Judgment : P. Jyothimani, J. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 21. 2007 passed in Writ Petition No.7689 of 2002. The first respondent, who is the writ petitioner has filed the writ petition challenging the order of the appellant dated 35. 2001 in and by which the appellant-college has terminated the services of the first respondent as Lecturer in the Department of Malayalam and the same was confirmed by the second respondent, the Director of Collegiate Education by an order dated 12. 2002 and also for a direction to the appellant to reinstate the first respondent as Lecturer in Malayalam with arrears of salary and consequential benefits. .2. The first respondent was appointed as a Lecturer in Malayalam in the appellant college with effect from 26. 1995. The first respondent had applied for leave and the same was not granted by the appellant college. Thereafter he was placed under suspension. The appellant issued a show cause notice for initiating disciplinary proceedings against the first respondent in the proceeding dated 19. 2000. The two charges framed against the first respondent were that he was remained absent unauthorisedly from 37. 2000 and the second charge was that the first respondent has eloped with a former girl student of the appellant college and that he had allegedly married her. The first respondent has submitted his explanation denying the above said charges. In respect of the charge of his illicit relationship with a former student, the first respondent has given explanation that he was forcibly taken to the Sub-Registrars office and made to sign in a document which he later came to now was a deed of agreement to marry one Reeja. 3. The appellant college has appointed one R. Mohanan Nair as enquiry officer to enquire into the alleged charges. On behalf of the appellant-management, the Correspondent, the Secretary of the college end the father-in-law of the first respondent were examined as witnesses. The first respondent has alleged that the entire enquiry was conducted in a biased manner in violation of the principles of natural justice. The first respondent was informed by the appellant on 5. 2001 that the enquiry officer has submitted his report and he was directed to submit his explanation based on the enquiry officers report. Accordingly, the first respondent has submitted his explanation on 5. 2001. The first respondent was informed by the appellant on 5. 2001 that the enquiry officer has submitted his report and he was directed to submit his explanation based on the enquiry officers report. Accordingly, the first respondent has submitted his explanation on 5. 2001. However, the appellant has informed the first respondent that the managing committee, of which the Secretary and the Correspondent of the appellant-college were members, had considered the enquiry report and resolved to terminate the services of the first respondent with retrospective effect from 37. 2000. The first respondent has filed an appeal before the second respondent-Director of Collegiate Education on 16. 2001 and ultimately, the second respondent has confirmed the order of the appellant dated 35. 2001. Aggrieved against the said order of the appellant-college and the second respondent, the first respondent has approached this Court by filing the writ petition. .4. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant in the writ petition, while denying the various averments in the affidavit in support of the writ petition, it was stated the activities of the first respondent were against the interest of the college and its students in committing unethical acts harming the reputation of the institution. It was further stated that it is not true that the first respondent had unknowingly signed the marriage register, but he has voluntarily and willingly married one Reeja and the first respondent is still living with her. Also the first respondent not taken any steps to cancel the marriage he has not produced any cancellation deed. It was also stated that the first respondent was already married to one Anitha Mary and had two children through her. Therefore, the second marriage is actually prohibited under the law applicable to Christians. It is the case of the appellant that the enquiry was conducted and enquiry report was also furnished to the first respondent. But the first respondent had not submitted any reply to the said notice and hence there is no bias. Since it was a serious misconduct on the part of the first respondent harming the reputation of the institution, the said action had to be taken against the first respondent. 5. But the first respondent had not submitted any reply to the said notice and hence there is no bias. Since it was a serious misconduct on the part of the first respondent harming the reputation of the institution, the said action had to be taken against the first respondent. 5. While considering the averments in the affidavit and the counter affidavit and also the contentions raised on behalf of both the parties, learned single Judge, apart from holding the manner in which the enquiry was conducted by the appellant was against the principles of natural justice, has also gone into the merits of the charges levelled against the first respondent concluding that the appellant has failed to prove that the first respondent has married the said Reeja and merely registering of a document, agreeing to marry some one, cannot be taken to be a concluded marriage. However, the learned single Judge has stated that some anti social elements had threatened the first respondent by trespassing into his house and abducting him and obtained the signature in the Sub-Registrars Office, Kanjiramkulam on the same day. It was both on the basis of not following the principles of natural justice as well as on merit that the authorities have not proved the charges, the learned single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the first respondent by setting aside the order of punishment with a direction to the appellant to re-instate the first respondent with continuity of service and 50% of arrears of salary calculated from the date of his dismissal within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the order. It is as against the said order of the learned single Judge, the second respondent/management in the writ petition has filed the present writ appeal. .6. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant is about the conduct of the first respondent. The appellant has relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court reported in 2006 9 Scale 459 , wherein the Apex Court held that it is the teachers, who mould its future citizens by imparting to his students not only knowledge, but also a sense of duty, righteousness and dedication to the welfare of nation and in such circumstances, the conduct of the first respondent will only mislead the future citizens and therefore this cannot be taken lightly on the technical grounds. It is also the grievance of the appellant that the learned single Judge having come to the conclusion that the enquiry was not conducted in conformity with principles of natural justice, ought not to have gone into the merits of the charges framed against the first respondent. It is also the further case of the appellant that the appellant institution being a Christian minority institution has followed the principles of natural justice by giving adequate opportunity to the first respondent and passed orders in accordance with law. The appellant has further stated that the Correspondent and Secretary of the appellant-college happened to be the constituents of the institution and as such they had to be necessarily present in the committee while considering the enquiry report filed by the enquiry officer and therefore it is a matter of necessity which cannot vitiate the proceedings. 7. On the other hand, Mr. R. Yashod Varadhan, learned senior counsel, who has taken notice on behalf of the first respondent, who was writ petitioner, would submit that the manner in which the enquiry was conducted by the appellant is totally against the basic concept of principles of natural justice in the sense that the Secretary and Correspondent of the college having given evidence against the first respondent have chosen to sit as committee members to pass an order of dismissal, which is basically against the principles of natural justice. 8. We heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the first respondent and perused the records. 9. It is not in dispute that in the enquiry conducted against the first respondent-lecturer, the Secretary and the Correspondent of the appellant-college have given evidence against the first respondent. It is true that in addition to the above said two witnesses, on the side of the management, the father-in-law of the first respondent was also examined as a witness. On fact it is also not in dispute that the enquiry officers report was placed before the committee of the appellant/management in which the Correspondent as well as the Secretary of the college also sitting to decide about the enquiry officers report, which has ultimately resulted in the passing of the impugned order of termination of the services of the first respondent. 10. 10. Therefore, on the face of it without going into the merits of the charges framed against the first respondent, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the impugned orders are devoid of any legal sanction, since it violates the principles of natural justice. Unfortunately, the persons who has given evidence against the first respondent-lecturer have themselves decided to terminate the services of the first respondent, as disciplinary authority which is not only against the legal norms but also against the principles of natural justice. 11. In the case of Uttar Pradesh State v. Mohd. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 the five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the order of dismissal passed against a Head constable by the District Superintendent of Police, who has given evidence in the same case against the head constable and also passed an order of dismissal against him. Even though the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court have held that the writ petition is not maintainable, since the said order of dismissal was passed on 20.4.1948, which was confirmed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police on 6. 1949 and subsequent appeal was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police on 24. 1950, on the basis that the High Court could not have got the jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India before such powers were given under the Constitution even if the violation of principles of natural justice is prima facie found. In the dissenting judgment given by MR. VIVIAN BOSE, J., it was held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 the Constitution of India can be exercised retrospectively and in that case by the time the appellate authority has passed orders confirming dismissal, which was in April 1950, the Constitution has already come into existence. In the dissenting judgment given by MR. VIVIAN BOSE, J., it was held that the jurisdiction under Article 226 the Constitution of India can be exercised retrospectively and in that case by the time the appellate authority has passed orders confirming dismissal, which was in April 1950, the Constitution has already come into existence. The learned Judge has expressed the importance of the principles of natural justice as a principle to inspire confidence in the mind of the public regarding fairness of enquiry and has observed as follows: “…Apparently, no other witness was available, so the District Superintendent of Police, who seems to have had personal knowledge about the facts, stepped down from the Bench and got his testimony recorded by another authority, once before charge and gain after charge, and each time, after that was done, stepped back on to the Bench in order solemnly to decide whether he should believe his own testimony in preference to that of the witness who, in his judgment, had committed perjury and gone back on the truth. It hardly matters whether this was done in good faith or whether the truth lay that way because the spectacle of a Judge hopping on and off the Bench to act first as Judge, then as witness, then as Judge again to determine whether he should believe himself in preference to another witness, is startling to say the least. It would doubtless delight the hearts of a Gilbert and Sullivan Comic Opera audience but will hardly inspire public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of departmental trials; and certainly not in the mind of the respondent. Even before the Constitution, departmental trials were instituted to instill a sense of security in the services and inspire Confidence in the public about the treatment accorded to Government servants. The question in these cases is always: “Whether it is likely to produce in the minds of the litigant or the public at large a reasonable doubt about the fairness of the administration of justice." (S) AIR 1957 SC 425 (A)) 27. On of the English cases relied on by this Court in the case just cited was the House of Lords decision in Forme United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices 1926 AC 5S6 (Q). At p. 600 LORD ATKINSON cited an instance which is almost on all fours with the present case. On of the English cases relied on by this Court in the case just cited was the House of Lords decision in Forme United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices 1926 AC 5S6 (Q). At p. 600 LORD ATKINSON cited an instance which is almost on all fours with the present case. He said: "It could not possibly have been intended by this statute to authorise a practice which would, I think, be inconsistent with the proper administration of justice — namely, that a licensing justice, one of the members of the compensation authority, should, on a given occasion, descend from the Bench, give his evidence on oath, and then return to his place upon the Bench to give a decision possibly based on his own evidence." The matter is, as I said, covered by authority and I need say no more except that, even if it were not, I would have had no hesitation in reaching the same conclusion." 12. In Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and Others AIR 993 SC 2155, the Supreme Court by reiterating the principle that no man shall be a judge in is own cause, observed as follows: "10. Since the rules of natural justice were not embodied rules, it is not possible and practicable to precisely define the parameter of natural justice. In Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All ER 109, TUCKER, L.J. observed: "There are, in my view, no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and the every kind of domestic Tribunal. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with, and so forth." It has been observed by this Court in Union of India v. P.K Roy, AIR 1968 SC 850 , that: "The extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case." Similar view was also expressed in A.K. Kraipaks case, AIR 1970 SC 150 (ibid). The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case." Similar view was also expressed in A.K. Kraipaks case, AIR 1970 SC 150 (ibid). This Court observed: "What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a Court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened, the Court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case." PROF. WADE in his ADMINISTRATIVE LAW has succinctly summarised the principle of natural justice to the following effect: "It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: not as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject matter, the application for principles of natural justice, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject-matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice depend on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth." One of the cardinal principles of natural justice is “Nemo debet esse judex in propria cuasa" (No man shall be a judge in his own cause). The deciding authority must be impartial and without bias. It has been held by this Court in Secretary to Govt. Transport Dept. v. Munuswamy, AIR 1988 SC 2232 : (1988) Supp. SCC 651, that a predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. The deciding authority must be impartial and without bias. It has been held by this Court in Secretary to Govt. Transport Dept. v. Munuswamy, AIR 1988 SC 2232 : (1988) Supp. SCC 651, that a predisposition to decide for or against one party without proper regard to the true merits of the dispute is bias. Personal bias is one of the three major limbs of bias namely pecuniary bias, personal bias and official bias. A classic case of personal bias was revealed in the decision of this Court in Uttar Pradesh State v. Mohd. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 . In the said case a departmental enquiry was held against an employee. One of the witnesses against the employee turned hostile. The officer holding the enquiry than left the enquiry gave evidence against the employee and thereafter resumed to complete the enquiry and passed the order of dismissal. This Court quashed the order of dismissal by holding inter alia that the rules of natural justice were grievously violated." (emphasis supplied) 13. Even though it is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the conduct of the first respondent affects the educational atmosphere in the college, which is attractive, has no substance on the facts and circumstances of the case. There is absolutely no dispute that such conduct should not be encouraged, but the same should be subject to the principles of law, especially in conformity with the concept of natural justice Hence, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the appellant is liable to be set aside on the ground of principles of natural justice and accordingly the same is set aside since the impugned order of dismissal pass, against the first respondent is set aside on the ground of not following the principles of natural justice, we are also of the view that it is n. proper to go into the charges levelled against the first respondent. 14. In view of the above said facts, the writ appeal stands partly allowed. The observation of the learned single Judge regarding the merit of the charges framed against the first respondent are sat aside, but the order of the learned single Judge is confirmed only on the ground of not following the principles of natural justice. 14. In view of the above said facts, the writ appeal stands partly allowed. The observation of the learned single Judge regarding the merit of the charges framed against the first respondent are sat aside, but the order of the learned single Judge is confirmed only on the ground of not following the principles of natural justice. It is open to the appellant/management to proceed afresh against the first respondent on the charges levelled against him after following the principles of natural justice and pass orders in accordance with law after giving adequate opportunity to the first respondent without taking into consideration the order of the learned single Judge regarding the merit of the charges levelled against the first respondent. No costs. Consequently, M.P.No.1 of 2007 is closed. Writ appeal partly allowed.