1. It is not in dispute that trained Graduate/Post Graduate Teachers whose date of appointment was on or before 09-05-1989 were to be promoted to the post of Master. After obtaining the service particulars of such teachers from the concerned Chief Education Officers, the Director School Education, Jammu vide his order No. DSEJ/Ang/Prom/M/920-27 dated 25-5-2005 sanctioned the promotion of such teachers. One of them was the petitioner. After the promotion the petitioner joined on the promotional post. Subsequent thereto the Chief Education Officer, Kathua vide his letter No. CEOK/WS/8264 dated 13-9-2005 and CEOK/WS/6794-95 dated 16-8-2005 informed the Director that the date of appointment of the petitioner on the post of Lab. Assistant stood wrongly communicated to him as date of his appointment as Teacher and his date of appointment as a teacher was 10-9-1992. After receiving the said information in regard to the petitioner and one another Teacher similarly placed the Director, School Education vide his order dated 8-11-2005 ordered as follows:- "In view of the facts stated above, Sh Manohar Lal, Ex-Teacher, GMS Rajpura (Ghagwal) and Sh Rajeev Sharma Ex-Teacher HSS, Hatli were not eligible for their promotion as Master in view of their date of posting/joining in the teacher cadre, as such, their promotion as master is hereby cancelled with immediate effect. The concerned DDOs shall relieve these masters immediately and direct them to report to the Chief Education officer, Kathua for their further adjustment as teacher in the District." 2. Being aggrieved of the cancellation of his promotion by the above order, the petitioner has filed the instant writ petition. 3. The contention of Mr. Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the cancellation of promotion of the petitioner tantamounts to his reversion to a lower rank, as such, it is bad in law for having not preceded with any inquiry or opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. It was incumbent upon the respondents to hold enquiry and provide at least a right of hearing to the petitioner before his reversion. 4. The contention of Mrs. Neeru Goswami, Dy.A.G is that the petitioner was not entitled to promotion, but despite his dis-entitlement under a mistaken belief that his date of appointment was on or before 9-5-1989, he was accorded promotion. When the mistake was detected the promotion order issued in favour of the petitioner was cancelled. 4. The contention of Mrs. Neeru Goswami, Dy.A.G is that the petitioner was not entitled to promotion, but despite his dis-entitlement under a mistaken belief that his date of appointment was on or before 9-5-1989, he was accorded promotion. When the mistake was detected the promotion order issued in favour of the petitioner was cancelled. The petitioner was not entitled to any show cause notice or hearing because of the fact that his order of promotion was based upon mistaken belief. He was not eligible for promotion, therefore, his promotion could be validly cancelled without providing him any opportunity of hearing. The opportunity of hearing or enquiry in view of the fact that he was not eligible would have only been an idle formality. No prejudice can be said to have been caused to the petitioner in the circumstances of the case. 5. Mr. Chouhan, learned counsel for the petitioner factually does not dispute the fact that the petitioners date of appointment as a Teacher was not on or before the stipulated date. In this view of the matter admittedly, the petitioner was not eligible to be promoted because only those teachers who stood appointed on or before the stipulated date were to be promoted. 6. In view of this factual position, it cannot be disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not eligible for promotion. So the question would arise whether before cancelling the promotion of the petitioner granted on a mistaken belief observance of principles of natural justice was necessary ?. Mr. Chouhan submits that it was necessary. For supporting his view he relies upon the following cases. Divisional Superintendent, Eastern Railway, Dinapur and others, Appellants v. L. N. Kashri and others, Respondents, AIR 1974 SC 1889 wherein it was held:-. "The respondents were confirmed in the scale of Rs. 110-180. The appellants having fixed the scale and confirmed the respondents could not reduce the scale without giving any opportunity to the respondents to be heard. Further more, the respondents on confirmation became entitled to rights to the post and to the scale of pay fixed by the Board." 7. S.L. Kapoor, Appellant v. Jagmohan and others, Respondents., AIR 1981 SC 136 in which it was observed by their Lordships: "16. Further more, the respondents on confirmation became entitled to rights to the post and to the scale of pay fixed by the Board." 7. S.L. Kapoor, Appellant v. Jagmohan and others, Respondents., AIR 1981 SC 136 in which it was observed by their Lordships: "16. Thus on a consideration of the entire material placed before us we do not have any doubt that the New Delhi Municipal Committee was never put on notice of any action proposed to be taken under Sec. 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act and no opportunity was given to the Municipal Committee to explain any fact or circumstance on the basis (of which) that action was proposed. If there was any correspondence between the New Delhi Municipal Committee and any other authority about the subject matter or any of the allegations, if information was given and gathered it was for entirely different purposes. In our view, the requirements of natural justice are met only if opportunity to represent is given in view of proposed action. The demands of natural justice are not met even if the very person proceeded against has furnished the information on which the action is based, if it is furnished in a casual way or for some other purpose. We do not suggest that the opportunity need be a `double opportunity that is, one opportunity on the factual allegations and another on the proposed penalty. Both may be rolled into one. But the person proceeded against must know that he is being required to meet the allegations which might lead to a certain action being taken against him. If that is made known the requirements are met." 8. Virender Chawla Vs The Chandigarh, Administration and others, 1984 (1) SLR 452 a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court observed as under:- "There is no dispute with the proposition that the reversion as a result of orders passed by the administrative authority in order to rectify or correct mistakes, does not constitute reduction in rank in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the employee may not be entitled to be afforded reasonable opportunity of the kind envisaged by the said Article of the Constitution. But in view of the following observations of their Lordships in S.L. Kapoors case (Supra) it cannot be any longer asserted that even minimum requirement of natural justice of giving hearing to the given employee before an order reverting him from the post that he is holding is passed are not to be complied with: `The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away and we have been liberated from the psittacine incantation of `administrative action. Now, from the time of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, (1967) 2 SCR 625: (AIR 1967 SC 1269), "even an administrative order which involves civil consequences...... must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice". What are civil consequences? The question was posed and answered by this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, (1978) 2 SCR 272 : (AIR 1978 SC 851), Krishna Iyer J., speaking for the Constitution Bench said : "But what is a civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, by passing verbal booby-traps? `Civil consequence undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence" 9. Indu Bhushan Vs Govt of Jammu and Kashmir and others, 1985 SLJ 67 in which this Court has held- "Rules of natural justice are required to be observed even in administrative orders when the administrative orders are likely to affect valuable rights of the citizens. Denial of right of being heard will be violative of Art. 14 of the constitution of India and would negate the principles of natural justice which requires that decisions must be arrived at after hearing the parties and nobody should be condemned unheard. The rule of natural justice sets minimum standards of fairness in adjudication by bodies which in many cases bear no resemblance to Courts, it would be unfair if right of being heard is denied to a citizen against whom an adverse order is passed by the administrative tribunals. Each tribunal whether administrative or judicial has to follow the rule of natural justice and decisions proposed to be given, affecting any bodys right should be made only after notice is given to the affected person. Each tribunal whether administrative or judicial has to follow the rule of natural justice and decisions proposed to be given, affecting any bodys right should be made only after notice is given to the affected person. Without issuing notice to the affected person administrative tribunal cannot decide against person whose rights are being adjudicated upon by it. Prior notice to an affected person is to be given necessarily even by administrative tribunals. Natural justice generally requires that persons likely to be directly affected by proposed administrative acts, decisions or proceedings be given adequate notice of what is proposed so that they may be in a position: (i) to make representation on their own behalf; (ii) effectively to prepare their own case and to answer the case they have to meet." 10. S. Janak Singh and others Vs Air Officer Commanding (Air Commander) Srinagar, 1987 SLJ 451, in which this Court held:- "In the counter filed, the appointment of the petitioners in Grade-II and their promotion from Grade-II to Grade-I with effect from 27-12-1967 has not been denied. It has also been admitted that the petitioners were reverted in 1979 i.e. 12 years after they were promoted to Grade-I." 11. On the strength of the above authorities Mr. Chouhan, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the failure on the part of the respondents to afford opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before ordering cancellation of his promotion renders the order impugned illegal being violative of principles of natural justice. 12. Mrs. Neeru Goswami, learned counsel for the respondents submits that since the petitioners promotion was not in accordance with law for the reason that his appointment was beyond the stipulated date, therefore, Director, School Education was justified in cancelling the same. In such a situation principle of natural justice would not have applied. 13. In State of Madhya Pradesh and others Vs Shyama Pardhi, AIR 1996 SC 2219 their Lordships held as follows:- "It is now an admitted fact across the Bar that the respondents had not possessed the pre-requisite qualification, namely, 10 + 2 with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as subject. The Rules specifically provided that qualification as a condition for appointment to the post of ANM. Since prescribed qualification had not been satisfied, the initial selection to undergo training is per se illegal. Later appointments thereof are in violation of the statutory rules. The Rules specifically provided that qualification as a condition for appointment to the post of ANM. Since prescribed qualification had not been satisfied, the initial selection to undergo training is per se illegal. Later appointments thereof are in violation of the statutory rules. The Tribunal, therefore, was not right in directing the reinstatement of respondents. The question of violation of the principles of natural justice does not arise. The ratio of Shrawan Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 309, strongly relied on, has no application to the facts of this case. That was a case where appellants possessed initial qualifications but they did not undergo the training. Since the appointment was set aside on the ground of want of training, this Court interfered with; directed the Government to reinstate them into service and further directed them to send the appellants therein for training. 14. Principles of natural justice are not the principles for universal application. Their application depends upon the fact situation of each particular case. There is no manner of doubt that where an administrative action entails civil consequences the observance of the rules of natural justice is essential as a general rule. But where breach of the rules of natural justice in a given case has not caused any prejudice to the affected party, whether the Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction must act at the instance of such affected party in view of the fact that wherever there is violation of principles of natural justice the affected party is entitled to approach the Court for seeking setting aside of the order? 15. In M.C. Mehta Vs Union of India and others, AIR 1999 SC 2583 their Lordships observed as follows:- " It is true that, whenever there is a clear violation of principles of natural justice, the Courts can be approached for a declaration that the order is void or for setting aside the same. Here the parties have approached this Court because the orders of the Department were consequential to orders of this Court. Question, however, is whether the Court in exercise of its discretion under Article 32 or Article 226 can refuse to exercise discretion on facts or on the ground that no de facto prejudice is established. Here the parties have approached this Court because the orders of the Department were consequential to orders of this Court. Question, however, is whether the Court in exercise of its discretion under Article 32 or Article 226 can refuse to exercise discretion on facts or on the ground that no de facto prejudice is established. On the facts of this case, can this Court not take into consideration the fact that any such declaration regarding the 10-3-1999 order will restore an earlier order dated 30-7-1997 in favour of Bharat Petroleum Corporation which has also been passed without notice to HPCL and that if the order dated 10-3-1999 is set aside as being in breach of natural justice, Bharat Petroleum will be getting two plots rather than one for which it has no right after the passing of the latter order of this Court dated 7-4-98? 17. Courts are not infrequently faced with a dilemma between breach of the rules of natural justice and the Courts discretion to refuse relief even though rules of natural justice have been breached, on the ground that no real prejudice is caused to the affected party. 18. We shall initially refer to two cases where discretion was exercised not to grant relief and the first one was a case where relief was refused even though there was breach of natural justice. The first one is Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Govt. of Andh. Pra. (1966) 2 SCR 172 : (AIR 1966 SC 828). There the Panchayat Samithi, in exercise of its statutory powers passed a resolution on 25-8-1960 to locate a primary health centre at Dharmajigudem. Later, it passed another resolution on 29-5-1961 to locate it at Lingapalem. On a representation by villagers of Dharmajigudem, Government passed orders on 7-3-1962 setting aside the second resolution dated 29-5-1961 and thereby restoring the earlier resolution dated 25-8-1960. The result was that the health centre would continue at Dharmajigudem. Before passing the orders dated 7-3-62, no notice was given to the Panchayat Samithi. This Court traced the said order of the Government dated 7-3-1962 to Section 62 of the Act and if that were so, notice to the Samithi under Section 62(1) was mandatory. Later, upon a review petition being filed, Government passed another order on 18-4-1963 cancelling its order dated 7-3-62 and accepting the shifting of the primary centre to Lingapalem. This Court traced the said order of the Government dated 7-3-1962 to Section 62 of the Act and if that were so, notice to the Samithi under Section 62(1) was mandatory. Later, upon a review petition being filed, Government passed another order on 18-4-1963 cancelling its order dated 7-3-62 and accepting the shifting of the primary centre to Lingapalem. This was passed without notice to the villagers of Dharmajigudem. This order of the Government was challenged unsuccessfully by the villagers of Dharmaji-gudem in the High Court. On appeal by the said villagers to this Court, it was held that the latter order of the Government dated 18-4-1963 suffered from two defects, it was issued by Government without prior show cause notice to the villagers of Dharmaji-gudem and Government had no power of review in respect of Government orders passed under Section 62(1). But that there were other facts which disentitled the quashing of the order dated 18-4-63 even though it was passed in breach of principles of natural justice. This Court noticed that the setting aside of the latter order dated 18-4-63 would restore the earlier order of Government dated 7-3-62 which was also passed without notice to the affected party, namely, the Panchayat Samithi. It would also result in the setting aside of a valid resolution dated 29-5-61 passed by the Panchayat Samithi. This Court refused relief and agreed that the High Court was right in not interfering under Article 226 even if there was violation of natural justice. Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) observed (p. 189) (of SCR) : (at pp. 837 of AIR) as follows : "Both the orders of the Government, namely, the order dated March 7, 1962 and that dated April 18, 1963, were not legally passed : the former, because it was made without giving notice to the Panchayat Samithi, and the latter, because the Government had no power under Section 72 of the Act to review an order made under Section 62 of the Act and also because it did notgive notice to the representatives of Dharmaji-gudem village. His Lordship concluded as follows : "In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the Government dated April 18, 1963? His Lordship concluded as follows : "In those circumstances, was it a case for the High Court to interfere in its discretion and quash the order of the Government dated April 18, 1963? If the High Court had quashed the said order, it would have restored an illegal order -- it would have given the Health Centre to a village contrary to the valid resolutions passed by the Panchayat Samithi. The High Court, therefore, in our view, rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary discretionary power in the circumstances of the case." The above case is clear authority for the proposition that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because the order has been passed against the petitioner in breach of natural justice. The Court can under Article 32 or Article 226 refuse to exercise its discretion of striking down the order if such striking down will result in restoration of another order passed earlier in favour of the petitioner and against the opposite party, in violation of principles of natural justice or is otherwise not in accordance with law." 16. In view of the above, it is manifest that it is not always necessary for the Court to strike down an order merely because it has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice. The Court can refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 if such striking down results in the restoration of another order passed in favour of affected party which is not in accordance with law. 17. In the instant case granting of promotion to the petitioner was on account of wrong assumption of the fact that he had been appointed as a teacher before the stipulated date which actually was admittedly incorrect. Being the appointee of the later date than the stipulated date he was not entitled to be promoted. Therefore, the order impugned passed for cancellation of promotion though in violation of principles of natural justice if is quashed it would restore the illegal order of promotion. In such a situation this Court is empowered to decline interference and accordingly is to be declined. In the present situation when promotion order is per se in violation of the eligibility of the petitioner in the event of its cancellation, the question of violation of principles of natural justice would not arise. 18. In such a situation this Court is empowered to decline interference and accordingly is to be declined. In the present situation when promotion order is per se in violation of the eligibility of the petitioner in the event of its cancellation, the question of violation of principles of natural justice would not arise. 18. For the reasons stated above, writ petition deserves to be dismissed. As such, same is dismissed alongwith connected CMP. Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated.