Virender Singh, J. 1. Vide impugned judgment dated 7.3.2007 of learned Principal Sessions Judge, Poonch, appellant Shahab Din son of Mohd. Din, Caste Qureshi, resident of Jallian, (hereinafter referred to as `accused), stands convicted under Sections 341/302 RPC and has been sentenced for life imprisonment under Section 302 RPC and one month under Section 341 RPC. Both the sentences have been ordered to run concurrently. The judgment of conviction has been sent to this Court for confirmation under Section 374 Cr. P.C. We, therefore, intend to dispose of Criminal Appeal. No. 4 of 2007 and Confirmation No. 2 of 2007. In brief, the case of the prosecution is as under: 2. Munir Hussain is the deceased in this case. His father is the first informant, who alleged that on 3.6.2002, the deceased was going to village Jallian to request the villagers to help him in cultivation of rice saplings. At about 4.30 p.m., when he was passing by the road adjoining the house of the accused at Jallian, he was assaulted by the accused with a danda which landed on his head, consequently, he fell down on the ground. Thereafter, the accused lifted a stone and struck the same repeatedly on the head, eye, abdomen and other parts of body of the deceased. He became unconscious was brought to the Police Station, Mandi by some persons who reached the spot. FIR was initially registered under Sections 341, 307 RPC. The police swung into action. The Investigating Officer prepared injury memo of the deceased and referred him to District Hospital, Poonch. However, he died on the way. The offence was then converted from Section 307 RPC to Section 302 RPC. After that the investigation was taken over by SHO, who got the post-mortem conducted by the concerned doctor, went to the spot, prepared the seizure memo of the bloodstained earth and also lifted a stone from the place of occurrence. Accused was arrested by him, who, pursuant to his disclosure statement, got a danda (lathi) recovered. An opinion was sought from the doctor with regard to weapon vis-a-vis the injury and the doctor opined that the injury was caused with lathi only. 3. Accused was arrested by him, who, pursuant to his disclosure statement, got a danda (lathi) recovered. An opinion was sought from the doctor with regard to weapon vis-a-vis the injury and the doctor opined that the injury was caused with lathi only. 3. The motive projected by the prosecution is that Atika Begum, the sister of the deceased had gone with her cattle in the vicinity of Government Primary School, Azmabad, where the accused had tried to molest her and she went to the nearby fields to narrate the incident to her brother (deceased), who went to the accused to inquire about the said incident where a scuffle ensued between the deceased and the accused had allegedly threatened the deceased to teach him a lesson. In this regard, the prosecution has produced PW Bahar Din, who otherwise has been projected as a witness to the occurrence also, along with Ghulam Ahmed, Gias Din and Abdul Ghani, the other eyewitnesses. 4. We do not feel the necessity of reproducing the entire evidence which is otherwise detailed in the impugned judgment for the reason that Mr. Ahmad appearing for the appellant has not assailed the impugned judgment on merits so far main occurrence is concerned except praying for diluting the main offence, submitting that the deceased had received only one injury on the right side of his forehead and in the opinion of the doctor, the death had occurred because of the blunt trauma. Dwelling upon his arguments, Mr. Ahmad then submits that although the police had allegedly lifted a stone from the place of occurrence but after showing the danda and stone, to the doctor concerned, the opinion given by him was that possibility of the head injury was by stick and not by the stone. The learned counsel in this regard has drawn our attention to Ex. PW-AM 1. From this, Mr. Ahmad develops that the case of the prosecution as set up to the effect that after giving danda blow on the head of the deceased, who consequently fell on the ground and thereafter the accused lifted a stone and struck the same repeatedly on the head and other parts of his body, is not a true account of occurrence. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Ahmad, while strengthening his view point for the purpose of diluting the main offence, then submits that in the aforesaid background, it appears to be a chance occurrence as Munir Hussain (since deceased) was going to village Jallian to request the villagers to help him in the cultivation of rice saplings and per chance at about 4.30 p.m., he was passing by the road adjoining the house of the accused, when the accused appeared there along with a danda. The learned counsel submits that may be when Bahar Din appeared in the witness box, he stated that the accused was concealing himself on the way, but in the totality of acts and circumstance?, this part of statement does not appear to be convincing especially when he made lot of improvement by saying that after the deceased had fallen on the ground, the accused had allegedly lifted the stone lying there and caused him many injuries. According to the learned counsel, the statements of the other witnesses also do not improve the case in this regard. 6. Mr. Ahmad then submits that even otherwise also the motive part would also not improve the case of the prosecution, so as to bring it within the mischief of Section 302 RPC, especially in this aforesaid factual background. 7. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, Mr. Ahmad submits that the present case falls within the purview of Section 304 Part-II RPC or at the most Section 304 Part-I RPC. 8. Mr. Qazi, while opposing the submissions advanced by Mr. Ahmad, contends that the intention to kill the deceased is writ large in this case, as there was strong motive in the bosom of the accused to commit this occurrence who on the date of occurrence was waiting for the deceased to pass by the adjoining road of his house and the moment he reached there, he pounced upon him and caused injury on the head. Mr. Qazi then submits that may be prosecution law is not clear about the other injuries, as those injuries do not find in the medical evidence, still the present case falls within the ambit of Section 302 RPC. The solitary injury caused by danda damaged the brain of the deceased resulting into death within few hours of the occurrence. According to Mr. Qazi, the accused, thus, has no case for diluting the main offence. 9. The solitary injury caused by danda damaged the brain of the deceased resulting into death within few hours of the occurrence. According to Mr. Qazi, the accused, thus, has no case for diluting the main offence. 9. After hearing the learned counsel for both the sides and going through the entire record minutely, we are of the considered view that the present case calls for diluting of the main offence. 10. No doubt, the motive projected in the case in hand is that the accused had allegedly made an attempt to tease and molest the sister of the deceased for which a scuffle had ensued one day prior to the occurrence and the accused had also allegedly threatened the deceased to teach him a lesson, the fact remains that possibly the accused could not dream that the deceased on the date of occurrence would be passing in front of his house for the purpose of calling certain villagers from village Jallian for cultivation of rice saplings. Therefore, taking it from that angle, the present occurrence can be said to be a chance occurrence. 11. We see the present case from another angle. The weapon of offence allegedly shown in the hand of the accused is a danda, which is available in every house especially in the houses of the villagers. The moment accused saw deceased passing through adjoining road of his house, he lifted the danda and assaulted the deceased, which fell on his head. He has not repeated it. Another fact, which this Court cannot lose sight of, is that the prosecution witnesses, in order to bring this case within the mischief of Section 302 RPC, have gone to the extent of improving their case, saying that after the deceased had fallen on the ground, accused lifted a stone and caused many injuries on the person of the deceased. This is contrary to the medical evidence, as the doctor of autopsy found only one injury on the forehead of the deceased, may be causing laceration to the brain. From this factual scenario, we can comfortably conclude that there is only one injury on the vital part of the body of the deceased caused by the accused. This is contrary to the medical evidence, as the doctor of autopsy found only one injury on the forehead of the deceased, may be causing laceration to the brain. From this factual scenario, we can comfortably conclude that there is only one injury on the vital part of the body of the deceased caused by the accused. Once we observe that the occurrence had taken place all of a sudden, when the deceased was passing in front of the house of the accused, and it is only one injury that too not caused by any lethal weapon, as it is danda only, we can comfortably conclude that there was no intention the bosom of the accused viz. to commit the murder of the deceased. 12. A subtle line of distinction has to be drawn between the intention and the knowledge. Knowledge may be presumed from intent, but intent cannot be inferred from knowledge. There cannot be any hard and fast rule to say that a single blow on a vital part would not fall within the definition of Section 302 RPC and it should always fall within the ambit of Section 304 Part-I or 304 Part-II of RPC. However, this depends upon the facts and circumstances of each and every case. Their Lordships of Honble Apex Court in a very recent judgment rendered in Rajpal and others v. State of Haryana reported as 2003(3) RCR 209 while drawing the distinction between Sections 299 and Section 300 IPC (equivalent to Sections 299 and 300 RPC) have given the broad guidelines to appreciate such type of situation. 13. In the aforesaid judgment, their Lordships have observed that in the scheme of IPC, `culpable homicide is the genus and `murder its species. All `murder is `culpable homicide but not vice versa, IPC recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first degree and the gravest form of culpable homicide is defined in Section 300 as `murder. The second degree of `culpable homicide is punishable under first part of Section 304. Culpable homicide of third degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304 IPC. It has been further observed by their Lordships that the academic distinction between `murder and `culpable homicide not amounting to murder has always vexed the courts. The second degree of `culpable homicide is punishable under first part of Section 304. Culpable homicide of third degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304 IPC. It has been further observed by their Lordships that the academic distinction between `murder and `culpable homicide not amounting to murder has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. Their Lordships while dealing with said aspect have depicted the following comparative table, which will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences: Section 299 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by the death is caused is done. Intention (a) With the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of Knowledge (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death Section 300 Subject to certain exception culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done. (1) With the intention of causing death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 14. It is also observed that the above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each, that it may not be convenient to give a separate and clear cut treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages. Each case has to be seen on its own facts. 15. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each, that it may not be convenient to give a separate and clear cut treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages. Each case has to be seen on its own facts. 15. We have appreciated the case in hand while following the ratio of the aforesaid judgment and keeping in account the factual scenario and the medical evidence, in our considered view, the present case would fall within the mischief of Section 304 Part-I RPC only and not for the offence punishable under Section 302 RPC for which the accused has already suffered conviction vide impugned judgment. We hold accordingly. We may observe here that the present case does not call for conviction of the accused under Section 341 RPC at all, as already recorded by the learned trial Judge for the reason that there is no evidence, much less convincing evidence in this regard. We, therefore, acquit him for the said charge. 16. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, the net result is that the instant appeal is partly allowed. The conviction and sentence of the accused, recorded by the learned trial Court under Section 302 RPC is hereby disturbed and he instead stands convicted under Section 304 Part-I RPC, for which he shall now undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 50,000 (Rupees fifty thousand), in default thereof, to further undergo RI for two years. In case the fine is recovered, the entire amount shall be converted into compensation and the same be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased. Confirmation Reference (Reference No. 2/2007) sent by the learned trial Court under Section 374 Cr.P.C. is answered accordingly. All quarters concerned be informed of the judgment.