Judgment :- These Civil Revision Petitions are directed against the orders dated 01.02.2006 made in E.A.Nos.59 and 57 of 2005 in E.P.Nos.209 and 208 of 2004 in O.S.Nos.83 and 82 of 1987 by the District Munsif, Arni, allowing the Applications to implead the legal representatives of Deceased – First Plaintiff – A.K.S.Thiyagarajan. Legal Representatives of Deceased/Judgment Debtor are the Revision Petitioners. 2. Factual background in nutshell is as follows:- The Property in Door Nos.235 and 236, Gandhi Market Road, Arni Town, Tiruvannamalai District belongs to (1) A.K.S.Thiyagarajan, (2)A.K.S.Jagatheesan, (3)A.K.S.Bala-sundaram and (4) A.K.S.Azhagesan. All of them, as joint owners of the property, let out the property to the Defendant - Gopal. The said properties are non-residential buildings and the Judgment Debtor was the Tenant. Eviction was sought for and Notice was issued on 211. 1985 terminating the tenancy. Since the buildings were exempted from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, Civil Suits were filed in O.S.Nos.82 and 83 of 1987 before Sub-Court, Arni against the Judgment Debtor/Tenant – Gopal for recovery of possession of the properties. The Suits were decreed on 28.09.1989. 3. As against the Judgment and Decree, the Tenant – Gopal has filed Appeals in A.S.Nos.180 and 181 of 1989 on the file of Additional District Court, Vellore. By Judgment and Decree dated 28.02.1990, the Appeals were allowed. Aggrieved by the same, the Plaintiffs/Landlords filed Second Appeals in S.A.Nos.1196 and 1197 of 1990 before High Court, Madras, which were allowed on 011. 2001. The Plaintiffs/Landlords were granted decree for recovery of possession. 4. During the pendency of the Second Appeals before High Court, Madras, one of the Landlord – A.K.S.Thiyagarajan – First Plaintiff died on 19.09.2001. The death of the First Decree Holder was not brought to the notice of the High Court and the High Court delivered the Judgment on 011. 2001 allowing the Second Appeals. 5. Subsequently, three of the surviving Plaintiffs viz., A.K.S.Jagatheesan, A.K.S.Balasundaram and A.K.S.Azhagesan along with legal heirs of Deceased – First Plaintiff filed E.P.Nos.60 and 61 of 2002 before Sub-Court, Arni for execution of the Decree. The Execution Petitions were transferred to District Munsif Court, Arni and renumbered as E.P.Nos.208 and 209 of 2004. When the matters stood thus, the Decree Holders filed E.A.Nos.57 and 59 of 2005 for impleading legal heirs of the Deceased – Decree Holder A.K.S.Thiyagarajan as Petitioners in the Execution Petition. The Execution Petitions were transferred to District Munsif Court, Arni and renumbered as E.P.Nos.208 and 209 of 2004. When the matters stood thus, the Decree Holders filed E.A.Nos.57 and 59 of 2005 for impleading legal heirs of the Deceased – Decree Holder A.K.S.Thiyagarajan as Petitioners in the Execution Petition. That was strongly objected by the Judgment Debtors. 6. Learned District Munsif, Arni allowed the Applications for impleading the Legal Representatives of the deceased on the ground that there is a decree for recovery of possession and that Brothers of Deceased – A.K.S.Thiyagarajan were parties to the Second Appeals to whom the right to continue Appeals survive. 7. Assailing the Impugned Order, learned counsel for the Petitioners contended that when one of the Joint Decree Holders died and when no steps were taken for impleading legal representatives in the Second Appeals, the decree abates in entirety. It was further submitted that when there is no separate and divisible right to the Decree Holders, the Decree cannot be executed by other Decree Holders. It was further submitted that the Respondents being the Appellants in the Second Appeals ought to have taken steps, without which decree in the Second Appeals are not valid and inexecutable. In support of her contentions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions reported in (1) A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1427; (2) 2001 (3) C.T.C. 52; (3) 2003 (3) S.C.C. 272 ; (4) 2004 (7) S.C.C. 354 and (5) 2006 (3) S.C.C. 605 . 8. Countering the arguments, learned Senior Counsel Mr.R.Subramanian has submitted that Plaintiffs 2 to 4 being Brothers, the right to continue to sue survives to them. It was further submitted that when the fact of death of a party was not brought to the notice of the Court, when it passed the Decree, it is only an irregularity and it cannot have the effect of making the decree inexecutable. Learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the decisions reported in (1) A.I.R. 1964 RAJASTHAN 79; (2) A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 733; (3) A.I.R. 1978 PATNA 258 and (4) A.I.R. 1983 MADRAS 5. 9. Having regard to the submissions of both sides, the Question falling for consideration is whether on the death of one of the Plaintiffs during the pendency of the Second Appeal and in the event of his legal representatives are not brought on record, whether the Suit will abate rendering the decree a nullity. 10. 9. Having regard to the submissions of both sides, the Question falling for consideration is whether on the death of one of the Plaintiffs during the pendency of the Second Appeal and in the event of his legal representatives are not brought on record, whether the Suit will abate rendering the decree a nullity. 10. First Plaintiff – A.K.S.Thiyagarajan died on 19.09.2001 during the pendency of the Second Appeals. The Second Appeals were allowed on 011. 2001. The main contention of the Petitioners is that the Respondents being the Appellants in the Second Appeals ought to have taken steps, without which the Decree passed in the Second Appeals cannot be executed and impleading Applications cannot be entertained during the execution stage. 11. Sardar Amarjit Singh Karlas case reported in 2003 (3) S.C.C. 272 is the leading case on the point. In the said case, the Supreme Court held whether an Appeal partly abates on account of death of one or the other party on either side has to be considered depending upon the fact as to whether the decree obtained is a joint decree or a severable one. Holding that procedural laws must be liberally construed to make it workable to advance the ends of justice, the Supreme Court laid down the law as under:- "...30. The question, therefore, as to when a proceeding before the Court becomes or is rendered impossible or possible to be proceeded with, after it had partially abated on account of the death of one or the other party on either side has been always considered to depend upon the fact as to whether the decree obtained is a joint decree or a severable one and that in case of a joint and inseverable decree if the appeal abated against one or the other, the same cannot be proceeded with further for or against the remaining parties as well. If otherwise, the decree is a joint and several or separable one, being in substance and reality a combination of many decrees, there can be no impediment for the proceedings being proceeded with among or against those remaining parties other than the deceased. As observed in State of Punjab ..Vs.. If otherwise, the decree is a joint and several or separable one, being in substance and reality a combination of many decrees, there can be no impediment for the proceedings being proceeded with among or against those remaining parties other than the deceased. As observed in State of Punjab ..Vs.. Nathu Ram (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 89), the Code does not itself provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents even where, as against one such it has abated but it is only the courts which have held that in certain circumstances the appeal also would abate against a co-respondent as a result of abatement against the deceased respondent. The same would be the position of an appeal vis-à-vis the Appellants, as in the other cases. Order 22 Rule 4 also was considered not to provide for abatement of the Appeal(s) against the co-respondents of the deceased respondent and it was specifically observed therein that to say that the appeals against them also abated in certain circumstances is not a correct statement. It was held that the appeals against such other respondents cannot be proceeded against and, therefore, had to be dismissed, in certain circumstances. 31. But, in our view also, as to what those circumstances are to be, cannot be exhaustively enumerated and no hard-and-fast rule for invariable application can be devised. With the march and progress of law, the new horizons explored and modalities discerned and the fact that the procedural laws must be liberally construed to really serve as handmaid, make it workable and advance the ends of justice, technical objections which tend to be stumbling blocks to defeat and deny substantial and effective justice should be strictly viewed for being discouraged, except where the mandate of law inevitably necessitates it. Consequently, having regard to the nature of the proceedings under the Act and the purpose of reference proceedings and the appeal therefrom, the Court should adopt a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of the delay as well as the considerations which should weigh in adjudging the nature of the decree i.e., whether it is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable.... .... ......... 32. ..... Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances noticed by us that the appellant claimants have each their own distinct, separate and independent rights, the principles enumerated in Harihar Prasad Singh ..Vs.. .... ......... 32. ..... Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances noticed by us that the appellant claimants have each their own distinct, separate and independent rights, the principles enumerated in Harihar Prasad Singh ..Vs.. Balmiki Prasad Singh ( 1975 (1) S.C.C. 212 ) and Indian Oxygen Ltd., ..Vs.. Ram Abdar Singh (C.A.No.1444 of 1966 dated 24.09.1968) squarely apply with all force. The appeals even dehors the claims of the deceased and others who have not chosen to approach the High Court or this Court, were neither rendered incapable of consideration nor impossible of according any relief nor could be held difficult to enforce the decree that may be passed, in favour of the remaining appellants without suffering the vice of inconsistency. Even if it is likely to result in two different sets of judgments of varying content, purport or reason, as long as the enforcement of the decrees passed therein in not rendered impossible due to mutual contradiction in terms of self-destructive nature, there is no justification whatsoever to assume them to be inconsistent or contradictory decrees, at all. The mere fact that in a set of similar or identical nature of cases two different nature or type of decrees were necessitated is no reason to treat them to be inconsistent or contradictory decrees, so long as both can be executed and enforced without either of them being destructive of the other. Contradictory or inconsistent decrees, consequently, could be held to have resulted only in a given case when the relief granted in one cannot be enforced/realised without denying the relief in the other or totally nullifying or setting at naught the relief granted in the other, and in no other class of cases...."(underlining added) Referring to Amarjit Singh Karlas case, almost the same principles were reiterated in other decisions reported in Shahazada Bi and Others ..vs.. Halimabi ( 2004 (7) S.C.C. 354 ) and N.Khosla ..Vs.. Rajlakshmi and others ( 2006 (3) S.C.C. 605 ). 12. Halimabi ( 2004 (7) S.C.C. 354 ) and N.Khosla ..Vs.. Rajlakshmi and others ( 2006 (3) S.C.C. 605 ). 12. It is well settled that "the question as to whether in a given case the decree is joint and inseverable or joint and severable or separable has to be decided, for the purposes of abatement or dismissal of the entire appeal as not being properly and duly constituted or rendered incompetent for being further proceeded with, requires to be determined only with reference to the fact as to whether the judgment/decree passed in the proceedings vis-à-vis the remaining parties would suffer the vice of contradictory or inconsistent decrees. For that reason, a decree can be said to be contradictory or inconsistent with another decree only when the two decrees are incapable of enforcement or would be mutually self-destructive and that the enforcement of one would negate or render impossible the enforcement of the other". (Vide Para 34.4 – Amarjit Singhs case in 2003 (3) S.C.C. 272 ). .13. Learned counsel for the Petitioners has placed reliance upon the decisions reported in Sri Chand and others ..Vs.. M/s. Jagdish Pershad Kishan Chand and others (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1427) and Amba Bai and others ..Vs.. Gopal and Others (2001 (3) C.T.C. 52). These cases deal with the situation in an Appeal where one of the Appellants died. The principle, which has been laid down is that if in respect of the one of Deceased ¬Appellants the Appeal has abated, the decree in favour of the Respondents had become final against his legal representatives and the Appellate Court had no power to proceed with the Appeal and vary the decree where the decree is a joint one and inseparable. This principle is not applicable to the case in hand. 14. In the present case, four Brothers have filed the Suit against the Tenant for recovery of possession. During the pendency of the Second Appeals, one of the co-owner died. The Decree is in favour of all four Brothers. On the death of one of the Plaintiffs, it cannot be stated that the Decree has become inconsistent or contradictory Decree. To hold so would defeat the ends of justice. Mere fact that all Brothers joined together as Plaintiffs and filed one Suit does not mean that the Suit would abate for non-impleading of legal representatives of one of the Plaintiffs. To hold so would defeat the ends of justice. Mere fact that all Brothers joined together as Plaintiffs and filed one Suit does not mean that the Suit would abate for non-impleading of legal representatives of one of the Plaintiffs. The Decree is in substance combination of decrees in favour of all the Plaintiffs. .15. In the decision reported in Ramnarain ..Vs.. Kishorelal (A.I.R. 1964 Rajasthan 79), a suit for ejectment of Tenant was filed by co-owners. One of the Co-owners died pending the Suit. His legal representatives were not brought on record. Holding that the Suit does not abate and one co-owner is competent to maintain the Suit, Rajasthan High Court has held as under:- ."...Where a tenancy has been lawfully determined by the landlord and where no question of statutory tenancy arises the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end between the parties. The position of the quondam tenant after the termination of the tenancy is that of a tenant on sufferance, which is akin to that of a trespasser. That being so, a suit by one of the landlord co-owners to eject such a tenant is fully competent in law. It must follow, therefore, that a suit for ejectment continued by one of the co-owners alone after the death of the other co-owner during its pendency in the trial court cannot be thrown out as having abated on the ground that the latters legal representatives were not brought on the record...." 16. In the decision reported in Sahdeo Singh ..Vs.. Ramchhabila Singh and others (A.I.R. 1978 PATNA 258), Patna High Court has held as "...Where during pendency of a suit by co-owners for declaration of title and possession against trespassers one of the co-owners dies the suit will not abate for non-substitution of his legal representatives for the reason that the suit is maintainable even by some only of the co-owners..." .17. Dealing with combination of several decrees, in the decision reported in Harihar Prasad ..Vs.. Dealing with combination of several decrees, in the decision reported in Harihar Prasad ..Vs.. Balmiki Prasad (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 733), the Supreme Court has held as follows:- ."....Where a Plaintiff or an appellant after diligent and bonafide enquiry ascertains who the legal representatives of a deceased defendant or respondent are and brings them on record within the time limited by law, there is no abatement of the suit or appeal; the impleaded legal representatives sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased and the decision obtained with them on record binds not merely those impleaded but the entire estate including the interest of those not brought on record. Unless there is fraud or collusion or there are other circumstances which indicate that there has not been a fair or real trial or that against the absent heir there was a special case which was not and could not be tried in the proceeding, the heirs who have applied for being brought on record should be held to represent the entire estate including the interests of the heirs not brought on the record. The fraud or collusion must be a fraud or collusion between the appellant on the one hand and the representative of the deceased respondent who is brought on record on the other and vice versa. The fraud or collusion must be between the parties on record to the detriment of the legal representative who has not been brought on record...." 18. Brothers sought for eviction of Tenant and recovery of possession. All of them being co-owners joined together and filed one Suit. Even if one of them died, there was substantial representation. Be it noted that the Revision Petitioners have not challenged the Judgment in Second Appeal Nos. 1196 and 1197 of 1990. Learned Senior Counsel has rightly submitted that the "Doctrine of Substantial Representation" is applicable to the case. The Plaintiffs 2 to 4 being on record, the right to continue the proceedings has survived on them and as such the Second Appeals were substantially represented. The Executing Court cannot go behind the Decree and declare the Decree as nullity. .19. Having regard to the nature of the proceedings, non-impleading of Legal Representatives of Deceased – First Plaintiff would not result in two different sets of Judgments of varying content. There is no justification for the Judgment Debtor to contend that there would be two different contradictory decrees. .19. Having regard to the nature of the proceedings, non-impleading of Legal Representatives of Deceased – First Plaintiff would not result in two different sets of Judgments of varying content. There is no justification for the Judgment Debtor to contend that there would be two different contradictory decrees. The Impugned Orders do not suffer from any serious infirmity calling for interference. These Revision Petitions are devoid of merits and are bound to fail. 20. For the foregoing reasons, these Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected M.P.No.2 of 2006 is also dismissed.