Judgment ( 1. ) BY this appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles act, the appellant widow, child and parents of the deceased Gajriya alias Gajju, aged 25 years, have assailed the award dated 12. 1. 2000 passed by the Second Additional motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Barwani in Claim Case No. 58 of 1998, by which the claim has been dismissed on the ground that the appellants failed to prove that it was on account of rashness and negligence of Kamlesh, NA 1, that injury was caused to him to which he succumbed eventually. ( 2. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants submits that Gajriya was aged 25 years and his source of livelihood was income as labourer. On 5. 2. 1998 he was called by dinesh to work as labourer. Although, the deceased was not inclined, he was asked to sit on the pillion of the motor cycle for being taken to the place where he was required to work as labourer. However, before deceased Gajriya could properly sit on the said vehicle the rider of the motor cycle started the motor cycle with a jerk, the foot of the deceased got entangled in the spokes of rear wheel and he sustained severe injury. He was taken to the Primary health Centre, Rajpur itself, from where he was referred to Barwani Government hospital. However, he succumbed to the injury on 17. 2. 1998 and immediately an f. I. R. was lodged. The vehicle was owned by Dinesh s/o Supdilal Modi, respondent no. 2 and was insured with New India assurance Co. Ltd. Despite evidence to the effect that it was on account of rashness and negligence of rider of the motor cycle that the accident occurred, learned Member of the Tribunal has dismissed the claim on the ground that neither the rashness nor negligence of the driver of the motor cycle was established by the claimants. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that it is manifest from the evidence of AW 1, meerabai, widow of the deceased, AW 2, singla an eyewitness of the incident and aw 3 Sakara that it was the sheer negligence of the respondent No. 1 in suddenly starting the motor cycle that injury was sustained by the deceased to which he eventually succumbed. Under these circumstances, the learned counsel contends, the finding of the Claims Tribunal that the claimants have failed to prove rashness and negligence, is perverse. ( 3. ) MR. Anil Goyal, the counsel for the insurance company, respondent No. 3, submits that since the evidence was in variance and not consistent, the Claims tribunal has rightly dismissed the claim on the ground that the claimants failed to prove rashness and negligence. ( 4. ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The claimants examined in all four witnesses. AW 1 claimant Meerabai, widow of the deceased, has deposed that on account of the use of the motor cycle, her husband had received injury and he was rushed to hospital immediately. Kamlesh had asked her not to report the matter immediately as he would take care of the treatment. Thereafter, her husband was taken to the hospital at Barwani, where he was treated for 6 days and, thereafter, he had died. She has categorically said that it was on account of the use of the motor cycle that her husband sustained injury. In cross-examination also she has been quite consistent. Singla, AW 2, corroborates her and states that Kamlesh started the motor cycle rashly and just 20 ft away, while the deceased had not been able to adjust himself as pillion rider Gajriyas foot got entangled in the rear wheel and it started bleeding. Similar is the version of Sakara, AW 3. Sakara has stated in cross-examination that no sooner Gajriya tried to mount, the motor cycle was started with the result his balance was lost and his foot had got entangled in the wheel. Dr. Suresh Chandra Hardiya, AW 4, has stated that on account of the injury, tetanus had developed and deceased Gajriya succumbed to the injury. ( 5. ) FROM the conjoint reading of the testimony of AW 1, Meerabai; AW 2, singla and AW 3, Sakara we are of the view that through these witnesses the claimants have been able to prove that it was on account of negligence of driver kamlesh that the accident occurred and on account of the injury received in the said accident, the deceased died, though on account of tetanus. Since the tetanus was the result of the injury caused on account of the accident alluded to, we are of the view that the death can be directly ascribed to the accident deposed by these witnesses and the F. I. R. promptly lodged after the death. Under these circumstances, we are unable to uphold the finding of the learned member of the Tribunal that the claimants have failed to discharge the burden that the accident occurred on account of the rashness and negligence of the rider of the motor cycle. ( 6. ) BEFORE we advert to the evidence with regard to the compensation, we propose to deal with the argument of learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 that the risk of the pillion rider is not covered and, therefore, in any case the claimants are not entitled to receive any compensation from the insurance company. To buttress his argument, learned counsel for insurance company, respondent No. 3 has referred to the decision of the Apex Court in United india Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tilak Singh, 2006 ACJ 1441 (SC ). We have perused the said decision and taken into consideration the conclusion drawn in para 21 of the same, which reads as extracted below: " (21) In our view, although the observations made in Asha Ranis case, 2003 acj 1 (SC), were in connection with carrying passengers in a goods vehicle, the same would apply with equal force to gratuitous passengers in any other vehicle also. Thus, we must uphold the contention of appellant insurance company that it owed no liability towards the injuries suffered by the deceased rajinder Singh who was a pillion rider, as the insurance policy was a statutory policy and hence it did not cover risk of death of or bodily injury to gratuitous passenger. " ( 7. ) FROM the above observations of the supreme Court, it is luculent that it is only in relation to the gratuitous passenger in any vehicle that the insurance company, unless additional risk is covered, cannot be saddled with the liability. " ( 7. ) FROM the above observations of the supreme Court, it is luculent that it is only in relation to the gratuitous passenger in any vehicle that the insurance company, unless additional risk is covered, cannot be saddled with the liability. In the present case, it can hardly be disputed, though evidence to the contrary has been rendered by naw 1, Dinesh Modi and NAW 2, Kam-lesh Gupta, that the deceased was being taken on the motor cycle for the purpose of labour work for which he had been engaged by the NA 1, Kamlesh, the said act of taking Gajriya, therefore, amounting to part of his engagement for which he was to be paid and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be held that he was a gratuitous passenger. The insurance company, respondent No. 3, cannot claim to exonerate itself from the liability on the ground that extra risk was not covered. In these circumstances we find that all the respondents including the respondent No. 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay compensation. Though it is pleaded that Gajriya alias Gajju was earning about Rs. 50 per day, in view of the evidence on record, he may be getting work hardly for 25 days in a month. Under these circumstances, even if he was getting rs. 40 per day in the year 1998 for the labour work, his monthly income comes to rs. 1,000 and accordingly Rs. 12,000 per annum. If 1/3rd was deducted towards his own expenses, while he was alive, the loss of dependency comes to Rs. 8,000 x 17 = rs. 1,16,000. In addition, the appellants are entitled to funeral expenses Rs. 2,000 and for loss of consortium to the appellant no. 1 Rs. 3,000; thus, the appellants are entitled to a sum of Rs. 1,21,000 as compensation for the respondents, collectively and severally. ( 8. ) IN the result, this appeal is partly allowed. Setting aside the impugned award, it is directed that the appellants shall be entitled to recover Rs. 1,21,000 from the respondents. Respondents shall be liable severally and collectively. The appellants shall also be entitled to interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of award passed by the M. A. C. T. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal partly allowed.