JUDGMENT All these appeals arise out of one and the same order passed by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Chitradurga, allowing the claim petitions filed by the respective claimants and fastening liability on the appellant-insurance company. The common question that i~ involved is as to whether the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation was justified in putting the liability on the appellant. Therefore, all these appeals are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The facts in brief giving rise to all these appeals are to the effect that on 14-6-2004, the respective claimants travelled in the tractor-trailer bearing No. KA-14-2117/2118 and according to the claimants, they were going in the said vehicle to a place called T-Nulenur Village in order to load the vehicle with areka saplings and as such, in a capacity of loaders, these claimants travelled in the said vehicle in question and while they were returning in the tractor-trailer, of one Siddappa, the tractor-cum-trailer turned turtle near a slopy region on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver concerned. The respective claimants sustained injuries in the accident and all of them filed the claim petition before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner on the ground that they being the employees of the second respondent/owner and as the injuries caused to them were in the course of their employment and arise out of their employment, the employer is liable and consequently, the appellant-insurance company will be liable to pay compensation to them. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner allowed the claim petitions and awarded a sum of Rs. 1,75,325/- to the claimant Hanumanthappa (M.F.A No. 4505 of 2005), Rs. 1,77,408/- to the claimant Nagappa (M.F.A No. 4504 of 2005), Rs. 1,43,448/- to Rajappa (M.FA No. 4506 of 2005), Rs. 95,018/to the claimant Ramappa (M.FA No. 4507 of 2005) and Rs. 1,77,408/- to the claimant Niranjan (M.FA No. 4508 of 2005). The insurance company being aggrieved by the liability being put on it by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, has therefore preferred these appeals questioning the said order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. 3. I have heard the arguments addressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant Sri AN. Krishnaswamy and the learned Counsel for the first respondent/claimant Sri N.K Siddeshwara and the If learned Counsel for the second respondent/insured Sri N.D. Jayadevappa. 4. 3. I have heard the arguments addressed by the learned Counsel for the appellant Sri AN. Krishnaswamy and the learned Counsel for the first respondent/claimant Sri N.K Siddeshwara and the If learned Counsel for the second respondent/insured Sri N.D. Jayadevappa. 4. The main contention of the appellant's Counsel is that the tractor-trailer is a transport vehicle and therefore, it was incumbent on the part of the owner of the vehicle to have obtained necessary permission as required under Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the 'Act' in short) and in the absence of permit being so taken, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner could not have saddled the liability on the appellant. In support of the above submission, the learned Counsel places reli'1nce on the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as well as on the decisions bearing on the point. It was also submitted that the insurance policy taken out by the second respondent-owner is a "Miscellaneous and Special type of vehicles policy-A liability only" and having regard to the limitations as to use, the vehicle in question could not have been used without a permit and therefore, the liability being put on the appellant cannot be sustained in law. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel places reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of the Oriental Insurance Company Limited v Meena Variyal and Others. 5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the secona respondent owner of the vehicle on his part also placed reliance on several decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court to contend that the permit is not necessary since the tractor-trailer falls under the category of goods vehicle and having regard to the provisions of Sections 66(3) and 96(2)(xxxi) and Rule 100 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the question of insured taking out a permit does not arise. In addition to the above provisions of law, he placed reliance on the decisions in National Insurance Company Limited v V. Chinnamma and Others; Sasi v Saidali; United India Insurance Company Limited v V Gangappa and Others; Oriental Insurance Company Limited v Kashim and Another; Oriental Insurance Company Limited v Thippeswamy and Another; Bhimavva and Others v Shankar and Others; Dilip Kumar v Rajesh Sahani and Others; Natwar Parikh and Company Limited v State of Kamataka and Others; Public Prosecutor v G. T. Krishnaswami Naidu and Another; Nagashetty v United India Insurance Company Limited and Others; National Insurance Company Limited v Prembai Patel and Others; Skandia Insurance Company Limited v Kokilaben Chandravadan and Others; New India Assurance Company Limited v C.M. Jaya and Others and a judgment of this Court in case of Divisional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited v Smt. Akkavva and Others". 6. The point that the learned Counsel for the second respondent sought to drive home by placing reliance on the aforesaid decisions is that no permit is needed if the tractor-trailer was used by the owner solely for agricultural purpose and in the instant case, it is not in dispute that the tractor-trailer was used for the purpose of agriculture and secondly, it is also not in dispute that all the claimants were loaders working under the second respondent-owner and as such, they being the employees of the second respondent, there is no scope for taking the view that there has been breach of policy conditions by the insured. Yet another submission made by the learned Counsel for the insured is that the appellant has not led any evidence before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner with regard to the grounds now being urged before this Court and therefore, in the absence of the appellant leading any evidence with regard to policy conditions or the necessity for having a permit, it is not open to the appellant to canvas such new pleas for the first time before this Court and hence no such substantial question of law is involved nor can this Court permit the appellant to urge the grounds which were not taken up before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. 7. In the light of the contention put forward by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether any substantial question of law is involved in all these appeals? 7. In the light of the contention put forward by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the following points arise for consideration: (1) Whether any substantial question of law is involved in all these appeals? (2) Whether permit is necessary in respect of the tractor-trailer belonging to the second respondent in the light of the policy produced before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner by the appellant? (3) Whether the impugned order is sustainable in law? 8. Point No. I.-It is the submission of the learned Counsel for the second respondent that the appellant has raised the grounds of permit being not obtained by the insured and this ground, being urged for the first time before this Court and in the absence of evidence being let j.- by the appellant before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, therefore, cannot be accepted and as no evidence was let in by the appellant, no substantial question 8flaw arises in all these appeals. The learned Counsel for the appellant on the other hand contended that the policy itself has been produced and has been marked as per Ex. R. 1 before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and even in the objections filed before the workmen's compensation authorities the appellant has taken the stand that the liability of the appellant is subject to terms and conditions and limitations of the policy and therefore, it was the duty of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to have examined the question of liability of the appellant having regard to the terms and conditions of the policy and as such, no new ground is being now urged before this Court and more over the question that is raised concerns the liability of the appellant and as such, it is a substantial question of law. In my view having regard to the fact that the appellant having taken the above stand before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in its objections filed, the policy Ex. In my view having regard to the fact that the appellant having taken the above stand before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in its objections filed, the policy Ex. R. 1 also haying been produced and the said policy clearly indicating that the policy covers use only' under a permit within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, or such a carriage falling under sub-section (3) of Section 66 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it was the duty of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to have examined this aspect of the matter and the impugned order does not indicate that the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner did take note of the conditions of the policy, particularly with regard to the limitations of use and merely because the policy was in force as on the date of accident, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner could not have put the liability on the appellant without examining the issue relating to vehicle in question being used under a permit or not. In this regard, the decision cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant in M/s. Woolcombers of India Limited v Woolcombers Workers' Union and Another will have to be taken into consideration. In the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court has held that "the giving of reasons in support of their conclusions by judicial and quasi-judicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. Having regard to the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in the instant case, except saying that the policy has been produced as per Ex. R. 1 and that the said policy is in force and therefore the appellant is liable, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had not examined other aspects of the matter particularly with regard to the terms and conditions obtaining in the policy and the limitation of use of the vehicle. R. 1 and that the said policy is in force and therefore the appellant is liable, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had not examined other aspects of the matter particularly with regard to the terms and conditions obtaining in the policy and the limitation of use of the vehicle. As such, I am of the opinion that the question raised is a substantial question of law which goes to the root of the matter so far as the liability of the appellant is concerned and having regard to the specific conditions obtaining with regard to limitations of use and also having regard to Section 66 of the Act and having regard to the definition of transport vehicle, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner therefore failed to examine all these aspects in proper perspective and has on the other hand mechanically proceeded to put the liability on the appellant only because the policy is produced and the said policy was found to be in force as on the date of the accident. Hence, I answer Point No.1 in the affirmative. 9. Point No. 2.-Coming to the question of necessity of obtaining a permit, no doubt in the policy produced at Ex. R. 1, it is mentioned under the heading 'limitations of use' that the policy covers use only under a permit. Referring to Section 66 of the Act and to the definitions 'goods carriage' and 'transport vehicle', it is submitted by the appellant's Counsel that the tractor-trailer falls within the category of transport vehicle and the decision of the Apex Court in Natwar Parikh's case is also pressed into service in this regard. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the insured contended that even though tractor-trailer may come within the expression 'transport vehicle' a close reading of Sections 66 and 95 of the Act and Rule 100 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, would go to indicate that permit will not be required and there is no bar for carrying the respective loaders in the vehicle in question. The learned Counsel placed reliance on Rule 100(1) and (3) and on Section 66(3) to draw support for the said arguments. As rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the second respondent-insured, Section 66(3)(i) of the Act provides that provisions of clause (i) of Section 66(3) shall not be applicable to any goods vehicles the weight of which does not exceed 3000 kilograms. As rightly submitted by the learned Counsel for the second respondent-insured, Section 66(3)(i) of the Act provides that provisions of clause (i) of Section 66(3) shall not be applicable to any goods vehicles the weight of which does not exceed 3000 kilograms. Therefore, there is some force in the said submission made by the learned Counsel for the second respondent-insured as regards permit being not necessary in respect of any goods vehicle coming within the category mentioned in clause (i) of sub-section (3) of Section 66. However, in the instant case, there is no evidence placed as to the gross vehicle weight of the tractor-cum-trailer and this Court, sitting in appeal, cannot for the first time take evidence to find out as to whether the tractor-cum-trailer falls within the category of the vehicle mentioned in Section 66, sub-section (3)(i). Hence, I am of the considered opinion that in the absence of there being material to indicate as to the gross vehicle weight, the matter may require further examination by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and as such, the issue relating to the necessity of obtaining permit or otherwise would depend upon the above factors and therefore, the matter will have to be remitted to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to consider this question. Only upon the finding being recorded by the Commissioner with regard to the vehicle in question coming within Section 66, sub-section (3)(i), the further question relating to obtaining permit or otherwise can be considered having regard to the provisions of Section 66 of the Act. 10. Since the parties are not disputing the relationship between the insured and the claimants as employer-employee and further there being no dispute with regard to the tractor-cum-trailer being used only for the purposes of agriculture, the only point which has not been considered by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and which has led to the liability being put on the appellant is with regard to the terms and conditions of the policy and in necessity of obtaining permit in the face of provision obtaining in Section 66 of the Act. Since the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has not examined all these aspects and has proceeded to fix the liability on the appellant only on the basis of the policy being in force, in my view, in the light of the contention put forward by the appellant-insurance company that in the absence of there being a permit obtained by the insured, the insurance company will not be liable, the impugned order therefore, cannot be unstained in law. 11. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the matter requires remand to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in order to examine the question raised by the parties before this Court as regards the liability of the appellant and as regards the necessity to obtain permit. The Commissioner also will have to take into account section 66, sub-section (3)(i) of the Act and will have to record a finding as to whether the vehicle in question does require any permit or not and after all these exercises, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner will have to finally decide the question relating to liability of the appellant-insurance company. Hence, for the limited purpose of recording a finding on the question of liability and also in regard to the contention urged by the appellant concerning violation of mandatory provisions of Explanation II of Section 4(1)(c) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Commissioner will have to hear both sides and after affording them the opportunity to place material in this regard, the matter will have to be disposed of in accordance with law. Since the matter is being remanded at this point of time, on considering the fact that the accident pertains to the year 2004 and the claimants have been awarded compensation as mentioned above, it is also necessary to direct the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to dispose of the case within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order and both parties shall co-operate in this regard. All these appeal therefore stand disposed of and the amount in deposit made by the insurance company be refunded to it.