JUDGMENT P. R. SHIVAKUMAR, J. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli dated 12.2.1993 made in A.S. No. 230 of 1991 by which the judgment and decree of the trial Court (District Munsif, Thuraiyur) passed in O.S. No. 3555 of 1979 was confirmed. 2. The respondent/plaintiff temple filed the suit for the following reliefs: (i) Directing the appellant/defendant to deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the plaintiff or in the alternative, declaring the plaintiff's title to the suit property and as a consequential relief directing the defendant to deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiff; (ii) For a direction to the appellant/defendant to pay a sum of Rs. 350/- either as arrears of rent or as damages for use and occupation; and (iii) For payment of future mesne profits from 1.9.1979. 3. According to the respondent/plaintiff temple, the appellant/defendant was permitted to occupy the suit site on a monthly rental basis by the previous trustee of the temple and the agreed rent was Rs. 10/- per mensem. After the appointment of a fit person to administer the affairs of the temple, who took charge on 1.10.1976, the appellant/defendant failed to pay the rent for the above said site in spite of a number of reminders and the same made the fit person to issue a notice on 10.8.1977 terminating the tenancy and directing the appellant/defendant to vacate the premises by the end of August 1977, namely 31.8.1977. The appellant/defendant, who received the notice, sent a reply dated 24.8.1977 denying the title of the plaintiff temple and setting up title in himself alleging that he had purchased the suit site from the previous trustee on 5.2.1975. Contending that the above said sale deed executed in violation of the provisions of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 is null and void and hence will not bind the plaintiff institution, the respondent/plaintiff has filed the above said suit for the above said reliefs. 4. The suit was resisted by the appellant/defendant by filing a written statement containing the following averments: There was suppression of facts and the plaintiff had come to the Court with a false case to deprive the defendant of his legitimate right. 4. The suit was resisted by the appellant/defendant by filing a written statement containing the following averments: There was suppression of facts and the plaintiff had come to the Court with a false case to deprive the defendant of his legitimate right. Originally the father of the appellant/defendant was the lessee who took the suit site on lease from the hereditary trustee of the temple about 50 years prior to the filing of the suit and put up constructions for his use and occupation as his residence. After the death of his father, the appellant/defendant continued as a tenant of the suit site, remodelled the superstructure and was using the eastern portion of the superstructure as his residence and was carrying on his welding business in the western portion. Meanwhile, on 5.2.1975, the hereditary trustee of the plaintiff temple sold the suit site to the defendant for a valuable consideration of Rs. 3,100/- for binding and necessary purpose of the temple. After the said sale, the appellant/defendant became the owner of the suit site also and thereafter, the jural relationship of landlord and tenant did not continue. Therefore, there was no subsisting lease or tenancy to be terminated by the issue of a notice. The plaintiff temple also lost the right to demand any rent. In any event, the appellant/defendant, being the owner of the superstructure, was entitled to the benefits of the City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921. Based on the said allegations, the appellant/defendant had prayed for the dismissal of the suit in its entirety. 5. The trial Court framed as many as six issues and conducted trial in which the Executive Officer in charge of the plaintiff temple was examined as P.W.1 and four documents were marked as Exhibits A-1 to A-4 on the side of the plaintiff. Two witnesses including the appellant/defendant were examined as D.W.1 and D.W.2 and three documents were marked as Exhibits B-1 to B-3 on the side of the appellant/defendant. The report and plan submitted by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the trial Court were marked as Court documents Exhibits C-1 and C-2. 6. Two witnesses including the appellant/defendant were examined as D.W.1 and D.W.2 and three documents were marked as Exhibits B-1 to B-3 on the side of the appellant/defendant. The report and plan submitted by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the trial Court were marked as Court documents Exhibits C-1 and C-2. 6. After hearing arguments advanced on both sides, the learned trial Court (District Munsif, Thuraiyur) came to the conclusion that the sale deed executed by the former trustee of the plaintiff temple in favour of the defendant was null and void and hence the defendant had not acquired any title in respect of the suit site. The trial Court also held that the notice terminating tenancy was valid and that the claim of the defendant to the benefits under the provisions of the City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921 was not available to him and hence decreed the suit as prayed for with cost. 7. The said judgment and decree of the trial Court was challenged by the appellant/defendant before the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli in A.S. No. 230 of 1991. The learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli, besides concurring with the findings of the trial Court regarding the validity of the sale deed executed in favour of the defendant by the erstwhile trustee and the statutory notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the finding of the trial Court regarding the defendant's claim of entitlement to the protection under the provisions of the City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921 , has also given a finding to the effect that even assuming that the statutory notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 issued by the plaintiff was not proper, there was waiver on the part of the appellant/defendant and hence he was not entitled to raise the question of validity of the said notice at the appellate stage. The learned appellate Judge also held that by setting up title in himself and denying the plaintiff's title, the appellant/defendant had lost his right to claim the benefits under the City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921 and hence dismissed the appeal with cost, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 8. The learned appellate Judge also held that by setting up title in himself and denying the plaintiff's title, the appellant/defendant had lost his right to claim the benefits under the City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921 and hence dismissed the appeal with cost, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 8. Challenging the said judgment and decree of the First appellate Court, by which the judgment and decree of the trial Court stands confirmed, the appellant/defendant has come forward with this second appeal. 9. This Court heard the arguments advanced by Mr. K.S. Vamsidhar, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant and also by Mr. N.C. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent and also perused the records, including the judgments of the lower Courts. 10. Admittedly the suit vacant site measuring east-west 23 feet and north-south 43 feet originally belonged to the respondent/plaintiff temple and initially the father of the defendant, then, after his life time, the appellant/defendant happened to be the tenant, in respect of the vacant site till 5.2.1975, the date of execution of the sale deed Exhibit B-1 by the then trustee of the plaintiff temple in favour of the appellant/defendant. It is also not in controversy that the superstructure standing thereon belonged to the appellant/defendant and after the date of Exhibit B-1-sale deed, the defendant stopped payment of rent for the vacant site to the plaintiff temple. Meanwhile, the fit person appointed to manage the affairs of the plaintiff temple issued a notice under Exhibit A-1 dated 11.8.1977 terminating the tenancy and directing the defendant to deliver possession of the suit vacant site by the end of 31.8.1977. For the above said notice, the appellant/defendant issued a reply notice under Exhibit B-3 dated 25.8.1977 denying the existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff temple and the defendant any longer after the date of Exhibit B-1 sale deed. It is also not in dispute that the tenancy was on a monthly basis at a monthly rent of Rs. 10/-. Soon after the receipt of the above said reply notice, the fit person filed the original suit on behalf of the plaintiff. 11. It is also not in dispute that the tenancy was on a monthly basis at a monthly rent of Rs. 10/-. Soon after the receipt of the above said reply notice, the fit person filed the original suit on behalf of the plaintiff. 11. It was the specific contention of the plaintiff that Exhibit B-1-sale deed allegedly executed by the former trustee of the plaintiff temple is not valid in the eye of law and the same is null and void, in the light of the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. For the sake of convenience, Section 34 of the Act is extracted hereunder: “ Alienation of immovable trust property: (1) Any exchange, sale or mortgage and any lease for a term exceeding five years of any immovable property, belonging to, or given or endowed for the purposes of, any religious institution shall be null and void unless it is sanctioned by (the Commissioner) as being necessary or beneficial to the institution: Provided that before such sanction is accorded, the particulars relating to the proposed transaction shall be published in such manner as may be prescribed, inviting objections and suggestions with respect thereto; and all objections and suggestions received from the trustee or other persons having interest shall be duly considered by (the Commissioner).” 12. The trial Court as well as the first appellate Court held that Exhibit B-1-sale deed relied on by the appellant/defendant in support of his claim that he had become the owner of the suit site also was null and void in view of the above said provision. Though the said finding of the Courts below is stated to be erroneous in one of the grounds set out in the grounds of appeal, the same has not been framed as a substantial question of law involved in this appeal by the appellant himself. Though the said finding of the Courts below is stated to be erroneous in one of the grounds set out in the grounds of appeal, the same has not been framed as a substantial question of law involved in this appeal by the appellant himself. That apart, the learned counsel for the appellant, while advancing arguments on behalf of the appellant in this second appeal, has conceded that the finding of the Courts below regarding the validity of the sale deed executed by the trustee in respect of the property belonging to the temple cannot be successfully challenged and that the lower Courts have correctly held the sale to be null and void applying the provisions found in Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959. 13. It is nobody's case that the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 is not applicable to the plaintiff temple. In fact, in accordance with the provisions of the said Act only, fit person has been appointed. It is also the admitted case of the appellant/defendant that the displaced trustee who executed Exhibit B-1-sale deed in favour of the appellant was a hereditary trustee and that the plaintiff temple is a public temple having a hereditary trustee. Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 clearly lays down the law that any alienation of the immovable properties belonging to the Public religious institution shall be null and void, if such alienation of the above said property is made without the prior sanction of the Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. Admittedly, before executing Exhibit B-1-sale deed, no sanction was obtained from the competent authority for the same. Therefore, the Courts below have rightly held that Exhibit B-1 - sale deed is null and void and that the same had not put an end to the title of the plaintiff temple to the suit site. No interference is warranted in the second appeal with the said finding of the lower Courts and the same deserves to be confirmed. 14.1. No interference is warranted in the second appeal with the said finding of the lower Courts and the same deserves to be confirmed. 14.1. (i) Whether the notice to quit is valid in lawe and (ii) Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the City Tenants‘ Protection Act is correct in lawe” - are the two other issues raised by the appellant in this appeal as the substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal. 14.2. The trial Court, after holding that the tenancy was a month to month tenancy terminable by the issue of a 15 days notice terminating the tenancy with the end of an English Calendar Month and that the same was properly done by the fit person of the plaintiff temple by issuing Exhibit A-1-notice terminating the tenancy by the end of the English Calendar month August 1977 i. e. by 31.8.1977. The said finding of the trial Court was challenged before the lower appellate Court on the ground that the tenancy was sought to be terminated forthwith, even though the appellant/defendant was directed to vacate and hand over possession by the end of the Calendar month and hence, the notice to quit was not in accordance with the letter and sprit of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The above said aspect was dealt with by the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli (lower appellate Court) in detail. After referring to various judgments of the High Court as well as Supreme Court, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the intention of the landlord in issuing the notice should be culled out from the contents of the notice as to whether the tenancy was terminated forthwith or the same was terminated by the end of the Calendar month by which the tenant was asked to vacate and hand over possession. By adopting such a method, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the tenancy was terminated by the end of the Calendar month and not forthwith. By adopting such a method, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the tenancy was terminated by the end of the Calendar month and not forthwith. In support of the above said proposition, the learned lower appellate Judge has relied on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Bhagabandas Agarwalla v. Bhagwandas Kanu AIR 1977 SC 1120 : (1977) 2 SCC 646 , in which the Honourable Supreme Court has made the following observation: “Now, it is settled law that a notice to quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat. “The validity of a notice to quit”, as pointed out by LORD LINDLEY, L.J. in Sidebotham v. Holland Sidebotham v. Holland Sidebotham v. Holland , (1895) 1 QB 378 “ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw.” It must not be read in a hyper-critical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendantism or over refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sense way.” 15. For proper appreciation, the relevant portion of the notice is hereby extracted: The words cannot be interpreted to mean that the tenancy was terminated with effect from the date on which the notice was issued. What was meant by the plaintiff by issuing the said notice is that the tenancy was terminated by the issue of the said notice. “With effect from on which date the tenancy was terminatede” - will be the next question that arises for consideration. The answer is found in the next line of the notice by which the tenant was required to vacate and hand over possession by the end of 31.8.1977. A conjoint reading of both the sentences will give a clear picture that the tenancy was terminated by 31.8.1977, namely by the end of a English Calendar month. Exhibit A-1-notice was issued on 11.8.1977. The very next day itself, namely on 12.8.1977 itself, the same was received by the appellant/defendant. Clear 15 days time was granted for vacating the suit site. It is quite obvious from the above said facts that Exhibit A-1 notice was issued in strict compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The very next day itself, namely on 12.8.1977 itself, the same was received by the appellant/defendant. Clear 15 days time was granted for vacating the suit site. It is quite obvious from the above said facts that Exhibit A-1 notice was issued in strict compliance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore, this Court endorses its approval to the finding rendered by the learned First Additional Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli (first appellate Court) that Exhibit A-1 notice to quit was perfectly valid in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 16. The further observation made by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge (first appellate Court) is that assuming Exhibit A-1 notice to be not in accordance with the requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, even then the appellant/defendant could not claim the benefit of absence of such a valid notice as the tenancy in his favour stood forfeited under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and that the moment he relied on Exhibit B-1-sale deed to set up title in himself and denied not only the title of the plaintiff temple but also the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, his rights under the tenancy came to an end. When a tenant sets up title in himself and denies the title of the landlord, that itself will result in the forfeiture of his tenancy rights and thereafter, he shall not be entitled to a notice of termination under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, since the termination in case of forfeiture is automatic. 17.1. The learned lower appellate Judge has also rightly observed that the right to be served with a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is a benefit conferred upon the tenant and that such a benefit can be waived by the tenant/lessee; that when the tenant/lessee has not chosen to take any defence in his written statement regarding the validity of the notice to quit, the same would amount to waiver of notice and that thereafter at a belated stage, say in the appellate stage, he cannot be allowed to take such a stand. In support of the above said finding, the learned lower appellate Judge has referred a judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Sudarshan Trading Co. In support of the above said finding, the learned lower appellate Judge has referred a judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Sudarshan Trading Co. Ltd. v. L. D. 'Souza Sudarshan Trading Co. Ltd. v. L. D. 'Souza Sudarshan Trading Co. Ltd. v. L. D. 'Souza AIR 1984 Karnataka 214 and a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust Ltd. AIR 1972 SC 2091 : (1973) 2 SCC 127 . 17.2. In Gauri Shankar v. Hindustan Trust Ltd. ( supra), when no plea had been taken in the original written statement that a valid notice to terminate the contractual tenancy had not been served, and subsequently, after a lapse of 8 years, an amendment sought for before the trial Court itself by the defendant to introduce such a plea was allowed, the same was held by the Honourable Supreme Court improper as the gross delay and laches on the part of the defendant in raising such a plea should have been taken into consideration by the trial Court, while dealing with the petition for amendment. The relevant passage from the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court is extracted here under: “….. Ultimately when the suit for eviction was filed in 1959 it dragged on for several years. In the written statement which was originally filed no plea was taken that a valid notice to terminate the contractual tenancy had not been served and, therefore, the petition for eviction was not maintainable. The respondent waited or 8 years before seeking an amendment to include a plea on the absence of such a notice. The trial Court did allow the amendment but in our opinion no such amendment should have been allowed on account of the gross delay and laches on the part of the respondent in raising such a plea. In such matters, it must be remembered that if a technical plea of the nature sought to be raised had been raised at an earlier stage the appellant could have withdrawn the petition for eviction with liberty to file another petition after serving the requisite notice. In such matters, it must be remembered that if a technical plea of the nature sought to be raised had been raised at an earlier stage the appellant could have withdrawn the petition for eviction with liberty to file another petition after serving the requisite notice. By not raising that plea for nearly 8 years a great deal of prejudice was caused to the appellant… In our judgment the course of the litigation between the parties had taken and the manner in which the plea was sought to be raised by an amendment after eight years of the institution of the eviction petition and further the abandonment of any contention based on that plea before the Rent Control Tribunal were more than sufficient to persuade the court that any argument based on the absence of a valid notice should not have been allowed.” 17.3. In Sudarshan Trading Co. Ltd. v. L. D. 'Souza Sudarshan Trading Co. Ltd. v. L. D. 'Souza Sudarshan Trading Co. Ltd. v. L. D. 'Souza ( supra), a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, following the above said judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court, has also made the following observation.” “The same considerations, in our opinion, apply in this case. Even on the assumption that there was a month to month tenancy it would cause prejudice to the respondent, if appellant is permitted to raise this ground of invalidity of the notice at this distance of time.” 18. This Court is of the considered view that the lower appellate Court has correctly come to the conclusion that the appellant/defendant should be deemed to have waived his right to get a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and proceeded on the assumption that Exhibit A-1-notice was in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and that hence, the validity of the said notice could not be agitated in the appeal for the first time. The finding of the lower appellate Court that the tenancy right of the appellant/defendant stood forfeited under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 by his assertion of title in himself and denial of the plaintiff's title does not deserve any interference in this appeal and there is no reason, whatsoever, to interfere with the same. 19. The finding of the lower appellate Court that the tenancy right of the appellant/defendant stood forfeited under Section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 by his assertion of title in himself and denial of the plaintiff's title does not deserve any interference in this appeal and there is no reason, whatsoever, to interfere with the same. 19. For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that the above said first substantial question of law projected by the appellant/defendant has been correctly decided by the lower Court and that hence, there is no scope for any interference, whatsoever, with the findings of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court in this regard. 20. “Whether the finding of the lower appellate Court that the plaintiff was not entitled to the protection under the City Tenants‘ Protection Act is correct in law”-is the next issue projected as a substantial question of law in this second appeal. The said defence is no longer available to the appellant/defendant in view of the amendment brought to the City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921 by Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996 introducing proviso “f” to sub-section 3 of Section 1 of City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921. The proviso reads thus: “nothing contained in this Act shall apply to tenancies in respect of any land owned by any religious institution or religious charity belonging to Hindu, Muslim and Christian or other religion.” By virtue of the proviso, all the properties belonging to the public religious institutions and public religious charities are exempted from the said Act. Therefore, the appellant/defendant who was a tenant in respect of the property belonging to the plaintiff temple which is a public religious institution, cannot have any of the benefits conferred by the Chennai City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921. 21. The other finding of the lower appellate Court that the appellant/defendant having suffered forfeiture of tenancy rights by denying the title of the landlord and denying the tenancy itself, had made himself ineligible to get the benefits of the provisions under the City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921 is based on sound reasons and no interference can be made in this second appeal regarding the said finding also. Moreover, the said question has become academic in view of the amendment introduced to the City Tenants‘ Protection Act, 1921 by the Tamil Nadu Act 2 of 1996 providing explanation “f” - Section 1(3) whereby all the properties belonging to public religious institutions and public religious charities stand exempted from the said Act. 22. For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that there is no discrepancy or infirmity in the judgment of the lower appellate Court confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court and that there is no scope for any kind of interference with the same in the second appeal. There is no merit in the second appeal and the same deserves to be dismissed. 23. In the result, this second appeal is dismissed. There is no order as to payment of costs. Second appeal dismissed.