JUDGMENT M. M. DAS, J. — The anguish and sentiments expressed by this Court time and again coupled with a command to appoint officers having legal background and well-versed or trained in law to handle proceedings under the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 (for short, ‘the Act’) not only appears to have not been taken note of but also appears to have been brushed aside by the authorities of the State. For the above reasons, this Court is being flooded with petitions seeking exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the legality/perversity and un-tenability of the orders passed by the authorities even belonging to the highest hierarchy under the Act. 2. This is a petition where the petitioners have called in question the order dated 27.8.1993 passed by the Commissioner, Consolidation, Orissa, Cuttack in R.C. No.1075 of 1991 annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition. 3. The petitioner’s case is that land in sabik plot No.1154 under sabik khata No.174 measuring about Ac. 0.16 deci¬mals situated in mouza Kothi in the district of Cuttack is claimed to have been acquired by one Maheswar Acharya in the year, 1930 when he was in joint-ness with his only elder brother late Dayanidhi Acharya. The petitioners are the sons of late Dayanidhi Acharya and the opp.party No.4 is the son of late Maheswar Acharya. The above land was recorded in the 1930 settle¬ment Record of Rights in the name of Maheswar Acharya. The peti¬tioners claimed that by an unregistered family settlement dated 15.8.1937, a partition was effected between the said Dayanidhi and Maheswar, in which the suit property, notwithstanding the fact that it was acquired in the name of Maheswar was divided between both the branches as the said property formed a part of the joint family property. The petitioners claimed that during settlement operation, late Maheswar consented for such partition by putting his signature on the YADAST No.377. They further claimed that the said property was being peacefully possessed jointly by the two branches, which would be evident from the possession certificate issued by the Tahasildar, Kujanga. 4. During the consolidation operation, the petitioners filed an objection under Section 9(2) of the Act before the Consolidation Officer-opp.party No.3 praying for recording of the suit property in the joint names of the petitioners and the opp.party No.4. 4. During the consolidation operation, the petitioners filed an objection under Section 9(2) of the Act before the Consolidation Officer-opp.party No.3 praying for recording of the suit property in the joint names of the petitioners and the opp.party No.4. The Consolidation Officer by his order dated 10.5.1990, after making due enquiry, allowed the said objection and directed to record the land jointly in the names of the petitioners and the opp.party No.4. The opp.party No.4 preferred an appeal under Section 12 of the Act before the Deputy Director, Consolidation-opp.party No.2. The Appellate Authority after hearing the parties by his order dated 28.11.1991 under Annexure-1 to the writ petition dismissed the said appeal. Being ag¬grieved, the opp.party No.4 preferred a revision under Section 36 of the Act before the Commissioner, Consolidation, Orissa Cut¬tack-opp.party No.1, which was numbered as Revision Case No.1075 of 1995. The petitioners allege that as the petitioner No.1 who was looking after the revision had to go for working outside the State, they could not participate in the Revision proceeding and the Commissioner of Consolidation by his order dated 27.8.1993, in the absence of the petitioners, allowed the revision, direct¬ing to record the disputed land exclusively in the name of opp.party No.4. Upon coming to know of such an order, the peti¬tioners have preferred the present writ petition challenging the said order passed by the Commissioner of Consolidation, Orissa, Cuttack-opp.party No.1 and have sought for quashing the said order. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed by the opp.party No.4, denying the allegation of the petitioners that Maheswar Acharya was in joint possession over the property along with his elder brother-in-law-Dayanidhi Acharya. It has been further stated that Maheswar and Dayanidhi were separate and did not constitute a joint family when the property was acquired. The property originally belonged to Bardhaman Estate. By virtue of a permanent lease, the said property was acquired from Bardhaman Estate by Maheswar and tenancy was created by fixation of annual rent and payment of salami and coupled with delivery of posses¬sion. Maheswar was in exclusive possession of the said property and accordingly, the same was recorded in his name in 1930 Set¬tlement Record of Rights. After death of Maheswar, the opp.party No.4 claims to be in peaceful possession over the same and also states to have constructed two rooms over the said land which is being used by him as out house. After death of Maheswar, the opp.party No.4 claims to be in peaceful possession over the same and also states to have constructed two rooms over the said land which is being used by him as out house. Subsequently also it is claimed that the opp.party No.4 has raised further construction over the said land, which is incomplete. While denying the other allega¬tions made in the writ petition, the date of death of the common ancestor being Hari Acharya has also been disputed. Several documents have been annexed to the writ petition in respect of the respective pleadings made by the parties. 6. A rejoinder affidavit has also been filed by the peti¬tioner reasserting the plea taken in the writ petition and annex¬ing further documents thereto. 7. I have perused the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, Kujanga on 10.5.1990 in Objection Case No.1524/184 and the order dated 28.11.1991 passed by the opp.party No.2 in Con¬solidation Appeal No.50 of 1990 and the impugned order dated 27.8.1993 passed by the Commissioner - opp.party No.1 in R.C. No.1075 of 1991. 8. A bare reading of all the above three orders goes to show that none of the authorities below have taken note of the various documents which have now been produced and annexed to the respective pleadings of the parties. All the three orders exposes the immature approach of all the three authorities under the Act in deciding valuable rights of the parties over immovable proper¬ty. 9. From the scheme of the Act, it would be seen that Section 4(4) thereof provides that upon the publication of the notification issued under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 in the Official Gazette every suit and proceedings for declaration of any right or interest in any land situate within the consolida¬tion area in regard to which proceedings could be or ought to be started under this Act, which is pending before any Civil Court, whether of the first instance or appeal, reference or revision shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the Court before which such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated. 10. 10. Section 44 of the Act provides that the authorities under the Act as well as the Tahasildar shall have all such powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a Civil Court in respect of matters relating to summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and examining them on oath, affirmation or otherwise and the issue of a commission, compelling the production of documents, admission of evidence by affidavit and any other matter that may be prescribed, which a Civil Court exercises while trying a suit. Section 51 of the Act envisages that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions contained in Clause 3 of Section 4 and Sub-section (1) of Section 7, all questions relating to right, title, interest and liability in land lying in the consol¬idation area, except those coming within the jurisdiction of Revenue Courts or authorities under any local law for the time being in force, shall be decided under the provisions of the Act by the appropriate authority during the consolidation operations and no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter which an officer or authority empowered under the Act is competent to decide. 11. It is naive to mention that deciding the question of right, title and interest over immovable property involves com¬plicated questions of civil law. But, nevertheless, such powers have been vested with the authorities under the Act. It is, therefore, expected that such officers/authorities are to be well equipped in law to effectually adjudicate question of right, title and interest over immovable property. From the orders passed by the various authorities in the present case, it appears that no attempt whatsoever has been made by any of the parties to bring to record all relevant documents and to produce oral evi¬dence. No direction also appears to have been issued by any of the authorities under the Act, directing the parties to file affidavits in support of their cases along with supporting docu¬ments. Strangely parties have annexed copies of documents which are relevant for adjudicating the question of title, only for the first time in the present writ petition. Had such documents been asked to be produced by the authorities, the dispute between the parties could have been effectually adjudicated upon. 12. Strangely parties have annexed copies of documents which are relevant for adjudicating the question of title, only for the first time in the present writ petition. Had such documents been asked to be produced by the authorities, the dispute between the parties could have been effectually adjudicated upon. 12. At this juncture, I would like to refer to the decision in the case of Raghunath Mukhi v. Chakrapani Mukhi (dead) and after him Musa Bewa and others, 1992 (I) O.L.R. 191 where this Court in no uncertain terms expressed that the consolidation authorities by the very nature of the jurisdiction vested in them are required to adjudicate civil right involving personal law and relating to immovable property and other civil rights. The ques¬tions that crop up and posed are of complicated nature. This Court further expressed in the said judgment that it obligates the authorities to know the law before they assume and exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate in accordance with law and for the litigants, an ignorant Judge is a devil’s representative putting on the mask of an adjudicator. Those who are required to adjudicate civil rights including personal and property rights should have studied law or are trained in law. This Court further observed that a person involved in a civil dispute before he enters the precincts of the Court should have the trust and confidence that the person who sits on the chair as an adjudicator/Judge, is competent to appreciate and understand matters having regard to his knowledge and capability and is adequately equipped to decide. For such litigant, high sounding designation is not of much worth, and it is only his confidence and trust are what matters and, therefore, psychological factor in the mind of the litigant is more important than how a lis is decided by the adjudicating authority. It is the duty of the Judge to utilize his own insight into law even where the parties have tumbled or failed. With regard to the authorities under the Act in this State as well as in other States, this Court ex¬pressed its view as follows :- “Under some State Acts, the final Court is presided over by Judicial Officers. No doubt, consolidation programmes are time bound programmes. With regard to the authorities under the Act in this State as well as in other States, this Court ex¬pressed its view as follows :- “Under some State Acts, the final Court is presided over by Judicial Officers. No doubt, consolidation programmes are time bound programmes. Hence, we should suggest that where legal rights are involved, the final Court is presided over by Judicial Officers well versed in law and, therefore, competent to decide legal questions leaving matters like creation of Chakas etc, not involving civil rights to an administrative officer or as in some other progressive Acts, relating to tenant, the revisional au¬thority is conferred on the High Court as regards questions of law. These are matters in regard to which we can only make sug¬gestions for consideration of the law making authorities. But the Government being representative of the people is obliged to safeguard the interests of the people. We, therefore, command the Government to appoint officer as regards revisional forum who has legal background and is well-versed or trained in law so that the appearance inspires faith and confidence.” 13. Again, the same question came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Madan Mohan Jena and others v. D.C. Swain and others, 1993 (II) OLR 524. Hon’ble Justice A. Pasayat (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Court while relying upon the decision in the case of Raghunath Mukhi (supra) taking note of the case made out by the petitioner therein, came to the conclusion that where the object is that the question relating to right, title and interest in the property shall be adjudicated by the authorities under the Act, it is appropriate that all relevant facts and materials should be before the adju¬dicating authorities so that an effective and proper adjudication can be made and where civil rights are to be adjudicated, proce¬dures akin to those provided in the Code of Civil Procedure by and large are to be followed, unless they are at variance with those specifically set out in the Act and the Rules. By adoption of those procedure, no prejudice to the parties is likely to be caused. Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 should be kept in view by the adjudicating authorities though the Act and the Rules do not provide their application except to limited extent. By adoption of those procedure, no prejudice to the parties is likely to be caused. Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 should be kept in view by the adjudicating authorities though the Act and the Rules do not provide their application except to limited extent. The Court further observed that authorities should proceed keeping in view such principles and requirements of principles of natural justice and observance of rule of law is of vital importance and is compulsory not only for those who are to obey the law but also those who are to enforce the law. 14. With regard to the question of the desirability to have officers with legal training or at least legal bent of mind, it was held that functions of Civil Court are being presently exer¬cised by the authorities under the Act and they are in essence substitutes of the Judicial Officers. Though it cannot be said that the orders of judicial officers are blemishless, yet, expe¬rience shows that standard of the orders passed by the authori¬ties under the Act leave much to be desired. In many instances, orders patently show lack of rudimentary and fundamental knowl¬edge of law. People who go before the authorities must go there with a feeling that they are going to get substantial and effec¬tive justice and they should not come back with a feeling that adjudicatory machinery prescribed under the Act is a mockery. 15. As in the aforesaid decided case, similarly in the instant case, learned counsel for the State submitted that the officers appointed are competent officers. This Court has no comments to make with regard to the competency of such officers otherwise, but in respect of their competency in deciding the civil rights, from various orders which this Court comes across in innumerable number of writ petitions filed against such orders passed by the authorities under the Act, it would clearly mani¬fest that the authorities under the Act, deciding complicated questions of civil rights including the right over property,lack rudimentary knowledge for deciding such questions. Taking note of the contentions of the learned counsel that the Act has created a hierarchy of forums, such as, original, appellate and revisional and if a person is aggrieved by the original order, he can move the appellate forum and if he is still aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority, he can move the revisional authority, this Court emphatically held in the above cited case that the question is not availability of forum but whether any of the forums is really acting as true adjudicator of the dispute. It was further observed in the said decision that experiences show that even the appellate and the revisional authority not to speak of the original authority, lack in fundamentals and rudiments of law. Expressing its dis-satisfaction, this Court held that an¬guish expressed in the case of Raghunath Mukhi (supra) does not appear to have been taken note of by the State as otherwise, rapid increase of number of writ petitions challenging correct¬ness of the orders passed by the authorities under the Act, would not have been there. It was also recorded that the command to appoint officers having legal background, well versed or trained in law, as made in the case of Raghunath Mukhi (supra) does not appear to have been taken note of and it is high time that the State does something positive in the matter to restore fast van¬ishing faith of the people on the hierarchy of the adjudicators prescribed under the Act. 16. Upon taking into consideration the above two decided cases and applying the ratio and the observations made therein, to the facts of the present case, it leaves no doubt for this Court that in spite of the above two decisions, where directions were issued to the State for taking steps to re-establish the faith of a litigant on the authorities adjudicating disputes under the Act nothing appears to have been done by the State in that regard. All the three orders passed by the opp.parties 1 to 3 as already observed, show immature approach of the authorities and expose their lack of rudimentary knowledge of civil law. Even though the authorities have been substituted in place of the competent civil Court, it appears that none of the authorities being opp.parties 1 to 3, have followed the basic principles of the Code of Civil Procedure while passing the orders. 17. Even though the authorities have been substituted in place of the competent civil Court, it appears that none of the authorities being opp.parties 1 to 3, have followed the basic principles of the Code of Civil Procedure while passing the orders. 17. This Court while re-affirming the anguish expressed by this Court in the cases of Raghunath Mukhi (supra) and Madan Mohan Jena and others (supra) directs the State Government to take appropriate effective steps/measures so as to give elementary training to the authorities before they are appointed to adjudicate disputes under the Act in order to restore the confidence of a litigant on such authorities. 18. Considering the nature of orders which has been passed by the opp.parties 1 to 3 in the present case, all the orders dated 28.11.1991 and 27.8.1993 passed by the Deputy Director, Consolidation and the Commissioner, Consolidation vide Annexures-1 and 2 are hereby quashed and the matter is remitted back to the Consolidation Officer-opp.party No.3 to decide the Objection Case afresh by giving opportunity of hearing to the respective parties and granting liberty to them to produce all relevant records and any other evidence including oral evidence, if they like to adduce such evidence before him. After taking all such materials into consideration, the Consolidation Officer shall pass a fresh order with regard to the claim raised by the objector before him. It is needless to mention that parties can seek appropriate relief as per the provisions of the Act if they are aggrieved by such order to be passed by the Consolidation Officer. The peti¬tioners as well as the opp.party No.4 are directed to appear before the Consolidation Officer, Kujanga on 2.5.2007 (2nd May, 2007) and the petitioners are directed to produce a certified copy of this judgment before the said Consolidation Officer - opp.party No.3 for compliance of the above direction. 19. As almost 17 years have passed in the meantime, the Consolidation Officer is directed to dispose of the matter within a period of six months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment, before him. 20. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Orissa, Bhubaneswar for taking necessary steps as per the directions issued by this Court in the cases of Raghunath Mukhi (supra) and Madan Mohan Jena and others (supra) as well as in the present case. 20. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Orissa, Bhubaneswar for taking necessary steps as per the directions issued by this Court in the cases of Raghunath Mukhi (supra) and Madan Mohan Jena and others (supra) as well as in the present case. 21. The writ petition is accordingly allowed but in the circumstances of the case, without any cost. Petition allowed.