JUDGMENT R. K. Agrawal, J. - Finding that conflicting opinions have been expressed by two co-ordinate Benches of this court in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. India Steel Supply Company [1987] UPTC 493 and Karam Chand Thapar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1980] UPTC 644 and the view taken in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. India Steel Supply Company [1987] UPTC 493 (All) requires consideration, the learned single judge has directed the matter to be placed before the honourable Chief Justice for suitable orders. The honourable Chief Justice was pleased to direct it to be listed before Division Bench. Facts of the case : Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the opposite party, is a registered dealer under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, hereinafter referred to as, "the Act" and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of ice. For the assessment year 1979-80, the opposite party disclosed the taxable sales of Rs. 3,08,380. The Sales Tax Officer, Ward 2, Jhansi vide order dated May 30, 1981 passed under rule 41(7) of the U.P. Sales Tax Rules, 1948, hereinafter referred to as "the Rules", completed the original assessment by accepting the disclosed turnover. He, however, imposed a tax of Rs. 18,502.80 at the rate of six per cent on the sale of ice. Thereafter it transpired that the tax on the sale of ice has been imposed at a lesser rate and it ought to have been eight per cent instead of six per cent resulting in tax of Rs. 6,167.60 being short levied. The proceedings under section 22 of the Act were initiated by issuance of notice dated November 2, 1982 seeking rectification of the mistake which was apparent on the record. However, actual rectification was made vide order dated September 4, 1984 wherein tax on sale of ice at the rate of eight per cent and interest was also imposed. Feeling aggrieved the opposite party preferred an appeal under section 9 of the Act before the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, Jhansi Region, Jhansi, who vide order dated September 20, 1985 had rejected the appeal. Still feeling aggrieved the opposite party preferred second appeal under section 10 of the Act before the Trade Tax Tribunal, Kanpur. Feeling aggrieved the opposite party preferred an appeal under section 9 of the Act before the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, Jhansi Region, Jhansi, who vide order dated September 20, 1985 had rejected the appeal. Still feeling aggrieved the opposite party preferred second appeal under section 10 of the Act before the Trade Tax Tribunal, Kanpur. The Tribunal vide order dated July 6, 1987 had allowed the appeal and has held that as the assessment order was passed on May 30, 1981 whereas the order under section 22 of the Act was passed on September 4, 1984, the period of limitation of three years for rectification stood expired on May 30, 1984 and therefore, the order could not be sustained and was set aside. We have heard Shri S. P. Kesarwani, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of the revisionist and Shri Krishna Agrawal, learned Counsel for the opposite party. Rival submissions : Learned Standing Counsel submitted that as in the present case the show-cause notice under section 22 of the Act had been issued on November 2, 1982, the assessing authority could have rectified the assessment order dated May 30, 1981 at any time and the period of limitation of three years would not be applicable. He submitted that the view taken by this court in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax v. India Steel Supply Company [1987] UPTC 493 (All), does not require any reconsideration as it is the correct view. In support of his various pleas he has relied upon the following decisions : (1) Sales Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ernakulam v. Sudarsanam Iyengar & Sons [1970] 25 STC 252 (SC). (2) Sha Vajeshankar Vasudeva and Company v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Assessments), Mangalore - 1 [1974] 34 STC 257 (Karn). (3) Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers (Coal Sales) Ltd., Moradabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1975] UPTC 11 (All). (4) State of Tamil Nadu v. Kodaikanal Motor Union (P.) Ltd. [1986] 62 STC 272 (SC). Shri Krishna Agrawal, learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand submitted that in view of the specific provisions of sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act, the assessing authority could not on its own motion rectify any mistake in any order passed by it, which is apparent on the record, beyond a period of three years. Shri Krishna Agrawal, learned counsel for the opposite party, on the other hand submitted that in view of the specific provisions of sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act, the assessing authority could not on its own motion rectify any mistake in any order passed by it, which is apparent on the record, beyond a period of three years. The first proviso which permits passing of an order beyond a period of three years is applicable where the proposed rectification is sought to be done on the basis of the application and does not apply to a case of suo motu rectification. The issuance of notice within a period of three years would not empower the assessing authority to bypass the period of limitation provided in the main part of sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act. He submitted that the view taken by this court in the case of Karam Chand Thapar [1975] UPTC 11 (All) is the correct view and the same view should be taken. We have given our anxious consideration to the various pleas raised by the learned counsel for the parties. Provisions of law : The relevant provision of sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act reads as under : "(1) Any officer or authority, or the Tribunal or the High Court may, on its own motion or on the application of dealer or any other interested person, rectify any mistake in any order passed by him or it under this Act apparent on the record within three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified : Provided that where an application under this sub-section has been made within such period of three years, it may be disposed of even beyond such period : Provided further that no such rectification, as has the effect of enhancing the assessment, penalty, fees or other dues shall be made unless reasonable opportunity of being heard has been given to the dealer or other person likely to be affected by such enhancement." From a reading of the aforesaid provisions, we find that in the main part of sub-section (1) any officer or authority, or the Tribunal or this court has been empowered to rectify any mistake in any order passed by such person under the provisions of the Act which is apparent on the record. However, this rectification has to be done within a period of three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified. The first proviso makes an exception. It provides that if an application seeking rectification under sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act has been made within a period of three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified, then the said application can be disposed of even beyond such period, meaning thereby that the order of rectification can be passed even after the period of three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified. The provision made in the proviso shall apply only to a case where any application has been made and it would not apply to a case where action of rectification is being taken suo motu as it would be covered by the main part of sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act. The second proviso, however, incorporates the principles of natural justice, which provides that no rectification which has the effect of enhancing the assessment, penalty, fees or other dues shall be made without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the dealer or other person likely to be affected by such enhancement. Case law relied upon - (1) Karam Chand Thapar [1980] UPTC 644 (All). In the aforesaid case the assessment for the assessment years 1967-68 and 1968-69, was completed on August 2, 1971 and a suo motu action to rectify the order was intimated for issuance of notice on March 26, 1974. The order of rectification was passed on February 27, 1975, i.e., beyond the period of three years from the date of order sought to be rectified. A learned single judge of this court while considering the provisions of section 22 of the Act reproduced hereinbefore has held as follows : "(3) ... A perusal of it indicates that under the principal clause there is no material change except that what was implicit has been made explicit. It empowers initiation of proceeding both on the application of the dealer or an interested person and also on its own motion. It retains their restriction of limitation. The order has to be passed three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified. It empowers initiation of proceeding both on the application of the dealer or an interested person and also on its own motion. It retains their restriction of limitation. The order has to be passed three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified. But the proviso carves out an exception and lifts the bar of limitation if the application has been filed within three years. There is however a significant omission. A plain reading of it indicates that it applies only in those cases where an application under section 22 for rectification has been made. The rectification under the amended section can be done both on its own motion and on the application of dealer or any other interested person. As the words 'on its own motion' are not included in the proviso the conclusion is inescapable that the Legislature intended to limit the extension of period beyond three years only in those cases where the application was filed by any dealer or any other interested person. It may be that the words 'interested person' may include Commissioner of Sales Tax as well but it cannot be accepted that the proviso can apply to proceedings which were initiated on its own motion. In other words, in suo motu action the order has still to be passed within three years. As the three years expired on August 1, 1974 the assessing authority was left with no jurisdiction to rectify the order on July 22, 1975." (2) India Steel Supply Company, Gorakhpur [1987] UPTC 493 (All). The assessment in this case was made on August 27, 1979, the notice under section 22 of the Act had been issued on May 21, 1982 seeking rectification in the assessment order. The order under section 22 of the Act was passed on October 11, 1982. Relying upon the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers. The order under section 22 of the Act was passed on October 11, 1982. Relying upon the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers. (Coal Sales) Ltd. [1975] UPTC 11 (All), the learned single judge of this court has held that the notice having been issued under section 22 by the Sales Tax Officer within a period of three years, i.e., May 21, 1982 the rectification order dated October 11, 1982 though beyond the period of three years would be valid, it did not follow the decision in the case of Karam Chand Thapar [1980] UPTC 644 (All) on the ground that the Division Bench decision had not been overruled by the order of any other Bench. (3) Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers (Coal Sales) Ltd. [1975] UPTC 11 (All). In this case the assessment order was passed on March 27, 1971, a notice under section 22 of the Act was issued on March 21, 1974 requiring the petitioner therein to appear before the Sales Tax Officer, Moradabad and rectification order under section 22 of the Act was passed on March 26, 1974, which was served upon the petitioner on March 31, 1974. The plea raised before the Division Bench was that as the order has been served upon the petitioner on March 31, 1974, the date of order should be taken to be March 31, 1974 and in that view of the matter it would be barred by limitation. The Division Bench has repelled the contention by holding that the rectification in this case was done on March 26, 1974 when the order effecting rectification was actually written, signed and made a part of the original assessment order and the date on which the assessment order is rectified is the date on which the rectification is actually made in the order in the normal way. After holding so, the Division Bench further proceeded to hold that it can be urged with considerable force that when section 22 of the Act provides that the assessing, appellate or revisional authority may at any time within three years of any order passed by him rectify any mistake apparent on the face of record, it in fact means that the assessing, appellate or revisional authority may at any time within three years from the date of any order proceed to rectify any mistake apparent on face of the record. Thus construed it will mean that where a notice in exercise of power under section 22 of the Act has been issued within three years of an order, the authority concerned has proceeded to rectify the order within limitation and actual rectification made after three years would not be defective. This view was expressed on the basis of the Karnataka High Court decision in the case of Sha Vajeshankar Vasudeva and Company [1974] 34 STC 257. The Division Bench did not go into the question as to whether Karnataka High Court has correctly interpreted the decision of the apex court or not. (4) Sudarsanam Iyengar & Sons [1970] 25 STC 252 (SC). In this case the apex court was considering the provisions of rule 33 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Rules, 1950 in respect of the assessment year 1962-63, which was to the following effect : "Rule 33(1). If for any reason the whole or any part of the turnover of business of a dealer or licensee has escaped assessment to tax in any year or if the licence fee has escaped levy in any year, the assessing authority or licensing authority, as the case may be, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) may at any time within three years next succeeding that to which the tax or licence fee relates determine to the best of his judgment the turnover which has escaped assessment and assess the tax payable or levy the licence fee in such turnover after issuing a notice to the dealer or licensee and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary." The apex court while interpreting the word "determine" as employed in rule 33 has held that the words which follow the word "determine" in rule 33 must be accorded their due signification. The words "assess the tax payable" cannot be ignored and it is clearly meant that the assessment has to be made within the period prescribed. Assessment is a comprehensive word and can denote the entirety of proceedings which are taken with regard to it. It cannot and does not mean a final order of assessment alone unless there is something in the context of a particular provision which compels such a meaning being attributed to it. The apex court further held that in its judgment despite the phraseology employed in rule 33 the principle which has been laid in other cases relating to analogous provisions in sales tax statute must be followed as otherwise the purpose of a provision like rule 33 can be completely defeated by taking certain collateral proceedings and obtaining a stay order as was done in the present case or by unduly delaying assessment proceedings beyond a period of three years. It is undoubtedly open to the Legislature or the rule-making authority to make its intention quite clear that on the expiry of a specified period no final order of assessment can be made. Then the taxing authorities would certainly be debarred from completing the assessment beyond the period prescribed. The provisions of rule 33 of the Travancore-Cochin General Sales Tax Rules, 1950 are entirely different from that what has been provided under section 22(1) of the Act. The words used in section 22(1) of the Act are "... rectify any mistake ... within three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified". The language is imperative and that is why an exception has been carved out in the first proviso, which provides for rectification of any mistake even beyond the period of three years if an application has been made within the period of three years. The intention of the Legislature is, therefore, clear that where suo motu action is being taken for rectification of any mistake in an order it should be done within a period of three years whereas in cases where the proceedings having been started upon an application having been made within three years from the date of the order, the mistake can be rectified even beyond the period of three years. Thus the decision of the apex court in the case of Sudarsanam Iyengar & Sons [1970] 25 STC 252 would not be applicable to the present case. (5) Sha Vajeshankar Vasudeva and Company [1974] 34 STC 257 (Karn). In this case the Karnataka High Court has followed the decision of the apex court in the case of Sudarsanam Iyengar & Sons [1970] 25 STC 252 and has held that there is difference between the power of limitation and reassessment. It has held as follows : "... I am of the view that even in the case of a rectification of a mistake in the order of assessment, a notice issued by the assessing authority to the assessee asking the assessee to show cause as to why the order of assessment should not be rectified should also be considered as an integral part of the rectification proceedings because without the issue of such notice and giving reasonable opportunity to the assessee, it would not be open to the assessing authority to make rectification of the order of assessment to the prejudice of the assessee. In substance, an order of rectification is also an order of assessment because an order of assessment after it is rectified would result either in enhancing the liability of the assessee or reducing it." With great respect we are unable to agree with the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in the aforesaid case. The language of section 22(1) of the Act is quite different from that of section 25A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957. In section 25A there was no such provision for passing on an order upon an application beyond the period of three years whereas in the present case the State Legislature has treated two situations differently by making specific provisions - (1) Where rectification has to be made within three years and (2) Where it has to be done even beyond the period of three years. (6) Kodaikanal Motor Union (P.) Ltd. [1986] 62 STC 272 (SC). In the aforesaid case the apex court has held that in interpreting a section of the Act, purpose of Act and the object of the particular section have to be borne in mind and where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eye, some violence to the language is permissible in an unhappily, worded provision, for making sense. In the aforesaid case the apex court has held that in interpreting a section of the Act, purpose of Act and the object of the particular section have to be borne in mind and where the purpose is apparent to the judicial eye, some violence to the language is permissible in an unhappily, worded provision, for making sense. (7) Aditya Kumar Gulab Shanker v. Additional Revising Authority, Sales Tax, Bareilly [1974] UPTC 576. In this case a Division Bench of this court, while considering the provision of section 22(1) of the Act has held that a plain reading of the section reveals that the statute contemplates that the power of rectification conferred by section 22 has to be exercised within three years of the date of the order sought to be rectified. Normally the aforesaid language, used in the section, implies further restriction on the power of authorities concerned not to rectify an error in an order after three years. The consistent view of this court has been that the order of rectification under section 22 of the Act has to be passed within a period of three years from the date of the order sought to be rectified. The exception being where an application seeking rectification has been made within a period of three years, the order of rectification can be passed even after the expiry of a period of three years. This exception has been made in order to ensure that no party is made to suffer for no fault of his whereas suo motu action for rectification is to be taken by the concerned authority within a period of three years in view of the clear language of sub-section (1) of section 22 of the Act. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of the considered opinion that the decision in the case India Steel Company [1987] UPTC 493 (All) is incorrectly decided whereas the decision in the case of Karam Chand Thapar [1980] UPTC 644 (All) lays down the correct law. As in the present case, the Tribunal has held that the order of rectification passed on September 4, 1984 has been passed suo motu and it was not on any application made before the assessing authority, the order passed after a period of three years from May 30, 1981 was barred by limitation. The revision has, therefore, no merit and is hereby dismissed. The revision has, therefore, no merit and is hereby dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.