petitioners being well aware that allowing the writ petition of Ved Prakash Garg and others against the order dated 31st May, 2003 was confined to their cases, have filed writ petition praying for setting aside the order dated 31st May, 2003. The petitioners were not party to the writ petition of Ved Prakash Garg and others and they at best can rely on the judgment of this Court in Ved Prakash Garg and others case as a precedent. Thus the submission of the petitioners Counsel that in view of the judgment of this Court in writ petition filed by Ved Prakash Garg and others the order passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge in cases of the petitioners also stood quashed by this Court cannot be accepted. 16. Thus the submission of the petitioners Counsel that in view of the judgment of this Court in writ petition filed by Ved Prakash Garg and others the order passed by Additional District & Sessions Judge in cases of the petitioners also stood quashed by this Court cannot be accepted. 16. The next submission on which learned Counsel for the petitioners has much emphasised is that in view of the decision of the State Government dated 6th December, 2004 as contained in the counter affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary (Forest) in the writ petition of Ved Prakash Garg and others, the land in question is to be treated as land belonging to the Revenue Department and mining lease can be granted. Copy of the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition of Ved Prakash Gargs case has been filed as Annexure-4 to this writ petition. It is relevant to extract paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit, which contains the decision relied by Counsel for the petitioner : "That the Government has taken a decision to file counter affidavit before the Honble Court stating the stand of the Government to the following effect : (I) That in view of the decision taken in the meeting dated 6th December, 2004 held under the Chairmanship of Commissioner, Industrial Development it has been resolved that the land in question should be treated as the land belonging to the Revenue Department of the State Government. The mining operation thereon should be permitted as earlier. (II) That the Government has also decided to accept and implement the opinion given by the learned Advocate General to the effect that the Appellate Court (Addl. District Judge, Anpara) did not have the power to review its own order-dated 30-7-1994 vide his review order dated 31-5-2003 with regard to the land in question. Consequently that order for including the land in question vide notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act is without jurisdiction. In view of the above the State Government does not support in review proceedings initiated by the Forest Department before the Additional District Judge, Anpara." 17. Consequently that order for including the land in question vide notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act is without jurisdiction. In view of the above the State Government does not support in review proceedings initiated by the Forest Department before the Additional District Judge, Anpara." 17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the State Government having decided in a meeting under the Chairmanship of the Commissioner, Industrial Development, that the said land is to be treated as land of the Revenue Department and the mining operation be permitted, the petitioners are entitled for grant of relief. The issue to be considered is as to what is the consequence and effect of the aforesaid decision and whether on the basis of the aforesaid decision, the petitioners have right to claim grant of mining leases. 18. Entry 17-A of the Concurrent List of the Constitution is "forest". Forest Act is a Central legislation. The legislative power of the State to legislate is subject to constitutional provisions of Article 254. The decision in the meeting dated 6th December, 2004 as relied by Counsel for the petitioners is an administrative decision of the State Government. At this juncture, it is relevant to look into the provisions of the Forest Act. Section 5 of the Forest Act as applicable in the State of U.P. is as follows : "5. Bar of accrual of forest rights.—After the issue of notification under Section 4 no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession or under a grant or a contract in writing made or entered into by or on behalf of the Government or some person in whom such right was vested when the notification was issued; and no fresh clearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall be made in such land, nor any tree therein felled, girdled, lopped, tapped, or burnt, or its bard or leaves stripped off, or the same otherwise damaged, nor any forest-produce removed therefrom, except in accordance with such rules as may be made by the State Government in this behalf." 19. Section 5 of the Forest Act contains an injunction regarding accrual of rights after issue of notification under Section 4. Section 5 of the Forest Act contains an injunction regarding accrual of rights after issue of notification under Section 4. Section 5 clearly contemplates that no right shall be acquired in or over the land comprised in such notification, except by succession or under a grant or a contract in writing. There is no case in the writ petition that at the time when notification under Section 4 was issued there was any right in petitioners of carrying any mining in the land in dispute. In view of Section 5 of the Forest Act, no right can be acquired by any person. The injunction in Section 5 of the Forest Act cannot be diluted or done away by any administrative decision taken by the State Government. The object and consequence of a land to constitute a reserved forest is for laudable objects. The Apex Court in Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi and another; (2001)6 S.C.C. 496 had emphasised the importance of protection of material resources of the community. Following was observed in paragraph 13 of the said judgment : "13. It is important to notice that the material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain etc. are natures bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment, which enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution..." 20. At this juncture, it is useful to recall the observation of the Apex Court in (1997)2 S.C.C. 267 , T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India and others. The Division Bench in Smt. Pyari Devis case (supra) had noticed the directions of the Apex Court in T.N. Godavarmans case. The Apex Court while explaining the meaning of "forest" under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 laid down following in paragraph 4 : "4. ... The word forest must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers all statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term "forest land", occurring in Section 2, will not only include "forest" as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership..." 21. This description covers all statutorily recognised forests, whether designated as reserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section 2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term "forest land", occurring in Section 2, will not only include "forest" as understood in the dictionary sense, but also any area recorded as forest in the Government record irrespective of the ownership..." 21. Further in paragraph 5 direction was given by the Apex Court, which is quoted as below : "5. We further direct as under : 5(1). In view of the meaning of the word "forest" in the Act, it is obvious that prior approval of the Central Government is required for any non-forest activity within the area of any "forest". In accordance with Section 2 of the Act, all on-going activity within any forest in any State throughout the country, without the prior approval of the Central Government, must cease forthwith. It is, therefore, clear that the running of saw mills of any kind including veneer or plywood mills, and mining of any mineral are non-forest purposes and are, therefore, not permissible without prior approval of the Central Government. Accordingly, any such activity is prima facie violation of the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Every State Government must promptly ensure total cessation of all such activities forthwith." 22. Thus, even if the notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act has not been issued, Section 5 of the Forest Act is operative by virtue of notification under Section 4 and the land included in Section 4 notification cannot be said to be a land in which non forest activities, i.e., mining operation be permitted as per observation of the Apex Court in T.N. Godavarmans case (supra). 23. One more aspect of the case to be noted is with regard to the power of the State Government qua the order passed by the appellate authority under Section 17 of the Forest Act. As noted above, the Additional District Judge, who is appellate authority has passed an order reviewing the earlier appellate order consequence of which is that land is to be included in Section 4 notification. The scheme of the Forest Act has to be looked into to know as to whether the order of the appellate authority under Section 17 of the Forest Act can be reversed by the State Government exercising any administrative power. The scheme of the Forest Act has to be looked into to know as to whether the order of the appellate authority under Section 17 of the Forest Act can be reversed by the State Government exercising any administrative power. The power of the Additional District Judge being a power conferred under Section 17 of the Forest Act, the said power cannot be taken away by any administrative decision by the State Government. Here it is relevant to note that earlier under Section 17 of the Forest Act an appeal from the order of the Forest Settlement Officer was to lie before an officer of the Revenue Department of the rank not lower than Collector. Section 22-A was added by U.P. Amendment by which there was power of the revision in the State Government. Section 17 of the Forest Act was amended by U.P. Amendment. Section 17 of the Forest Act as amended in U.P. with effect from 23rd November, 1965 has already been extracted above. With effect from the date Section 22A was also amended by U.P. Amendment by which it was specifically provided that no petition under this section may be made, after November 22, 1965 and the State Government may not exercise any power under this section after the said date. Section 22-A as applicable in State of U.P. is extracted below : "22-A. Power of revision in other cases.—(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 22, the State Government may, either of its own motion or on a petition being made in that behalf, call for the record of any appeal decided under Section 18, and may confirm the order passed on such appeal, or set it aside, or modify it, or remand the case to the Forest Settlement Officer with such directions as it may think fit. (2) No petition under this section may be made, after November 22, 1965 and the State Government may not exercise any power under this section after the said date." 24. The legislative scheme under Sections 17 and 22-A is clear. Till the appeal under Section 17 was heard by the Revenue Officer, the State Government was given the power of revision and when the appellate authority became the District Judge, the legislature provided a restriction for exercising a revisional power by the State Government against the order of District Judge. The legislative scheme under Sections 17 and 22-A is clear. Till the appeal under Section 17 was heard by the Revenue Officer, the State Government was given the power of revision and when the appellate authority became the District Judge, the legislature provided a restriction for exercising a revisional power by the State Government against the order of District Judge. The above provision clearly indicates that the State Government has even been denuded with power to exercise the power of revising the order of the District Judge passed under Section 17 of the Forest Act. Thus it cannot be imagined that by any administrative order the State Government can dilute the order passed by the Additional District Judge. 25. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 69239 of 2006 (M/s Subhash Stone Products v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 19.3.2007 for submission that unless notification under Section 20 is issued under the Forest Act, the land is not a forest land and the State was fully empowered to permit mining. In the above writ petition, the question before the Court was as to whether the State can realise transit fee from the vehicles transporting the stone chips, stone grids and boulders from the mining site to different destinations. In the said background the Division Bench held that since notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act has not yet been issued, the State Government cannot charge any transit fee. It is relevant to note that on behalf of the State the judgment in Smt. Pyari Devis case (supra) was cited. The Division Bench in M/s Subhash Stone Products case (supra) itself noticed the above judgment and held that the said case was distinguishable since the issues involved were different. Following was observed by the Division Bench in M/s Subhash Stone Products case (supra) : "... Learned Counsel has placed reliance in support of his contention on the different cases being M/s Yashwant Stone Works v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1988 All 121 , U.P. Gandhi Ismarak Nidhi, Vyayasthapak and others v. State of U.P. and others, 1988 All. L.J. 149; Smt. Pyari Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 2004 (96) RD 27 and Kumar Stone Works and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2005(3) AWC 2177 . L.J. 149; Smt. Pyari Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 2004 (96) RD 27 and Kumar Stone Works and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2005(3) AWC 2177 . With the strength of the aforesaid cases, much emphasis has been given upon the fact that irrespective of publication of notification under Section 20 of the Act, the land if once decided by the Government to constitute a reserve forest, it becomes a forest land and the forest department in that view of the matter has every right to levy transit fee in regard thereto. Learned Counsel has also submitted that in view of decision of writ petition No. 24911 of 2004 given by the Division Bench (Annexure-7) once the prayer for exemption from transit fee has been refused, the petitioner does not have any substantive right to approach this Court again for the same relief in the present petition. So far as the cases referred to above by the Chief Standing Counsel are concerned, we find that they deal with in respect of different other issues involved with regard to forest land. Those judgments are in different context wherein the Court has held that irrespective of publication of notice under Section 20 of the Act the land if once decided to constitute reserve forest would be treated as reserve forest..." 26. The Division Bench further noticing the judgment of Smt. Pyari Devis case (supra) in M/s Subhash Stone Products case (supra) made following observations: "...So was also the question for consideration by the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Pyari Devis case (supra). In that case too, the question of applicability of Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act was under decision and since the permission for carrying out the mining operation in the land in question was there, the Court held that the same was not possible without obtaining permission of the Central Government under Section 2 of the Forest (Conservation) Act." 27. The Division Bench in M/s Subhash Stone Products case (supra) itself held that the judgment in Smt. Pyari Devis case was on different facts and footing and the judgment and was not applicable. The Division Bench in M/s Subhash Stone Products case (supra) itself held that the judgment in Smt. Pyari Devis case was on different facts and footing and the judgment and was not applicable. The present is a case, which is on similar facts as of Smt. Pyari Devis case, hence the judgment in M/s Subhash Stone Products case does not help the petitioners, which itself has laid down that the said case was on different facts. Further the Division Bench in the aforesaid case did not express any different opinion than the law laid down in Smt. Pyari Devis case. 28. The last submission of the petitioners that Section 20 notification having not been issued, the State Government was fully entitled to treat the land as land not belonging to the Forest Department and the same as belonging to the Revenue Department. As noted above, after issuance of notification under Section 4, Section 5 comes into play and prohibition of accrual of any right operate after issuance of notification under Section 4. The issue as to whether the State Government by any administrative decision can take a decision contrary to Section 5 of the Forest Act has already been discussed above. The fact that Section 20 notification has not yet been issued does not empower the State Government to take an administrative decision to treat the land included in notification under Section 4 as a land belonging to the Revenue Department or to permit mining in the said land. Thus non issuance of notification under Section 20 of the Forest Act does not empower the State Government to take any administrative decision to permit any mining operation in the land included in the notification under Section 4 of the Forest Act. 29. In view of the foregoing discussions, none of the submissions of learned Counsel for the petitioners has any substance. The petitioners are not entitled for any relief as claimed in the writ petition. 30. The writ petition is dismissed. ————