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2007 DIGILAW 275 (CAL)

Zinder Ali Sk. v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2007-04-05

AMIT TALUKDAR, RUDRENDRA NATH BANERJEE

body2007
JUDGMENT Amit Talukdar, J.: Pursuant to a charge-sheet submitted by P.W. 14, Hari Sankar Pandey, the Investigating Officer of this case, the sole appellant herein was arrayed in Sessions Trial No. VIII (3)/05 before the learned Fast Track, Fourth Court, Krishnanagar, Nadia, to answer the following charges: "(a) That you on 23.2.03 evening on the way of the complainant at Sukpukur under P.S. Nakashipara, District Nadia committed rape on Chandmoni Khatun and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 376 of IPC. (b) That you on 23.2.2003 in the evening near the house of complainant at Sukpukur under P.S. Nakashipara, District Nadia committed rape on Chandmoni Khatun with a promise to marry her and thereafter you continued to have sexual intercourse with her with intention to cheat and then you cheated her and thereby committed offence punishable under section 417 of IPC. (c) That you on or about 23.2.2003 at Sukpukur P.S. Nakashipara, District Nadia, agree with Naki Mollick illicit connection with and Jinder Ali Sk. and that the same act was done in pursuance of the agreement and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 120B of IPC." 2. Since the appellant pleaded not guilty, he was placed on trial and the prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 14 witnesses, of which P.W. 1 is the victim girl herself, P.Ws. 6 and 11 were her parents, P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4 were witnesses to the salish held for settling the incident, P.W.5 was an Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police who recorded the formal FIR (Ext,2) instituted on the basis of the petition filed by P.W.1 under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. P.W.8 was a lady home guard who produced the victim girl before P. W. 7, the Medical Officer of Sadar Hospital, Krishnanagar who medically examined the victim girl on 08.8.2003, P.W. 9 was an N.V.F. constable who produced the appellant on 23.10.2003 before P.W.10, another doctor who was Superintendent, Sadar Hospital, Krishnanagar, who found him capable to perform sexual intercourse, P.W.12 was a constable who produced the co-accused who being a juvenile was tried separately, P.W.13. was the learned Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the statement of the proseecutrix (P.W.1) under section 164 (Ext.6). 3. The defence was a case of false implication. 4. Mr. P. S. Bhattacharyya, learned Counsel apperaring with Mr. was the learned Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the statement of the proseecutrix (P.W.1) under section 164 (Ext.6). 3. The defence was a case of false implication. 4. Mr. P. S. Bhattacharyya, learned Counsel apperaring with Mr. Ranjit Kumar Sanyal and Bidyut Baran Biswas, learned Advocates, placed a number of points for consideration in this appeal. Mr. Bhattacharyya at the outset submitted that the date and time of the occurrence could not be properly established by the prosecution and the original copy of the petition under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of which P.W. 5 recorded the formal FIR was not filed, but only on the basis of xerox copy action was taken. Mr. Bhattacharyya also submitted that there was sufficient delay in filing the said petition which only goes to show the falsity of the prosecution case. 5. Developing his argument further Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that the crux of the prosecution case related to a salish held over the alleged incident against the appellant. But surprisingly enough the said salish was not brought on record. As such, any evidence on this point was liable to be disbelieved. Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that the evidence of P.W.1, prosecutrix was an uncorroborated testimony and no importance should have been given in view of the incongruities in the prosecution case. 6. Mr. Bhattacharyya further submitted that the allegation against the appellant with regard to the promise of marriage, given to the prosecutrix (P.W.1) could not be established by the prosecution on the basis of the evidence adduced. Accordingly he was of the view that the second charge in respect of section 417 of the Indian Penal Code cannot stand. He referred to the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 11 and showed us in the light of the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer (P.W.14) that for the first time in Court those witnesses spoke with regard to the salish and the actual incident and as such, those evidence should be altogether left out of consideration. 7. Lastly, Mr. 2, 3, 4, 6 and 11 and showed us in the light of the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer (P.W.14) that for the first time in Court those witnesses spoke with regard to the salish and the actual incident and as such, those evidence should be altogether left out of consideration. 7. Lastly, Mr. Bhattacharyya submitted that as the place of occurrence was a busy place and it was most unlikely that no other person noticed the actual incident when the appellant along with his another associate (tried by the Juvenile Court) dragged P.W.1 the prosecutrix for committing the offence and submitted that there was sufficient improbabilities in the prosecution case which rendered the entire conviction recorded by the Fast Track, Fourth Court as illegal and should be set aside. 8. Mr. S. K. Mahata, learned Senior Counsel for the State appearing with Mrs. Sireen Sultana, learned Advocate, opposed all the submissions of Mr. Bhattacharyya. Mr. Mahata submitted that the evidence of P.W.1 by itself was sufficient to warrant conviction of the appellant as it was trustworthy and it fitted with all other surrounding evidence on record. He further submitted that if the evidence of P.W.1 is read alongside the evidence of the Medical Officer i.e. P.W.7 then there is nothing further required for the prosecution to prove its case as the medical evidence completely goes in support of the prosecution evidence and the appeal bearing no merit was liable to be dismissed. 9. As a part of his submission Mr. Mahata referred to the decision of Yedla Srinivasa Rao vs. State of A.P., 2007(1) SCC (Cri) 557. 10. We have heard the submissions made at the Bar and have perused the evidence and materials on record. We will now proceed to evaluate the same in the light of the submissions made by the learned Counsels for the appellant and the State and would see as to whether the conviction of the appellant in respect of the aforesaid charges can be maintained. 11. As we have seen earlier the appellant was arraigned before the learned Fast Track, Fourth Court to answer the three distinct head of charges viz.(a) section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, (b) section 417 of the Indian penal Code and (c) section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 12. 11. As we have seen earlier the appellant was arraigned before the learned Fast Track, Fourth Court to answer the three distinct head of charges viz.(a) section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, (b) section 417 of the Indian penal Code and (c) section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 12. We would at first take up the first charge in respect of section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. 13. In order to prove its case against the appellant in respect of the said charge the prosecution is required to prove that there must have been sexual intercourse by a man (the appellant) with a woman against her consent and it falls within any of the circumstances, as mentioned in the six clauses of section 375 of the Indian Penal Code. 14. In order to appreciate the prosecution case in a wholesome fashion it would be profitable to advert to the version of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) in her FIR (Ext. 2). She has specifically made out a case that she was below eighteen years of age and used to work in a weaver's shop to sustain her family. The appellant used to allure her by way of giving various ill-proposals; while the other accused (who has been tried as a juvenile) hatched a conspiracy to violate her. 15. On the date of occurrence when it was quite dark she was accosted by the appellant and was sought to be violated; but, as the raised an alarm she was threatened to be killed by the appellant and forcibly violated against her will and the offence was abetted by the other accused (who has been tried as a juvenile). Juvenile accused also used to entice her. Thereafter the appellant violated her for several times against her will under threat and she was given a false assurance that he would marry her. Taking advantage of her helplessness she was further violated against her will. 16. On 20.2.2003 since the appellant finally refused to marry her she informed her parents and neighbours about the incident. As such, a village salish was held on 24.2.2003, but however the appellant refused to marry her. 17. This persuaded the prosecutrix (P.W.1) to approach the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnanagar by way of filing a petition under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 27.2.2003. 18. As such, a village salish was held on 24.2.2003, but however the appellant refused to marry her. 17. This persuaded the prosecutrix (P.W.1) to approach the Court of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnanagar by way of filing a petition under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 27.2.2003. 18. On the basis of the same the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnanagar directed Nakashipara Police Station for causing an investigation into the said allegation and subsequently issued tagid to the said police station. 19. Strangely enough the said petition (Ext. 1) was treated as an FIR only on 19.7.2003 by P.W.5, ASI, Sanjoy Upadhya, attached to the Nakashipara Police Station and P.W.14, Hari Sankar Pandey was entrusted with the investigation of the said case. 20. Before proceeding further we would like to record our anguish with the manner in which the Nakashipara Police Station sat over the petition (Ext. 1) filed by the prosecutrix (P.W.1) under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Krishnanagar way back on 27.2.2003 and for months together did not care to register a formal FIR. Recently the Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumari vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors., 2006(1) SCC (Cri) 678, held that the provision of section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is mandatory and the police officer concerned is duty-bound to register the case on receiving information disclosing a cognizable offence and the genuineness or credibility of the information cannot, be a condition precedent for registration of an FIR. 21. In view of the same definitely there has been an errant step by the investigating agency but, however, we feel simply because of such lapse the prosecution, as a whole, cannot suffer. 22. Coming back to the substantive evidence of the prosecutrix as P.W.1 we find she has substantially corroborated her earlier version and stated that on the date of occurrence she used to work in a weaver's shop and while on her way to home she was regularly approached by the appellant with the proposal of marriage, which she turned down, on the ground that as she was very poor he wanted to marry her according to the choice of her father (P.W.6). On the date of occurrence when she was returning home it was a dark night. On the date of occurrence when she was returning home it was a dark night. The appellant forcibly caught her and pushed a napkin in her mouth and forcibly violated her. Subsequently on the point of threat she was violated for 2/3 days and her wearing apparels (Mat. Ext. 1) were torn. 23. Due to fear of her life she did not disclose the incident but after 2/3 days of the incident the appellant refused to marry her and she informed the incident to her parents whereupon a salish was held in the village and the appellant declined to abide by the decision of salish. 24. From her evidence we find that she approached the police station and was advised to settle the matter amicably otherwise to file a case in the Court. She also made a statement (Ext.6) before the Judicial Magistrate (P.W.13) and was medico-legally treated by Dr. Promotha Kr. Roy (P.W.7) and her wearing apparels were seized. 25. Simmering differences may be apparent in the evidence of the prosecutrix with the earlier version; but, at best as the maker of the FIR her earlier version can stand corroborated under section 157 of the Evidence Act or contradicted in the light of section 145 of the Evidence Act. 26. Thus far and no further. 27. What we have before us is the substantive evidence of the prosecutrix that- she was violated by the appellant against her consent; she was put under a threat of her life; there was a subsequent false hope of marriage and her wearing apparels (Mat. Ext.I) were seized by the investigating agency. 28. We have reached an extremely important junction of the prosecution case. 29. The substantive evidence of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) would now be required to be glanced again alongside the evidence of P.W.7. Dr. Promotha Kr. Roy, the Medical Officer of the Sadar Hospital, Krishnanagar. Dr. Roy (P.W.7) was acting as a gynecologist in the said hospital. On 08.8.2003 he examined the prosecutrix, Chandmoni Khatun (P.W.I) and found that: “(1) Hymen Rougicity lost; (2) Old tear as 7 O'clock position; (3) Vagina has been admits one finger easily" 30. Dr. Roy (P.W.7) further deposed that he was told by the patient i.e. the prosecutrix that she was assaulted by the present appellant six months back in the month of February, 2003. 31. Dr. Roy (P.W.7) further deposed that he was told by the patient i.e. the prosecutrix that she was assaulted by the present appellant six months back in the month of February, 2003. 31. It is necessary to see his cross-examination wherein the defence could extricate the following : "The patient did not state to me that she was raped by Jindal Sk." 32. Dr. Roy (P.W.7) further in his cross-examination admitted that he had mentioned in his report the age of the prosecutrix as 18 years. 33. If we read the evidence of P.W.7, Dr. Roy, the Medical Officer of the Sadar Hospital, Krishnanagar that the hymen of the prosecutrix (P. W.1) was lost and there was a old tear at 6 O'clock position and her female organ admitted a finger easily. 34. This shows that the prosecutrix (P.W.1) was subjected to sexual intercourse. 35. Even if the prosecutrix (P.W.1) did not state that she was raped by the appellant but instead that she was assaulted, in our view, the manner of description by the prosecutrix of her highest deathless shame a woman can suffer would not mellow down the act of the appellant which has to be considered in the light of the evidence of P. W.10. Dr. Nripati Roy, Superintendent of the Sadar Hospital, Krishnanagar, who in his report (Ext.4) found the appellant to be capable of performing sexual act. 36. Once we have before us the evidence of the Medical Officer (P.W.7). who medico-legally examined the prosecutrix we would again revert to her substantive evidence where we find that she was forcibly violated against her will for more than one occasion. 37. Let us stop here. 38. The incident relates to a dark evening of 23.2.2003. The prosecutrix approached the police and was advised to go to the Court. She approached the salish, the decision of which was refused by the appellant. Thereafter, she immediately went to the only remedy available before her i.e. by way of filing a petition under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 27.2.2003. 39. For reasons best known to the investigating agency, the substantive FIR (Ext.2) could only be registered on 19.7.2003. We have deprecated such action and have quoted the decision of Ramesh Kumari vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. (supra). 40. 39. For reasons best known to the investigating agency, the substantive FIR (Ext.2) could only be registered on 19.7.2003. We have deprecated such action and have quoted the decision of Ramesh Kumari vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Ors. (supra). 40. The medical evidence is after all only an evidence of opinion and the Court cannot be strictly bound by the same. However, a simple reckoning of the delay between the actual date of incident i.e. 23.2.2003 and the actual date of examination of the prosecutrix by the Medical Officer (P.W. 7) i.e. on 08.8.2003 shows that there has been a delay of nearly six months. This delay factor cannot be wiped out from our consideration. More so, if we again come to the evidence of the Medical Officer (P.W.7) where he has specifically deposed that the prosecutrix had told him that the appellant had committed the acts six months back in the month of February, 2003. 41. We do not feel persuaded by the cross-examination of the said Medical Officer (P.W.7) "It is not a injury. May be bleeding by tear of hymen. If rape committed by using force bleeding is must." 42. In our view, this result of cross-examination cannot stand to reason in view of the long lapse of time between the actual incident of commission of rape and her examination before the Medical Officer by which time judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the injury must have healed with the passage of time. 43. In all, much importance should not be given, in our view, to the said cross-examination of the Medical Officer (P.W.7) as we have already held that after all the evidence of the Medical Officer is a opinion and it cannot be binding on the Court. 44. But, as we have found that the substantive evidence of the prosecutrix (P.W.1) with regard to her being violated against her will has been matched with the evidence of the Medical Officer we feel no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the prosecutrix at the date and the time of incident was violated. 45. Once more we will reach the evidence of the prosecutrix to have a full grip over the prosecution case. 45. Once more we will reach the evidence of the prosecutrix to have a full grip over the prosecution case. After we have found that from her substantive evidence on record the case of her violation has been established we feel the first charge, in respect of section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, has been successfully brought home against the appellant by the prosecution. 46. The factum of a salish was spoken by the prosecutrix at the very first blush in her petition (Ext.1). So also in her substantive evidence as P.W.1 before the Court. So far as the question of salish is concerned we have before us the evidence of P.W.2, Mocha Sk. P.W.3, Tajem Sk., P.W.4, Saheb Ali Sk. All these witnesses have uniformly deposed that they were informed by the prosecutrix (P.W.1) and her father (P.W.5. Makram Ali Sk.) with regard to the incident of commission of rape by the appellant upon the prosecutrix arranged for a salish where it was decided that either the appellant would marry the victim girl or bear all her expenses for the marriage. But, he refused. 47. After we have seen the substantive evidence of P.Ws. 2, 3, and 4 on the question of salish it would be' now required on our part to come to the evidence of P.W.14, Hari Sankar Pandey, the Investigating Officer of this case. Mr. Bhattacharyya has taken exception to the above witnesses to the salish stating for the first time about the factum of the same and non-production of the salish paper. The cross-examination of P.W.14 shows that he did not seize the salish paper but he heard about the same. His cross-examination shows that there is some departure made by P.Ws. 3, 6 and 11 between their first version before the Investigating Officer and in Court. We have looked into the same. We feel that as the evidence on record with regard to the salish which has been brought before us by P.Ws. 2. 3, and 4 including the prosecutrix herself and her parents (P.W.6 and P.W. 11) we see no reason to disbelieve the same. More so, in the record we find that actually there is a salish paper. The same was not however exhibited. For whatever worth it is there on the record in File- 'C' containing the list of Exts. 2. 3, and 4 including the prosecutrix herself and her parents (P.W.6 and P.W. 11) we see no reason to disbelieve the same. More so, in the record we find that actually there is a salish paper. The same was not however exhibited. For whatever worth it is there on the record in File- 'C' containing the list of Exts. at page 13, we cannot either go beyond it or fall back behind the same. 48. The incongruities, as elicited from the cross-examination of the Investigating Officer (P.W.14). in our view, are superficial and cannot in any manner affect the credibility of the prosecution case. In fact, cross-examination of P.W.14, Hari Sankar Pandey, the Investigating Officer is of quite importance for the prosecution. His cross-examination shows he seized the wearing apparels (Mat. Ext. 1) of the prosecutrix on the strength of the seizure list (Ext. 1). It shows the wearing apparels were not sent to the Forensic Laboratory to ascertain whether there was mark of semen and there was no prayer made by him for collection of the swab of the victim girl. Neither was there any prayer for ossification to ascertain her age. All these simply go to show the remissness on the part of the investigating agency for which in our considered opinion the prosecution case can never suffer for the reasons which we would just discuss hereinabove. 49. Before seeing the evidence of the prosecutrix once again we would see the evidence of P.W.13, Anirban Das, the Judicial Magistrate who recorded the statement of the prosecutrix (Ext.6) on 30.9.2003. Even though such statement is not a substantive evidence and can only be used to contradict or corroborate the prosecutrix we have seen the same for a purposeful appreciation of the prosecution case and we feel that there also she stuck to her main version. 50. Even at the cost of repetition we would again come back to the evidence of the prosecutrix and as we find that her evidence is trustworthy and inspiring confidence in the mind of the Court the same can be accepted without any hesitation. Simply the same could have been sufficient for us to uphold the conviction on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix in view of the strength of her evidence. Simply the same could have been sufficient for us to uphold the conviction on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix in view of the strength of her evidence. [See: Madho Ram vs. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 469 ; State of U.P. vs. Pappu, 2005(3) SCC 594 ; Vishnu alias Undrya vs. State of Maharashtra, 2006(1) SCC (Cri) 217]. 51. After all the prosecutrix is not an accomplice. Her evidence when inspiring confidence in the mind of the Court can form the sole basis of the conviction. In fact, the evidence of the prosecutrix is even more reliable than the injured witness. [See: Kamalanantha vs. State of T.N., 2005(5) SCC 194 ]. 52. But, we have also seen the other surrounding evidence and find that her version stands totally corroborated with the other evidence on record. Although we have noticed some fissures in the medical evidence (P. W. 7), we feel that even in the absence of a medical evidence and non-examination of the doctor it would not be fatal to the prosecution when the version of the prosecutrix was happily established. [See: State of M.P. vs. Dayal Sahu, 2005(8) SCC 122 ]. 53. After we have seen the entire scenario we come to the conclusion that the first charge in respect of the offence of section 376 of the Indian Penal Code has been proved to the hilt by the prosecution. 54. Now, we would come to the second charge in respect of section 417 of the Indian Penal Code. 55. For the purpose of constituting the offence of section 417 of the Indian Penal Code it is required to be proved that there should be a fraudulent or dishonest inducement by the accused by deceiving the prosecutrix and pursuant to such deception some act was committed which the prosecutrix would not have done had she not been deceived and consequent to the same she was subjected to harm i.e. subjecting to sexual intercourse. 56. In order to better appreciate this position, as we have seen earlier that from the medico-legal examination (P. W. 7) and the statement (Ext.6) recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by P.W.13 she was 18 years which is also the version of the prosecutrix herself. 56. In order to better appreciate this position, as we have seen earlier that from the medico-legal examination (P. W. 7) and the statement (Ext.6) recorded under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by P.W.13 she was 18 years which is also the version of the prosecutrix herself. There is no conclusive proof with regard to the actual age of the prosecutrix in the absence of her radiology test: But, if we wipe out from our mind the age factor we find that the prosecutrix was being chased by the appellant with a dangling bait of marriage. On the fateful occasion she was ravished against her wish. There was no consent: Entire act of the appellant was against her will. This by itself was sufficient to constitute the offence, as contemplated under section 375 of the Indian Penal Code. Of course, subsequently she was again subjected to sexual intercourse by the appellant with the false hope of a marriage which was not ultimately honoured by him, as we have found from the witnesses (i.e. P.Ws. 2, 3 and 4). In our view, the prosecution was also successful in proving its case against the appellant in respect of the charge of section 417 of the Indian Penal Code. 57. The appellant was, of course, acquitted in respect of the charge of section 120B of the Indian Penal Code. 58. We have considered the submission of Mr. Bhattacharyya and we do not feel tempted to abide by the same. Even if the petition under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ext.1) was the xerox version and the original was not in the record (which has been perused by us in the list of documents consisting the seizure list in File 'C') we find that once the investigation has ended in submission of a report in final form against the appellant the defect in the investigation, which has been very correctly painted out by the Fast Track, Fourth Court, would hardly have any impact on the trial and would be deemed to have buried with the investigation coming to an end. 59. The delay, which peeved Mr. Bhattacharyya in lodging the FIR, has been eloquently discussed by us in the foregoing paragraphs and we feel the prosecutrix cannot be held guilty for any laches in this regard. 59. The delay, which peeved Mr. Bhattacharyya in lodging the FIR, has been eloquently discussed by us in the foregoing paragraphs and we feel the prosecutrix cannot be held guilty for any laches in this regard. It was a recalcitrant investigation on the part of the investigating agency which did not choose to act on her prayer and would, at best, be a remissness, as felt by us earlier and not be of any dent in the prosecution case, as a whole. 60. So far as the argument of Shri Bhattacharyya that the evidence of P.W.1, the prosecutrix was an uncorroborated testimony, we feel, in view of our earlier discussion and the authority of the Apex Court, cited by us, there is no scope for entertaining the same. 61. On the contrary, we find that the submission of Mr. Mahata for the State is more acceptable and the decision of Yedla Srinivasa Rao vs. State of A.P. (supra), relied upon by Mr. Mahata has axiomatic application in the present case. 62. This would now bring us to the question of sentence. Mr. Bhattacharyya had also argued on the point of sentence. We would deal with the same in its individual perspective. 63. For the offence of section 417 of the Indian Penal Code the appellant was sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 600/- in default to suffer further simple imprisonment for two months. The statute provides whoever is found guilty in respect of an offence punishable under section 417 can be visited with a punishment which may extend to one year or with fine or with both. In view of the desperate nature of the appellant and his subsequent conduct, we feel that the sentence of six months imprisonment was bare minimum, imposed by the Fast Track, Fourth Court and no interference in the same is called for. 64. In respect of the principal charge under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code the appellant was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten (10) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-; in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for six months. Considering the entire background of the prosecution Cd3e and the heinousness of the crime committed by the appellant upon a defence-less young girl we find there is hardly any scope to interfere with the said sentence. 65. 5,000/-; in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for six months. Considering the entire background of the prosecution Cd3e and the heinousness of the crime committed by the appellant upon a defence-less young girl we find there is hardly any scope to interfere with the said sentence. 65. The punishment provided under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code stipulates that the imprisonment may be for life or for a term which may extend to ten years but shall not less than 7 years. The learned Fast Track, Fourth Court have sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years with fine, in our view, neither there is any situation which has been made out by the appellant to interfere with the sentence nor the nature of the case permits the Court to come to any other decision. In fact, in our mind, the sentence of ten years considering the gravity of the crime was not at all severe. 66. If we look at the entire background of the prosecution case we find that after violating her against her will the prosecutrix was assured of a marriage and again subjected to the evil act and the decision arrived at by the villagers in the salish was not honoured by the appellant. The prosecutrix was around 18 years of age and held from a very poor family and she eked her livelihood by working in a weaver's shop and supported her entire family. The act of the appellant has practically destroyed her life and put her in a perpetual sense of shame and she would have to abide by the stigma slapped upon her by the appellant till her last breath. 67. At the stage of sub-section (2) of section 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the appellant said "........ he has pregnant wife in his house carrying for 9 months and there is nobody to look after her. The accused begs apology from the Court." 68. The appellant did not hesitate a moment before destroying a young girl and again spoiled her by false promise of marriage has subsequently settled in life and married, which only shows the insensible and desperate conduct. 69. We find that the sentence is a just sentence. 70. In view of our aforesaid discussion we find no merit in the appeal and accordingly, dismiss the same. 71. 69. We find that the sentence is a just sentence. 70. In view of our aforesaid discussion we find no merit in the appeal and accordingly, dismiss the same. 71. Before parting, we find that the Fast Track, Fourth Court (Shri Sukhendu Das) has discussed the entire evidence and summed it up in a very efficient manner. He has also dealt with the question of sentence to which we have nothing to add. 72. Office is directed to communicate our appreciation to Shri Das. 73. Appeal dismissed. Rudrendra Nath Banerjee, J.: I agree. Appeal dismissed.