JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—Since all the aforesaid first appeals from order are connected and have been heard analogously, the same are being decided by this common judgement and order having binding effect upon all the aforesaid appeals. The First Appeal From Order No. 653 of 2007, which has been dealt with herein, will be considered as leading case. 2. This appeal is arising out of the judgment and order dated 29th January, 2007 passed by the District Judge, Moradabad in an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act) filed by the appellant for setting aside the arbitral award dated 21st December, 2004, arising out of the dispute between the parties herein. 3. From the orders passed under Section 34 of the Act, appeal lies in the Court under Section 37 of the Act provided such order falls under the category of orders specified thereunder. The order impugned has been passed refusing to set aside the arbitral award, therefore, it falls within the category of such orders and as such, we find that the same is appealable under Section 37 (1)(b) of the Act. 4. The fact in brief is that the appellant wanted to construct houses and develop colonies in the city of Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh. It had to construct 24 meters wide road at Ram Ganga Vihar Phase II, Moradabad and in that respect the offer of the respondent was accepted and the agreement was duly executed between themselves. According to the appellant, the work was not done by the respondent to their satisfaction. Therefore, the dispute arose. 5. The respondent filed civil suit, being O.S. No. 305 of 1998 in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Moradabad. In the suit, the appellant filed an application under Sections 5 and 8 of the Act for the purpose of resolving the dispute with the intervention of the Arbitrator. Such application was dismissed. The appellant made revisional application before the High Court whereunder the proceeding in the suit was stayed. The respondent requested the appellant to resolve the dispute through the Arbitrator during the pendency of the suit, when the appellant gave its consent by forwarding a list of Arbitrators. The respondent gave his consent to the name of one such person, named in the list. The respondent requested the appellant to resolve the dispute through the Arbitrator during the pendency of the suit, when the appellant gave its consent by forwarding a list of Arbitrators. The respondent gave his consent to the name of one such person, named in the list. Therefore, by consent of the parties, such person was appointed as sole Arbitrator for the purpose of resolving the dispute between the parties. 6. Parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. All the points as raised by the parties had been considered by the Arbitrator followed by the impugned award. 7. According to the appellant, the award passed by the learned Arbitrator is illegal, unjustified and against the principles of natural justice. He had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the respondent. He had to peruse only the file relating to the blacklisting of the respondent but he has acted beyond his jurisdiction. The aforesaid suit filed by the respondent was dismissed for non-prosecution and the decree passed therein would operate as res judicata. The impugned award is illegal on account of dismissal of the suit and in the eye of law there is no force in the impugned award. He had committed misconduct by illegally entertaining the claim of the respondent and passing the award thereon. He had also committed illegality by appointing the Commissioner for collection of evidence. The report of the Commissioner is unfair, incomplete and based on hearsay evidence. He had given undue weight to the evidence collected by the Commissioner. Learned Arbitrator has accepted the money claim of the respondent, which was time barred. The award is without reasons. He had concluded the proceedings with undue haste and without properly considering the dispute in correct perspective. Therefore, the award is against the public policy and as such is liable to be set aside. Further, according to the appellant, in view of a Government Order dated 9th March, 1972, as amended on 30th March, 1972, two Arbitrators were to be appointed, one of which ought to have included a Deputy Chief Engineer or Additional Chief Engineer and the other one ought to be an officer of U.P. Judicial Service, for the purpose of disposal of the dispute involving more than rupees ten lacs. Therefore, the award which has been passed by the learned Arbitrator is void ab initio. Therefore, the award which has been passed by the learned Arbitrator is void ab initio. He was biased and his conduct was illegal and arbitrary. He had no jurisdiction to award future interest and the interest during pendency of the arbitral proceedings, to the respondent. The damage has not been properly estimated due to non-completion of work by the respondent. No finding has been given with regard to the damages suffered by the appellant and therefore, the same is misconduct on his part. The condition of the agreement was not carefully perused by the Arbitrator and as such he has acted beyond his jurisdiction. Learned Arbitrator had to pass the award on a non-judicial stamp paper but he has passed the award on the stamp paper. Since proper stamp duty is not paid in accordance with the provisions of the Stamp Act on the award, the impugned award is liable to be impounded. Learned Arbitrator has acted without jurisdiction while allowing the application under Section 33 of the Act, ex parte. 8. According to the respondent, the application of the appellant under Section 34 of the Act was not in proper form and was not maintainable. The objections of the appellant do not come within the purview of Section 34 of the Act and, thus, are liable to be rejected. Learned Arbitrator has passed the award considering the facts and circumstances of the case, evidence available on record and reasonability of the cause. Court has no jurisdiction to consider reason or the reasonableness of the award. The award is final and binding upon the parties. Court is not empowered to exercise appellate jurisdiction against the award. The respondent denied that the award was non-satisfactory. Whatever contention has been made by the appellant, the same is only to level stigma upon the contractor and to victimise him. Learned Arbitrator has considered all the grounds and come to the conclusion by passing the award to which Court cannot sit in appeal. The appellant himself invoked Clause 34 of the agreement and the respondent accepted the same and the reference was made on 21st December, 2004. It cannot be said that the award is incomplete and against the principles of natural justice. The Arbitrator was appointed for the purpose of disposal of all the disputes, so he has got jurisdiction to consider all the claims and disputes between the parties. It cannot be said that the award is incomplete and against the principles of natural justice. The Arbitrator was appointed for the purpose of disposal of all the disputes, so he has got jurisdiction to consider all the claims and disputes between the parties. The appellant accepted the jurisdiction of the sole Arbitrator, therefore, at this belated stage he cannot take the plea of estoppel. The principle of res judicata is applicable where the case is decided finally on merits, which is not so herein. Learned Arbitrator has not committed any misconduct. The award is within the domain of reference made by the parties. Learned Arbitrator has passed the award taking into account all the evidences available on record and not on the basis of hearsay evidence. The appellant has not filed any objection with regard to the inspection of site made by Mr. Mansa Ram, Junior Engineer (now retired) and the report submitted by him. The claim of the respondent is not barred by limitation. The period of limitation cannot be applied unless and until finality is attached to the bills. The award is not against the public policy. It is not necessary for the learned Arbitrator to re-evaluate every evidence on record. Since the Arbitrator was appointed at the instance of the appellant, parties are estopped from raising any objection with regard to appointment of the Arbitrator at this stage. The Arbitrator has jurisdiction to pass award with regard to the interest and future interest what he thinks fit and proper. Learned Arbitrator has not committed any irregularity while calculating the damages and loss suffered by the appellant. Learned Arbitrator has rightly rejected the counter-claims of the appellant. Proper stamp duty was paid by the respondent. 9. Before us, initially Mr. Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel and subsequently Mr. Learned Arbitrator has not committed any irregularity while calculating the damages and loss suffered by the appellant. Learned Arbitrator has rightly rejected the counter-claims of the appellant. Proper stamp duty was paid by the respondent. 9. Before us, initially Mr. Ravi Kiran Jain, learned Senior Counsel and subsequently Mr. Anil Sharma along with Sri P.K. Singh, learned Counsel, appeared on behalf of the appellant and contended that the arbitral award is squarely hit by Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Act, which reads as under : “(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration : Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside;” 10. To elaborate this contention, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant placed before us necessary arbitration clause being Clause 34 of the contract, which is as follows : “CLAUSE 34 : Except where otherwise provided in the contract all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the specifications, designs, drawings and instructions herein mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship materials used on the work or as to any other question claim right, matter or thing whatsoever, in any way arising, out or relating to the contract designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instructions, order or those conditions or otherwise concerning the works, or the execution or failure to execute the same whether arising during the progress of the work or after the completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to the person appointed by the V.C. of M.D.A. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Government servant, that he had to deal with matters to which the contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Government servant he had expressed view on all or any of the matters in dispute of difference. In the event of the arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being transferred or vacating his office or being unable to act for any such reason, V.C. at the time of such transfer, vacation of office or inability to act, shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the contract. Such person shall be entitled to proceed with the reference from the stage at which it was left by his predecessor. It is also a term of this contract that no person other than a person except appointed by the Chairman/V.C. should act as arbitrator and if for any reason that is not possible, the matter is not to be referred to arbitration at all.” 11. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, further contended that the clause of exception i.e. ‘Except where otherwise provided in the contract takes away the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator from the arbitration clause and in such a situation if the Arbitrator proceeds, such action will be without jurisdiction. In support of such submissions, he placed reliance upon various judgments reported in AIR 1989 SC 952 (Paras 9 & 10) Vishwanath Sood v. Union of India and another; 1991(2) Arb. L.R. 180 (SC) (Paras 26 to 39) Associated Engineering Co. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and another; AIR 1997 SC 980 (Para 7) New India Civil Erectors (P) Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, 1999(2) Arb. L.R. 19 (SC) (Para 2) Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. Balasore Technical School, 2003(3) Arb. L.R. 409 (SC)(Para 43) Pure Helium India Pvt. Ltd. v. Oil & Natural Gas Commission; 2002(1) Arb. L.R. 506 (SC) (Paras 16 & 17) General Manager, Northern Railways and another v. Sarvesh Chopra; and 2006(1) Arb. L.R. 308 (AP)(DB)(Para 26) Sri Harsha Constructions, Hyderabad v. Union of India and others. 12. All the aforesaid judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant except the last one, i.e. Sri Harsha Constructions (supra), are under the repealed Act i.e. the Arbitration Act, 1940 but not under the newly enacted Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The objects and reasons of the new Act are different from those of the earlier Act. The Legislature felt necessary to repeal the earlier Act, therefore, the new Act has been enacted. The objects and reasons of the new Act are different from those of the earlier Act. The Legislature felt necessary to repeal the earlier Act, therefore, the new Act has been enacted. The outlook and the character of the new Act is different from that of the earlier Act. Under the new Act, the real intention of the Legislature is not to interfere with the domestic or international arbitration very often or as a matter of course. As a result whereof the decision of the domestic arbitration now a days has become much more smother than the earlier. In the statement of the object and reasons of the Act of 1996 it is widely felt that the Act of 1940 has become outdated. The Law Commission of India, several representative bodies of trade and industry and experts in the field of arbitration have proposed amendments to the same to make it more responsive to contemporary requirements. It is also recognised that economic reforms may not become fully effective if the law dealing with settlement of both domestic and international commercial disputes remains out of tune with such reforms. The United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. This model has also been adopted in the domestic field of arbitration by the new enactment. Hence, the scope and ambit of the provisions of Section 34(2)(a)(iv), as available in the new Act, may not be guided by the principles underlying the earlier Act. 13. The Act of 1996 is very different from the Act of 1940. The provisions of Act of 1996 have, therefore, to be interpreted and construed independently and in fact reference to the Act of 1940 may actually lead to misconstruction. In other words, the provisions of Act of 1996 have to be interpreted being uninfluenced by the principle underlying the Act of 1940. In order to get help in construing these provisions, it is more relevant to refer to the United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law which adopted the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, rather than the Act of 1940, as per the ratio of the judgment reported in AIR 1999 SC 565 (Sundaram Finance Limited v. NEPC India Ltd.) 14. The Act of 1996 is a long leap in the direction of alternate dispute resolution systems. It is based on UNCITRAL Model. The Act of 1996 is a long leap in the direction of alternate dispute resolution systems. It is based on UNCITRAL Model. The decided cases under the Act of 1940 have to be applied with caution for determining the issues arising for decision under the Act of 1996, as per ratio of (2004) 3 SCC 155 (Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja). 15. However, without prejudice to above, we have taken note of following decisions. In Sri Harsha Constructions (supra) a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in a proceeding under new Act held that when the claims are agreed to be ‘excepted items’, they shall not come within the arbitrable items. While construing so, the Division Bench has relied upon the earlier judgments passed under the old Act. We have no conflict of opinion with the principle but we have to keep in our mind the scope of reference agreed by and between the parties to go before an independent Arbitrator. When the parties have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator so appointed and proceeded on the basis of the reference, thereafter when the award is passed against any of the parties, he or they cannot turn around and challenge the award on such ground. 16. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant also placed reliance upon Clause 32 of the contract, which is as follows : CLAUSE 32 (a) : If the contractor considers any work demanded of him to be outside the requirements of contract, or considers any record or ruling of the Engineer-in Charge of his subordinates to be unfair, he shall immediately upon such work being demanded such record or ruling being made, ask in writing for written instructions or decisions whereupon he shall proceed without delay to perform of the written instructions of decisions he shall file a written protest with the Engineer-in-charge, steaing clearly and in detail the basis of his objections. Except for such protest or objections, as are made or record in the manner herein specified, and within the time limit stated the records rulings instructions, or decisions of the Engineer-in-Charge shall be final and conclusive. Instruction and/or decisions of the Engineer-in-Charge contained in letters transmitting drawings to the contractor shall be considered as written instructions or decisions, subject to protests or objections as wherein provided. Instruction and/or decisions of the Engineer-in-Charge contained in letters transmitting drawings to the contractor shall be considered as written instructions or decisions, subject to protests or objections as wherein provided. (b) If the contractor is dissatisfied with the final decision of the Engineer-in-Charge in pursuance of clause 32 (a), the contractor may within twenty-eight days after receiving notice of such decision, given notice in writing requiring that the matter be submitted to arbitration and furnishing detailed particulars of the dispute or difference specifying clearly the point at issue. If the contractor fails to give such notice within the period of twenty days as stipulated above, the decision of Engineer-in-Charge shall be conclusive and binding on the contractor. (c) Except where otherwise provided in the contract all questions and disputes to the meaning of the specifications, designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to quality of workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any other question, claim, right, or rates of extra items sanctioned and decided or not by the competent authority under the conditions of this contract matter of thing whatsoever. In any way arising out of or relating to contract designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instructions orders on these conditions or otherwise concerning the works, or the execution or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work or thereafter the completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred appointed by the Vice-Chairman of the M.D.A. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so appointed is a Government servant, that he had to deal with the matters to which the contract relates and that in the course of his duties as Government servant he had expressed view on all or any of the matters in dispute or difference. The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally or subsequently referred being incapacitated to act, the V.C./Chairman shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with terms of the contract. The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally or subsequently referred being incapacitated to act, the V.C./Chairman shall appoint another person to act as arbitrator in accordance with terms of the contract. It is also a term of this contract that no person other than a person appointed by the V.C. of M.D.A./Chairman as aforesaid shall act as arbitrator and if for any reason that is not possible, the matter is not to be referred to arbitration at all the arbitrator(s) may from time to time with the consent of the parties enlarge the time for making and publishing the award. Subject as aforesaid the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this Clause. All disputes between the parties to the contract arising out of and relating to the contract shall after written notice by either parties to the contract, to the other party, be referred to arbitration as above. Unless the parties otherwise agree, such reference shall not take place until after the completion, alleged completion or abandonment of the work or the determination of the contract. The venue of the arbitration shall be such a place or places as may be fixed by the arbitrator in his/their sole discretion. Any suit or application for the enforcement of this arbitration clause shall be filed in the competent Court at Moradabad, and no other Court of any other district of Uttar Pradesh or outside Uttar Pradesh shall have any jurisdiction in the matter. The award of the arbitrator shall be final, conclusive and binding on both the parties to the contract.” 17. We have gone through various clauses of the agreement, particularly Clauses 32 and 34, but we do not find any specification as to what are the exceptions in either of the two Clauses. Possibly, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant wanted to submit with regard to the Clauses 6 to 10 and 14, but from the plain reading of such clauses also, we do not find any exception which can be said to have ousted from the domain of the Arbitrator appointed herein. Possibly, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant wanted to submit with regard to the Clauses 6 to 10 and 14, but from the plain reading of such clauses also, we do not find any exception which can be said to have ousted from the domain of the Arbitrator appointed herein. At the time of considering any issue with regard to the exception, the Court should not be swayed away only with the word “except” or “exception” but meaningful “except” or “exception” in terms of the reference. If the subject matter of exceptional clause/s is/are also referred to the Arbitrator then the Arbitrator will be governed by such reference. It is to be remembered that the arbitration agreement is independent to the original agreement. Under the scheme of new Act of 1996 the arbitration clause is separable from other clauses of agreement. The arbitration clause constitutes an agreement by itself. Similarly it is held by the Supreme Court in Firm Ashok Traders (supra). Section 7 of the Act provides for arbitration agreement which reads as follows : “7. Arbitation agreement.—(1) In this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. (2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. (3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing. (4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in— (a) a document signed by the parties; (b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of tele-communication which provide a record of the agreement; or (c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other. (5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.” 18. Now appointment of arbitrator is very much comprehensive. Even upon the exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication, an Arbitrator can be appointed. Therefore, we have to see not only the exception clause but also domain of the Arbitrator. Now appointment of arbitrator is very much comprehensive. Even upon the exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication, an Arbitrator can be appointed. Therefore, we have to see not only the exception clause but also domain of the Arbitrator. In the instant case, a civil suit was filed and certain proceedings were undertaken in the Civil Court which reached up to the stage of revision. By that time the appellant authorities themselves suggested certain names of Arbitrators for the purpose of resolving the disputes through them from which one name has been accepted by the respondents. Therefore, now at this belated stage, the appellant cannot turn out and say that they are not bound by the arbitration agreement under which the Arbitrator was appointed for the purpose of adjudicating the cause. If such arbitration agreement is independent of any clause/s of the contract, the exception clause/s of the contract cannot make any exception therein. In fact, Mr. Sharma understood his draw back and switched over his argument to the last clause of the agreement pasted in vernacular, the English translation of which is quoted below : “Local Civil Court will have jurisdiction in respect of any dispute with regard to construction and development work or any other loss, damage or payment of any amount due.” 19. According to us, such clause is nothing but a forum selection clause. Such clause cannot be construed as an exception to such an arbitration agreement, which Mr. Sharma wanted to establish. 20. We repeat and say that we are concerned about the scope of reference and not with regard to the clause, having prevailing effect over the agreement provides for clause of “exception”. The exception might be available within the agreement but that will be of no avail if the parties wanted to proceed in accordance with the terms and conditions existed for arbitration. In a conflict between scope of reference and scope of arbitration, the earlier will prevail over later unless an objection is raised at a relevant point of time. In the instant case the respondents themselves wanted to go to Civil Court considering that the subject matter may not be covered by the arbitration. In the Civil Court objection was raised by the appellant that the arbitration clause can cover all such disputes. The exceptional clause was then very much existing. In the instant case the respondents themselves wanted to go to Civil Court considering that the subject matter may not be covered by the arbitration. In the Civil Court objection was raised by the appellant that the arbitration clause can cover all such disputes. The exceptional clause was then very much existing. Had it been so, either the scope of reference would have been allowed on such line or they would have allowed the respondents to proceed with the existing civil suit or suits agreeing with the fact that all the points may not be covered by the arbitration. But once the parties came to an appropriate conclusion for referring the matter to the arbitration through the person as nominated by the appellant and accepted by the respondent without any specification that how far it can go within the contract, the offer and acceptance of such reference became an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. If there is no specification in the reference, it will be an accepted position that the Arbitrator will proceed within the fore corners of the reference. 21. Mr. Navin Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, contended before this Court that Section 34 (2) (a) (iv), Section 16 and Section 4 of the Act will be taken together for the purpose of determination of the issue under contemplation. Whether all the disputes are falling within the purview of the arbitration depends on the terms of reference which is more prudent for the purpose of Section 16 of the Act, whereunder it has been provided that the arbitral tribunal itself is competent to rule its own jurisdiction. Therefore, if no objection has been raised with regard to the competency and the reference is categorical and open to all types of the disputes therein, the principle of waiver as provided under Section 4 of the Act will be applicable. Section 4 of the Act is quoted hereunder : “4. Therefore, if no objection has been raised with regard to the competency and the reference is categorical and open to all types of the disputes therein, the principle of waiver as provided under Section 4 of the Act will be applicable. Section 4 of the Act is quoted hereunder : “4. Waiver of right to object.—A party who knows that— (a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may derogate, or (b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement, has not been complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without stating his objection to such non-compliance without undue delay or, if a time limit is provided for stating that objection, within that period of time, shall be deemed to have waived his right to so object.” 22. Hence such point as agitated by the appellant cannot be sustained. 23. Now let us consider the question of limitation which has been raised by the appellant. According to Mr. Sharma, the claimant-respondent approached the Civil Court to protest against blacklisting on 30th April, 1998 when the proposal of arbitration was accepted by the claimant on 28th November, 2001. Therefore, the claim of the respondent is clearly barred by law of limitation. According to Mr. Sharma, Article 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable in the instant case. As per Article 137, an application for which no period of limitation is provided, can be made within 3 years from the date when the right to apply accrues. According to Mr. Sinha, unless and until final bill is submitted by the contractor before the authority for the purpose of payment and the authority refuses to pay, right to sue cannot arise, therefore, question of limitation does not arise. Thus, the question of limitation will arise from the date of refusal of payment of the final bill. According to him, the final bill was placed before the authority only on 5th May, 2000 and all the items under the final bill were subject matter of arbitration as available from the award itself, therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the scope of consideration of the claim was beyond the period of limitation. He further contended that the aforesaid Article is similar to Article 113 of the Limitation Act. 24. He further contended that the aforesaid Article is similar to Article 113 of the Limitation Act. 24. According to us if any part amount of bill is paid during the progress of the work without demur, such payment can not lead to any dispute. One party has paid and other party has accepted. Dispute can only arise when after submission of bill the authority refuses to pay any amount or wants adjustment of amount earlier paid etc. No such situation arose hereunder. Therefore, in our opinion, the date of submission of final bill is very relevant for the purpose of due consideration of question of limitation. 25. In this context Article 55 of the Limitation Act is also to be taken into account, wherein it is provided that for compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied not herein specially provided for, the period of 3 years will be calculated for the purpose of limitation, from the date when the contract is broken or (where there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit is instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases. In the instant case, it is very difficult to construe that the contract came to an end by blacklisting of the respondent on 22nd April, 1998. According to us, the cause of blacklisting, and the cause for the purpose of payment of bill amount for the work already done by the claimant/respondent, are different from each other. A contractor can be blacklisted for his future work due to some reason or his future work can be suspended which is not subject matter herein. However, such action, if any, cannot disentitle him from claiming an amount which he is legally entitled for his work already done. Even if it does for adjustment of any amount as compensation, that will arise only at the time of preparation of final account. In a case of price of work done by the contractor for the authority firstly, there will be final measurement of work by the parties called as joint measurement, if necessary, making entry in the joint measurement book followed by final bill which again followed by final accounting for payment. In this case the measurement was done on 3rd February, 1999 but the measurement was finalised on 18th March, 1999. In this case the measurement was done on 3rd February, 1999 but the measurement was finalised on 18th March, 1999. Therefore, even if the final bill was submitted on 5th May, 2000, it cannot be construed as intentional belated final bill to save the limitation. It is to be specifically remembered that unless final bill accounting is made on final bill prepared on joint measurement, the account between the parties is as good as running and continuous account. Therefore, no question of limitation can arise. If the date which has been given by Mr. Jain at the time of his initial arguments i.e. 18th March, 1999 is construed as the date of final measurement and the date of acceptance of proposal for arbitration is 18th September, 2001, the claim is squarely within the period of limitation, irrespective of the factum of producing final bill on 5th May, 2000, which according to the respondent is the actual date of accrual of the cause of action. 26. Mr. Sharma relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1988 SC 1007 , Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi Development Authority, to establish that mere failure or inaction to pay does not lead to the inference of the existence of dispute. Dispute entails a positive element and assertion in denying, not merely inaction to accede to a claim or a request. We have no conflict of opinion with regard to such principle rather it supports the case of the respondent. Moreover, in Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi (supra), no final bill was prepared but the dispute arose even before the final bill, about the claim of non-payment. 27. The aforesaid judgment as well as the judgments reported in 1996(l) Arb. L.R. 77 (SC), M/s. Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. M/s. Indo Swiss Synthetics Gem Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and others, and 1999(3) Arb. L.R. 335 (SC), Steel Authority of India Limited v. J.C. Budharaja, Government and Mining Contractor, are cited basically to establish that Article 137 of the Limitation Act will be applicable in case of the claim for non-payment of any amount out of contract. We have not found any difference on principle in calculating the period of limitation under either of the Articles as referred above. We have not found any difference on principle in calculating the period of limitation under either of the Articles as referred above. In all the aforesaid Articles one point is very clear that 3 years period is to be counted from the date when the cause of action arose. Cause of action cannot arise when there is no dispute between the contracting parties. If the cause of action arises in respect of any part payment during pendency of the work, then the dispute can only be restricted to such part payment because no finality can be said to have reached till the date of submission of the final bill. Placement of final bill depends upon the measurement of the work to be done by the parties jointly. Therefore, if the dispute is with regard to the final bill, it will automatically relate back to the measurement being the basis or foundation of such final bill. Unless the measurement is completed, there is no scope for making any final bill. Therefore, making of the final bill by the contractor is a product of bilateral discharge of performance i.e. joint measurement of the work done. The date of acceptance of proposal for arbitration falls squarely within the period of 3 years from the date of measurement, not from the date of final bill which has been placed later on. Therefore, the point of limitation raised by Mr. Sharma, cannot be sustained. 28. So far as the rejection of the counter-claim of the appellant is concerned, we have gone through the award and found that learned Arbitrator has held as follows : “Annexure 17 (A) goes to show that no recovery has been shown by the respondent against bond No. 300. The respondent could not show any contract provision based on which the respondent (appellant herein) is having the right to adjust any amount from one contract to another. In addition to the above I have also decided in other awards that no amount is recoverable from the claimant. I accordingly reject the counter claim of the respondent.” 29. Therefore, there is no scope for interference with the impugned award on this count also. 30. So far as the procedure of appointing Commissioner is concerned, the same was done by the consent of the parties. So far the point of interest, if any, is concerned, no serious dispute has been raised. Therefore, there is no scope for interference with the impugned award on this count also. 30. So far as the procedure of appointing Commissioner is concerned, the same was done by the consent of the parties. So far the point of interest, if any, is concerned, no serious dispute has been raised. Therefore, both these points are also not feasible for the purpose of coming to a conclusion contrary to that of the learned Arbitrator. 31. Further the important question raised by the appellant is the question of public policy. He contended that the Court may set aside arbitral award if it is in conflict with the public policy. He placed reliance on the judgment reported in AIR 2003 SC 2629 , Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. SAW Pipes Ltd., in support of this submission. 32. The phrase ‘public policy’ used in Section 34 of the Act, in the context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be said that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (supra) it has been held as follows : “31. Therefore, in our view, the phrase ‘public policy of India’ used in S. 34 in context is required to be given a wider meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public good or in public interest or what would be injuries or harmful to the public good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be said to be in public interest. Such award/judgment/decision is likely to adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition to narrower meaning given to the term ‘public policy in Renusagar’s case (supra), it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is patently illegal. Result would be—award could be set aside if it is contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Result would be—award could be set aside if it is contrary to : (a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b) the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality, or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal. Illegality must go to the root of the matter and if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against the public policy. Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Such award is opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void.” 33. We are concerned with such proposition and there is no conflict with regard to the same. But we fail to understand, under what circumstance the same will be applicable herein. Merely direction of the Arbitrator for payment of damages, loss of profit, overhead expences etc. out of the work already done under the contract, cannot be said to be against the public policy. In [ 2007 (9) ADJ 470 (DB)] (State of U.P. v. M/s. Taxmaco Ltd. Balgharia, Calcutta) this Division Bench of the High Court followed the judgments of the Supreme Court in this respect and held as follows : “In 2006 (4) Arb. LR 275 (SC) [K.N. Sathyapalan (dead) by Lrs. v. State of Kerala and another] we find that the Supreme Court held that when in any unforeseen circumstances the contractor held up from complleting the work within the stipulated period and the State had not taken any step in cooperating with the contractor, in such circumstances if any question with regard to delay of execution of work has been considered by the Arbitrator, the same cannot be said to be without jurisdiction but within the jurisdiction. In J.T. 2006 (10) SC 62 (Food Corporation of India v. M/s. A.M. Ahmed and Co. and another) the Supreme Court further held that escalation of price due to gap of time or non fulfillment of contract within the period is normal event or consequence if the question of delay is not out of the domain of the Arbitrator to consider. According to us once the Arbitrator/umpire has considered the delay, he is also empowered to consider the natural and consequential event in connection with the delay. Therefore, it cannot be said that the umpire acted without jurisdiction in considering the delay.” 34. According to us once the Arbitrator/umpire has considered the delay, he is also empowered to consider the natural and consequential event in connection with the delay. Therefore, it cannot be said that the umpire acted without jurisdiction in considering the delay.” 34. Against this background, we narrate herein the final position of claims allowed by the learned Arbitrator, to understand the position as to whether or not, the impugned award as passed, is against the public policy. The final position of payment is quoted hereunder : Claim No. Amount claimed by the Amount awarded claimant(Rs) (Rs.) Claim No. 1 9,71,576 679952 (Price of work alone) Claim No. 2 34553+62,500(E.M) 34553+62,500 (E.M) to (Refund of earnest be released money and security) Claim No. 3 9,20,984 726914 (Overhead loss due to prolongation of contract) Claim No. 4 (Escalation 9,00,000 — of market price) Claim No. 5 9,15,466 — (Loss of turnover/loss of profitability) Claim No. 6 (Pendentelite — — & future interest) Claim No. 7 (Cost of 50,000 — arbitration) Claim No. 8 40,000 — (Loss of profit) Total 3832579 1441419 Counter claim of 35,89,111.15 Nil respondent 35. No payment was allowed by the Arbitrator on account of damages or loss of profit. Only an amount under Claim No. 3 was considered on account of overhead loss due to prolongation of contract. The contract period was extended up to 15th June, 1988 but work was stopped by the appellant on 21st April, 1988 without reason by which the respondent (claimant therein) suffered. The Arbitrator held breach of contract on the part of the appellant (respondent therein) and ultimately assessed the loss giving reasons. We cannot go for the reasons of the reasonableness. If such type of determination by learned Arbitrator is construed as against the public policy, then the object and reasons for repealing the old Act and introducing the new Act will be totally frustrated. 36. Hence, in totality we do not find any justification or reason to interfere with the impugned award, which has been affirmed by the learned District Judge, Moradabad vide its order dated 29th January, 2007 under Section 34 of the Act. Consequently, the appeals as made by the appellant, fail and thereby dismissed. The interim order, if any, stands vacated. 37. No order is passed as to costs. Hon’ble Shishir Kumar, J.—I agree. ————