Judgment :- The petitioners, who are twenty-four in numbers, claim to be the residents of Gudivada (Paderu), a Muthadari Village in Visakhapatnam District. It is stated that the forefathers of the petitioners were put in possession of small bits of lands by the then Muttadar and thereafter, the predecessors of the petitioners and the petitioners have continued in possession and enjoyment of the same wherein they have constructed their houses and residing therein for the past more than 70 years. They are also paying house taxes to the Gram Panchayat regularly. While so, in the year 1979, the third respondent-Agency Divisional Officer-cum-Special Deputy Collector, Paderu, Visakhapatnam, initiated proceedings for ejection under the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulations, 1959 (for short Regulation 1 of 1959) alleging that the petitioners are in occupation of the land in question in contravention of the provisions of Section 3(2)(a) of Regulation 1 of 1959. However, after conducting due enquiry, a finding was recorded that no transfer of land from Schedule Tribe was involved and accordingly, the proceedings were dropped by order dated 23-09-1979. Though the said order has become final, the second respondent on the very same allegation initiated fresh proceedings for ejection and the second respondent by separate orders passed in the year 1982 ordered ejectment of the petitioners herein from the respective lands in their possession. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners preferred appeals before the Agent to the Government and District Collector, Visakhapatnam under Section 3(3) of Regulation 1 of 1959. The said appeals were heard together and by a common order, dated 11-02-1985 the appeals were dismissed confirming the order of ejection passed by the second respondent. Questioning the same, though the petitioners preferred a revision petition before the first respondent, the same was dismissed by order dated 17-12-1993. Hence, this writ petitions seeking a declaration that the orders passed by the respondents and the consequential steps initiated to evict the petitioner is arbitrary and illegal. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. It is primarily contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order of ejection passed under Section 3(2)(a) of Regulation 1 of 1959, is hit by the principles of res judicata since the earlier proceedings initiated against the petitioners on the very same allegation were disallowed after hearing on merits. It is primarily contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned order of ejection passed under Section 3(2)(a) of Regulation 1 of 1959, is hit by the principles of res judicata since the earlier proceedings initiated against the petitioners on the very same allegation were disallowed after hearing on merits. The learned counsel for the petitioners that since admittedly the land in occupation of the petitioners is a road margin, it cannot be said that any transfer is involved within the meaning of Section 2(g) of Regulation 1 of 1959 and consequently, the very initiation of proceedings is without jurisdiction also contends it. As could be seen from the material on record, the specific case of the petitioners is that their forefathers came into occupation of the land in question long back pursuant to the permission granted by the Muttadar in writing. A copy of the permission granted by the Muttadar was also placed before the Special Deputy Collector, Tribal Welfare, Paderu in the eviction proceedings initiated earlier in the year 1979 on the basis of which a finding was recorded that no transfer from Scheduled Tribe was involved. It is also the specific case of the petitioners that the land in question is a Government land and though it forms part of agency tracts since it was never in possession of any tribal, by virtue of G.O.Ms.No.41, they acquired a right for grant of pattas in view of their continuous possession. Sub-section (1)(a) of Section 3, provides that any transfer of immovable property situated in the agency tracts by a person, whether or not such person is a member of a Schedule Tribe, shall be absolutely null and void, unless such transfer is made in favour of a Schedule Tribe. Under Section 3(1)(b) of Regulation 1 of 1959, unless the contrary is proved, a presumption has to be drawn that the immovable property situated in the agency tracts and in possession of a non-tribal has been acquired through a transfer made to him by a member of a Schedule Tribe. Under Section 3(1)(b) of Regulation 1 of 1959, unless the contrary is proved, a presumption has to be drawn that the immovable property situated in the agency tracts and in possession of a non-tribal has been acquired through a transfer made to him by a member of a Schedule Tribe. The word ‘transfer’ has been defined under Section 2(g) of Regulation 1 of 1959 as under: “2(g) ‘Transfer’ means mortgage with or without possession lease, sale, gift, exchange or any other dealing with immovable property, not being a testamentary disposition and includes a charge on such property or a contract relating to such property in respect of such mortgage, lease, sale, gift, exchange or other dealing.” The law is well settled that the burden of proof is always on the person who is in possession of the land situated in the agency tracts to establish that his possession is not in contravention of Section 3(1) (a) of Regulation 1 of 1959. In the case on hand, the respondents have not disputed the specific plea of the petitioners that the land in question is a road margin. Even the case of the petitioners that they were permitted by the then Muttadar to occupy the land in question is not in dispute, but it is only contended that the said Muttadar is not competent to grant permission. Even assuming that the Muttadar is not competent to grant permission, the occupation of the Government land by the petitioners would be rendered unauthorized, but the same cannot be held to be in contravention of Section 3(2) (a) of Regulation 1 of 1959 since no transfer of land was involved. As a matter of fact a clear finding to that effect was recorded by the Special Deputy Collector, Tribal Welfare in the order dated 23-09-1979 and the same has become final. In view of the said finding recorded in the earlier proceedings, the initial burden of proof placed on the petitioners has been discharged and consequently, the presumption under Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of Regulation 1 of 1959 has no application. In view of the said finding recorded in the earlier proceedings, the initial burden of proof placed on the petitioners has been discharged and consequently, the presumption under Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of Regulation 1 of 1959 has no application. In identical circumstances, in U. Subhash Chandra Bose v. Agent to Government and District Collector 1992(1) ALT NRC) it was held that since the land was admittedly a poramboke land belonging to the Government and the petitioners therein were allegedly encroachers, it cannot be said that there was any transfer in contravention of the provisions of Regulation 1 of 1959. Following the said principle of law W.P.No.5101 of 1992 was allowed by order dated 24-12-2002 and the same was confirmed by a Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.307 of 2003 by Judgment dated 12-03-2003 holding that it was not permissible for the parties to have recourse to the provisions of Regulation 1 of 1959. The petitioners herein also stand on the same footing since it is not in dispute that the land in occupation of the petitioners is a road margin and has never been in possession of any tribal. It is clear from the finding recorded by the Special Deputy Collector (Tribal Welfare) while disallowing eviction proceedings by order dated 23-09-1979, that no transfer in contravention of the provisions of Regulation 1 of 1959 is involved. Hence, the provisions of Regulation 1 of 1959 have no application and consequently, the impugned orders of ejection are without jurisdiction are liable to be set-aside on that ground alone. Accordingly, the impugned orders are set aside. However, it is made clear that this shall not preclude the respondents to take recourse to any other appropriate statute to recover possession from the petitioners following due process of law. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No costs.