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2007 DIGILAW 297 (CAL)

BANGUR FINANCE LIMITED v. TEJESH RANJAN GHOSH

2007-04-18

PARTHA SAKHA DATTA

body2007
P. S. DATTA, J. ( 1 ) BY this application dated 31. 01. 2995 under section 401 read with section 482 of the Cr. PC quashing is prayed for of the proceeding in Criminal Case No. C-1741 of 1996 under section 138 of the Negotiable instruments Act pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 13th court, Calcutta together with the challenge to the order dated 20. 12. 2004 passed by the said learned Magistrate rejecting the petition of the petitioners praying for their discharge from the case. ( 2 ) THE ground for quashing of the proceeding is that although notice in terms of the provisions of the N.. Act was received by the petitioners on 27. 07. 1996 the complaint was lodged with the learned Court under section 138 of the Act on 18. 09. 1996,. e. beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act which is why the proceedings at the very inception was unlawful and not maintainable and in support of the contention the petitioners placed before the learned Trial court a decision of this Court reported in 2001 (1) CHN 235 . The learned magistrate rejected the petition primarily on the ground that the question of limitation was raised only when the prosecution evidence was closed, the accused was already examined and the stage was set for defence evidence. The learned Magistrate was of the view that when this was the position and cognizance had already been taken by the learned Chief Metropolitan magistrate and when the case should be tried on the strength of the law prevailing at the time when the offence was committed he did not think it at all expedient to make any order of discharge. ( 3 ) ACCUSED No. 1 is a limited company within the meaning of Companies act, 1956, accused No. 2 is the Director and accused No. 3 is an officer of the company and these two accused persons were at all material time and are still in charge of, and responsible to, the accused No. 1, company and for issuance of cheque. The accused No. 1, company made an Intercorporate deposit for a sum of Rs. 200 lac with the accused company for a period of six months with interest @ 23% p. a. The accused No. 1 issued a cheque bearing no. 912108 on 22. 6. The accused No. 1, company made an Intercorporate deposit for a sum of Rs. 200 lac with the accused company for a period of six months with interest @ 23% p. a. The accused No. 1 issued a cheque bearing no. 912108 on 22. 6. 96 drawn on Bank of Rajasthan, Chowringhee Branch, calcutta in favour of the complainant company for a sum of Rs. 8,85,500/- which the complainant presented for encashment through its banker namely punjab and Sind Bank, Chickpet, Bangalore on 11. 7. 1996 but the cheque was returned unpaid on 12. 7. 96 with the remark "insufficient Funds". The complainant by registered letter with A/d dated 22. 7. 1996 demanded payment of Rs. 8,85. 500/- to the accused against the aforesaid dishonoured cheque fifteen days from the receipt of the notice but the accused failed and neglected to comply with the demand letter. As the A/d card was not returned by the postal authority the complainant wrote to the Post Master, Museum road Post Office, Bangalore on 12. 8. 1996 seeking for confirmation about the service of the notice on the accused No. 1/ company. The G. P. O. Bangalore by their letter dated 28. 8. 1996 intimated to the complainant that the notice was served upon the accused-addressee on 27. 7. 1996. The letter by the G. P. O. Bangalore, dated 28. 8. 1996 was received by the complainant on 30. 8. 1996. Payment having not been made in spite of notice dated 22. 7. 1996, the prosecution was lodged against the company and their officers under section 138 of N.. Act. ( 4 ) I have heard Mr. Debasish Roy, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Milan Mukherjee appearing with Mr. Sandipan Ganguly, learned advocates for the opposite parties. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Roy, the question of limitation being a mixed question of law and fact could be raised before the learned Magistrate at any stage of the trial particularly when the fact was not in dispute and the position of law so far as the statute is concerned was explicit and unambiguous and the learned Magistrate was not justified in rejecting the petition simply on the ground that the plea was raised at a belated stage. According to Mr. Roy, in terms of the express language of the statute the petition of complaint was ex facie barred by limitation. Mr. According to Mr. Roy, in terms of the express language of the statute the petition of complaint was ex facie barred by limitation. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that so far the question of limitation is concerned the Court might refer the matter to the hon'ble the Chief Justice for a decision by a Division Bench in view of contradictory decisions rendered by two Hon'ble Single Judges of this Court on the point. ( 6 ) THE requirement for sending a notice after a cheque is returned by the Bank unpaid is set out in clauses (b and c) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act (before amendment ). They read thus: "provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless - (a) * * * (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. " ( 7 ) SECTION 142 (b) relating to cognizance of offence reads. thus: notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) - (a) * * * (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. " ( 8 ) THUS, given a conjoined reading of the two clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to section 138 and section 142 of the Act it becomes clear that the prosecution has to be launched within one month from the date following the date of expiry of 15 days which is the time given to the drawer for payment. Thus starting point of limitation for the complainant to launch a prosecution under section 138 of the N.. Thus starting point of limitation for the complainant to launch a prosecution under section 138 of the N.. Act commences in terms of clause (b) of section 142 of the Act which provides that the complaint has to be made within a month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. Noticeably, when the cheque was issued and dishonoured there has not been any amendment of clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act by which the limitation for issuance of demand notice has been extended to 30 days instead of 15 days which the law before its amendment. We are not concerned with that. Thus while payment has to be made by the accused-drawer within 15 days of the receipt of the notice, prosecution has to be launched by the payee within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. In other words, prosecution has to be launched by 45 days from the date of receipt of the demand notice by the drawer. The question is what would be the starting point of limitation in case the payee or the holder in due course has no knowledge because of not receiving back the a/d card from the post office as to on which particular day the drawer has been in receipt of the demand notice. Here, in the instant case the cheque was issued on 22. 6. 1996. It was returned dishonoured to the complainant on 12. 7. 1996. The complainant issued a demand notice on 22. 7. 1996 which is within the period of limitation in terms of the clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act. Now according to the complainant he did not get back the A/d card from the postal department which is why he wrote a letter to the Post Master, Museum Road, Post Office, Bangalore, for confirmation about the service of notice on the accused No. 1 and the bangalore G. P. O. by the letter dated 28. 8. 1996 made such confirmation and such confirmatory letter to the effect that notice was served on 27. 07. 1996 came to the hand of the complainant on 30. 8. 8. 1996 made such confirmation and such confirmatory letter to the effect that notice was served on 27. 07. 1996 came to the hand of the complainant on 30. 8. 1996 and following which the complaint was lodged before the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 18. 09. 1996 which is long after the statutory period was over. Evidently, the complaint was not lodged within a month in terms of section 142 of the Act. ( 9 ) THE decision in the case of Santa Priya Engineers (Pvt.) and Anr. vs. Uday Sarkar Das and Anr. reported in 1993 C Cr. LR (Cal) 236 dealt with this question where a learned Single Judge of proviso to this Court held that a fair and reasonable construction of clause (c) of section 138 of the Act should be read into it so that the expression therein "within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice" should be made to mean within 15 days from the time of knowledge of the sender about the receipt of the notice' so that 'such-like complaint' may not fail for default on the part of the postal department and without any fault on the part of the complainant. According to the learned judge on such construction cause of action for such complaint would accrue on the failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days from the date of knowledge of the complainant about the receipt of the notice by the drawer, which would neither be prejudicial to the drawer rather beneficial to him as he would get longer time to make payment of the amount and thus avoid criminal liability for non-payment. The learned Judge based his reasoning on the analogy of the decision of the Supreme Court in K. P. Varghese vs. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam and Anr. , AIR 1981 SC 1922 where the Hon'ble supreme Court favoured incorporation which would avoid absurdity and mischief and makes provision rationale and sensible. In Darshan Singh vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 2001 (1) CHN 235 , another learned single Judge of this Court held a contrary view. , AIR 1981 SC 1922 where the Hon'ble supreme Court favoured incorporation which would avoid absurdity and mischief and makes provision rationale and sensible. In Darshan Singh vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. reported in 2001 (1) CHN 235 , another learned single Judge of this Court held a contrary view. According to His Lordship once the cause of action-has started running it cannot remain suspended subsequently and under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138, the cause of action will start running from the date of receipt of the notice and not from the date of receipt of the A/d Card by the complainant and date of sender's knowledge is not material for the purpose of computation of limitation. In this reported decision the earlier decision in Santa Priya Engineer's case was referred to alongwith a decision of the Supreme Court in Sil Import, usa vs. Exim Aides Silk Products Silk Exporters, Bangalore reported in 1999 SCC (Cri) 600. This question arose for consideration before the Hon'ble supreme Court in Sil import (supra ). In Sil Import case statutory notice was sent by Fax on 11. 06. 1996 and on the next day the respondent sent another notice by registered post which was served on the appellant on 25. 06. 1996. On 08. 08. 1996, the respondent filed the complaint. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, liability to make payment arises from the day after the message was faxed which was 11. 06. 1996 not from the date of service of next day's notice which was sent by registered post and which was served on 25. 06. 1996. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held at paragraph 19 of the judgment that the High Court's view that the sender of the notice must know the date when it was received by the sendee, for otherwise he would not be in a position to count the period in order to assert the date when cause of action has arisen is fallacious because it erases starting date of the period of 15 days envisaged in clause (c) according to which the starting date is the date of the receipt of the said notice, and once it starts the offence is concluded on the failure to pay the amount within 15 days therefrom. (Emphasis Supplied ). (Emphasis Supplied ). According to their Lordships, if a different interpretation is given the absolute interdict incorporated in section 142 of the Act that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence unless the complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises, would become otiose' (Emphasis Supplied ). Thus the decision of this Court in Darshan Singh's Case (supra) is expressly based on the supreme Court decision in Sil Import case (supra ). The decision in Dalmiya cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd. and Ors. , reported in 2001 SCC (Cri) 1163, dealt with the issue in the line of Sil Import case (supra ). Their Lordships held that starting point of limitation is the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer. Their Lordships held "efforts to defeat the objectives of law by resorting to innovative measures and methods are to be discouraged lest it may affect the commercial and mercantile activities in a smooth and healthy manner, ultimately affecting the economy" (emphasis supplied ). Yet, another learned Single Judge of this Court in Sri moinuddin Munshi vs. Shri Abhijit Pal and Anr. , 2002 C Cr. LR (Cal) 861 by relying upon Sil Import and Dalmiya Cement Cases (supra) held that the cause of action for filing a complaint under section 138 of the NI Act will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice expires. Before His Lordship the case of Santa Priya Engineers (supra) was also referred to and His Lordship like Darshan Singh's case (supra) was not agreeable to the view in Santa priya Engineers (supra) in view of the two aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble supreme Court. Again there is another decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar vs. Yashpal Singh and Anr. , reported in 2005 scc (Cri) 1153, wherein Their Lordships held that complaint has to be filed within one month from the date immediately following the date on which the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. , reported in 2005 scc (Cri) 1153, wherein Their Lordships held that complaint has to be filed within one month from the date immediately following the date on which the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. According to Their Lordships a combined reading of sections 138 and 142 makes it clear that cause of action is to be reckoned accordingly and there leaves no room for doubt that the cause of action can arise only once. In paragraph 11 of the judgment it has been clearly laid down that the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. ( 10 ) A situation may be stated here. In an unreported decision of this court in M/s. S and S Industries and Enterprises Ltd. vs. M/s. Magma Leasing ltd. , CRR No. 2758 of 2001, the learned Judge who decided the case in Sri moinuddin Munshi (supra) faced again a similar situation where according to the learned Judge demand notice was received by the drawer on 17. 05. 1999 and in terms of section 138 read with section 142 the complaint was to have been filed on 01. 07. 1999 but it was filed on 13. 07. 1999. His Lordship quashed the proceeding on the ground of limitation. The matter went up to the hon'ble Supreme Court where in Criminal Appeal No. 290 of 2006, Their lordships of the Supreme Court passed the following order: (unreported): "we have heard Counsel for the parties. Leave granted. Counsel for the appellant relies upon the decision of this Court in the case of Prem Chand Vijay Kumar vs. Yashpal Singh and Anr. 2005 (4) SCC 417 which follows an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Sil Import, usa vs. Exim Aides Silk Exporters, Bangalore, 1999 (4) SCC 567 . He has also brought to our notice some observations made by this Court in the case of Dalmiya Cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd. and ors. , 2001 (6) SCC 463 . But those observations have been considered and explained in the subsequent decisions. He has also brought to our notice some observations made by this Court in the case of Dalmiya Cement (Bharat) Ltd. vs. Galaxy Traders and Agencies Ltd. and ors. , 2001 (6) SCC 463 . But those observations have been considered and explained in the subsequent decisions. In view of the law declared by this court in the case of Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra), this appeal must be allowed and we, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order and remit the matter to the Trial Court for trial of the case in accordance with law. No order as to costs. " ( 11 ) BY this said order Their Lordships were pleased to refer to the decisions in Sil Import and Dalmiya Cement Cases (supra) but held that the observations made in Dalmiya Cement Case have been considered and explained in the subsequent decision. e. , the case of Prem Chand Vijay kumar (supra) which is the exposition of law declared by the Hon'ble Court, now while following punctually the decision in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar I have noticed that on the point of limitation the judgment of Sil Import case (supra) is very direct and this decision was also relied on and approved in the case of Dalmiya Cement Ltd. (supra ). Again in the decision in Prem chand Vijay Kumar (supra) which is a later decision and which according to their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the unreported decision in Magma leasing Ltd. case (supra) was the law declared by the Supreme Court, the decisions in Sil Import and Dalmiya Cement (supra) were expressly referred to therein and Their Lordships in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra) did not appear to have dissented from the position of law as has been explained in sil Import USA and Dalmiya Cement (supra) and I read to find that these two earlier decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were explicitly relied on and approvingly referred to in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar case, (supra ). ( 12 ) SINCE in Criminal Appeal No. 290 of 2006 reference has been made to the case of Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra), it is necessary to see the facts and circumstances of the said case and the ratio of the decision reached thereat. ( 12 ) SINCE in Criminal Appeal No. 290 of 2006 reference has been made to the case of Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra), it is necessary to see the facts and circumstances of the said case and the ratio of the decision reached thereat. Similar exercise has to be made for the purpose of reaching a just decision of our case in respect of the decisions in Sil Import and Dalmiya cement Cases. I have noticed earlier that our point for consideration is whether the starting point of limitation for payment by the accused is the date of service of statutory notice upon the drawer or the date when the drawee comes to know of such service of notice upon the drawer. ( 13 ) IN Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra) the facts were that the cheque was dishonoured due to inadequacy of funds and intimation was given on 06. 02. 1995. Statutory notice was issued by the complainant/appellant on 17. 02. 1995 demanding payment and the same was admittedly received by the accused who however requested the appellant for sometime to make the payment. On the request of the respondents, the cheque was again presented on 06. 07. 1995 and it was again dishonoured due to inadequacy of funds. Intimation came to the appellant on 20. 07. 1995. Again, statutory notice was sent on 24. 07. 1995. The accused made a reply on 10. 08. 1995 refuting the allegations contained in the legal notice and then the complaint was lodged on 28. 08. 1995. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that clause (a) of the proviso to section 138 does not put any embargo upon the payee to successfully present a dishonoured cheque during the period of its validity. And on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour, a fresh right but not a cause of action accrues in his favour. Their Lordships held that once first notice was received by the accused persons the cause of action commenced and cause of action arises when the drawer fails to make payment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice and a combined reading of sections 138 and 142 makes it clear that cause of action is to be reckoned accordingly. Their Lordships held "the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the drawer expires. " (Emphasis Supplied ). Again at para 15 of the judgment their Lordships observed that "in Sil Import. USA vs. Exim Aides Silk exporters it was held that the language used in section 142 admits of no doubt that the Magistrate is forbidden from taking cognizance of the offence if the complaint was not filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arose. Completion of the offence is the immediate forerunner of rising of the cause of action. In other words, cause of action would arise soon after completion of the offence and period of limitation for filing of the application starts running simultaneously. (Emphasis Supplied)". ( 14 ) BOTH in Sil Import and Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra) the decision in Sadanandan Bhadran vs. Madhavan Sunil Kumar. 1988 SCC (Cri) 1471 was referred to where it was held that once a notice under clause (b) of proviso to section 138 of the Act is "received" by the drawer of the cheque, the payee or holder of the cheque forfeits his right to again present the cheque as cause of action has accrued when there was failure to pay the amount within the presented period and the period of limitation starts to run which cannot be stopped on any account, (emphasis supplied) ( 15 ) IN Dalmiya Cement case (supra) the facts were somewhat peculiar which are no relevant in the case before us and it appears that in order to put embargo on a dishonest drawer Their Lordships were inclined to compute the period of limitation from the date of service of the second notice. Here the notice regarding non-payment of the cheque amount was communicated by the bank to the complainant on 02. 06. 1998. On 13. 06. 1998, the complainant issued a statutory notice upon the respondent who received the notice and acknowledgement was received by the complainant on 15. 06. 1998. The respondents by their letter dated 20. 06. 1998 which was received by the appellant on 30. 06. 1998 intimated that they received empty envelopes without any contents and requested the appellant to mail the contents. 06. 1998. The respondents by their letter dated 20. 06. 1998 which was received by the appellant on 30. 06. 1998 intimated that they received empty envelopes without any contents and requested the appellant to mail the contents. By the time the complainant received the intimation of the respondents, the statutory period of filing the complaint was about to expire. Believing the averments of the respondent's letter to be true the appellant presented the cheque again on 01. 07. 1998 to the drawee bank which was again dishonoured on 02. 07. 1998. Then followed statutory notice which was received by the payee on 27. 07. 1998 but no payment was made. According to the complainant the accused on 06. 08. 1998 sent a registered cover which contained some waste newspaper bits. As despite dishonour of the cheque and receipt of notice the amount was not paid the appellant filed the complaint on 09. 09. 1998 within the statutory period from the date of service of the second notice. The High court quashed the complaint on the ground of limitation. The Hon'ble supreme Court held that the respondents tried to blow hot and cold in the same breath, stating on the one hand that the notice of dishonour had not been received by them and on the other praying for dismissal of the complaint on the plea that the complaint was barred by time in view of the notice served by the appellant which they had not received. The plea of the respondents was not only contradictory and afterthought but apparently carved out to resist the claim of the complainant and thereby frustrate the provisions of law. Now in this case also there has been reference to Sil import case (supra) very extensively and the entire paragraph 7 in the judgment of Sil Import case (supra) was quoted. The said paragraph 7 in Sil import case has been reproduced in the last part of paragraph 13 of this judgment, and it bears no repetition. ( 16 ) THUS in Dalmiya Cement Case (supra) also though the facts are not of relevance to us the ratio of the decision in Sil Import case (supra) has been relied on by their Lordships in the Dalmiya Cement Case (supra ). ( 16 ) THUS in Dalmiya Cement Case (supra) also though the facts are not of relevance to us the ratio of the decision in Sil Import case (supra) has been relied on by their Lordships in the Dalmiya Cement Case (supra ). In Sil import case (supra) the question directly arose whether the sender of the notice must know the date when it was received by the sendee as the High court was of the view that for otherwise he would not be in a position to count the period in order to ascertain the date when cause of action had arisen. Their Lordships in the Sil Import case (supra) clearly and categorically held that the High Court's view is erroneous in inasmuch as it erases the starting date of the period of 15 days envisaged in proviso (c) to section 138 and according to Their Lordships if a different interpretation is given the absolute interdict incorporated in section 142 of the Act that no Court shall take cognizance any offence unless the complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises would become otiose. Thus according to Their Lordships the starting point is the date of the receipt of the notice (not of the date of knowledge of the complainant about receipt of the notice by the drawer) and once it starts the offence is completed on the failure to pay the amount within 15 days therefrom. Thus in all the three cases decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court it has been consistently held that the cause of action arises from the date of receipt of the notice and limitation starts from that day which cannot be erased by any amount of other interpretation. Therefore, in view of the decision in Sil Import (supra) the decision of Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in Santa Priya case (supra) appears to have been overruled and the decision in Darshan Singh case (supra) is on the decision in Sil Import case (supra ). ( 17 ) MR. Therefore, in view of the decision in Sil Import (supra) the decision of Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in Santa Priya case (supra) appears to have been overruled and the decision in Darshan Singh case (supra) is on the decision in Sil Import case (supra ). ( 17 ) MR. Debasish Ray, learned Advocate for the petitioner forcefully argues that in the unreported decision in Crl Appeal No. 290 of 2006 [arising out of this Court's unreported decision in M/s. S. S. Industries (supra)] the supreme Court was not pleased to observe that Sil Import case was wrongly decided or that for the accused the starting point of limitation to make payment is the date of knowledge of the payee about the service of statutory notice on the payee, nor was it that in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar the Supreme court held view contrary and diametrically opposite to the Sil Import's case on the point of limitation. Mr. Ray further argued that the facts in Dalmiya cement and Prem Chand Vijay Kumar and Sadanandan Bhardan are diverse and in different context but all of them approved the ratio of the decision in sil Import case, and having regard to the law of precedent this Court has necessarily to follow all the four decisions which held all along a consistent view and which has not been overruled in the unreported decision. ( 18 ) I agree with the submission. In Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra), it has been held that (a) The period of one month for filing the complaint is reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice by the drawer expires, (b) the decision in Sil Import (supra) was not only approvingly referred to but also relied upon in Prem Chand Vijay Kumar (supra), (c) it was held in Prem chand Vijay Kumar (supra), that for the drawer the starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the payee as to receipt of statutory notice, (d) four consecutive analytical decisions, namely Sil Import. Dalmiva cement Case. Sadanandan Bhadran. Dalmiva cement Case. Sadanandan Bhadran. and Prem Chand Vijay Kumar are consistently unanimous on the point that for the drawer limitation is 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice, and for the payee it is 30 davs from the date on which cause of action accrues which accrues from the day following the day of expiry of that 15 days, (e) In the unreported decision in m/s. Magma Leasing Ltd, vs. S. S. Industries and Enterprises Ltd. (Criminal appeal No. 290 of 2006) which was reached in consideration of facts and circumstances of the case none of the four decisions was dissented from or overruled by Their Lordships. Therefore, when in the instant case the accused received the notice on 27. 07. 1996 and evidence has been unchallengeably led to that effect, limitation starts from 28. 07. 1996 and not from 01. 09. 1996. ( 19 ) MR. Milan Mukherjee learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party submitted that when the case was filed before the learned Magistrate all the three important landmark decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly specifying the starting point of limitation for institution of a complaint and the time when the cause of action arises did not come into being and since at that time the decision of the Hon'ble Single Judge in Santa Priya case (supra) was in force, the ratio the decision of that case which held that the starting point of limitation is the date of knowledge of the complainant about service of demand notice upon the drawer has to prevail and this being so the complaint is well within time. In support of the submission Mr. Mukherjee cited a decision in the case of Sri Anup Kumar and Anr. vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1992 C Cr. LR (Cal) 1. Now to appreciate the submission of Mr. Mukherjee we are to refer to the case of Hooghly Docking and Engineering Company, 1980 (1) CHN 280 where the question arose whether beleated but payment of the provident fund dues before launching of the prosecution but after expiry of the statutory period would render the prosecution untenable. It was held by the Hon'ble Single Judge that such payment before launching of the prosecution would liquidate the offence. This view was upset in Pranati Textile case, 1989 Cr. It was held by the Hon'ble Single Judge that such payment before launching of the prosecution would liquidate the offence. This view was upset in Pranati Textile case, 1989 Cr. LJ 1804 where it was held that a belated and even pre-prosecution payment would not be a bar to a criminal prosecution and conviction. In Anup Kumar and Anr. 's case (supra) it was held by Their Lordship that every person has the obvious right to govern himself and to regulate his acts according to the law as enunciated by this Court until the same is altered in due course, judicial or legislative. It cannot be in any way reasonable, right, just or fair lay down a law in a particular manner and then to convict a person for some act which at the material time and until ruled differently, could not warrant a criminal prosecution. Thus, according to Mr. Mukherjee when the complaint was lodged the law as was declared in the decision in Santa Priya Engineer's case (supra) was in force and the complainant was entitled to lodge the complaint computing the period of limitation from the date of receipt of communication from the Bangalore GPO on 28. 8. 96 intimating therein that the notice was served on 27. 7. 96. Mr. Debasish Roy, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submitted that the reasoning of Mr. Mukherjee is erroneous because it is not that there was no law at all as to the point of limitation for institution of a case when the alleged offence was committed and the case was initiated. According to Mr. Roy, the law enacted by the legislature was very clear that the starting point of limitation for the drawer to make payment is the say following the day of receipt of the demand notice and when limitation starts from that day in terms of the statute it cannot be deferred to suit the convenience of the complainant ( 20 ) UPON hearing the learned Advocate for the parties it can be said that the analogy drawn by Mr. Mukherjee is not available to the case at hand. In the decision in Hooghly Docking and Engineering Co. (supra) right of an accused was declared to the effect that he cannot be prosecuted on account of belated payment because of pre-launching-prosecution-payment. In Anup kumar and Anr. Mukherjee is not available to the case at hand. In the decision in Hooghly Docking and Engineering Co. (supra) right of an accused was declared to the effect that he cannot be prosecuted on account of belated payment because of pre-launching-prosecution-payment. In Anup kumar and Anr. (supra) it was held that the accused had the right to govern himself according to the law enunciated at the time. But here in the instant case the said analogy cannot be placed because of the fact that the law enacted by the Parliament was very clear that the drawer has to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice and the said law as was there at the time of filing of the complaint is the same law in respect which the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court were pronounced. It is the intention of the legislature that is the law and that intention which has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in three consecutive decisions was the same intention existing when the law was so enacted, when the offence was committed allegedly, and when the case was filed. It is not that intention of the legislature changed because of change of law. Law remained the same as on today in the same manner as it was and the intention of the legislature as has been interpreted by the Supreme Court was the same intention when the offence was committed and so far as the law is concerned it admits of no two different interpretations because the law is explicit. If we are to make a different interpretation then any such different interpretation contrary to this one would be prejudicial to the accused because the accused also knew when the complaint was lodged that as on the day when the complaint was filed the same was barred by limitation in terms of the law and he had right to and was entitled to discharge. When this is so this Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly laying down the intention of the legislature. The case of Anup Kumar and Anr. (supra) rather is most appropriate to the accused-opposite parties herein. Therefore the submission of Mr. Mukherjee cannot be upheld. When this is so this Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly laying down the intention of the legislature. The case of Anup Kumar and Anr. (supra) rather is most appropriate to the accused-opposite parties herein. Therefore the submission of Mr. Mukherjee cannot be upheld. With reference to Crawford's Statutory Construction, (1940 Edn.) it can be said that when the provision in the Negotiable Instruments Act declares unambiguously and expressly a specific period of limitation what has been so expressly provided for by the law must necessarily exclude what is not so provided for. Therefore, what is not specifically mentioned in the law must be deemed to have been deliberately excluded from its purview and any attempt to make any other interpretation as to the point of limitation than the interpretation which is deducible from clear language of the statute would amount to invent "casus omisus" which is distinctly absent there. It is not that there was a lacuna in the law and that lacuna or vacuum was filed up by the decision in Shanta Priya Engineer's case (supra) and when this is not so we cannot be permitted to make a meaning of the law with respect to the provision in clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act contrary to what has been clearly laid down in the provisions of the statute. ( 21 ) MR. Mukherjee refers to a decision in Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. vs. State of Assam and Ors. , AIR 1990 SC 123 wherein it has been held that the provision of a statute must be construed so as to make it effective and operative on the principle "ut res majis valeat quam periat" it has been held that it is so doubt true that if a statute is absolutely intractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness and this is not in judicial review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a Court of construction, dealing with the language of a statute, does in order to ascertain the meaning and purpose which they legislative intended for it. There Lordships in the judgment referred to an English decision in Manchester Ship Canal Company vs. Manchester Racecourse Co. There Lordships in the judgment referred to an English decision in Manchester Ship Canal Company vs. Manchester Racecourse Co. , 1900 (2) Ch 352, Farwell, J. said: "unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty. " in Fawcett Properties vs. Buckingham Country Council, 1960 (3) All ER 503, Lord Denning approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said: "but when a statute has some meaning even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though it is little to choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning the Statute has to bear rather than reject it as a nullity. " It is, therefore, the Court's duty to make what it can of the statute, knowing that the statutes are meant to be operative and not inept and that nothing short of impossibility should allow a Court to declare, a statute unworkable. In Whitney vs. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 1926 AC 37, lord Dunedin said: "a statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. " ( 22 ) UPON consideration of the decision it does not appear to me that there is any unreasonableness in the law at hand. The law is not senseless, nor unworkable, nor unreasonable, nor inept or inoperative. The statute intended to bind the drawer to make payment within a certain time limit which is 15 days from the date of receipt of notice; and the meaning is very clear. I ask myself if the starting point of limitation for the drawer is sought to be linked with the date of payee's knowledge as to the receipt of the notice by the drawer, then would not the provision be fraught with uncertainty and unworkability in this that the drawer would then ask as to from which day his limitation would run because he fails to have knowledge of the date of drawee's knowledge of the receipt of notice by the drawer. ( 23 ) MR. Mukherjee submitted that non-action of the postal department cannot wipe out the right of the complainant to sue. ( 23 ) MR. Mukherjee submitted that non-action of the postal department cannot wipe out the right of the complainant to sue. Answer to this question may be found in the Sil Import Case (supra) where Their Lordships observed as follows: "chapter XVII of the Act, containing sections 138 to 142, was inserted in the Act as per the Banking Public Financial Institution and Negotiable instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988. When the legislature contemplated that notice in writing should be given to the drawer of the cheque, the legislature must be presumed to have been aware of the modern devices and equipment already in vogue and also in store for future. If the Court were to interpret the words "giving notice in writing" in the section as section as restricted to the customary mode of sending notice through postal service or even by personal delivery, the interpretative process would fail to cope up with the change of time. " ( 24 ) AGAIN in Dalmiya Cement Case (supra) Their Lordships of the Supreme court observed: "section 27 of the General Clauses Act deals with the presumption of service of a letter sent by post. The despatcher of a notice has, therefore, a right to insist upon and claim the benefit of such a presumption. But as the presumption is a rebuttable one, he has two options before him. One is to concede to the stand of the sendee that as a matter of fact he did not receive the notice, and the other is to contest the sendee's stand and take the risk for proving that he, in fact, received the notice. It is open to the despatcher to adopt either of the options. If he opts for the former, he can afford to take appropriate steps for the effective service of notice upon the addressee". ( 25 ) IN view of what has been discussed above I am of the considered judgment that the revisional application has to be sustained since the prosecution was barred by limitation. ( 26 ) ACCORDINGLY, I allow the application and set aside the order of the learned Magistrate dated 20/12/2004. Consequently the petitioners stand discharged.