UDAY KUMAR CHATTOPADHYAY ALIAS CHATTERJEE v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL
2007-04-05
PRAVENDU NARAYAN SINHA
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
( 1 ) THIS revisional application has been preferred by the de facto complainant petitioner assailing the order dated 9. 1. 07 passed by the learned additional Chief Judicial Magistrate (in short the ACJM), Asansol thereby dropping the case No. C-774 of 2006 in which the learned Magistrate earlier directed investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. treating the complaint as FIR. ( 2 ) MR. Prabir Kumar Mitra, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the surname of the petitioner is Chatterjee @ Chattopadhyay and his father is Nani Gopal Chatterjee. The petitioner married one Kajal, daughter of Kanu Bhuia on 5. 7. 80 and at the relevant time of marriage his father in-law was working at Natindanga Colliery under the E. C. L. The said kanu Bhuia became unfit for his job and approached the E. C. L. , authorities for premature retirement and requested the authorities to appoint the petitioner in his place. The E. C. L. authority accordingly, on the basis of recommendation of Kanu Bhuia appointed the petitioner on 14. 11. 83 and, at the time of appointment the petitioner filled up necessary documents mentioning his surname as well as the name of his father. In the year 1988 he learnt that in the official record of the colliery his surname/title was changed to Bhuia from chattopadhyay. The petitioner accordingly approached the authorities for rectification of the error and to incorporate the name of his father and their title in the records of the colliery but the accused persons did nothing. The petitioner thereafter filed a writ application being C. O. No. 3398 (W) of 1991 and a learned single Judge of this Court by order dated 19. 7. 01 directed the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of E. C. L. , Sanctoria to consider the matter of rectification and gave liberty to the petitioner to make fresh representation before the authorities. The petitioner accordingly submitted fresh representation before the E. C. L. authorities but, they rejected the representation without taking into consideration the real problem. Subsequently, the accused persons arrayed in the complaint, who were the General Manager of Jhanjra Colliery, Chief general Manager, Personnel Manager and Agent, MIC, Jhanjra Project by entering into criminal conspiracy issued charge sheet against the petitioner. There was no enquiry on the basis of charge sheet dated 17. 10.
Subsequently, the accused persons arrayed in the complaint, who were the General Manager of Jhanjra Colliery, Chief general Manager, Personnel Manager and Agent, MIC, Jhanjra Project by entering into criminal conspiracy issued charge sheet against the petitioner. There was no enquiry on the basis of charge sheet dated 17. 10. 02, and thereafter, they issued another charge sheet dated 21. 7. 04/30. 7. 04 and in the official records the accused persons, who were the aforesaid officers of the colliery, showed his residential address at Khagharia in Bihar. The petitioner learnt that the accused persons had also erased the original entries of his service record and, intentionally entered wrong entries in the service record and everywhere they filled up records and forms using thumb impression of a fictitious person whereas the petitioner originally filled up all the papers putting his signatures in the service record. ( 3 ) MR. Mitra next contended that not only that, the accused persons also forced him to confess his guilt and also threatened him that he would be dismissed unless he confesses his guilt. Finding no other alternative the petitioner filed a written complaint before the learned ACJM, Asansol praying for direction upon the concerned police station for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. treating the petition of complaint as FIR. When the written complaint was filed in Court it was registered as case No. C-744 of 2006. The learned ACJM, Asansol on the basis of such written complaint directed the officer-in-charge, Hirapur P. S. to investigate the matter under Section 156 (3)of the Cr. P. C. treating the complaint as FIR. On 17. 11. 06 the officer-in-charge of Hirapur P. S. submitted a report that place of occurrence falls within the jurisdiction of Kulti P. S. and the learned ACJM accordingly sent the written complaint to the officer-in-charge, Kulti P. S. for investigation. On 9. 1. 07 the officer-in-charge, Kulti P. S. submitted a report before the learned ACJM stating therein that the incident took place outside the territorial jurisdiction of Kulti p. S. and, it should be sent to Faridpur P. S. The learned Magistrate thereafter by the impugned order dated 9. 1. 07 dropped the case and at the same time he rejected the petition under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. ( 4 ) MR.
1. 07 dropped the case and at the same time he rejected the petition under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. ( 4 ) MR. Mitra further contended that from the averments of the petition of complaint sufficient materials disclosing cognizable offences were established and there were sufficient ground for investigation into the allegations of the complaint treating the complaint as FIR. The territorial jurisdiction cannot be a ground to refuse investigation and to drop the case. The learned Magistrate has acted illegally by passing the impugned order dropping the case and also directing rejection of prayer under Section 156 (3) of Cr. P. C. In support of his contention Mr. Mitra referred to a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Trisuns chemical Industries v. Rajesh Agawral reported in 2000 SCC (Cr) 47 : 1999 C cr LR (SC) 364 and submitted that the Supreme Court in the said decision observed that, the Magistrate taking cognizance of offence need not have territorial jurisdiction to try the case. Any Judicial Magistrate of the First Class has power to take cognizance of any offence, whether committed within his jurisdiction or not. It was also held by the Supreme Court that power of Judicial magistrate of the First Class to take cognizance is not impaired by territorial jurisdiction. ( 5 ) MR. R. S. Chattopadhyay, the learned Advocate for the State submitted that the report of the police officer indicated that the alleged incident took place within the jurisdiction of Faridpur P. S. Naturally, the Hirapur P. S. or the Kulti P. S. had no jurisdiction to investigate into the allegations made in the complaint. Faridpur P. S. falls within the Sub-Division of Durgapur and the learned Magistrate at Asansol had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the written complaint and to direct either the O. C. , Hirapur or O. C. , Kulti P. S. to cause investigation treating the complaint as FIR. The learned Magistrate could have directed the police officer to send back the case diary and the FIR to the concerned police station but could not have passed the order dropping the case as well as investigation. Order of the learned Magistrate dropping the case was not proper when FIR discloses prima facie materials of cognizable offence.
The learned Magistrate could have directed the police officer to send back the case diary and the FIR to the concerned police station but could not have passed the order dropping the case as well as investigation. Order of the learned Magistrate dropping the case was not proper when FIR discloses prima facie materials of cognizable offence. ( 6 ) I have duly considered the submission of the learned Advocates for the parties and perused the impugned order passed by the learned ACJM, asansol in connection with M. P. Case No. 308 of 2006 arising out of C-774 of 2006 which reveal that by order dated 19. 10. 06 the learned ACJM directed the o. C. , Hirapur P. S. for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. treating the complaint as FIR. It is also clear from the order sheet that this petitioner filed the written complaint before the learned Magistrate for investigation under section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. After order dated 19. 10. 06 the learned Magistrate could not have passed the order on 9. 1. 07 dropping the case and directing that petition under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. is rejected. A Magistrate is not empowered to review or recall his own order. As the learned Magistrate himself by the order dated 19. 10. 06 directed for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. treating the complaint as FIR, the said learned Magistrate subsequently by order dated 9. 1. 07 could not have passed the order rejecting the petition under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. and dropping the case. ( 7 ) IN Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal (supra) the factual matrix as well as legal principle was identical. In the said reported decision the appellant company filed a complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate, first Class, Gandhidham (Gujarat) alleging certain offences including offence of cheating against another company located at Indore (Madhya Pradesh) and its directors. The learned Magistrate forwarded the complaint for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. The accused directors moved the High court of Gujarat under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. and a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court quashed the complaint. Thereafter, the complainant company filed the appeal in the Supreme Court.
The learned Magistrate forwarded the complaint for investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. The accused directors moved the High court of Gujarat under Section 482 of the Cr. P. C. and a learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court quashed the complaint. Thereafter, the complainant company filed the appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that, "it is an erroneous view that the Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence must necessarily have territorial jurisdiction to try the case as well. Chapter xiii of the Code relates to jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts "in enquiries and trials". . . . . . . . . Section 193 imposes a restriction on the Court of Session to take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction. But "any" Magistrate of the First Class has the power to take cognizance of any offence, no matter that the offence was committed within his jurisdiction or not. The only restriction contained in Section 190 is that the power to take cognizance is "subject to the provisions of this chapter ". . . . . . . . . . Therefore, when there is nothing in Chapter xiv of the Code to impair the power of a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class taking cognizance of the offence on the strength of territorial reason it is impermissible to deprive such a Magistrate of the power to take cognizance of an offence - of course, in certain special enactments special provisions are incorporated for restricting the power of taking cognizance of offences falling under such acts. . . . . . . . . . The jurisdictional aspect becomes relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises. It is therefore a fallacious thinking that only a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case has the power to take cognizance of the offence. If he is a Magistrate of the First Class his power to take cognizance of the offence is not impaired by territorial restrictions. After taking cognizance he may have to decide as to the Court which has jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post-cognizance stage and not earlier. " ( 8 ) SECTION 460 of the Cr.
After taking cognizance he may have to decide as to the Court which has jurisdiction to enquire into or try the offence and that situation would reach only during the post-cognizance stage and not earlier. " ( 8 ) SECTION 460 of the Cr. P. C. indicates that if any a Magistrate not empowered by law to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 of Cr. P. C. takes cognizance, it is an irregularity which does not vitiate proceeding. Besides this question, the guideline laid down by the Supreme Court clearly indicates that question of territorial jurisdiction, if any, could arise or would become relevant only when the question of enquiry or trial arises. The Supreme Court in several decisions observed that if the written complaint or the FIR prima facie discloses elements of cognizable offence investigation cannot be thwarted at initial stage. While the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in Trisuns Chemical Industry (supra)the Hon 'ble Apex Court was definitely aware of its observations made in catena of decisions relating to investigation on FIR which discloses prima facie materials of cognizable offence. The order passed by the learned Magistrate is accordingly illegal and is set said. It is clear that the learned Magistrate failed to apply proper judicial mind into the matter and acted illegally by dropping the case and also directing rejection of petition under Section 156 (3) of the cr. P. C. when the said Magistrate himself by his earlier order dated 19. 10. 06 directed investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Cr. P. C. treating the written complaint as FIR. It has already been indicated above that a Magistrate cannot recall or review his own order. The learned Magistrate is accordingly directed to proceed into the matter in accordance with law. ( 9 ) THE revisional application is accordingly allowed and disposed of in the light of the observations made above. .