Judgment ( 1. ) THIS revision is directed against the order dated 18-8-2006 by Fourth Civil judge Class-1, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 340-A/2004 by which the petitioners application under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil procedure Code was rejected. ( 2. ) THE objection of the petitioner before the Trial Court was that no notice as required under Section 401 of the M. P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 was served on the Corporation. So the suit itself was liable to be dismissed. Reliance is placed by the petitioner to the Division Bench judgment of this court in Harmesh Chandra Dua Vs. Nagar Palika Nigam, Gwalior, 2005 (4)MPLJ 38 and a Single Bench judgment of this Court in Jal Praday Karmchari kalyan Sangh Vs. Ayukt Nagar Nigam, Jabalpur, 2005 (3) MPLJ 145 and submitted that this revision be allowed and the suit filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 may be dismissed. ( 3. ) THE Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 opposed the contention and submitted as under:- (i) That a notice was duly served on the Commissioner, municipal Corporation, Jabalpur as-is apparent from the perusal of Notice Annexure P-2. (ii) That, the objection could have been raised by respondent no. 3 in this regard, but the applicant, who is defendant no. 3 has not raised this objection. (iii) That on 6-10-2005, the applicant filed similar objection before the Trial Court which was rejected by the Trial Court. Thereafter again similar objection was raised which has been dismissed by the Trial Court, rightly by imposing cost on the applicant. That the present petition has been filed just to delay the proceedings and may be dismissed with costs. The respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have not opposed the revision seriously. ( 4. ) TO consider the contention of the applicant, firstly pleadings in the plaint, a copy of which is on record as Annexure P-1, may be seen. The suit is for perpetual injunction for restraining the respondents in respect of demolition of the suit house which belongs to plaintiffs/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and for deleting the name of defendant/applicant herein from the record of corporation. ( 5. The suit is for perpetual injunction for restraining the respondents in respect of demolition of the suit house which belongs to plaintiffs/respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and for deleting the name of defendant/applicant herein from the record of corporation. ( 5. ) THIS suit was contested by the parties including the applicant also by filing a written statement and raised a plea that notice under Section 401 of the corporation Act was not served on Municipal Corporation, but it was served on the Commissioner, which is not in accordance with Section 401 of the Municipal corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred in short as the corporation Act)and the suit may be dismissed. ( 6. ) ON 6-10-2005, similar objection was raised by the applicant under order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code which objection was decided by the trial Court on 6-10-2005 itself and rejected the aforesaid application. ( 7. ) NOW in the light of the contentions raised by the parties, the legal position may be seen. Section 401 provides notice, the limitation and tender of amends in suit against Corporation. For ready reference, Section 401 of the corporation Act is quoted as under:- "401. Notice, limitation and tender of amends in suit against corporation, etc.- (1) No suit shall be instituted against the corporation, the Mayor-in-Council, or any Corporation Officer or servant, or any person acting under the direction of the corporation, the Mayor-in-Council or any Municipal Officer or servant, in respect of any act done or purporting to have been done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act or any rule or bye-law made thereunder until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the chief Corporation Office or at the residence of such officer, servant or person standing with adequate particulars,- (a) the cause of action; (b) the name and residence of the intending plaintiff and of his advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of the suit; and (c) the relief which he claims. (2) Every such suit shall be commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action, and the plaint therein shall contain a statement that a notice has been delivered or left as required by sub-section (1 ). (2) Every such suit shall be commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action, and the plaint therein shall contain a statement that a notice has been delivered or left as required by sub-section (1 ). (3) If the Corporation or any person to whom any notice is given under sub-section (1) has tendered sufficient amends to the plaintiff before the suit is instituted, the suit shall be dismissed. (4) If the defendant in any such suit is the Commissioner or any other Corporation officer or servant, payment of any sum or part thereof payable by him in or in consequence of the suit may, with the sanction of the Mayor-in-Council, be made from the Municipal fund. ( 8. ) THE Division Bench of this Court in Harmesh Chandra dua Vs. Nagar Palika Nigam, Gwalior (supra) has interpreted Section 401 of the corporation Act and held thus :- " (6) Section 401 of the Act as it stood on the date of filing of the suit provides that the notice in writing must contain :- (a) the cause of action; (b) the name and residence of the intending plaintiff and of his advocate, pleader or agent, if any, for the purpose of the suit; and (c) the relief which he claims. Sub-section (2) further provides that every suit shall be commenced within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action, and the plaint therein shall contain a statement that a notice has been delivered or left as required by sub-section (1 ). It has been held that notice addressed to Municipal Corporation is not valid and suit is liable to be dismissed. (7) The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Sharan bari, Municipal Councillor, Jabalpur Vs. Dr. K. L. Dubey, Mayor, municipal Corporation, Jabalpur and another, reported in 1974 mplj 612 , has held that the Corporation is a legal entity different from its office bearers. In legal proceedings, it is the Municipal commissioner and not the Mayor. Division Bench of this Court has also considered the scope of Sections 79 and 80 of Civil Procedure code and has held that notice under Section 80 was not proposed as the notice was sent to the Collector, District Gwalior and not to the State Government. In legal proceedings, it is the Municipal commissioner and not the Mayor. Division Bench of this Court has also considered the scope of Sections 79 and 80 of Civil Procedure code and has held that notice under Section 80 was not proposed as the notice was sent to the Collector, District Gwalior and not to the State Government. Since the notice has been sent to commissioner, Municipal Corporation the suit as filed will not be maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. Trial Court has, therefore, not committed any error in dismissing the suit. It is also held in the case of Municipal Corporation Murwara Katni Vs. Lalchand Jaiswal, reported in 2000 (2) MPLJ 288 that it is mandatory to serve notice under Section 401 (1) of the Act prior to filing of the suit. There is no provision in the Act that in case of emergency and where an injunction is sought a suit could be filed without serving a notice under sub-section (1 ). There is no provision for taking permission of the Court for filing the suit without complying with the requirement of service of notice. In the said facts of the case, plaint as filed is liable to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation after complying with the provisions of section 401 of Municipal Corporation Act. Therefore, dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court is modified and it is directed that the plaint be returned to plaintiff with liberty to present after complying with provisions of notice, if it is within limitation and permissible under the law. (8) Counsel for appellants then submitted that construction can be compounded by the authorities of the Municipal Corporation. He has submitted that he has moved an application for compounding the said construction. If such application is filed, it is expected that the authorities of Municipal Corporation shall take decision on the said representation in accordance with law ignoring the fact of return of the plaint. (9) In the result, decree passed by the Trial Court is modified and it is directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation after complying with the provisions of the notice. Therefore, plaint be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation after complying with the requirement of sub-section (1) of Section 401 of the Act. " ( 9. (9) In the result, decree passed by the Trial Court is modified and it is directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation after complying with the provisions of the notice. Therefore, plaint be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation after complying with the requirement of sub-section (1) of Section 401 of the Act. " ( 9. ) THE Division Bench found that the notice ought to have been delivered to the Municipal Corporation through Commissioner and notice sent to the Commissioner is not in accordance with law and returned the plaint for representation after complying with the provisions regarding notice. The learned Single Bench of this Court in Jal praday Karmchari Kalyan Sangh (supra), held thus:- "similar is the view in another decision of this Court in the case of kashiram Vs. Municipal Corporation Mandsour, 1966 JLJ SN 7. The decision in Putli Bai (supra), is based on two decisions of the supreme Court as referred as in Para 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this court in Union of India Vs. Imperial Tobacco Company, 1959 JLJ 718 = 1959 MPLJ 749 , and has contended that in that case notice was given to Union of India through General Manager of the railways. However, the notice was required to be sent to the general Manager of a particular Railway. The Division Bench in para 7 further held that it was under the impression because under section 79, Civil Procedure Code the suit was required to be filed against Union of India. However, in the present case, not only the notice was sent to Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur and not to the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, but, the suit has also been filed not against the Municipal Corporation, but against commissioner of Municipal Corporation. Apart from this, decision of Putli Bai (supra), is based on two decisions of the Apex Court. (2) In this view of the matter, since notice under Section 401 of the act was not sent to the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, and the suit is also not filed against the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, according to me, the two Courts below did not commit any error in dismissing the suit. (2) In this view of the matter, since notice under Section 401 of the act was not sent to the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, and the suit is also not filed against the Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur, according to me, the two Courts below did not commit any error in dismissing the suit. " The learned Judge found that in absence of a proper notice to the municipal Corporation, the notice is bad in law and the consequence is dismissal of the suit. ( 10. ) IN this regard, the position under Section 401 may be seen. The aforesaid provision provides that before institution of a suit against the corporation, a notice of one month is necessary in writing delivered or left at the chief Corporation Officer with adequate particulars. The particulars are the cause of action, the name and residence of the intending plaintiff and of his advocate, if any, for the purpose of the suit and the relief which he claims. This is the requirement of the law. The Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation is entitled to institute legal proceedings and obtain legal advice under Section 400 of the Corporation Act, which reads thus:- 400. Power of Commissioner to institute legal proceedings and obtain legal advice.- (1) The Commissioner may on behalf of the corporation- (a) institute, defend or withdraw from legal proceedings under this Act, or under any rule or bye-law made thereunder or; any other enactment for the time being in force; (b) compound any offence under this Act or under any rules or bye-law made thereunder, and charge such fees for; compounding of offence as may be prescribed (by bye-laws)[inst. by Section 3 (2) of the M. P. Act 13 of 1961 by the corporation]. by Section 3 (2) of the M. P. Act 13 of 1961 by the corporation]. (c) admit, compromise or withdraw any claim made under this act or under any other enactment of the time being in force; and (d) obtain such legal advice and assistance as he may from time to time think it necessary or expedient to obtain, for any of the purposes referred to in the foregoing clauses of this section, or for securing the lawful exercise of discharge of any power or duty vesting in or imposed upon the corporation, the Mayor-in-Council or any Municipal officer or servant: provided that the Commissioner shall not admit, compromise or withdraw any claim in a suit in which the whole amount claimed exceeds five hundred rupees without the previous sanction of the Mayor-in-Council, or where the total amount claimed exceeds two thousand rupees, without the previous sanction of the Corporation. (2) Money received by way of composition under this section shall be credited to the municipal fund. Section 55 of the Corporation Act provides power of Commissioner. 55. Power of Commissioner.- The Commissioner shall be the principal executive officer of the Corporation and all other officers and servants of the Corporation except the servants and officers of the Corporation office shall be subordinate to him. He shall have the right to speak at, and otherwise take part in the meeting of the corporation or any Committee thereof, but shall not be entitled to vote or to move any proposition. Section 7 of the Corporation Act provides that the Corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall by the said name sue and be sued. In respect of notice, though there is no specific provision, but if a notice with adequate particulars is delivered or left in the Corporation office in the chief Corporation Office, then it is the sufficient compliance of the provision. It is not in dispute that the aforesaid notice was served in the Chief Corporation office of respondent No. 3 and not at the residence of Commissioner when the aforesaid notice was duly served at the Chief Corporation Office, then whether merely the notice is addressed to the Commissioner, the Municipal Corporation will not be a fatal defect to non suit the plaintiff or to return the plaint. The Apex court had an occasion to consider the notice in State of Punjab Vs. The Apex court had an occasion to consider the notice in State of Punjab Vs. M/s. Geeta iron, (1978) 1 SCC 68 , and held thus :- "3. While dismissing the special leave petition for the reasons mentioned above, we would like to emphasize that the deserved defeat of the State in the Courts below demonstrates the gross indifference of the administration towards litigative diligence. In the present case, a notice under Section 80, Civil Procedure Code was sent. No response. A suit was filed and summons taken out to the Chief Secretary. Shockingly enough, the summons were refused. An ex parte proceeding was taken when the lethargic government woke up. 4. We like to emphasize that Governments must be made accountable by Parliamentary social audit for wasteful litigative expenditure inflicted on the community by inaction. A statutory notice of the proposed action under Section 80, Civil Procedure code is intended to alert the State to negotiate a just settlement or at least have the Courtesy to tell the potential outsider why the claims is being resisted. Now Section 80 has become a ritual because the administration is often unresponsive and hardly lives upto the parliaments expectation in continuing Section 80 in the Code despite the Central Law Commissions recommendations for its deletion. An opportunity for settling the dispute through arbitration was thrown away by sheer inaction. A litigative policy for the State involves settlement of Governmental disputes with citizens in a sense of conciliation rather than in a fighting mood. Indeed, it should be a directive on the part of the State to empower its law officer to take steps to compose disputes rather than continue them in Court. We are constrained to make these observations because much of the litigation in which Governments are involved adds to the case load accumulation in Courts for which there is public criticism. We hope that a more responsible spirit will be brought to bear upon governmental litigation so as to avoid waste or public money and promote expeditious work in Courts of cases which deserve to be attended to. " ( 11. ) THE Apex Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Gundugola venkatta Suryanarayana Gam, AIR 1966 SC 11 held that the notice must be reasonably considered and every venial error or defect cannot be permitted to defeat a just claim. " ( 11. ) THE Apex Court in The State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Gundugola venkatta Suryanarayana Gam, AIR 1966 SC 11 held that the notice must be reasonably considered and every venial error or defect cannot be permitted to defeat a just claim. If on a reasonable reading but not to as to make undue assumptions, the plaintiff is shown to have given the information which the statute requires him to give, any incidental defects of error may be ignored. The apex Court considering the purpose of the notice held thus:- "11. The object of the notice under Section 80 is to give to the government or the public servant concerned an opportunity to reconsider its or his legal position and if that course is justified to make amends or settle the claim out of Court. The section is imperative and must undoubtedly be strictly construed : failure to serve a notice complying with the requirements of the statute will entail dismissal of the suit. But the notice must be reasonably construed. Every venial error or defect cannot be permitted to be treated as a peg to hang a defence to defeat a just claim. In each case in considering whether the imperative provisions of the statute are complied with, the Court must face the following questions :- (1) whether the name, description and residence of the plaintiff are given so to enable the authorities to identify the person serving the notice; (2) whether the cause of action and the relief which the plaintiff claims are set out with sufficient particularity; (3) whether the notice in writing has been delivered to or left at the office of the appropriate authority mentioned in the section; and (4) whether the suit is instituted after the expiration of two months next after notice has been served, and the plaint contains a statement that such a notice has been so delivered or left. In construing the notice the Court cannot ignored the object of the legislature to give to the Government or the public servant concerned an opportunity to reconsider its or his legal position. If on a reasonable reading but not so as to make undue assumptions the plaintiff is shown to have given the information which the statute requires him to give, any incidental defects or errors may be ignored. ( 12. If on a reasonable reading but not so as to make undue assumptions the plaintiff is shown to have given the information which the statute requires him to give, any incidental defects or errors may be ignored. ( 12. ) THE notice in the present suit was served by the plaintiff and yegneswara Sastri. They raised a grievance about the notification issued by the Government of Madras on May 16,1950 : it was not an individual grievance of the two persons who served the notice but of all the Inamdars or agrahararndars. The relief for which the suit was intended to be filed was also not restricted to their personal claim. The notice stated the cause of action arising in favour of all the Inamdars, and it is not disputed that the notice set out the relief which would be claimable by all the Inamdars or on their behalf in default of compliance with the requisition. The plaintiff it is true along filed the suit, but he was permitted to sue, for and on behalf of all the Inamdars by an order of the Court under Order 1, Rule 8, Code of Civil Procedure. The requirements as to the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff was therefore complied with and the relief which the plaintiff claimed was duly set out in the notice. The only departure from the notice was that two persons served a notice under Section80 informing the Government that proceedings would be started, in default of compliance with the requisition, for violation of the rights of the Inamdars, and one person only out of the two instituted the suit. That in our judgment is not a defect which brings the case within the terms of Section 80. The right to institute a representative action may be exercised by one or more persons having an interest which is common with the others but it can only be exercised with the permission of the Court. If the Court grants permission to one person to institute such a representative action and if that person had served the notice under Section 80, the circumstance that another person had joined him in serving the notice but did not effectuate that notice by joining in the suit, would not in our judgment be a sufficient ground for regarding the suit as defective. 12. 12. The notice on behalf of Corporation is to be served on the commissioner and none else. Only the description of the notice will change and as per applicant, notice is to be served on the Municipal Corporation through commissioner, Jabalpur while in the present case, the notice has been served on the Commissioner Municipal Corporation, Jabalpur. The net result of both shall remain as it is and ultimately the notice has to reach in the hands of the commissioner for taking cognizance to give relief as demanded in the notice. It is not the case of respondent No. 3 that any prejudice is caused to respondent no. 3 by servicing aforesaid notice. ( 13. ) THE entire purpose of service of notice is to intimate the Municipal corporation about the intention of the plaintiff of filing of the suit and if any relief is granted to the plaintiff within the aforesaid period, then his suit is liable to be dismissed. In the present case, no such relief was granted by the corporation and the house of the plaintiff was noticed to demolish. In these circumstances, the suit was filed. The sufficient compliance of the provision appears to have been made. The parties are now in the Court, and the Court has to do substantial justice between the parties and merely on the technicalities, the suit cannot be dismissed. ( 14. ) IN view of the Division Benchs judgment of this Court in Harmesh chandra Dua (supra), even if the notice is found to be defective, the consequence will return of the plaint and not dismissal, as has been held in Jal praday Karmchari Kalyan Sangh (supra ). ( 15. ) BUT in this case, another glaring feature is that the applicant filed similar application before the Trial Court on 6-10-2005. The aforesaid application came up for hearing before the Trial Court and was dismissed by the trial Court on merits. When the similar question was considered and decided by the Trial Court, then the applicant cannot reiterate the same objection in the same proceedings at a later stage. The Apex Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal Vs. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 , considering the effect of interlocutory order passed at an early stage held that it cannot be re-agitated at subsequent stage in the same matter. The Apex Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal Vs. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941 , considering the effect of interlocutory order passed at an early stage held that it cannot be re-agitated at subsequent stage in the same matter. It is held thus:- " (7) The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter - whether on a question of fact or a question of law-has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a Higher Court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where Section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by Courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original Court as well as any higher Court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct. (8) The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court, whether Trial court or a Higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Does this however mean that because at an earlier stage of the same litigation consider the matter again. " ( 16. ) IN the present case, the similar objection was raised by the applicant on 6-10-2005, which was rejected by the Trial Court and this order was not assailed by the applicant. The order has attained finality. Thereafter the similar objection was again raised which has been rejected by the impugned order. In these circumstances, the applicant was having no right to re-agitate the same question which was decided on 6-10-2005. The order has attained finality. Thereafter the similar objection was again raised which has been rejected by the impugned order. In these circumstances, the applicant was having no right to re-agitate the same question which was decided on 6-10-2005. The present application under Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code was not tenable under the law and has been rightly rejected by the Trial Court, in which no jurisdictional error is found. This revision is without merit and is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,000/ -. Civil Revision dismissed.