Judgment :- Radhakrishnan, J. Original petition was preferred by the respondent herein seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P21 order passed by the Managing Director, Food Corporation of India and also for a writ of mandamus directing the Corporation to appoint the petitioner as Assistant Grade-III (Depot) at Alappuzha with retrospective effect from 11-3-1977 and to give him all consequential service benefits. Learned single Judge allowed the writ petition and granted a declaration that he would be in service as an Asst. Grade III (D) on a national basis with effect from 11-3-77. Aggrieved by the same this appeal has been preferred by the Food Corporation of India. 2. Qualification prescribed for direct recruitment to the post of Assistant Grade-III as per FCI Staff Regulation 1971 is Graduation. 70% of Assistant Grade – III posts are to be filled up by direct recruitment and the remaining 30% are to be filled up by promotion. As per the Staff Regulation 30% promotion vacancies are to be filled up by promoting persons who are having 3 years experience in Class IV posts strictly based on the zonal seniority depending upon the actual requirement and vacancy position. Respondent did not satisfy any of the above-mentioned requirements for appointment as Assistant Grade III. 3. Respondent was appointed as a watchman on compassionate ground on 11-3-1977 and at that time he was possessing only the qualification of SSLC and PDC and hence was not qualified for appointment to the post of Assistant Grade III. Discontented with the post of watchman he staked his claim for the post of Assistant Grade-III though not qualified for the post. Relaxation of the qualification was sought for on the ground that the Corporation had given relaxation to certain other employees from the requisite qualification for appointment on compassionate grounds. Reference was made to the cases of T.S. Ramakrishnan, Levin Noronha, Susan Mathew, Bhuvanachandran Pillai, Kunjunjamma etc. On that plea he approached this court and filed OP.4913/81 which was disposed of by this court on 26-5-1986. Noticing that no reasons had been stated for meeting out a differential treatment towards him compared to the above mentioned persons court directed the Corporation to pass a speaking order. Later the Corporation passed yet another order dated 19-11-1986 rejecting the claim of the respondent stating that he did not satisfy the qualification for the post of Assistant Grade-III. Noticing that no reasons had been stated for meeting out a differential treatment towards him compared to the above mentioned persons court directed the Corporation to pass a speaking order. Later the Corporation passed yet another order dated 19-11-1986 rejecting the claim of the respondent stating that he did not satisfy the qualification for the post of Assistant Grade-III. Further it was pointed out that very many persons who were having the qualification of SSLC were appointed only as watchmen and not as Assistant Grade III, relaxing the educational qualification. 4. Petitioner challenged the said order in OP.No.447/87, which was disposed of by this court on 18th January, 1990 quashing the above mentioned order and directed the Corporation to pass fresh orders in the light of the observations and directions contained in the earlier judgment. Corporation later passed an order dated 6-3-1992 rejecting the representation stating that relaxation from the qualification was given to few others by different Zonal Managers exercising their discretion and it would be difficult for the Managing Director to guage the manner in which the discretion was exercised, and it was pointed out that some of whom the benefit of relaxation was granted had better qualification than the respondent and that respondent had not been discrimination. Respondent then filed OP.No.3520 of 1992 challenging that order. Original petition was disposed of by this Court on 13th July 1993 setting aside the above mentioned order. This Court directed the Corporation to pass fresh order in the light of the earlier judgments. While disposing of the matter this Court opined as follows: “Indeed, the zonal managers of the Corporation do exercise their discretion to relax educational qualifications while making appointments from time to time under the dying in harness scheme. This is noticed in the impugned order, where it has also observed by the respondent that “it was difficult for him to guage the manner in which the discretion had been exercised by the competent officers in the instances which were pointed out by the petitioner, at this distant point of time.” This is indeed not the right attitude for the respondent to have taken in the light of the positive direction given by this Court in Ext.P7 judgment. The observations in sub-para (d) of the order too are unsatisfactory. They are rested upon mere assumptions without any basis. The observations in sub-para (d) of the order too are unsatisfactory. They are rested upon mere assumptions without any basis. It was also not proper for the respondent to have observed, that “if the petitioner’s case is decided now, it would lead to a cause of action and open to a pandora’s box of all the old cases of the past and also question the appointment based on qualifications which have been made in the interest of the Corporation.” There was indeed no justification to have closed the lid on the petitioner’s case in the above manner. Virtually, the respondent has given the go-bye to the directions of this court. He had evaded issues, which he was called upon to consider and answer. Ext.P10 to say the least, raised more questions than it answered. It is untenable and is accordingly set aside. I direct the respondent to consider the grievance of the petitioner afresh in terms of the directions in Exts.P7 and P9 and pass an appropriate speaking order giving valid reasons, within four months or receipt of a copy of this judgment.” Corporation later passed order dated 6-12-1993 reiterating that the individuals to whom relaxation was granted were having better qualification than the respondent and that the Zonal Managers were not acting arbitrarily while examining each and every claim. It was pointed out that the degree of hardship caused to the family was also a relevant consideration, which would govern the decision making process and in the absence of complete records it would not be possible to take a comparative view on the plea of discrimination. But keeping in view the spirit of the various orders passed by the court, the Managing Director of the Corporation passed the following order: “Shri Cletus need not however be appointed as AG-III (Depot) with retrospective effect because it cannot be categorically stated that the Zonal Managers acted in an arbitrary manner. Further Mr. Cletus has not worked in the capacity of AG-III (Depot) and hence the principle of ‘No work No Pay’ would apply. Hence Mr. Cletus may be appointed as AG-III (Depot) with prospective effect. Further Mr. Cletus’s appointment as AG-III (Depot) will be as a direct recruit. Further Mr. Cletus has not worked in the capacity of AG-III (Depot) and hence the principle of ‘No work No Pay’ would apply. Hence Mr. Cletus may be appointed as AG-III (Depot) with prospective effect. Further Mr. Cletus’s appointment as AG-III (Depot) will be as a direct recruit. It is also clarified that the relaxation as stated above is being granted in the instant case as a very special case and that this shall not be quoted as a precedent in any other case that may arise in future.” Corporation therefore issued the appointment order dated 8-12-1993 to the respondent and on that basis he joined duty, but still he staked his claim to the post of Asst. Grade III with retrospective effect from 11-3-1977 the date on which he was appointed as watchman. Request was turned down by the Corporation under its order dt. 10-1-95. Respondent then filed OP. 909/95 challenging that order stating that he is entitled to get appointment as Assistant Grade III with retrospective effect with the relaxation of the educational qualification. Original petition was allowed and a direction was given to the Corporation to re-consider the request of the petitioner for appointment with retrospective effect from 11-3-1977, which was turned down by the Corporation vide Ext.P21 order dated 22-3-1999 which was challenged by the respondent in OP.No.13231 of 1991. Original petition was allowed by the learned single Judge stating as follows: “Despite these observations and directions in the judgments, the Managing Director passed Ext.P21, the impugned order, refusing to consider the relevant issue and rejecting the representation, holding that appointment of the petitioner as Assistant Grade-III was done as a special case, and in relaxation of the qualification. There is no point in directing the respondents to consider the issues again, since they are not in a position to comprehend the directions in the judgments. Hence, I quash Ext.P21. It is declared that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been appointed as Assistant Grade-III with effect from 11-3-77, on a notional basis. Thereafter, he shall be governed by the regulations governing the appointment. The needful shall be done within a period of three months from the date of production of a copy of judgment. Hence, I quash Ext.P21. It is declared that the petitioner shall be deemed to have been appointed as Assistant Grade-III with effect from 11-3-77, on a notional basis. Thereafter, he shall be governed by the regulations governing the appointment. The needful shall be done within a period of three months from the date of production of a copy of judgment. The pay shall be re-fixed accordingly, within another two weeks.” Smt. Seemanthini, Senior counsel appearing for the Corporation submitted that the learned single Judge was not justified in giving a positive direction to the Corporation to appoint the respondent with retrospective effect from 11-3-1977 with relaxation of qualification from that date. Counsel submitted that appointment under the compassionate appointment scheme cannot be claimed as a matter of right, but still the Corporation gave appointment to the respondent as watchman on 11-3-1977. Corporation, later taking note of the various directions issued by this court, appointed the respondent as Assistant Grade-III relaxing the educational qualifications. Counsel referred to the decision of the apex court in State of J & K v. Sajad Ahmed, (2006 (7) SCALE 136), Union Bank of India v. M.T. Latheesh, ((2006) 7 SCC 350) etc. Counsel also submitted, the mere fact that the Corporation had given relaxation in few cases is not a reason to give relaxation of qualification to the respondent. In few of the other cases, plea for relaxation were refused also. Even then the Corporation relaxed the qualification in the case of respondent on the basis of the various directions given by this court and appointed him as Assistant Grade – III. Counsel submitted that several employees are citing the case of the respondent as a precedent insisting that the Corporation should relax the qualification for the post of Assistant Grade III while considering the application for compassionate appointment. Reference was made to the judgment in OP.12445 of 1998 wherein similar claim was however rejected by a learned single Judge of this court. Learned single Judge held as follows: “Even though petitioner has prima facie made out a case of arbitrariness and discrimination and violation of Article 14, I do not think the petitioner can be granted the relief because what the Corporation has done is an illegal thing even based on their own admission in Ext.P8. Learned single Judge held as follows: “Even though petitioner has prima facie made out a case of arbitrariness and discrimination and violation of Article 14, I do not think the petitioner can be granted the relief because what the Corporation has done is an illegal thing even based on their own admission in Ext.P8. This court should not permit perpetuation of illegality or repetition of the same mistake, but should only correct the mistake of the respondent, which is a Government of India agency. In the circumstances, if ineligible promotions are given to persons, the second respondent should take appropriate action to correct the same after notice to the parties. There will be a direction to the Managing Director of FCI to conduct an enquiry in the matter of irregular promotions to the persons above referred and take appropriate action against the officers concerned without any delay.” Respondent is getting this benefit, which otherwise he would not have legally entitled to only due to the various observations and directions made by the learned single Judges of this Court in various writ petitions. Respondent is forgetting the fact that in several cases request for relaxation of the educational qualification were refused also. 5. We are of the considered view that the mere fact that the Corporation had given relaxation of the educational qualifications to few employees exercising its discretionary power would not be a reason to grant relaxation of qualification to the respondent to a post to which graduation is the minimum qualification. Admittedly respondent is not a graduate and he possesses only SSLC and P.D.C. A court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot make a roving enquiry to examine the manner in which relaxation was given to few others by the various Zonal Managers who held the office of the Corporation during various spells. This court is concerned only with the question as to whether respondent is legally entitled to make a claim as of right for the post of Assistant Grade – III which admittedly he cannot due to lack of qualification. 6. Apex Court in Union Bank of India and others v. m.T. Latheesh, ((2006) 7 SCC 350) held that even though the Bank had made several compassionate appointments contrary to the Scheme, a writ court cannot compel the authority to perpetuate an illegality or mistake. 6. Apex Court in Union Bank of India and others v. m.T. Latheesh, ((2006) 7 SCC 350) held that even though the Bank had made several compassionate appointments contrary to the Scheme, a writ court cannot compel the authority to perpetuate an illegality or mistake. In State of J & K & Others v. Sajad Ahmed Mir, (2006 (7) SCALE 136), the Apex Court held that normally an employment in Government or other public sectors should be open to all eligible persons, which is in consonance with Article 14 of the Constitution. Deviation is made from the general rule in exceptional circumstance like compassionate appointment provided the appointee has sufficient qualification for the post. Giving compassionate appointment itself is a relaxation of the normal rule of public employment. Claim for further relaxation of qualification would amount double relaxation scarifying the merit and efficiency in service. Power for further relaxation of qualification can be exercised only in exceptional cases and the mere fact that the appointing authority has waived the educational qualification in few cases does not mean that others can claim the same as of right on a plea of discrimination. A Constitutional Court is not expected to make a roving enquiry and compare the factual situations in each and every cases, through a microscope and then substitute its opinion to that of the appointing authority as is sought to be done in this case. 7. Concept of equality before law, does not postulate absolute equality. Article 14 postulates similarity of treatment and not equivalent or identical treatment. Mere differentiation or inequality of treatment does not per se amount to discrimination. Claim for compassionate appointment cannot be demanded as of right. Such appointment is always an exception to the general rule of public employment. Article 16(1) of the Constitution guarantees of all citizens equality of opportunity in matters relating to public employment. The apex court in State of Haryana and others v. Rani Devi and others, ((1996) 5 SCC 308) held that the claim for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premises that one is dependent on the deceased employee, and strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 of 16 of the Constitution. The apex court in State of Haryana and others v. Rani Devi and others, ((1996) 5 SCC 308) held that the claim for appointment on compassionate ground is based on the premises that one is dependent on the deceased employee, and strictly this claim cannot be upheld on the touchstone of Article 14 of 16 of the Constitution. Reference may also be made to the decision of the apex court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachandra Ambekar, ((1994) 2 SCC 718), Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and others, ((1994) 4 SCC 138), Commissioner of Public Instructions and others v. K.R. Vishwanath, (2005) 7 SCC 206), I.G. (Karnuic) and others v. Prahlad Mani Tripathi, (2007 AIR SCW 335). 8. We are of the view that the mere fact that an exemption was granted to few applicants from educational qualification for compassionate appointment does not mean that hereafter all the applicants are entitled as of right to get exemption from the educational qualification which depends upon variety of factors including the approach of the officer who exercises the discretionary power. Discretion is a right to act in certain circumstances and within given limits and principles on the basis of one’s judgment and conscience. For example, ‘A’ exercise his discretion to exempt ‘B’ from the educational qualification. ‘A’ at the same time does not exempt ‘C’, ‘C’ complains of discriminatory treatment. In a given case, court can examine, whether ‘A’ has properly exercised his discretion in the case of ‘C’ as compared to ‘B’. Take another case, ‘A” exercises his discretion in favour of ‘B’, ‘E’ exercises his discretion against ‘D’, this is a case where the discretion is exercised not by ‘A’ alone but ‘E’ also. Both may differ in their judgment and conscience. ‘D’ will have difficulty in establishing a plea of discrimination against ‘E’ compared to ‘C’ as against A in the first quoted example because exercise discretion by two persons that is ‘A’ and ‘E’ may differ according to their judgment and conscience. 9. Both may differ in their judgment and conscience. ‘D’ will have difficulty in establishing a plea of discrimination against ‘E’ compared to ‘C’ as against A in the first quoted example because exercise discretion by two persons that is ‘A’ and ‘E’ may differ according to their judgment and conscience. 9. Zonal officers who manned to offices at the relevant time had exercised their discretion in a particular manner, some refusing the request for relaxation of educational qualification, some others did not Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not expected to make a roving enquiry and decide, how discretion has been exercised by each and every officer, and compare with another officer who failed to exercise his discretion. For accepting the plea of compassionate appointment as well as relaxation of the qualification, several factors may weigh with the officer. Financial hardship caused to a family is of prime consideration, which may vary, from one case to another, so also availability of vacancy, necessity of relaxing the minimum educational qualification and its impact on the efficiency of the administration and other hosts of factors. Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not justified in making a fishing enquiry on all those matters, especially when persons cannot as of right claim compassionate appointment as well as exemption from educational qualification. 10. Ext.P21 order in our view is perfectly in tune with the earlier observations and directions given by this court as well as the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions. Writ petitioner cannot clamour for a double relaxation as of right. In fact educational qualification was relaxed in the case of the petitioner but he wants retrospective relaxation of educational qualification from 11-3-1977 onwards, which in our view is nothing but an over ambitious prayer. If the plea of the respondent is accepted, that will set a bad precedent that is in future in the case of compassionate appointment, graduation cannot be insisted upon. 11. If the plea of the respondent is accepted, that will set a bad precedent that is in future in the case of compassionate appointment, graduation cannot be insisted upon. 11. Under such circumstance we are of the view that the learned single Judge was not justified in directing the Corporation to appoint the respondent as Assistant Grade – III with retrospective effect from 11-3-1977 relaxing the educational qualification especially, when the Corporation has appointed him giving relaxation of the qualification taking note of the various observations and findings recorded by this court in various judgments in the writ petitions filed by the respondent. We are of the view this is not a fit case where this court should exercise the extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the discretion exercised by the Corporation granting appointment as Assistant Grade – III from the date of that order. Under such circumstance we are inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge.