JUDGMENT S.S. Nijjar, J.:- This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the petitioner against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in CWP 12248 of 1997 decided on 21.12.2001. The judgment is challenged only partially as the writ petition has actually been allowed but the arrears of emoluments have been restricted to 50% of the amount she would have earned had she not been illegally kept out of service. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a Welfare Officer in the Indian Red Cross Society on 4.9.1986 and posted to Base Hospital, Guwahati. On 19.8.1991 petitioner was transferred and posted to Military Hospital, Amritsar. From there, in July 1995 she was transferred to 159 General Hospital, Ferozepur. The petitioner filed a representation on 25.7.1994 seeking cancellation of the transfer order on the ground that her children were studying in Amritsar. She had also brought to the notice of the respondents that she herself was a law student of Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar. Even respondent No.3, the Commanding Officer, who was looking after the General Hospital, Ferozepur, accepted the request of the petitioner and on 26.7.1995 recommended that her transfer be stayed for the time being. Thereafter, a telegraphic communication dated 5.10.1995 was sent to Military Hospital, Amritsar, to relieve the petitioner as she was to join duty at Ferozepur. A movement order was issued, wherein it was mentioned that her name had been struck off from the rolls of Military Hospital, Amritsar, w.e.f. 22.10.1995. She was given six days joining time. This movement order was in fact not served on the petitioner. During this period, the petitioner fell ill and she was under medical treatment till 4.1.1996. Her salary was not paid from November 1995. When she reported for duty at Military Hospital, Amritsar, on 3/4.1.1996, she was not allowed to join duty. She was told to go to Ferozepur. Aggrieved by the aforesaid action of the respondents, the petitioner filed a civil suit on 22.2.1996 seeking a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from implementing the transfer order dated 22.10.1995. Since there was no progress in the civil Court, he reported for duty at Ferozepur on 9.4.1997. She was permitted to join. The petitioner had not been paid her salary and allowances since November 1995. Since there was no progress in the civil Court, he reported for duty at Ferozepur on 9.4.1997. She was permitted to join. The petitioner had not been paid her salary and allowances since November 1995. She, therefore, made a representation to the Commanding Officer at Ferozepur who in terms of communication dated 20.6.1997 approached the Secretary General of the Indian Red Cross Society at New Delhi for release of her salary and allowances. The petitioner then applied for six days leave from 23.6.1997 to 28.6.1997. The leave was granted but subsequently cancelled. When the petitioner reported for duty, she was served with the letter dated 9.7.1997. In this letter, it is stated as follows: “159 General Hospital c/o 56 APO 160/ Adm/97 Mrs Naresh Sharma IRC Welfare Officer STRUCK OF STRENGTH: 1. Ref to HQ IRCS letter No.12/W/119/Est/222 dt 1 July 97 (photocopy at). 2. Your taken on strength to this hospital is wrong as per direction from HQ IRCS vide letter under reference and you are to be SOS from this hospital forthwith. 3. In view of the above, you have to hand over the IRC stores by 10 July 97 positively. Sd/- HS Hooda Lt Col Registrar For Offg Codg Offr” The conclusion was reached at by the respondents on the basis of the opinion rendered by the Legal Adviser who had opined as under:­ “Nothing can be done the matter is pending. However, the action” of Commandant in admitting the Welfare Officer has rendered the trial Court’s order nugatory and is therefore wrong.” It is recorded thereafter as follows: “From the above advise, you will observe that the action taken by you permitting Mrs Naresh Sharma to join duty at 159 General Hospital on 9th Apr 97 during the pendency of the case is wrong and you are therefore advised to SOS her from 159 HQ immediately lest it may not be treated as contempt of court.” 3. After noticing the aforesaid facts, the learned Single Judge has held that the action of the respondents in not permitting the petitioner to join duty is erroneous. The writ petition has been allowed and the order dated 1.7.1997 (Annexure P9) and the order dated 19.7.1997 (Annexure P9) have been quashed. 4. After noticing the aforesaid facts, the learned Single Judge has held that the action of the respondents in not permitting the petitioner to join duty is erroneous. The writ petition has been allowed and the order dated 1.7.1997 (Annexure P9) and the order dated 19.7.1997 (Annexure P9) have been quashed. 4. In the writ petition, the petitioner had specifically pleaded that the reasoning adopted by the respondents removing her name from the rolls is clearly extraneous and not relevant to circumstances in which the petitioner was allowed to join duties. In Annexures P9 and P10, it has been mentioned that she had been wrongly allowed to join duty during the pendency of the civil suit. The respondents have not concluded that the petitioner was remiss in any manner in not joining duty at Ferozepur. 5. Counsel for the appellant submits that once the order of removal of the petitioner was held to be illegal and arbitrary, she would be entitled to full pay and allowances during the period she was illegally kept out of service. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relies on a full Bench judgment of this Court in Hari Palace, Ambala City v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court and anr, 1979 PLR 720 and a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt Ltd v. The Employees of M/s lndustan Tin Works Pvt Ltd. and ors, AIR 1979 SC 72. 6. Mr BS Guliani, Advocate, on the other hand submits that the petitioner-appellant herself is responsible for her name being struck off from the rolls. She had initially filed a civil suit praying for injunction. She failed to get any relief in the civil suit. She even filed an appeal against the decision of the civil Judge. The appellant met with failure in the appellate Court also. She never joined in compliance of the orders of transfer. She was guilty of the misconduct and, therefore, the orders of the authorities cannot be said to be arbitrary. The learned counsel further submits that the Red Cross Society is a Welfare Society which is a non-profit making association. In any event, the learned Single Judge has exercised the discretionary powers of the Court in denying 50% of the back wages to the appellant. The learned counsel further submits that the Red Cross Society is a Welfare Society which is a non-profit making association. In any event, the learned Single Judge has exercised the discretionary powers of the Court in denying 50% of the back wages to the appellant. The learned counsel further submits that there are no hard and fast rules that whenever an order of termination is set aside, reinstatement with full back wages follows. In support of his submission” the learned counsel relies on Smt. Saran Kumar Gaur and ors v. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors, 1991(2) RSJ 769 and General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, [2005(3) Law Herald (P&H) 558 (SC)]: 2005(5)SLR 51. 7. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. We are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge erred in not granting full back wages to the appellant. The learned Single Judge has given a clear finding that there has been no grave error on the part of the petitioner nor she misconducted herself in joining her duties. She has diligently performed her duties from 1986 till 19.7.1997. Removal of her name from the rolls, according to the learned Single Judge, is a clear act of arbitrariness on the part of the respondents. In such circumstances, the ­ question of what relief is to be granted to the employee is no longer resintegra. Speaking for the Full Bench, S.S.-Sandhawalia, Chief Justice, in the case of Hari Palace (supra) has held as follows:- . “5. There is no gain saying the fact that there has been some divergence of opinion in the various High Courts on the point earlier varying views had been expressed as to where precisely the onus lay with regard to the claim to back wages and also with regard to the striking of the issues or the necessary point for determination thereof by the Labour Court itself. Within this Court a Division Bench in Daljeet and Co. Private Ltd. Ropar v. The State of Puniab and others has held that the dismissed employee is reinstated with continuity of service, the normal relief would be the payment of full wages from the date of dismissal, and it is for the employer to raise this matter and prove that the employee had been earning wages for the whole or any part of the period in question. The aforesaid view has been consistently followed in this Court and reaffirmed in Harbans Singh and others v. The Assistant Labour Commissioner and others. The Allahabad High Court was inclined to take a similar view in Postal Seals Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v. Labour Court, Lucknow and the same tenor is the judgment of the Gujrat High Court in Dhari Gram Panchayat v. Safai Kamdar Mandal. However, all controversy now seems to have been set at rest by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt Ltd v. The Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd and others wherein the appeal by Special Leave was expressly limited to the question of grant of back wages. It has been held therein in no uncertain terms: “Ordinarily, therefore a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer.” And again: “Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure.” The aforesaid view has then been reiterated by their Lordships in GT Lad and others v. Chemicals and Fibres India Ltd, 1979 Lab. & Ind. Cases 298.” 8. From the above, it becomes apparent that there had been some ground divergence of opinion in the High Courts on the point of back wages prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Tin Works (supra). The grant of full back wages has been the normal rule and the party objecting to it has to establish the circumstances necessitating a departure. The aforesaid observations also make it abundantly clear that denial of back wages on the order of termination being set aside would be putting a premium on the arbitrary action of the employer in firstly keeping the workman/employee out of the job and thereafter denying back wages on the that he or she has not performed duties during that period. Therefore, the grant of full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. 9. Therefore, the grant of full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. 9. In a more recent decision, in the case of UP State Brassware Corporation Ltd v. Udev Narain Pandey, (2006)1 SCC 479 as regards entitlement of back wages on an order of termination being declared invalid, it was held that no precise formula can be laid down as to under what circumstances payment of back wages should be allowed. Indisputably, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It would, however, not be correct to contend that it is automatic. Besides, it could not be granted mechanically only because on technical grounds or otherwise an order of termination is found to be in contravention of the provisions of the statutory Act. In the said case, it was held by the Supreme Court that payment of full back wages cannot be the natural consequence of an order of termination from service being invalidated. It was observed that although direction to pay full back wages on a declaration that the order of termination was invalid used to be the usual result, but now, with the passage of time, a pragmatic view of the matter is being taken by the Court realizing that an industry may not be compelled to pay to the workman for the period during which he apparently contributed little or nothing at all to it and/or for a period that was spent unproductively as a result whereof, the employer would be compelled to go back to the situation which prevailed many years ago, namely when the workman was retrenched. Therefore, whether the petitioner is entitled to full back wages would have to be seen in the peculiar facts of this case. The learned Single Judge has denied 50% back wages only on the ground that the petitioner has not served the Society. On the other hand, it has been held that there has been “no grave error” on the part of the petitioner, “nor she misconducted herself”. Thereafter, it has been held by the learned Single Judge that the action of the respondents in not permitting the petitioner to join duty is erroneous. On the other hand, it has been held that there has been “no grave error” on the part of the petitioner, “nor she misconducted herself”. Thereafter, it has been held by the learned Single Judge that the action of the respondents in not permitting the petitioner to join duty is erroneous. It is not the case of the respondents that the order of the learned Single Judge as regards there being no grave error on the part of the petitioner or that she misconducted herself in joining the duty is erroneous. In fact, it is not even shown by the respondents that the said order was assailed by them. No other material has been placed before the Court to show that the petitioner has been gainfully employed, during the period of forced idleness. No reason has been put forward as justification for denial of 50% back wages, either by the learned Single Judge society. Therefore, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, we hold that the petitioner would be entitled to full back wages which she would have earned, but for the illegal act of the Society. In the case of Smt Saran Kumar Gaur (supra) referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents, the Supreme Court actually never decided the question with regard to payment of back wages. In paragraph 10 of the judgment it is clearly observed that the case is being disposed of without giving any direction for making payment of back wages. The employees in fact were permitted to take out necessary legal proceedings for salary, if so advised. On the other hand, the Supreme Court gave a mandate to the respondent-College to make the payment of the salary to the teachers who had actually worked. The judgment is on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case and would be of no assistance to the Society in the present case. In the case of General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh (supra), the Labour Court had decided the case of the workman on the basis that there was a violation of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman was, however, granted 50% of the back wages by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak on the ground that there was plenty of work available for Class-IV labourers. The management filed a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed. The workman was, however, granted 50% of the back wages by the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak on the ground that there was plenty of work available for Class-IV labourers. The management filed a writ petition in this Court which was dismissed. In these circumstances, the matter reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the workman would not be entitled to any back wages. The reasons for denial of back wages are stated in paragraph 11 of the judgment which is as under:­ “In the case in hand the respondent had worked for a very short period with the appellant, which was less than one year. Even during this period there were breaks in service and he had been given short term appointments on daily wage basis in different capacities. The respondent is not a technically trained person but was working on a Class IV post. According to the finding of the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court plenty of work of the same nature, which the respondent was doing, was available in the District of Rohtak. In such circumstances we are of the opinion that the respondent is not entitled to payment of any back wages.” A perusal of the above shows that the Supreme Court upheld the award with regard to reinstatement; however, denied even 50% of the back wages for the reasons stated above. In the present case, the learned Single Judge has clearly held that the petitioner had worked diligently and efficiently from 1986 till 19.7.1997. Therefore, her claim has nothing in common with the workman in the case of Rudhan Singh (supra). In view of the above, we allow the appeal and modify the judgment of the learned Single Judge to the effect that the appellant shall be entitled to full back wages and other allowances from the date she was illegally kept oukit of service i.e. 9.7.1997 till payment. ——————————