JUDGMENT Hon’ble Devi Prasad Singh, J.—Affidavits have been exchanged. 2. With the consent of parties Counsel the petition is decided finally at the admission stage. 3. The controversy relates to dismissal from service in pursuance of provisions contained in Rule 8 (2)(b) of U.P. Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). Question involved in the present writ petition is when a police personnel may be dismissed from service, without holding regular inquiry in pursuance to Rule 8 (2) (b) of the Rules read with Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 4. The brief facts of the present case are summarised as under : 5. The petitioner was appointed as Constable on 26.12.1999 and he was posted at Lucknow after training. According to petitioner’s Counsel, he performed duties in various districts of U.P. as Lucknow, Sitapur, Mahoba and Unnao. According to petitioner’s Counsel, during the entire tenure of service the petitioner has not faced any departmental proceedings, or was punished. While posted at Unnao, he obtained leave on 3.9.2003 and continued till 30.12.2003 i.e., 190 days. The period of which the petitioner was on leave, was reported to be unauthorised absence from duty hence, under provisions of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules, the petitioner was dismissed, from service by the order dated 10.12.2006 by the Superintendent of Police, Unnao. The provisions of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules are analogous to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. For convenience the Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules is reproduced as under : 8. Dismissal and removal.—(2) No Police Officer shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after proper inquiry and disciplinary proceedings as contemplated by these rules : Provided that this rule shall not apply— (b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry; or” 5. The plain reading of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules shows that a police employee can be dismissed from service without holding any inquiry if the authority is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold departmental enquiry. 6. The plain reading of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules shows that a police employee can be dismissed from service without holding any inquiry if the authority is satisfied that for some reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to hold departmental enquiry. 6. On account of absence from duty, the Superintendent of Police Unnao by the impugned order dated 10.12.2006 contained in Annexure 1 to the writ petition, has dismissed the petitioner from service. At the time when the petitioner was dismissed from service, he was holding the promotional post of Head Constable in civil police in police line, Unnao. It has been recorded that the petitioner was unauthorisedly absent from duty for 110 days. It appears that the order of dismissal was passed in pursuance to Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules during the period he was absent from duty. 7. While assailing the impugned order, it has been submitted by Sri M.P. Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order impugned in the writ petition has been passed by adopting the recourse of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules without assigning any reason. It has been submitted by the petitioner’s Counsel that ordinarily, the principles of natural justice should not be dispensed with by adopting recourse of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules, in case inquiry in any manner is feasible. In the present case, the defence set up by the petitioner’s Counsel is that initially, the petitioner informed the respondents relating to his illness on telephone and thereafter, forwarded medical leave. A departmental appeal was preferred against the impugned order of dismissal from service which was also dismissed by the appellate authority by the subsequent impugned order dated 18.4.2007 contained in Annexure 2 to the writ petition. The defence taken by the petitioner was that from 20.3.2006 to 15.4.2006, he was discharging duty at Maurawan, district Unnao and while serving at Maurawan, he was under medical treatment and submitted medical certificate of the period from 16.3.2006 to 15.4.2006. On 15.4.2006, he resumed duty at Police Line, Unnao. It was stated before the appellate authority by the petitioner that on account of chronic disease of heart patient on 6.6.2006 to 16.6.2006 he suffered from serious heart ailment and remained under medical treatment. On 15.4.2006, he resumed duty at Police Line, Unnao. It was stated before the appellate authority by the petitioner that on account of chronic disease of heart patient on 6.6.2006 to 16.6.2006 he suffered from serious heart ailment and remained under medical treatment. On account of heart attack, he fell unconscious in the police line and remained lying in the barrack of the Police Line Unnao for some period. 8. The submission of the petitioner’s Counsel is that in case the petitioner would have been given opportunity to defend his case, he could have submitted medical report and assign reasons before the disciplinary authority or the inquiry officer. The dismissal from service by adopting recourse of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules was not justified under the facts and circumstances of the present case. 9. Undoubtedly, the material on record indicate that the petitioner either went on leave or remained absent from duty from time to time may be, because of heart ailment. The petitioner alongwith the writ petition, has filed photocopies of certain medical certificates and note sheets issued by the Medical College and Primary Health Centre. However, these certificates and medical note sheets cannot be looked into by this Court while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The fact remains whether authorities were justified in adopting recourse of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules for dismissal of the petitioner from service. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, whether there were sufficient grounds for denial of principles of natural justice to hold inquiry. 10. While passing the impugned order, the Superintendent of Police Unnao indicated that on account of unauthorised absence from duty and also on account of the fact that the inquiry is not possible as the petitioner is not traceable, the service are liable to be dismissed in pursuance of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules. The finding has been recorded that the petitioner was guilty of serious misconduct on account of unauthorised absence from duty. So far as the dismissal from service for the unauthorised absence from duty is concerned, it does not seem to be unjustified. A Government servant in case, remains absent from duty without prior sanction of leave, may face major penalty in the form of dismissal from service. So far as the dismissal from service for the unauthorised absence from duty is concerned, it does not seem to be unjustified. A Government servant in case, remains absent from duty without prior sanction of leave, may face major penalty in the form of dismissal from service. However, while doing so, the employee should be given opportunity to defend and justify his absence from service. Only unjustified absence from duty without sanctioned leave, may be a ground for dismissal from service. Thus, if a Government employee is absent from duty without sanction of leave deliberately and his conduct seems to be careless one, then he or she may face a major punishment of dismissal from service. But when because of some compelling circumstances and certain immediate needs and requirements on justifiable ground, a Government employee proceed on leave without waiting for sanction of leaves from the authorities after submitting representation may not create a ground for major penalty. But it does not mean that a Government employee may abstain from duty without prior sanction. In case the circumstances are so serious and compelling that the Government employee is not in a position to wait for sanction from the competent authority, then relevant material must be brought on record. However, it shall not preclude the authorities to accept or reject the leave application. It shall depend on facts and circumstances of each case. In case leave application is rejected, then it shall always be incumbent on the Government employee to resume duty. In the present case, there is nothing on record, which may indicate that before passing the order impugned, the Superintendent of Police made some effort at his end in the form of notice or communication to the petitioner’s address for resumption of duty. The chronic heart ailment may be a ground, which had compelled the petitioner to abstain from duty with prior information to department. However, such facts should have been investigated through proper inquiry. The impugned order does not indicate that some effort was made by the Superintendent of Police for petitioner’s resumption of duty. It was incumbent on the Superintendent of Police to require the petitioner to resume duty before taking recourse of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules. 11. However, such facts should have been investigated through proper inquiry. The impugned order does not indicate that some effort was made by the Superintendent of Police for petitioner’s resumption of duty. It was incumbent on the Superintendent of Police to require the petitioner to resume duty before taking recourse of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules. 11. My attention has been invited to Rule 16 of the rules which provides the procedure which should have been adopted by the Superintendent of Police before taking action against the petitioner because of alleged unauthorised absence from duty. 12. It has been settled by the catena of decisions of judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court that denial of opportunity provided by the statute or non-compliance of statutory provisions falls in the category of exception. Ordinarily, the authority should adopt the recourse of departmental proceedings in accordance with Rules before awarding major penalty. The order for dismissal from service which takes away the right of livelihood of an employee should be passed only with due compliance of principles of natural justice and the service rules. The provisions contained in Rule 8 (2)(b) of the rules, is an exception to the general rule which requires compliance of principles of natural justice. The recourse of Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules, should be adopted only in exceptional cases and justified grounds where the departmental inquiry against the delinquent is not possible or in case departmental inquiry is held, it shall affect the national integrity, security or alike matters. 13. In the case of Union of India and another v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , Hon’ble Supreme Court held that expediency or inexpediency of holding of inquiry in pursuance of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution falls within the domain of President or the Governor. In the present case, the appointing authority keeping in view the security of State. Expediency involves matters of policy. Satisfaction may be arrived as a result of secret information received by the Government brewing danger to security of the State and like matters. In the present case, the appointing authority keeping in view the security of State. Expediency involves matters of policy. Satisfaction may be arrived as a result of secret information received by the Government brewing danger to security of the State and like matters. Reasons of satisfaction need not be recorded in the impugned order but during the course of judicial review the superior Court may look into the record and form opinion as to whether the doctrine of clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution dispensing the inquiry or the principles of natural justice whether there was sufficient material on record justifying the State Act. Relevant portion from Tulsi Ram Patel’s case (supra), is reproduced as under : “127. ...If he fails in all the departmental remedies and still wants to pursue the matter, he can invoke the Court’s power of judicial review subject to the Court permitting it. If the Court finds that he was not in fact the person convicted, it will strike down the impugned order and order him to be reinstated in service. Where the Court finds that the penalty imposed by the impugned order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all proportion to the offence committed or not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case or the requirements of that particular Government service the Court will also strike down the impugned order...It is, however, not necessary that the Court should always order reinstatement. The Court can instead substitute a penalty which in its opinion would be just and proper in the circumstances of the case.” 14. Hon’ble Supreme Court further proceeded to hold as under : “133. The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. 134. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not, therefore, find a place in the final order. 134. It is obvious that the recording in writing of the reason for dispensing with the inquiry must precede the order imposing the penalty. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not, therefore, find a place in the final order. It would be usual to record the reason separately and then consider the question of the penalty to be imposed and pass the order imposing the penalty, it would, however, be better to record the reason in the final order in order to avoid the allegation that the reason was not recorded in writing before passing the final order, but was subsequently fabricated. The reason for dispensing with the inquiry need not contain detailed particulars, but the reason must not be vague or just a repetition of the language of clause (b) of the second proviso. For instance, it would be no compliance with the requirement of clause (b) for the disciplinary authority simply to state that he was satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold any inquiry. Sometimes a situation may be such that it is not reasonably practicable to give detailed reasons for dispensing with the inquiry. This would not, however per se invalidate the order. Each case must be judged on its own merits and in the light of its own facts and circumstances.” 15. While dealing with the question relating to satisfaction of President or Governor, their Lordships in the case of Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 . held as under : “141. Under Article 74 (1) of the Constitution, the satisfaction of the President would be arrived at with the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister as the Head and in the case of a State by reason of the provisions of Article 163 (1) by the Governor acting with the aid and advice of his Council of Minister with the Chief Minister as the Head. Whenever, therefore, the President or the Governor in the constitutional sense is satisfied that it will not be advantageous or fit or proper or suitable or politic in the interest of the security of the State to hold an inquiry, he would be entitled to dispense with it under clause (c). The satisfaction so reached by the President or the Governor must necessarily be a subjective satisfaction. Expediency involves matters of policy. The satisfaction so reached by the President or the Governor must necessarily be a subjective satisfaction. Expediency involves matters of policy. Satisfaction may be arrived at as a result of secret information received by the Government about the brewing danger to the security of the State and like matters. There may be other factors which may be required to be considered, weighed and balanced in order to reach the requisite satisfaction whether holding an inquiry would be expedient or not. If the requisite satisfaction has been reached as a result of secret information received by the Government, making known such information may very often result in disclosure of the source of such information. Once known, the particular source from which the information was received would no more be available to the Government. The reasons for the satisfaction reached by the President or Governor under clause (c) cannot, therefore, be required to be recorded in the order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank nor can they be made public.” 16. While considering the case where an order was passed by the appointing authority like in the present case, by the Superintendent of Police, it would be seen that whether the appointing authority while specifying the expediency or inexpediency of holding of an inquiry on the same material reaching the conclusion that holding of inquiry shall not be feasible or justifiable in the interest of State or public order. 17. In other case, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 729 , Chief Security Officer and others v. Singasan Ravidas, while relying upon the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra), their Lordships while dismissing the appeal, had reiterated the principle that dismissal of service without holding regular inquiry must be based on subjective satisfaction recorded by the appointing authority. In absence of sufficient material or good ground for dispensing with the inquiry, the order of dismissal from service was held to be not proper. 18. In the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, (1991) 1 SCC 362 their Lordships had allowed the appeal on the ground that the authorities failed to disclose the material in existence at the date of passing the order of punishment in support of subjective satisfaction recorded by the competent authority. 18. In the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, (1991) 1 SCC 362 their Lordships had allowed the appeal on the ground that the authorities failed to disclose the material in existence at the date of passing the order of punishment in support of subjective satisfaction recorded by the competent authority. The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Tulsi Ram Patel (supra) was reiterated and the order of punishment was found to be based on unfounded ground. Their Lordship have reproduced the dictum of Apex Court in the case of Tulsi Ram Patel (supra) in para-5 thereof, as under : “A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail.” 19. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Jaswant Singh (supra) again in para-5 thereof, proceeded to hold as under : “The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer.” 20. In the case State of U.P. and others v. Chandrika Prasad, 2006 (1) ESC 374 (All) (DB), relying upon the aforesaid judgment of Apex Court (supra), interpreted Rule 8 (2)(b) of the Rules read with Article 311 (2) (b) of the Constitution of India has held as under : "15. The words "some reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry” means that there must be some material for satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not reasonably practicable. The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. The words "some reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold enquiry” means that there must be some material for satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that it is not reasonably practicable. The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. The Apex Court in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1991 SC 385 in para 5 at page 390 has observed as under : “It was incumbent on the respondents to disclose to the Court the material in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned order in support of the subject satisfaction recorded by respondent No. 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) can be invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental enquiry.” “..When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer.” 17. That mere mention of fact that delinquent person may influence witnesses without there being any material to support the same is nothing but a conjecture surmise and ipse dixit on the part of the disciplinary authority to dispense with the enquiry. If the contention of the appellant is accepted, the constitutional protection, available to a Government servant under Article-311 (2) of the Constitution as reflected in Rule 8 (2) of the aforesaid Rules would render illusory and artificial. The normal rule of enquiry can always be defeated by the disciplinary authority in an arbitrary manner whenever it intend to get rid of a Government servant for any reason, it did not find conducive to its expectations. Constitutional protection cannot be dispensed with lightly as held by the Apex Court and is to be followed and observed in words and spirit and strict manner.” 21. Constitutional protection cannot be dispensed with lightly as held by the Apex Court and is to be followed and observed in words and spirit and strict manner.” 21. The aforementioned principle settled by a Division Bench relied upon by the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court, has been reiterated by this Court in subsequent judgment reported in 2006 (4) ESC 2303 (All), Bhupat Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. and others; 2007 (1) ESC 706 (All), Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. and others; 2005 (2) ESC 1229 (All), Ravindra Raghav v. State of U.P. and others; 2002 (2) ESC 190 (All), Achal Singh v. State of U.P. and others; 2002 (2) ESC 302, Vashishtha Singh v. State of U.P. and others; and in an unreported judgment decided on 23.5.2002 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16803 of 2001, Yatendra Singh v. State of U.P. and others. 22. It should be noted that the principles of natural justice is the pulse beat of Indian Constitution. Ordinarily, every order depriving the petitioner from civil rights or from the source of livelihood, in violation of principles of natural justice, shall be arbitrary and hit by Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Even if there are statutory provisions of denial of principles of natural justice, the State action must be based on subjective satisfaction on the basis of material on record. While exercising powers of judicial review to lift the veil, the Constitution Bench in the case of AIR 1978 SC 597 , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, held as under : “32. It is well established that even where there is no specific provision in a statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken against an individual, which affects the rights of that individual, the duty to give reasonably opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. 37. It appears to me that even executive authorities when taking administrative action which involves any deprivations of or restrictions on inherent fundamental rights of citizens must take care to see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or unfairness. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even the appearance of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirements of natural justice.” 23. The Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1991 SC 101 , Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress, again reiterated the aforementioned principle and held that while interpreting a statute the Constitution Policy provides valuable aid for its interpretation. Right to life includes right to livelihood. Accordingly, right to livelihood cannot be subjected to arbitrariness and at whims by authorities. The management cannot have absolute power to terminate the services of an employee in an unjust and unfair manner. Relevant portion from the case of Delhi Transport Corporation (supra) is reproduced as under : “There is need to minimise the scope of the arbitrary use of power in all walks of life. It is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however high-placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that . individuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the posts, however high they may be. There is only a complaisant presumption that those who occupy high posts have high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. In particular, it would be both unwise and impolitic to leave any aspect of its life to be governed by discretion when it can conveniently and easily be covered by the rule of law. The employment under the public undertakings is a public employment and a public property. It is not only the undertakings but also the society which has a stake in their proper and efficient working. Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency. To ensure both, the service conditions of those who work for them must be encouraging, certain and secured, and not vague and whimsical. With capricious service conditions, both discipline and devotion and endangered, and efficiency is impaired. Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency. To ensure both, the service conditions of those who work for them must be encouraging, certain and secured, and not vague and whimsical. With capricious service conditions, both discipline and devotion and endangered, and efficiency is impaired. The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot be hand on to the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of undefined premises and uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of them. Both the society and the individual employees, therefore, have an anxious interest in service conditions being well-defined and explicit to the extent possible. The arbitrary rules, such as the one under discussion, which are also sometimes described as Henry VIII Rules, can have no place in any service conditions.” 24. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation (supra) further held that prevailing social conditions and actualities of life are to be taken into account. The arbitrary, unbridled and naked power of wide discretion to dismiss an employee without any guideline or procedure would tend to defeat the constitutional mandate. Relevant portion from the case of Delhi Transport Corporation (supra) is reproduced as under : “Law is a social engineering to remove the existing imbalance and to further the progress, serving the needs of the Socialist Democratic Bharat under rule of law. The prevailing social conditions and actualities of life are to be taken into account to adjudging whether the impugned legislation would subserve the purpose of the society. The arbitrary, unbridled and naked power of wide discretion to dismiss a permanent employee without any guidelines or procedure would tend to defeat the constitutional purpose of equality and allied purposes referred to above. Courts would take note of actualities of life that persons actuated to corrupt practices are capable, to manouver with higher echelons in diverse ways and also camouflage their activities by becoming sycophants or chronies to the superior officers. Sincere, honest and devoted subordinate officer (are) unlikely to lick the boots of the corrupt superior officer. Courts would take note of actualities of life that persons actuated to corrupt practices are capable, to manouver with higher echelons in diverse ways and also camouflage their activities by becoming sycophants or chronies to the superior officers. Sincere, honest and devoted subordinate officer (are) unlikely to lick the boots of the corrupt superior officer. They develop a sense of self-pride for their honesty, integrity and apathy and inertia towards the corrupt and tend to undermine or show signs of disrespect or disregard towards them. Thereby, they not only become inconvenient to the corrupt officer but also stand an impediment to the on-going smooth siphony of corruption at a grave risk to their prospects in career or even to their tenure of office.” 25. Again Hon’ble Supreme Court given the word of caution in the same judgment (supra) that vesting of arbitrary power would be a breeding ground for nepotism and insolence. To quote : “Therefore, one would be circumspect, pragmatic and realistic to these actualities of life while angulating constitutional validity of wide arbitrary, uncanalised and unbridled discretionary power of dismissal vested in an appropriate authority either by a statute or a statuary rule. Vesting arbitrary power would be a feeding ground for nepotism and insolence; instead of sub serving the constitutional purpose, it would defeat the very object, in particular, when the tribe of officers of honesty, integrity and devotion are struggling under despondence to continue to maintain honesty, integrity and devotion to the duty, in particular, when moral values and ethical standards are fast corroding in all walks of life including public services as well. It is but the need and imperative of the society to pat on the back of those band of honest, hard-working officers of integrity and devotion to duty. It is the society’s interest to accord such officers security of service and avenues of promotion.” 26. In one another case reported in 1995 (5) SCC 482 , LIC of India and another v. Consumer Education & Research Centre and others. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even in a contractual relationship the authorities of State must act in a fair, just and equitable manner. In one another case reported in 1995 (5) SCC 482 , LIC of India and another v. Consumer Education & Research Centre and others. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that even in a contractual relationship the authorities of State must act in a fair, just and equitable manner. To quote : “In the sphere of contractual relations the State, its instrumentality, public authorities or those whose acts bear insignia of public element, action to public duty or obligation are enjoined to act in a manner i.e. fair, just and equitable, after taking objectively all the relevant options into consideration and in a manner that is reasonable, relevant and germane to effectuate the purpose for public good and in general public interest and it must not take any irrelevant or irrational factors into consideration or appear arbitrary in its decision. Duty to act fairly is part of fair procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21. Every activity of the public authority or those under public duty or obligation must be informed by reason and guided by the public interest.” 27. In view of the above, it appears that the impugned order has been passed dispensing with the departmental inquiry without having subjective satisfaction with the objects sought to achieve. There is neither any material placed on record nor pleaded as to how the holding of disciplinary inquiry is not practicable or feasible. In absence of any material on record, this Court only inference which could be drawn is that the order has been passed in arbitrary exercise of power which fails at the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. 28. The writ petition is accordingly allowed quashing the impugned orders dated 10.12.2006 and 1.5.2007 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Unnao contained in Annexures 1 and 2 with consequential benefits to the petitioner. However, since the petitioner has not discharged duties during the period in question, he shall be entitled for payment of salary to the extent of 50%. It shall be open to the respondents to hold inquiry in accordance with law. 21. No orders as to costs. ————