JUDGMENT This appeal, preferred under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 04.06.1976, passed by the learned District Judge, Tehri Garhwal, in civil appeal No. 78 of 1971 (UK), whereby the appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree dated 08.11.1971, passed by Munsif, Tehri Garhwal (Camp Uttarkashi), in suit No. 75 of 1970, is upheld. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 3. Factual matrix of the case is that plaintiff aforesaid suit No. 75 of 1970, in the court of Munsif, Tehri Garhwal, for cancellation of gift deed dated 19.01.1970 (registered on 02.02.1970), executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2. It is pleaded by the plaintiff that the plaintiff and defendant no. 1 are joint owners of the property in suit, situated in Mauza Barkot. The said property was never partitioned. However, the defendant No. 1 projected himself to be the owner of the entire property and executed the impugned gift deed in respect thereof. It is alleged by the plaintiff that no permission of Darbar of Raja Tehri was obtained before executing the gift deed. Alleging that the gift deed in question is void, the plaintiff sought relief of cancellation of sale deed. 4. Defendants contested the suit and filed written statement. It is pleaded in the written statement that plaintiff is not the joint owner in the property in question and the impugned gift deed does not suffer from any illegality. It is further pleaded in the written statement, filed on behalf of the defendants that there was no need of obtaining permission of the Darbar of Raja of Tehri, for executing the gift deed. 5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the trial court :- 1. Did any partition take place, and were the plot and the house in question came into share of defendant No. 1? If so, did defendant No. 1 became sole MAURUSIDAR (title holder of ancestral property) and was he the sole bhumidhar in respect of the land in question? 2. Whether the plaintiff is co-owner of the house and the land in question? If so, is the gift deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 is void? If yes, to what extent? 3. 2. Whether the plaintiff is co-owner of the house and the land in question? If so, is the gift deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 is void? If yes, to what extent? 3. Was the permission of Darbar (of Raja of Tehri) was a condition precedent before executing the gift deed? If so, is the deed bad for want of such permission? 4. To what relief, if any, the plaintiff is entitled? 6. The trial court after recording the evidence and hearing the parties found that the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, are joint owners of the house and land in question. The trial court further found that the deed was not required to be executed with the permission of Darbar. The trial court found that the gift deed in respect of half share of defendant No. 1 was valid but the same was illegal to the extent of the plaintiff’s share in the property in suit. Accordingly, the suit was partly decreed, declaring the impugned gift deed dated 19.01.1970 (registered on 02.02.1970) ineffective to the extent of plaintiff’s half share. However, the gift deed was not cancelled, as prayed by the plaintiff, as the same was valid in respect of the half share of defendant No. 1. Aggrieved by said judgment and order dated 03.11.1971, passed by the trial court, civil appeal No. 78 of 1971 (UK) was preferred by the plaintiff. After hearing the parties, the same was dismissed by the lower appellate court. Hence this Second Appeal is filed by the plaintiff before the Allahabad High Court on 14.07.1976. This appeal is received by transfer to this Court under section 35 of U.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000, for its disposal. 7. It is pertinent to mention here that this second appeal was filed before Allahabad High Court prior to 01.02.1977 i.e. the date from which the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, came into force. As such, no substantial question of law was formulated in this appeal. On behalf of the appellant, arguments were advanced on the following two points :- 1. Whether the courts below have committed error of law in holding that the impugned gift deed is no bad for want of permission of Darbar? 2. As such, no substantial question of law was formulated in this appeal. On behalf of the appellant, arguments were advanced on the following two points :- 1. Whether the courts below have committed error of law in holding that the impugned gift deed is no bad for want of permission of Darbar? 2. Whether the courts below have erred in law in ignoring the fact that by the impugned gift deed, the defendant No. 1 has transferred the entire property to the defendant No. 2, projecting himself to be the sole owner of the property? 8. Answer to point No.1 :- It is argued that under Tehri Garhwal Bhumi Sambandhi Adhikar Niyam, 1941, a person was required to seek permission of the Darbar (of Raja of Tehri), before transferring his property to other person. In this connection, it is further argued that the impugned transfer made through the gift deed was in violation of said rules. Having gone through the relevant law on the point, in the opinion of this Court, the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is misconceived. The impugned gift deed was executed by defendant on 19.01.1970 (registered on 02.02.1970). The Tehri Garhwal Bhumi Sambandhi Adhikar Niyam, 1941, got repealed through Kumaun and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960 (U.P. Act No. XVII of 1960). Aforesaid U.P. Act No. XVII of 1960, was enforced in the District of Tehri Garhwal and Uttarkashi prior to 1970. Section 54 of said Act, i.e. Kumaon and Uttarakhand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1960, shows that Tehri Garhwal Bhumi Sambandhi Adhikar Niyam, 1941, were repealed by said Act. In other words, the Niyamawali, which is being relied by the plaintiff was repealed prior to the execution of the impugned gift deed, as the deed was executed in the year 1970. As such, the courts below have committed no error of law in holding that the gift deed was not bad in law for want of permission of Darbar (of Raja of Tehri). Accordingly, the point No. 1 stands answered. 9. As such, the courts below have committed no error of law in holding that the gift deed was not bad in law for want of permission of Darbar (of Raja of Tehri). Accordingly, the point No. 1 stands answered. 9. Answer to point No. 2 :- Learned counsel for the appellant, submitted before this Court that the defendant No. 1 had projected himself as the sole owner of the land and house in question, while actually he was simply a share holder in the property, as such, the courts below have errer in law in not decreeing the suit for cancellation of the gift deed. I have gone through the impugned judgment and decree, passed by the trial court and the one passed by the lower appellate court. The trial court after discussing the evidence on record, has found it correct, as pleaded by the plaintiff, that he was owner of the half share in the property in question. Accordingly, the trial court decreed the suit partly, declaring that the impugned gift deed shall be ineffective in respect of the half share of the plaintiff. However, since the defendant No. 1 admittedly, owned remaining half share, as such, he had every right to transfer his share to the third person. That being so, the trial court rightly refused to decree the suit for cancellation of the gift deed, as the same was valid in respect of the half share, owned by the defendant No. 1. I see no error of law, committed either by the trial court or by the lower appellate court in upholding the gift deed, in respect of half share held by defendant No. 1, which was transferred in favour of defendant No. 2. As such, the point No. 2 stands answered. 10. Before parting with the judgment, it is pertinent to mention here that the plaintiff, who is owner in respect of the half share in the properly in suit or his legal representatives can seek partition of the property by filling a suit against the other share holder. 11. For the reasons, as discussed above, this appeal has no force and is liable to be dismissed. The second appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. Interim order dated 15.07.1976, is hereby vacated.