JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. The present writ petition is filed by the Joint Action Committee (in short JAC) of the Public Works Department, Manipur constituted by representations of 3 registered Trade Union at Impala for quashing the letter dated 28.1.1998 (Annexure-A/7 to the writ petition) whereby and where under the Govt. of Manipur, through the Under Secy. (works) rejected the representation filed by the petitioner in view of the order dated 10.12.1997 passed by this Court in C.R. No. 849 of 1997 and also that a prayer for re-engagement of the remaining Muster Roll workers, whose names are mentioned in the Annexure-A/1 to the writ petition etc. 2. Heard Mr. Hemchandra learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Johnson, learned State counsel appearing or the respondents-1 and 2 and Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3. 3. Pleaded case of the petitioner, in short, is that the petitioner, being the JAC constituted by 3 registered Associations, namely, (i) The All Manipur PWD, Stores Division & Mechanical Division Employees and Workers Union, Imphal, (ii) The Imphal Building, PWD, Employees and Workers Association, and (iii) The Manipur PWD Building Project Division Employees and Workers Assn., Imphal, is looking after the interest of all the Muster Roll workers in the department of PWD, whose particulars are fully given in the Annexure-A/1 to the writ petition. The present petitioner, on earlier occasion, filed writ petition, being C.R. No. 1265 of 1992 for regularization of the services of the Muster Roll workers in terms of the Government order dated 16.4.1997 issued by the Under Secretary (DP), Govt. of Manipur, which was disposed of by this Court on 27.5.1997 with a direction to the effect that "Further, till their regularization, they shall not be thrown out from service. If some persons have already been thrown out from service, they shall file a representation and on perusal of the representation, the authority shall take back the persons in service." In compliance with the aforesaid order dated 27.5.1997 the petitioner submitted representations dated 16.7.1997 (Annexure-A/4 to the writ petition) and dated 26.6.1997 to the hon'ble Minister (Works) on 2.6.1997. Another representation was also made on 15.7.1997 to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, Govt. of Manipur. In response to the aforesaid representations, the Under Secretary (works) to the Govt. Another representation was also made on 15.7.1997 to the Hon'ble Chief Minister, Govt. of Manipur. In response to the aforesaid representations, the Under Secretary (works) to the Govt. of Manipur vide his letter dated 28.1.1998 (Annexure-A/7 to the writ petition), informed its President that its representations were considered and rejected the same. After filing the aforesaid presentation, petitioner filed another writ petition being C.R. No. 849 of 1997, which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 10.12.1997 with the direction to the respondents to dispose of the representations (Annexures-A/4 and A/5) respectively within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of that order. In compliance with this Courts order dated 10.12.1997 passed in C.R. No. 849 of 1997. The respondents considered the Annexures-A/4 and A/5 of the writ petition and accordingly informed the writ petitioner that its representations had been duly considered and rejected. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid letter dated 28.1.1997 (Annexure-A/7 to the writ petition), the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner. 4. When the writ petition is taken up for hearing, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3, Mr. N. Ibotombi, raises a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the present writ petition on the following grounds (i) the petitioner, being an unregistered Association, is not a juristic person and has no locus standi to file a writ petition as fundamental and/or any other rights are being violated by the respondents. In support of his contention, he places reliance on the decisions of this Court in All Manipur DIC Supervisors Association v. State of Manipur 2000 (1) GLT 374, and the order dated 22.6.2005 passed in WP(C) No. 902 of 2002 in the case of All Manipur Mandol DPC Successful Candidates Association v. State of Manipur and Anr. as well as the decision rendered on 28.2.2005 in the case of the Thoubal District Farmers' Association for Natural Calamities v. State of Manipur and Ors. He also places reliance particularly on paragraphs 4 and 6 of the decision rendered in the case of Mahinder Kumar Gupta and Ors. v. Union of India. Ministry of Petroleum & National Gas (1995) 1 SCC 85 and on the judgment and order of a Division Bench of this Court passed in W.A. No. 89 of 1997 in the case of State of Manipur and Ors. v. State Land Used Board Casual Employees' Assn. v. Union of India. Ministry of Petroleum & National Gas (1995) 1 SCC 85 and on the judgment and order of a Division Bench of this Court passed in W.A. No. 89 of 1997 in the case of State of Manipur and Ors. v. State Land Used Board Casual Employees' Assn. and Anr. 2007 (1) GLT 409. Finally Mr. Ibotombi, appearing for the respondent No. 3, relies on the paragraphs 27, and 43 and 47 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, reported in the case of State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1 , wherein the Apex Court held, thus: 27....This court noticed that the jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with a writ petition was circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by judicial decisions and the High Court cannot transgress the limits on the basis of the whims or subjective sense of justice varying from judge to judge. Though the High Court is entitled to exercise its judicial discretion in deciding writ petitions or civil revision applications coming before it, the discretion had to be confined in declining to entertain petitions and refusing to grant reliefs asked for by the petitioners on adequate Considerations and it did not permit the High Court to grant relief on such a consideration alone. This Court set aside the directions given by the High Court for regularization of persons appointed temporarily to the post of lecturers. The court also emphasized that specific terms on which appointments were made should be normally enforced. Of course, this decision is more on the absence of power in the High Court to pass orders against the constitutional scheme of appointment. 43....If it is a contractual appointment, the appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, if it were an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would come to an end when it is discontinued. Similarly, a temporary employee could not claim to be made permanent on the expiry of his term of appointment. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. 47. When a person enters a temporary employment or gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and the engagement is not based on a proper selection as recognized by the relevant rules or procedure, he is aware of the consequences of the appointment being temporary, casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being confirmed in the post of when a appointment to the post could be made only by following a proper procedure for selection and in cases concerned, in consultation with the Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot also be held that the State has held out any promise while engaging these persons either to continue them where they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot constitutionally make such a promise. If is also obvious that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief of being made permanent in the post. 5. In the light of what has been held by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. Mr. Ibotombi submits that the instant writ petition is liable to be dismissed at threshold. According to him, in the present writ petition also. Muster Roll workers, whose services were discontinued by the respondents vide office order No. 314 dated 15.1.1992 on the ground of financial constraint and to avoid engagement of surplus Muster Roll workers, is a valid one and present petitioner has no right to approach on behalf of disengaged workers when they themselves decided not to approach this Court by filing writ petition from their own. Mr. Ibotombi places reliance on the order dated 26th February, 2002 by which Govt. of Manipur withdrew its Circular dated 16.4.1997 (Annexure-R/2 to the counter affidavit). Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the respondents also submits that there is difference between the Muster Roll Workers and Work Charged labour/employee and regularly selected employee, therefore, the disengaged Muster Roll Workers cannot be continued contrary to the terms and conditions mentioned in their order of engagement. 6. Mr. Hemchandra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, while resisting the contention of Mr. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3, submits that the present writ petition is maintainable as the writ petitioner. 6. Mr. Hemchandra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, while resisting the contention of Mr. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3, submits that the present writ petition is maintainable as the writ petitioner. JAC is the representative of 3 registered Union/Association on whose behalf the petitioner filed the instant writ petition: He further argues that the Muster Roll workers. Who were discontinued by the authority on 15.1.1992 are the members of the petitioner's Committee and the present writ petitioner also on earlier occasion filed a writ petition being C.R. No. 849 of 1997, which was considered by this Court and disposed of the direction to the respondents to consider the representations of the petitioner, which will be evident from Annexure-A/6 to the writ petition, and at that time the respondents did not raise question of maintainability of that writ petition and hence the respondents are not entitled to raise the question of maintainability of petition. He also argues that the respondents, out of 21 Muster Roll workers as mentioned in Annexure-A/1 to the writ petition, re-engaged 7 Muster Roll workers, which will be evident from Annexure-A/12 to the rejoinder affidavit of the petitions and such action of the respondent is discriminatory one and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. According to Mr. Hemchandra, out of 21 Muster Roll workers, remaining 14 M.R. workers have not yet been re-engaged by the authority and for such non-engagement no reason had been disclosed, which itself is a discriminatory one as they are also similarly situated like the 7 M.R. workers, who were re-engaged, vide Annexure-A/12 to the rejoinder affidavit. Mr. Hemchandra, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the disengaged Muster Roll Workers are entitled to get the benefit of the decision of Government as taken by it vide Annexure-R/2 to the affidavit-in-opposition relating to regularisation and service condition of Muster Roll Workers. At the end of his submission, he submits that the court may consider the case of the M.R. members of the petitioner on humanitarian ground as they are facing hardship to maintain their livelihood and direct the respondents to re-consider the case of the remaining 14 M.R. workers for re-engaging them subject to availability of work. 7. Mr. At the end of his submission, he submits that the court may consider the case of the M.R. members of the petitioner on humanitarian ground as they are facing hardship to maintain their livelihood and direct the respondents to re-consider the case of the remaining 14 M.R. workers for re-engaging them subject to availability of work. 7. Mr. Johnson, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents-1 and 2, submits for dismissal of the writ petition while adopting the averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondent No. 3 and the submission of Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 as the state respondents have not filed any counter. 8. This Court has given anxious consideration to the submissions of the learned Counsel of the rival parties as well as the records available and the Law Reports referred to by the learned Counsel. It is an admitted position that the present writ petitioner is not a registered Association as required to be a juristic person to file a writ petition before the court of law. Though in the writ petition, the petitioner contended that it is the representative of 3 registered trade Unions/Associations but in support of its contention, no document is annexed to the writ petition and also there is no such averment in the petition to the effect that the disengaged M.R. workers are the members of it rather, it appears from the records that 7 persons, who were re-engaged by the respondents, they themselves filed separate writ petitions challenging their respective order of disengagement and this Court in those writ petitions passed order in favour of them. As the respondents initially did not comply with the order of this Court, those M.R. workers filed contempt petitions before this Court and while the contempt petitions, being Contempt No. 127 of 1998, 234 of 1999 and 233 of 2002 were pending, the respondents re-engaged them which will be evident from Annexure-A/12 to the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner. As the respondents initially did not comply with the order of this Court, those M.R. workers filed contempt petitions before this Court and while the contempt petitions, being Contempt No. 127 of 1998, 234 of 1999 and 233 of 2002 were pending, the respondents re-engaged them which will be evident from Annexure-A/12 to the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner. Unless the fundamental and/or legal and any other right of a citizen and/or juristic person has been affected by any action of the authority and/or any body and if the petitioner filed any writ petition challenging the wrong action of any authority in which it is in no way connected in such wrong action, this Court should not exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as the present case is one of such cases. The aforesaid observation is based on the decision of this Court as well as the Apex Court. 9. This Court in the case of All Manipur DIC Supervisors (supra) specifically held that when an Association is not a registered one under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or under any other then the writ petition filed by such Association is not maintainable. Same view was expressed by this Court in its judgment and orders dated 22.6.2005 in WP(C) No. 902 of 2002 and the judgment and order dated 28.2.2005 passed in WP(C) No. 978 of 2004. Even in the case of Land Used Board (supra) this Court also held that an unregistered Association is not a juristic person and that apart no legal or any other right of the said Association was violated and hence the said Association was not aggrieved person. This Court further held in the aforesaid decisions that since the grievance of the members of the said Association were never aggrieved, they ought not to have filed writ petition as any legal right, it any, were never infringed and the instant writ petition ought not to be maintained. 10. In the instant case also it is an admitted position that the engagements of the M.R. workers were/are contractual in nature and remaining M.R. workers were discontinued since 1992, due to financial constraint of the Government. 10. In the instant case also it is an admitted position that the engagements of the M.R. workers were/are contractual in nature and remaining M.R. workers were discontinued since 1992, due to financial constraint of the Government. M.R. workers have no right to be continued in their engagement when employer does not require their services, as well as they cannot expect from a court of law a direction for re-engagement after about a decade against the policy decision of the Government due to financial constraints and to avoid the employment of surplus M.R. workers, when none of the fundamental and/legal and/or any other rights of those workers have been violated by the action of the respondents. According to this Court, the employer has the right to regulate the number of Muster Roll Workers considering the necessity as well as financial constraints faced by it, but undoubtedly the employer has no right to discontinue the Muster Roll and/or casual workers and/any other employees contrary to the terms and conditions. It is also the settled position of law that normally the court should not force an employer to recruit or retain an employee not required by it, though there are, of course, certain exceptions to the said rule such as, Muster Roll Workers, Work Charged employees and/or any public servant disengaged/dismissed from engagement/service in contravention of the Constitutional scheme or the relevant rules applicable to those workers and employees. The case in hand does not fall within the aforesaid exceptions. [See : Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd., Rae Bareli and Anr. v. Badri Nath Dixit and Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 54 ] 11. This Court sitting singly is unable to express any view different from the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of State Land used Board (supra) as I was one of the partly. The Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Kumar Gupta (supra) observed that the second writ petition stands liable to be dismissed on the sole ground that the Association cannot file a writ petition as it has no fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Kumar Gupta (supra) observed that the second writ petition stands liable to be dismissed on the sole ground that the Association cannot file a writ petition as it has no fundamental right under Article 32 of the Constitution. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in Umadevi (3) (supra) the contractual appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract if it was an engagement or appointment on daily wages or casual basis, the same would also come to an end when it is discontinued. In the present case, the petitioner nowhere stated as to why remaining 14 Muster Roll workers did not file any writ petition challenging their disengagement order and also there is no averment whatsoever in the writ petition that those M.R. workers authorized the petitioner to file the present writ petition on behalf of them, while those M.R. workers are the actual affected persons, whose fundamental right, if any, was allegedly violated. According to this Court, M.R. workers are normally engaged for certain particular works and not for all time and as they were not engaged against any particular post, they have no right to be regularized as played for or to be continued unless their employer requires their services. There is a distinction between Muster roll worker and work-charged employee and seasonal worker or properly selected employees. The nature of work of the Muster Roll worker is like a casual worker as such worker is engaged by its master for a specific work for a specific time and terms on daily wage basis at the rate sanctioned by its master and the daily rated worker is engaged for the day/days on daily wage basis but work charged employees are engaged on work charge establishments to do any skilled, unskilled, manual, supervisory or technical work and Casual labour/worker is engaged for rendering casual service like Muster Roll Worker and seasonal labour/worker is engaged for a definite season or for a period of a year. The properly selected employee has the substantive right to the post as the service of the person is guided by the terms and conditions of appointment and the rules, if any, applicable to him. The properly selected employee has the substantive right to the post as the service of the person is guided by the terms and conditions of appointment and the rules, if any, applicable to him. As the decision of the discontinuation or disengagement of Muster Roll Workers is the result of subjective satisfaction and policy of the authority considering financial constraint and surplus workers, in such circumstances it would not be proper for the court to interfere with the said decision of the authority, when the disengaged Muster Roll Workers were aware about their status at the time of their engagement. Not only that, the court, by the process of interpretation or constitution, cannot also amend the policy of the employer to bring the Muster Roll Worker and/or the casual labour/worker or seasonal labour/worker within the definition of regular employee for continuance of their service, who are not entitled to be regularized under the policy/scheme/rules, applicable to them when, in the instant case, there is a specific pleading by the respondents to the effect that the M.R. workers were disengaged due to financial constraints and to avoid engagement of surplus M.R. workers and the persons who were re-engaged, they were not re-engaged at the wisdom of the respondents, but on the basis of court's orders. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that the persons, who were re-engaged on the basis of the court's orders, cannot be equated with the remaining M.R. workers, who did not approach this Court from their own; rather they were happy with their disengagement order. Hence, the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the actions of the respondents are discriminatory in nature and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India has no force, in view of the fact that those workers who were re-engaged by the respondents was by virtue of court's order and not at the wisdom of the respondents, hence the M.R. workers re-engaged by the court's order and the remaining M.R. workers not re-engaged are two different classes. 12. Now coming to the contention of Mr. Hemchandra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, regarding application of Annexure-R/2 to the. Affidavit-in-opposition by which according to him, disengaged M.R. workers are entitled to be continued and/or regularized. 12. Now coming to the contention of Mr. Hemchandra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, regarding application of Annexure-R/2 to the. Affidavit-in-opposition by which according to him, disengaged M.R. workers are entitled to be continued and/or regularized. This Court, after careful scrutiny of the relevant documents noticed that Annexure-R/2 has already been withdrawn by the authority vide order No. 23/54/89-DP (Pt) dated 26.2.2002. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the submission of Mr. Hemchandra, so far the applicability of Annexure-R/2 of the affidavit-in-opposition. Regarding the prayer for quashing the impugned letter dated 28.1.1998 (Annexure-A/7), this Court is of considered opinion that there is no wrong in the said letter, hence, no interference is required. And the submission for a direction to the respondents to re-engage the M.R. workers on humanitarian ground and/or hardship of those workers cannot be accepted by this Court, as it is the duty of the court to decide the matter in accordance with law and not on sympathy contrary to law and also the court cannot convert itself as an employer, who can pass such an order as prayed for on humanitarian ground as he is the best authority to take decision for the welfare of his employees. [See : State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. v. Dr. Arupappa Teachers Training institute and Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 87 ; Union of India and Ors. v. P.K. Surendran Nair (2001) 4 SCC 309 ]. Apart from this, the instant writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner is not a registered Union or Association to be a juristic person and whose fundamental and/or legal and other rights were not affected by any action of the respondents. From the above facts and circumstances this Court is of the considered opinion that the submission of Mr. N. Ibotombi, learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 has some force, hence, it would not be proper for this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, more so, when it has already been held that the writ petition is not maintainable. 13. For the aforesaid circumstances and reasons stated hereinabove, the writ petition is. dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed