SABHAJEET YADAV, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Counsel for the parties. ( 2 ) BY this petition, the petitioners have challenged the orders dated 10. 11. 2004 and 16. 5. 1998 passed by opposite party No. 1 contained in Annexure nos. 1 and 2 of the writ petition. Vide order dated 16. 5. 1998 the revision filed by opposite party No. 2 has been allowed by the Court below and vide order dated 10. 11. 2004 the review application moved by the petitioners has been rejected. ( 3 ) THE reliefs sought in the writ petition rest on the allegations that the respondent No. 2 instituted a suit against the petitioners for streedhan and ornaments which was registered as Regular Suit No. 185 of 1990. After deemed or substituted service on petitioners (defendants in suit) the suit was proceeded ex-parte and an ex-parte decree was passed in favour of respondent No. 2 on 23. 3. 1991 and against the petitioners. It is stated that when the notice of execution of decree was served upon petitioner No. 3 in the last week of May, 1992, asking him to file objection by 4. 7. 1992 against the said decree, then he came to know about the said decree. Thereafter, he approached the Civil Court for enquiry of said decree on re-opening of the Civil Court after summer vacation on 1. 7. 1992 and contacted a Counsel and informed about the said notice, then counsel has told him about the said ex-parte decree on 1. 7. 1992 but he further told that its detail can only be known after inspection of the concerned file. The counsel directed the petitioner No. 3 to bring vakalatnama of petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 and asked him to contact again before 4. 7. 1992. The petitioner No. 3 Dev kumar returned back to home and after getting vakalatnama from petitioner nos. 1 and 2 contacted his Counsel again on 3. 7. 1992 in the night and came to know about the details of ex-parte decree on 4. 7. 1992 through their Counsel, who thereupon moved an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. for setting aside the ex-parte decree on 4. 7. 1992 and also moved objection against the execution proceedings. The said application was duly supported by an affidavit and opposite party No. 2 Smt. Mridula Devi also filed objection against the same. 7. 1992 through their Counsel, who thereupon moved an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. for setting aside the ex-parte decree on 4. 7. 1992 and also moved objection against the execution proceedings. The said application was duly supported by an affidavit and opposite party No. 2 Smt. Mridula Devi also filed objection against the same. The evidence was recorded in support of the application and P. W. 1 babu Lal E. D. M. P. Post Office concerned was examined on oath on behalf of Mridula devi and Smt. Yashoda Devi, petitioner No. 1 was examined as defence witness. After hearing the parties the Trial Court allowed the application of the petitioners and set aside the ex parte order and decree dated 23. 3. 1991 passed by Additional Civil Judge, Pratapgarh by awarding costs of Rs. 50/- on 18. 5. 1994. Certified copy of the order dated 18. 5. 1994 setting aside ex parte order dated 23. 3. 1991 is on record as Annexure No. 4. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order the respondent No. 2 preferred a revision and accepted the costs also. The Revisional Court vide order dated 16. 5. 1998 has set aside the order passed by the Trial Court holding that the application for setting aside ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13 has been moved beyond three days period of limitation prescribed for moving such application and no application for condoning the delay was moved along with the said application before the trial Court, as such application for setting aside ex-parte decree could not be entertained and allowed without condoning the delay. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order the petitioners have moved a review application which too was rejected by the Revisional Court below vide order dated 10. 11. 2004, hence this petition. ( 4 ) THE submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in given facts and circumstances of the case since the petitioners have not participated in the trial at any stage prior to the service of notice of execution of decree against them and they came to know about the execution of decree first time in the last week of May, 1992, therefore, the knowledge of decree could be treated only with effect from the date when they knew about the contents of decree and not earlier to it. Since they came to know about the contents of decree on 4. 7. 1992 through their Counsel and on the same day they had moved the application for recalling the ex parte decree on 4. 7. 1992, therefore, their application could not be held to be barred by time and as provided under Article 123 of the limitation Act the limitation would start to run from the date of knowledge of the decree and such knowledge of the decree would mean knowledge of the contents of the decree and not mere information about the decree. ( 5 ) IN support of his submission the learned Counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance upon the decision of Honble the Apex Court State of punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum and another, AIR 1963 SC 1604 wherein Honble the Apex Court has held that where claimant has not participated in proceeding before the Land Acquisition Officer while making award the period of limitation provided under section 18 (2) (b) of Land Acquisition Act for making reference would run from the date of knowledge of contents of award. As such since they moved application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. well within time on the date of knowledge of decree, therefore, they were not required to move any application for condoning the delay along with the said application. ( 6 ) CONTRARY to it learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has supported the order passed by Revisional Court below and contended that the learned Trial Court before passing its ex parte decree against the petitioners had found that summons of suit had been sufficiently served upon the petitioners and proceeded to pass ex parte decree against the petitioners. ( 6 ) CONTRARY to it learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has supported the order passed by Revisional Court below and contended that the learned Trial Court before passing its ex parte decree against the petitioners had found that summons of suit had been sufficiently served upon the petitioners and proceeded to pass ex parte decree against the petitioners. Therefore, unless the presumption is rebutted by the petitioners by placing materials before the Trial Court that summons of the suit were not duly served upon them the ex parte decree could not have been set aside and restore the suit and secondly the period of limitation would start to run from the date of decree and not from the date of knowledge of decree more so from knowledge of contents of the decree as the presumption regarding service of summons upon the petitioners has not been rebutted at all and in support of his submission, the learned Counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon Harcharan Singh v. Shiv Rani and others, AIR 1981 SC 1284 ; gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram, AIR 1989 SC 1433 ; m/s. Sardar Cold Storage and Ice Factory v. P. N. Bank, 1988 0 SCC 313; m. L. and B. Corporation v. Bhootnath, AIR 1964 SC 1336 ; rajendra Bahadur Singh v. Jugul Kishore, 1994 23 ALR 3; ragho Singh v. Mohan Singh, 2000 41 ALR (SC) 113 and ram Baran v. D. D. C. , 1987 0 RD 89 ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents has further submitted that even according to own case of the petitioners since service of notice of execution of decree has been admittedly effected upon the petitioners in the last week of May, 1992, therefore, 30 days prescribed period of limitation from the date of knowledge would be expired in the last week of June, 1992 and since the Courts were closed, therefore, it could be expired on first day of re-opening of the Court on 1. 7. 7. 1992, thus the application under Order VIII, Rule 13 moved by the petitioners was barred by three days time beyond the prescribed period of limitation and since no application for condoning the delay was moved by the petitioners, therefore, Trial Court could not entertain and allow the application under Order IX, Rule 13 moved by the petitioners and Revisional Court below has rightly set aside the order dated 18. 5. 1994. While trying to distinguish the aforesaid decision of Honble Apex Court rendered in Mst. Qaisar Jehan begums case (supra) relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for respondents has urged that the aforesaid decision was rendered under the provisions of section 18 (2) (b) of Land Acquisition Act and under the said provisions of the Act no application for reference could be moved before the Collector unless claimants know about the contents of the award as he is required to set out grounds of challenge against the awards made by the collector. Here in the instant case since the petitioners were not required to challenge the ex parte decree in the like manner, therefore, mere knowledge of the ex -parte decree itself was sufficient to move an application for setting aside the said ex parte decree and such knowledge of ex parte decree was acquired by the petitioners in the last week of May, 1992, therefore, 30 days prescribed period of limitation would be expired in the last week of June, 1992, which would have fallen in summer vacation, accordingly the period could have been expired on 1. 7. 1992 i. e. on the date of re-opening of the Court. Thus the application under Order IX, Rule 13 was barred by time for a period of 3 days beyond limitation and no delay condonation application was moved alongwith the said application. The law laid down by Honble the Apex Court has no application in given facts and circumstances of this case and is clearly distinguishable. Moreover, the petitioners did not file any documents on the basis of which they can say that they did not have knowledge about the decree from the copy of the summons of the execution case. The law laid down by Honble the Apex Court has no application in given facts and circumstances of this case and is clearly distinguishable. Moreover, the petitioners did not file any documents on the basis of which they can say that they did not have knowledge about the decree from the copy of the summons of the execution case. ( 8 ) WHILE refuting the submissions made by learned Counsel for the opposite parties, learned Counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that since the Trial Court has allowed the application by setting aside the ex-parte decree and restored the suit to its original number for disposal afresh on merit by permitting the parties to place their cases before the Court. Therefore, no injury and injustice has been causes to the respondent No. 2 on such restoration of suit and setting aside of the ex-parte decree and accordingly the revision filed by respondent No. 2 before the Court below was not maintainable at all and revisional Court below has fell into error in allowing the said revision filed by respondent No. 2. ( 9 ) IN support of his submission the learned Counsel for the petitioners has also place reliance upon the decision rendered by this Court in Ambika choudhary and others v. District Judge, Ballia and others, 2004 54 ALR 83. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that at any rate in case the Revisional Court has found that the application for setting aside ex parte decree was barred by law of limitation and moved beyond prescribed period of limitation without any application for condoning the delay, the only course, which was open for the Revisional Court, to permit the petitioners to move such application, but it was not open for the Revisional Court to shut the door of the Court for the petitioners to ventilate their grievance before the Trial Court. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has further placed reliance upon another decision rendered by Honble the Apex Court in C. P. Srivastava v. R. K. Raizada, 2000 RD 91 325 in support of his contention. Thus, in view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court the judgment and order passed by the Revisional Court below cannot be sustained and liable to be quashed by this Court. Thus, in view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court as well as this Court the judgment and order passed by the Revisional Court below cannot be sustained and liable to be quashed by this Court. ( 11 ) IN this connection, it is necessary to point out that from the perusal of the order dated 18. 5. 1994 passed by Trial Court while setting aside the ex parte decree dated 23. 3. 1991, it appears that Trial Court has recorded finding to the effect that notice of execution case was first time served upon one of the petitioners in the last week of May 1992 directing him to file objection against execution case by 4. 7. 1992 and when he contacted his Counsel on re-opening of the Court on 1st July 1992, then he came to know about the ex parte decree on that day, earlier to it he was not aware of any ex parte decree. No summon of suit had ever been served upon any of the petitioners and they have never appeared in the suit proceeding before the Trial Court, therefore, the Trial Court has found that the application under Order IX, Rule 13 moved on 4. 7. 1992 is well within time and there was no need to move any application for condoning the delay. ( 12 ) NOW coming again on facts of the case and law laid down by Honble the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Mst. Quaisar Jehan Begum, AIR 1963 SC 1604 . In my opinion, the submission of learned Counsel for the respondents cannot be countenanced for the simple reason that the period of limitation would start to run from the date of knowledge of contents of ex parte decree and not from the date of mere knowledge of ex parte decree. It is not in dispute that the petitioners came to know about the contents of the decree on 4th July, 1992 through their Counsel. Therefore, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree moved on 4. 7. 1992 cannot be held to be barred by time, even assuming that the petitioners came to know about the decree from notice of execution case in the last week of May 1992, even then they could know the contents of the decree only on 4. 7. 1992 and not earlier to it. 7. 1992 cannot be held to be barred by time, even assuming that the petitioners came to know about the decree from notice of execution case in the last week of May 1992, even then they could know the contents of the decree only on 4. 7. 1992 and not earlier to it. Thus, the application for condonation of delay was not required to be moved along with application for setting aside ex parte decree under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. moved on 4. 7. 1992. ( 13 ) AT any rate in case the Revisional Court below has come to the conclusion that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was barred by time and law of Limitation and application for condoning the delay had not been moved by the petitioners only course was one for the Revisional Court to permit the petitioners to move such application for condoning the delay but the revisional Court could not close proceedings before the Court below and shut doors of the Court, in given facts and circumstances of the case. Besides, this since on restoration of suit after setting aside ex parte decree parties were directed to adduce their evidence and contest their case on merit, therefore, it cannot be held that on account of setting aside ex parte decree any grave injustice has been caused to respondent No. 2 so as to call for interference by the revisional Court below. Therefore, in given facts and circumstances of the case i am of the considered opinion that the order dated 10. 11. 2004 and 16. 5. 1998 passed by the Revisional Court below cannot be sustained and liable to be quashed. ( 14 ) THE same are hereby quashed. The parties are permitted to appear before the Trial Court and adduce their evidence. Since it is suit of year 1990 and period of about 17 years have lapsed, therefore, the Trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit finally on merit after permitting the parties to adduce their evidence without granting undue adjournments to them expeditiously within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy of the order passed by this Court. ( 15 ) WITH the aforesaid observations and directions the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. Petition Allowed. .