Judgment :- Common Order: These revisions are directed against the Order of District Munsif Court, Vellore, dismissing the applications I.A.Nos.412, 413/2003 in O.S.No.1490/1994, declining to condone the delay in filing the restoration Petition and to restore the Petition filed under Or.9 R.13 CPC. 2. Factual background of the case are as follows:- 2. 1. The Respondent/Plaintiff filed O.S.No.1490/1994 for partition. Defendants 2 and 4 have entered appearance and filed their Written Statement. Because of their nonappearance, they were set exparte and Preliminary Decree was passed on 19.02.2001. 2. 2. Petitioner/D-4 filed I.A.No.208/2001 under Or.9 R.13 CPC to set aside the exparte Decree passed on 19.02.2001. That application was allowed on condition to pay cost of Rs.100/- on or before 30.11.2001. Since cost was not paid, I.A.No.208/2001 was dismissed on 30.11.2001. 3. Respondent/Plaintiff filed I.A.No.80/2002 for Final Decree. In the said application, the Petitioner/D-4 entered appearance and took time for filing counter. After receiving notice in the Final Decree application, the Petitioner filed I.A.Nos.412 and 413/2003 for setting aside the Order in I.A.No.208/2001 along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 266 days in filing restoration application. The Respondent/Plaintiff resisted the applications. Finding that no satisfactory reason is given for the delay, the trial Court dismissed both the applications which are challenged in these Revision Petitions. 3. On behalf of the Petitioner, learned Counsel Mr.T.Dhanyakumar has interalia contended that time for payment of cost can be extended in view of the latest decision of the Division Bench in 2006 (2) MLJ 729 . Placing reliance upon 1956 (1) MLJ 496 , it was contended where a counsel reports no instructions, the Court ought to have sent notice to the Defendant so as to afford an opportunity. Submitting that the Defendants claim right to the property through Settlement Deed, the learned Counsel contended that unless an opportunity is given to the Revision Petitioner, he would be deprived of his valuable right to defend the suit. 4. Taking me through the dates and events, the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff submitted that both the applications were filed only after the Petitioner entered appearance in the Final Decree stage and reason for non-payment of cost has not been satisfactorily explained. 4. Taking me through the dates and events, the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Plaintiff submitted that both the applications were filed only after the Petitioner entered appearance in the Final Decree stage and reason for non-payment of cost has not been satisfactorily explained. Submitting that the matter is pending in the Final Decree stage, the learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that if the applications are to be restored at this stage, the Plaintiff, who is a Pardhanisan woman, would be subjected to great hardship. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon the following two decisions - 2006 (4) TLNJ 298 and 2006 (5) CTC 649 . 5. The main contention of the Petitioner is, under Section 148 CPC, even after expiry of the period already granted, the Court has jurisdiction to extend the period subsequently. The learned Counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Division Bench reported in 2006(2) MLJ 729 . In the said decision, in a referred matter, observing that exercising power under Section 148 CPC, Court has power to extend the time beyond the stipulated period when sufficient cause exist, Division Bench of this Court has held as under:- "16. The above decision would make it clear that the Court cannot be made helpless or powerless where the upper limit fixed under Section 148 cannot take away the power of the Court under Section 151 to pass orders, as may be necessary, for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court. The rigid operation, as contained in Section 148, without considering Section 151, as laid down by the Supreme Court, would lead to absurdity. Therefore, both the Sections have to be read together, in order to find out, whether the petition for extension of time can be entertained or not. 17. The duty of the Court of Law is to administer justice, sometimes loosening the rigors of the procedural law. It is the substantive justice, which should be administered and not the procedural justice. Procedure is meant to facilitate the way for the administration of real justice and not to defeat it. .18. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N.v. Union of India, Sections 148 and 151 CPC allow extension of time, even if the original period fixed has expired. Similarly, Section 149 also is equally liberal in this respect. 19. .18. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N.v. Union of India, Sections 148 and 151 CPC allow extension of time, even if the original period fixed has expired. Similarly, Section 149 also is equally liberal in this respect. 19. So, a conjoint reading of Sections 148,149 and 151 CPC would make it clear that the Court has power to extend time beyond the stipulated period, when sufficient cause exists or events pointed out to the Court for non-compliance of the order are beyond the control of the party, as the object of the Code is not to promote failure of justice.” 6. In this case, I.A.No.412/2003 is not filed under Section 148 CPC seeking extension of time for payment of cost ordered in I.A.No.208/2001. That application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to restore I.A.No.208/2001. However, the wrong quoting of provision may not be an impediment in considering the merits of the application. 7. The main point falling for consideration is whether the Petitioner has made out sufficient cause for not paying the cost as ordered in I.A.No.208/2001. 8. The suit for partition if the year 1991. The Respondent/Plaintiff filed the suit for partition against her brothers. Defendants 2 and 4 have filed Written Statement strongly opposing the partition Suit. Plaintiff was examined in Chief as PW-1 on 110. 2000. Inspite of several opportunities, Defendants 2 and 4 have not cross-examined the Plaintiff till 19.02.2001, on which date, the Petitioner was set exparte and Preliminary Decree was passed. The application I.A.No.208/2001 filed under Or.9 R.13 CPC was allowed on payment of conditional cost of meagre sum of Rs.100/-, on or before 211. 2001. Even that meagre of cost was not paid. 9. According to the Petitioner, his brother D-4/ Chanbasha, who was looking after the case feel ill, has not informed the Petitioner about the said Order due to his sickness and he was not be able to pay cost of Rs.100, as ordered by the Court. No evidence was produced showing the illness of D-4. Even if D-4 was ill, nothing prevented the Petitioner from enquiring his counsel about the case, particularly when Preliminary Decree was already passed. .10. Both the applications were filed only after the Plaintiff has filed Final Decree application in I.A.No.80/2002. Yet another conduct of the Petitioner is to be noted. No evidence was produced showing the illness of D-4. Even if D-4 was ill, nothing prevented the Petitioner from enquiring his counsel about the case, particularly when Preliminary Decree was already passed. .10. Both the applications were filed only after the Plaintiff has filed Final Decree application in I.A.No.80/2002. Yet another conduct of the Petitioner is to be noted. The impugned Order was passed on 02.02.2005. Immediately thereafter, copy application was not filed; but made only on 09.03.2005. In the mean time, in the Final Decree application, Advocate Commissioner was appointed on 24.02.2005 and remuneration of Rs.3000/- was also deposited by the Plaintiff. Advocate Commissioner has inspected the properties on 23.07.2005. Only thereafter, after obtaining certified copy of the impugned Order, CRP was filed in October 2005. There appears to be deliberate delay at every stage. Reasons for non payment of cost of Rs.100/- and the delay in filing restoration application are not convincing. 11. Party claiming indulgence must prove that he was reasonably diligent in prosecuting the proceedings. In the present case, it can hardly be said to be reasonable cause or proper explanation for condonation of delay. 12. Yet another point is to be noted. Preliminary Decree was passed on 19.02.2001 which remains unchallenged. Out of four Defendants, only D-4 is contesting the suit. Other Defendants are not contesting. When the matter is pending at the Final Decree stage and the Commissioner has also visited the premises to effect partition, to restore the application to set aside the Decree passed in Preliminary Decree way back in 2001 would cause serious prejudice to the Plaintiff, who is a pardhanishan woman. There should be an end to the litigation, to avoid uncertainties and possibilities of the parties being dragged into Court for an indefinite period. This is all the more so, when the Respondent/Plaintiff is a Pardhanishan woman who has filed the suit against her brothers claiming her due share in the family property. In 2006 (4) TLNJ 298 = 2006 (5) CTC 822 [Kaliammal & others Vs. Sundharammal & others], dealing with Section 5 application filed in the Final Decree stage, holding that interest of justice requires that there must be an end to the litigation or otherwise, right accrued to the opposite party would be unsettled by the uncertainties of litigation, I have held as follows:- "20. Sundharammal & others], dealing with Section 5 application filed in the Final Decree stage, holding that interest of justice requires that there must be an end to the litigation or otherwise, right accrued to the opposite party would be unsettled by the uncertainties of litigation, I have held as follows:- "20. The learned Counsel for the Revision Petitioners contended that to advance substantial justice, the Revision Petitioners ought to be given an opportunity. While considering this plea, the right accrued to the other side ought to be kept in view. When there is deliberate delay, the Petitioners cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserve to be preferred as against technical consideration. 21. In 2003 (1) LW 585, [Sundar Gnanaolivu rep. By his Power of Attorney Agent Vs. Rajendran Gnanavolivy rep. By its Power of Attorney Agent], a Division Bench of this Court has held as under:- “14.A. In yet another Division Bench Judgment reported in 1990 (1) LLN 457 [Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Ltd. Tuticorin Vs. Appelalte Authority under the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, Madurai and another], the principles relating to rule of limitation have been discussed and the legal position has been stated by His Lordship Mr.Justice M.Srinivasan as he then was, in paragraphs 14 and 17 which read as under: “14. .... If a litigant chooses to approach the Court long after the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, he cannot say that no prejudice would be caused to the other side by the delay being condoned. The other side would have in all probability destroyed the records thinking that the records would not be relevant as there was no further proceeding in the matter. Hence to view a matter of condonation of delay with a presupposition that no prejudice will be caused by the condonation of delay to the Respondent in that application will be fallacious. In our view, each case has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the case. Length of the delay is a relevant matter to be taken into account while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. It is not open to any litigant to fix his own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which law has prescribed periods of limitation. 17. ... Length of the delay is a relevant matter to be taken into account while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. It is not open to any litigant to fix his own period of limitation for instituting proceedings for which law has prescribed periods of limitation. 17. ... Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long time, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay, and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that substantial justice deserved to be preferred as against technical considerations. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. Rules of limitation are based on principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. Is a litigant liable to have a Damocles’ sword hanging over his head indefinitely for a period to be determined at the whims and fancies of he opponent?” 13. The contention of the Plaintiff that exparte Preliminary Decree would cause serious prejudice to the Petitioner has no force. The Respondent/Plaintiff is sister of the Petitioner who claims 1/9th share in the properties. In the suit only lawful 1/9th share of the Plaintiff has been decreed. The Revision Petitioner cannot be heard to contend that partition of Plaintiffs lawful share has caused serious prejudice to him. 14. In consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, pointing out the inaction on the part of the Revision Petitioner, the trial Court has rightly declined to condone the delay. When the trial Court has exercised its discretion refusing to condone the delay, the revisional Court would not interfere with it, unless it is perverse or illogical. The impugned Order does not suffer from any perversity or serious infirmity calling for interference. 15. In the result, the order dated 02.02.2005, made in I.A. Nos.413, 412/2003 in O.S.No.1490/1994, on the file of the Additional District Munsif Court, Vellore, is confirmed and this Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, CMP No.20028/2005 is also dismissed.