JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—This petition seeks to challenge the order dated 19th November, 1997 passed by the District Inspector of Schools whereby financial approval to the appointment of the petitioner as a Class IV employee in the Lokmanya Intermediate College, Janki Nagar, District Kushi Nagar, which is an Intermediate College recognised under the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act’) has been refused. 2. The basic issue involved in this petition is whether the Principal of an Intermediate College can make any appointment of a non-teaching staff of a recognised aided institution without seeking prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the Principal of the College had sought permission from the District Inspector of Schools for filling up the vacancy and such permission was granted by the District Inspector of Schools it must be taken that the District Inspector of Schools had granted prior approval to his appointment. He further contended that such a ground cannot be taken as the impugned order refusing to grant financial approval to the appointment of the petitioner does not mention that the financial approval could not be granted as prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools had not been taken and that the District Inspector of Schools could not have passed the order without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 4. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand submitted that as prior approval was not taken by the Principal of the College before making the appointment, the appointment of the petitioner is void and confers no right upon him; that no opportunity was required to be given to the petitioner by the District Inspector of Schools and that the order cannot be said to be bad in law merely because it does not mention that prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools had not been taken. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. In order to properly appreciate the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, Regulation 101 of the Regulations which is contained in Chapter III of the Act has to be examined and the same is as follows : “101. 5. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. In order to properly appreciate the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, Regulation 101 of the Regulations which is contained in Chapter III of the Act has to be examined and the same is as follows : “101. The appointing authority shall not fill any vacancy in the non-teaching staff of a recognised aided institution except with the prior approval of the Inspector." 7. This Court has repeatedly emphasised that seeking of prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools under Regulation 101 is mandatory. In this connection reference may be made to the decision given in Amit Kumar v. District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur and others, 2000 (4) ESC 2758 and the relevant portion is quoted below : “From the aforesaid meaning of the word “except” it is clear that the expression “except” has been used in Regulation 101 to mean “only”. Therefore, the appointing authority before making appointment on a non-teaching post could make any appointment only after obtaining prior approval of DIOS. In my opinion use of these two words “shall” and “except” have been used in imperative terms and clearly express that prior approval of DIOS is a condition precedent for making any appointment on a non-teaching post. Use of word “except” with the prior approval of DIOS does not leave any discretion to the appointing authority to make any appointment without obtaining his prior approval. If Regulation 101 is treated to be directory then the appointing authority could make appointment on non-teaching post even without prior approval of the DIOS. It would result in giving power to the appointing authority to make appointment first, and thereafter obtain financial approval. This was not the intention of legislature or the Rule making authority. And it clearly intended that before making any appointment the appointing authority must obtain prior approval of the DIOS. The legislative intent has to be given effect to while interpreting regulatory provisions of Regulation 101. Regulations 103 to 106 of Regulations further make it clear that the Regulation 101 cannot be construed as permissive or directory. And it clearly intended that before making any appointment the appointing authority must obtain prior approval of the DIOS. The legislative intent has to be given effect to while interpreting regulatory provisions of Regulation 101. Regulations 103 to 106 of Regulations further make it clear that the Regulation 101 cannot be construed as permissive or directory. Further the procedural safeguard contained in Regulation 101, making it obligatory for the appointing authority in matters of making appointment on non-teaching posts, not to fill the vacancy except with the prior approval of the DIOS, has an element of public interest. Regulation 103 providing for appointments under the Dying in Harness Rules makes it obligatory on the DIOS to provide appointment to dependents not only in the institution where the deceased was working but any other institution, therefore, the only reasonable interpretation which can be given to the two words “shall” and “except” used in Regulation 101 is that these expressions are imperative and the regulatory provision contained in Regulation 101 is mandatory and cannot be treated to be directory. The requirement of obtaining prior approval of DIOS is not an empty formality. It is in public interest. The appointment of petitioner being contrary to Regulation 101 did not vest any right in him either to claim his appointment as regular or any salary.” 8. A Division Bench of this Court in Jagdish Singh, etc. v. State of U.P. and others etc., 2006 (4) ADJ 162 has also observed : “Scheme of Regulations 101 to 107 makes it clear that after receiving an intimation of vacancy, the District Inspector of Schools is empowered to send the applications of member of deceased employee, who is entitled for compassionate appointment to the institution, who has to issue appointment letter to such candidate. It is however, implied in the scheme that in the event there is no candidate entitled for compassionate appointment to fill a particular vacancy, the intimation of which has been received by the District Inspector of Schools, the District Inspector of Schools can direct the appointing authority to fill up vacancy by direct recruitment but even in a case the selection is made by direct recruitment by the Principal/committee of management, prior approval is required of the District Inspector of Schools before issuing an appointment letter to the selected candidate. Without prior approval of the Inspector, the Principal or the committee of management cannot issue an appointment letter or permit joining of any candidate. The requirement of prior approval in Regulation 101 is a condition precedent before issuing an appointment letter and is mandatory. The observation of the learned single Judge in the case of Dingur v. District Inspector of Schools, Mirzapur (supra) as quoted above, is also to the effect that approval has to be considered by the District Inspector of Schools after examining the proceeding relating to appointment and after examining as to whether prescribed procedure in a fair manner has been followed or not. The observation of the learned single Judge in Ram Dhani’s case (supra) that previous approval under Regulation 101 is required to be taken before issuing advertisement for filling up vacancy does not lay down correct law. We, however, make it clear that although prior approval is required from the District Inspector of Schools after completion of process of selection but there is no prohibition in the Principal/Management to seek permission of the District Inspector of Schools for filling up vacancy by direct recruitment. The permission may or may not be granted by the District Inspector of Schools but even if such permission to start the selection process or to issue advertisement is granted that is not akin to prior approval as contemplated under Regulation 101. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that prior approval contemplated under Regulation 101 is prior approval by the District Inspector of Schools after completion of process of selection and before issuance of appointment letter to the selected candidate.” (emphasis supplied) It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid judgments that prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools under Regulation 101 is mandatory and that prior approval contemplated under Regulation 101 is after selection and not prior to the initiation of the selection process. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision of a learned Judge of this Court rendered in Jai Shanker Tripathi v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (1) ESC 265. In Jai Shanker Tripathi (supra), the Court held that merely because the Principal of the College had sought a prior approval for filling up the post, it was not necessary to seek prior approval. In Jai Shanker Tripathi (supra), the Court held that merely because the Principal of the College had sought a prior approval for filling up the post, it was not necessary to seek prior approval. This is contrary to the observations made by the Division Bench in paragraph 22 of the judgment in Jagdish Singh (supra). Thus, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as the Principal of the College had sought permission from the District Inspector of Schools for filling up the vacancy, it was not necessary to obtain prior approval before making the appointment after the selection process was over, cannot be accepted. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that no opportunity was granted by the District Inspector of Schools before passing the impugned order and in support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court in Jai Shanker Tripathi (supra). 11. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of the counter affidavit, it has been clearly stated that prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools was not taken. This fact has not been specifically denied in the rejoinder affidavit and nor any document has been placed on record to show that prior approval was granted by the District Inspector of Schools. In fact, in the rejoinder affidavit all that has been stated is that permission had been sought from the District Inspector of Schools for filling up the vacancy. It is, therefore, clear that prior approval had not been granted by the District Inspector of Schools. The appointment of the petitioner by the Principal of the College was, therefore, clearly dehors the mandatory provisions of the Act and is no appointment in the eye of law. In my opinion, in such a situation when the facts are admitted, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the plea of violation of principles of natural justice. In this connection reference may be made to the decision given in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others, JT 1999 (5) SC 114. 12. In any view of the matter it cannot be doubted that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula and that its application will depend upon the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. 12. In any view of the matter it cannot be doubted that the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula and that its application will depend upon the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. This is what has been held by the Supreme Court in K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 273 ; N.K. Prasad v. Government of India and others, (2004) 6 SCC 299 ; State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh, (2004) 8 SCC 129; Karnataka SRTC v. S.G. Kotturappa, (2005) 3 SCC 409 and in Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd., (2005) 5 SCC 337 . 13. Sri Sudhakar Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the order dated 19th November, 1997 passed by the District Inspector of Schools refusing to grant financial approval to the appointment of the petitioner does not make a mention of the fact that the appointment of the petitioner had been made without prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools. Learned Standing Counsel submitted that a perusal of the said order clearly indicates that the post in question has to be filled up by making appointments on compassionate grounds and in any view of the matter as prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools was not taken as was required to be taken under Regulation 101, the said appointment cannot confer any benefit upon the petitioner. In my opinion the petitioner can claim a relief in this petition only if he establishes that his appointment was made in accordance with law. I have already observed that the appointment was made without following the mandatory provisions of Regulation 101 of the Regulations. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be permitted to take this plea. 14. Thus there is no merit in any of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. ———