Judgment :- S. Tamilvanan, J. This Criminal Appeal has been directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 112. 2000 made in S.C. No.12/1999 on the file of District Judge, Ootacamund. The appellants herein 1 and 2 are the accused 1 and 2 before the Trial Court. The brief facts of the case are as follows: On 2. 1997 at about 10.00 p.m., at Door No.9/77 of Kelly Estate Labourers Housing quarters, Gudalore within the jurisdiction of the respondent-police, the appellants 1 and 2 attacked P.Ws.1 and 2 namely Periyasamy and Manickam by M.O.1 and M.O.2 knives and caused injuries to both the witnesses, thereby the appellants/A1 and A2 have committed an offence punishable under Sections 324 and 307, I.P.C. respectively. 3. In support of the prosecution case, P.Ws.1 to 10 were examined and Exs.1 to 18 and M.Os.1 to 4 were marked. On the side of the appellants, no witness was examined and no document was marked. The Trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence and the arguments advanced by both sides has held that the charge against A1 under Section 324 and the charge against second appellant-A2 under Section 307, I.P.C. have been proved and accordingly the first appellant-A1 was convicted under Section 324, I.P.C. sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to undergo six months, Rigorous Imprisonment and second appellant- A2 was convicted under Section 307, and sentenced to undergo 7 years’ Rigorous Imprisonment and the period already undergone by the appellant was ordered to be set off. 4. When the Appeal was taken up today for arguments, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted a Memo of Compromise signed by the appellants 1 and 2/P.Ws.1 and 2, the affected persons in the alleged occurrence, and identified by both the learned counsel. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants relied upon the following decisions, and argued that the offences for which the appellants/accused, have been convicted are only compoundable. I. Mahesh Chand and another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 2111 . II. State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Rashid and another, 2005 (7) SCC 56 . III. Y. Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005 (1) SCC 347. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the AIR 1988 SC 2111 reads as follows: “ 2. I. Mahesh Chand and another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 2111 . II. State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Rashid and another, 2005 (7) SCC 56 . III. Y. Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005 (1) SCC 347. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the AIR 1988 SC 2111 reads as follows: “ 2. The accused were acquitted by the Trial Court, but they were convicted by the High Court for the offence under Section 307, I.P.C. This offence is not compoundable under law. The parties, however, want to treat it a special case, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is said and indeed not disputed that one of the accused is a lawyer practising in the lower Court. There was a counter case arising out of the same transaction. It is said that this case has already been compromised. The decision of this Court in Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987 (2) JT 361 , has been also referred to in support of the plea for permission to compound the offence. 3. We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the offence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the Trial Court shall permit them to compound the offence” 3. We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the offence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the Trial Court shall permit them to compound the offence” 6. In the above said case, in view of considering the facts and special circum-stances stated therein, the Honourable Supreme Court permitted to compound the offence, as a special case. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a precedent to record the compromise arrived at between the parties in the present case as far as the offence under Section 307, I.P.C. is concerned. 7. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a precedent to record the compromise arrived at between the parties in the present case as far as the offence under Section 307, I.P.C. is concerned. 7. The Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in 2005 (7) SCC 55 has held that compromise cannot be recorded in such case under Section 307, I.P.C. But, while awarding sentence the effect of compromise can be taking into consideration, and the order at Para 4 of the decision it reads as follows: “The offence under Section 307, I.P.C. is not a compoundable one, therefore, compromise cannot be recorded, but at the same time it is well settled that while awarding sentence the effect of com-promise can be taken into consideration. It has been stated that the appellant has remained in custody for a period of about 14 months and there is no allegation that he assaulted the deceased”. 8. Considering the facts and circum-stances, the sentence is modified by reducing the sentence already undergone by the appellants. While hearing this Appeal the victims P.Ws.1 and 2 are present before the Court. Learned Counsel for the appellants would state that the appellants have compromised the matter with the P.Ws.1 and 2 and according to them there was no permanent disability sustained by them. 9. Considering the facts and circum-stances, I am of the view to confirm the conviction as held by the Court below is, the first appellant under Section 324, I.P.C. and to pay a fine amount of Rs.2,000/- and confirm the conviction of the second appellant made by the Court below, under Section 307, I.P.C. On the facts and circumstances and also considering the Memo of Compromise by the party, I am of the view to modify the sentence of imprisonment against the second appellant by reducing the period of sentence already undergone by him and also to pay a fine amount of Rs.25,000/-and the said amount shall be paid as compensation to the victim P.W.2 within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, failing which he should undergo the imprisonment as directed by the Court below. 10. The Appeal is ordered accordingly.