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Allahabad High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 2705 (ALL)

MANOJ KUMAR PANDEY v. STATE O

2007-11-02

ALOK KUMAR SINGH

body2007
ALOK K. SINGH, J. This petition under section 482 Cr. P. C. has been filed to quash the order dated 20. 9. 2007 passed by Sri A. K. Rastogi, the then Sessions Judge, Lucknow, in Sessions Trial No. 679 of 2007 (State v. Brijesh Kumar Tiwari and others) through which the petitioner and one more person (non-applicant) have been summoned under section 319 Cr. P. C. to face the trial along with other accused persons. The sessions trial is proceeding under sections 320/120-B I. P. C. 2. Heard Sri Nagendra Mohan, learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned A. G. A. and Sri Mukul Rakesh, learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2 and perused the record. 3. The facts, wrapped in brevity, are that according to prosecution the deceased Anwar was shot at by accused Brijesh Kumar Tiwari and Kanhai Misra. The F. I. R. of this incident was lodged by Sri Anjani Kumar Pathak on 29. 3. 2003 at 5. 30 P. M. (annexure-1 ). According to the version of the F. I. R. the pistols which were used by Brijesh Kumar Tiwari and Kanhai Misra were supplied by the petitioner Manoj Kumar Pandey and Constable Rakesh Pandey who had come at the gate of lock up along with an unidentified person. Further according to the prosecution those pistols were recovered from the possession of Brijesh Kumar Tiwari and Kanhai Misra accused regarding which also another F. I. R. was lodged by Sri P. K. Shukla, Inspector Incharge Kotwali, Rae Bareli under sections 3/25 Arms Act on the same day i. e. 29. 3. 2003 under case crime Nos. 103 of 2003 and 104 of 2003. The deceased is said to has received two fire arm wounds of entry on his person. After completing the investigation the charge-sheet was submitted, against Brijesh Kumar Tiwari, Kanhai Misra, Constable Ram Awadh Ram and Chandra Mani, The petitioner Manoj Kumar Pandey and Rakesh Kumar Pandey (non-petitioner) were not charge-sheeted. 4. After framing of the charges on 23. 11. 2004. against the aforesaid four accused the statements of five witnesses were recorded. Then for the first time after recording the examination-in-chief of Anjani Kumar Pathak (P. W. 6) the prosecution moved an application under section 319 Cr. P. C. for summoning the petitioner and Ram Kumar Pandey (non-petitioner ). Meanwhile on an application moved by the accused persons under section 407 Cr. Then for the first time after recording the examination-in-chief of Anjani Kumar Pathak (P. W. 6) the prosecution moved an application under section 319 Cr. P. C. for summoning the petitioner and Ram Kumar Pandey (non-petitioner ). Meanwhile on an application moved by the accused persons under section 407 Cr. P. C. the session trial was transferred from Sessions Court Rae Bareli to the Sessions Court, Lucknow. 5. The learned Sessions Judge, Lucknow allowed the application under section 319 Cr. P. C. and summoned the petitioner and aforesaid non-petitioner Rakesh Kumar Pandey vide impugned order (annexure-3 ). 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that only examination-in-chief of Anjani Kumar Pathak (P. W. 6) has been conducted and therefore in absence of any opportunity to cross-examine, it cannot be treated as complete evidence for the purposes of passing an order under section 31 Cr. P. C. 7. The provisions of section 31 Cr. P. C. are extracted hereinbelow:- 319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.- (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such persons could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court although not under arrest or upon summons, may be detained by; such Court for the purpose of inquiry into or trial of, the offence. which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then- (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh and the witness re-heard; (b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. In the case of Hanuman Prasad v. State of U. P. and another (Criminal Misc. Case No. 572 to 2007, decided by this Court on 1. 3. 2007-AFR) it was observed that in Criminal Procedure Code the word evidence has not been defined. In the case of Hanuman Prasad v. State of U. P. and another (Criminal Misc. Case No. 572 to 2007, decided by this Court on 1. 3. 2007-AFR) it was observed that in Criminal Procedure Code the word evidence has not been defined. For this purpose recourse may be had to the Evidence Act wherein the word evidence has been defined as under:- " Evidence":- "evidence" means and includes- (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence; (2) all documents produced for the inspection of the court; such documents are called documentary evidence. In the instant case the examination-in-chief of the witness has been admittedly recorded. The maintainability of an application under section 319 Cr. P. C. is not subject to the condition of cross-examination of a particular witness or more than one witnesses. 8. In the case of Rakesh and another v. State of Haryana (2001 (43) ACC 392 (SC)), also it was laid down by Honble the Apex Court that the question to cross-examining the witness arises only after addition of the accused. There is no question of cross-examination of the witnesses prior to adding such person as accused. Section 319 Cr. P. C. does not contemplate an additional stage of first summoning the person and giving him an opportunity to cross-examine the witness who has deposed against him and thereafter deciding whether such person is to be added as accused or not. Therefore in view of the above proposition of law the first point raised on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. Another submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the Court below has not recorded its satisfaction to the effect that in all likelihood the newly added accused would be convicted. 9. This point entails consideration in the following manner. In the case of "palanisamy Gounder and another v. State represented by Inspector of Police" ( 2005 (12) SCC 327 ) it was held that a fishing inquiry is not contemplated. It was further observed that the manner in which power under section 319 Cr. 9. This point entails consideration in the following manner. In the case of "palanisamy Gounder and another v. State represented by Inspector of Police" ( 2005 (12) SCC 327 ) it was held that a fishing inquiry is not contemplated. It was further observed that the manner in which power under section 319 Cr. P. C. deserves to be exercised has been laid in Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2000 (40) ACC 795 (SC) = (2000) 3 SCC 262 ) saying that unless the Court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case against the newly added accused ending in their conviction for the offence concerned, the Court shall refrain from adding them as accused. Similarly, in the case of Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka (2004 (50) ACC 343 (SC) = (2004) 7 SCC 792 ), It was said that the power is discretionary and should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice and that the Court should not turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has already proceeded and the quantum of evidence collected till then and also the amount of time which the Court had spent for collecting such evidence. The Court, while examining an application under section 319 Cr. P. C. , has also to bear in mind that there is no compelling duty on the Court to proceed against other persons. In a nutshell, it means that for exercise of discretion under section 319 Cr. P. C. all relevant factors, including the one noticed above, have to be kept in view and an order is not required to be made mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence had come c. i record implicating the person sought to be added as an accused. " The Honble Apex Court in its recent judgment rendered in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq and another (2007 (58) ACC 254 (SC)) has reiterated that powers under section 319 Cr. P. C. should be exercised where there exists a possibility that accused so summoned in all likelihood would be convicted and such satisfaction should be arrived at. 10. Shafi v. Mohd. Rafiq and another (2007 (58) ACC 254 (SC)) has reiterated that powers under section 319 Cr. P. C. should be exercised where there exists a possibility that accused so summoned in all likelihood would be convicted and such satisfaction should be arrived at. 10. From the principles laid down by Honble the Apex Court in the aforesaid often quoted case laws, it therefore, comes out that besides performing a judicial exercise keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has already proceeded etc. , the could should exercise this discretionary power under section 31 Cr. P. C. sparingly and should also see that "there exists a possibility that accused so summoned in all likelihood would be convicted" as laid down in the case of Mohd. Shafi (supra) or there is reasonable prospect of the case against the newly added accused ending in conviction as held in the case of Michael Machado (supra ). There should be such evidence where newly added person will have to defend. Such summoning should not be merely on the ground that some evidence had come on record implicating the person sought to be added as an accused. Therefore, such satisfaction has to be arrived at on the basis of the evidence on record. Unless such satisfaction regarding likelihood of conviction is recorded in so many words while passing an order under section 319 Cr. P. C. , it would be difficult to ascertain as to whether or not the Court concerned has satisfied itself on this point. 11. In the impugned order according to the learned A. C. A. this satisfaction has been recorded. But the perusal of the order shows that in fact no such satisfaction has been recorded. The learned lower Court has merely mentioned in the impugned order that there is prima facie evidence to show that Manoj Kumar Pandey (petitioner) and Rakesh Kumar Pandey named in the F. I. R. have committed an offence for which they can be tried together. In other words some evidence has come on record implicating both the persons sought to be implicated which is not a sufficient ground as clearly laid down in the case of Krishnappa (supra ). Thus the recording of the such satisfaction to the effect that there exists a possibility that both the accused so summoned, in all likelihood is wanting. 12. Thus the recording of the such satisfaction to the effect that there exists a possibility that both the accused so summoned, in all likelihood is wanting. 12. In the result the impugned order deserves to be and is accordingly quashed. The lower Court may, however, pass an order afresh in this regard in accordance with the provision of law and in view of the principles laid down by Honble the Apex Court in the aforementioned cases or other cases. With these observations this petition under section 482 Cr. P. C. is finally disposed of. .