Order Petitioners have invoked the inherent Jurisdiction of this court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, pray19 for quashing the entire criminal proceeding pending against them vide Complaint Case No. 1207 of 2006 in the Court f Manoj Chandra Jha, Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh as also for quashing the order dated 23.11.2006 passed in the said proceeding, whereby the learned court below had taken cognizance for the offences under sections 498-A, 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioners. 2. The prayer for quashing is based upon two distinct and separate grounds he first ground relates to the territorial jurisdiction of the learned court below to entertain and continue with the proceeding and the second ground relates to the ea that since the institution of the case the complainant-opposite party was with ala fide intention and by way of revenge by to harass the petitioners, its continuance will amount to abuse of the process the court. 3. The case against the petitioners was registered on the basis of the complaint filed by the complainant/opposite party no. 2 alleging inter alia that the marriage of the opposite party no. 2 was solemnized with the petitioner no. 1 on 8.6.2006 and after the marriage, she went to her matrimonial house at Dhubri, Assam on 9.6.2006. Within a few days of her arrival at her matrimonial house, she began to face ill-treatment and mental and physical cruelty at the hands of her husband and her in-laws who include petitioner nos. 2 and 3 and her brother-in-law namely petitioner no. 4. Such ill-treatment was meted out to her on account of nonfulfilment of their demand of a sum of Rs. 2.00 lakh by way of dowry. A month after on 9.7.2006, the uncle of the complainant visited the house of the petitioners and on finding the pitiable condition of the complainant, and on being confronted with the demand of Rs. 2.00 lakh by way of dowry besides abuse and insult, the uncle of the complainant brought her to her parents' house at Hazaribagh on 11.7.2006 and since then, she has been living at the house of her father at Hazaribagh. It is further alleged that the husband and inlaws had illegally and forcibly retained the personal belongings including gold ornaments, wearing apparel and other articles which they have criminally misappropriated. It is further alleged that the husband and inlaws had illegally and forcibly retained the personal belongings including gold ornaments, wearing apparel and other articles which they have criminally misappropriated. Further allegation of the complainant is that she continued to be subjected to cruelty by the accused no. 4 namely, Sanjay Jain (brother-in-law of the complainant) who used to issue threats by telephone causing mental cruelty to the complainant, even at Hazaribagh. The statement of the complainant and her witnesses was recorded on solemn affirmation in course of inquiry under section 202 Cr.PC and on considering the allegations both in the complaint petition as also appearing in the statements of the witnesses, the learned court below recorded its observation that prima facie case for the offences is made out against four accused persons namely the present petitioners and issued summons against the petitioners directing them to face trial. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners while reading out the entire contents of the complaint petition, as filed by the complainant, submits that even according to the admitted case of the complainant, the entire acts of cruelty as alleged, were confined to the complainant's matrimonial house at Dhubri and no part of the alleged act was committed by the petitioners at Hazaribagh. Learned counsel explains that admittedly, the opposite party no. 2 had left her matrimonial house alongwith her uncle on 11.7.2006, whereafter she never returned to the house of the petitioners, nor did any of the petitioners ever visit her at her parents' house at Hazaribagh and as such the allegations in the complaint do not indicate that the alleged offences had continued even after complainant had left her matrimonial house and had returned to the house of her parents. Learned counsel emphasizes that admittedly, since no part of the alleged acts was committed by the petitioners at Hazaribagh, the court at Hazaribagh where the proceeding is presently pending, lacks territorial jurisdiction. Learned counsel in support of his contention, has referred to the following judgments of the Apex Court:-Manish Ratan and Ors. VS. State of M.P. & Anr. reported in 2006(8) Supreme 372 , Ramesh and others VS. State of T.N. reported in AIR 2005 Supreme Court 1989 and of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. VS. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another reported in (2004)8 SCC 100 . VS. State of M.P. & Anr. reported in 2006(8) Supreme 372 , Ramesh and others VS. State of T.N. reported in AIR 2005 Supreme Court 1989 and of Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. VS. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another reported in (2004)8 SCC 100 . Referring to the second ground, learned counsel explains that the case has been filed by the complainant with mala fide intention with revengeful motive only for the purpose of causing harassment to the petitioners, as would be evident from the fact that after the complainant had voluntarily left her matrimonial house alongwith her uncle on 11.7. 2006 and refusing to restore conjugal relation with her, the petitioner no. 1 had filed a suit for divorce under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the court at Assam vide T.S.(O) No. 32 of 2006 which was admitted on 14.9.2006. Adverting to the annexed copy of the plaint, learned counsel submits that summons in the suit was served upon the complainant at Hazaribagh on 22.9.2006 and it was only after having received summon in the divorce suit, the complainant filed her instant complaint petition before the court below at Hazaribagh on 11.10.2006. learned counsel submits that the aforesaid facts amply demonstrate that the complainant had filed her complaint with mala fides only to harass the petitioners by way of her revenge abusing thereby, the process of the court. 5. Opposite party no. 2 has appeared through her lawyer. A petition has been filed on her behalf praying for vacating the order of stay passed by this court on 31.1.2007. learned counsel appearing for the opposite party no. 2 controverts the ground advanced by the petitioners and claims that the grounds are totally misconceived and prayer of the petitioners for quashing the proceeding pending against them is not maintainable learned counsel explains that the contention of the petitioners that no part of the acts constituting offence under section 498A IPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the learned court below is incorrect and misleading. Referring to the statement contained in para-13 of the complaint petition as also the statement of the complainant recorded on solemn affirmation, learned counsel points out that even while the complainant was residing at her father's house at Hazaribagh, she used to be subjected to mental cruelty by threats issued by the accused persons on telephone and as such, the act of making telephonic calls in itself perpetrates mental cruelty and the consequence thereof was• suffered by the complainant at Hazaribagh, so cause of action did accrue to the complainant to file her complaint before the court at Hazaribagh. As regards the plea of malafides, learned counsel submits that this ground is also misconceived and merely because the complaint was filed by the opposite party no. 2 after service of notice in the divorce suit, no inference can be drawn that the complaint was filed with malice and mala fides and by way of any revengeful motives learned counsel explains that even after suffering extreme physical and mental torture at the hands of the accused persons, the complainant continued to hope and expect reconciliation with her husband and, therefore, she and her parents used to counter the threatening of the accused persons by remaining silent and it was only when her hope for reconciliation was shattered on being informed about the divorce suit filed by her husband, she had opted to exercise her right for necessary action under law for all that she had suffered at the hands of the accused persons. 6. Referring to the ground of territorial jurisdiction, Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the ordinary place of inquiry and trial and stipulates that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed. 7. The interpretation of the term "ordinarily" will have to be considered by reading the provisions of Section 178 Cr. PC. Which reads as under: "178. 7. The interpretation of the term "ordinarily" will have to be considered by reading the provisions of Section 178 Cr. PC. Which reads as under: "178. Place of inquiry or trial.-(a) When it is uncertain in Which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a. Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas." The opposite party no. 2 appears to have invoked clause C of Section 178 Cr. PC on the ground that the offence continues to be committed at Hazaribagh also besides at her matrimonial house at Assam. This plea is on the allegation that the threatening by way of telephonic calls used to be made to her by the accused no. 4 (petitioner no. 4) and as consequence thereof, she used to suffer mental torture at Hazaribagh. 8. The question posed is, whether the aforesaid allegation would constitute a continuing offence. 9. In the case of State of Bihar vs. Deokaran Nenshi & Another reported in AIR 1973 SC 908 , the Apex Court has explained the term "continuing offence" and had stated that "continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of the failure 'to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues untill the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and re-occurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction - between two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission, which continues, and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of continuing offence, there are thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when act or omission is committed once and for all". In the case of continuing offence, there are thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when act or omission is committed once and for all". Adopting the same explanation of the term "continuing offence", in the case of Manish Ratan & Ors. (supra) which relates to the offence of cruelty on account of dowry demand, the Apex Court had declared that the offence could not be held to be continuing one only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home. 10. The opposite party no. 2 has also relied upon the aforementioned judgments besides the judgment in the case of Sujata Mukherjee vs. Prashant Kumar reported in (1997)5 SCC 30 . In the case of Sujata Mukherjee (supra) the Supreme Court had held the offence to be continuing as specific allegations were made against the husband that he had gone to Raigarh where the complaint was filed and had assaulted the complainant, namely, the wife. The Apex Court had therefore held that part of the acts constituting offence had occurred also at Raigarh, so the court at Raigarh did have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the wife. Likewise, in the case of Ramesh and Others (supra), the facts disclosed that the matrimonial home of the wife was at Mumbai and the alleged acts of offence was mostly committed at Mumbai by the husband and in-laws. There was one allegation relating to Section 498A IPC that when relatives of the wife met her in-laws at a hotel at Chennai where they were staying on a particular date, there was again demand for dowry and threat to torture her in case she was sent back to Mumbai without money and articles demanded. The wife, who was living at the house of her parents at Trichy, had filed her case in the court at Trichy. The Apex Court held that though major portion of the acts of offence were committed at Mumbai and one of the acts giving rise to the offence under, section 498A took place at Chennai, none of the acts had ever occurred at Trichy and, therefore, the court at Trichy had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the wife. The Apex Court held that though major portion of the acts of offence were committed at Mumbai and one of the acts giving rise to the offence under, section 498A took place at Chennai, none of the acts had ever occurred at Trichy and, therefore, the court at Trichy had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the wife. In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith (supra), the facts of the case indicated that all the alleged acts of offence had occurred at the matrimonial house of the wife at Nagercoil and the wife had left the matrimonial house and went to Chennai and was staying there. Having regard to the facts that the alleged offensive acts were committed at Nagercoil, it was held that the court at Chennai did not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter. 11. In the present case, the opposite party no. 2 has invoked the jurisdiction of the court at Hazaribagh that the accused persons had caused mental cruelty to the opposite party no. 2 by issuing threats to her by telephone even while she was living at her parents' house at Hazaribagh and, therefore, the act of making telephonic calls even though was committed at Assam, the consequence thereof was suffered by her at Hazaribagh and it thus being a continuing offence under section 498A IPC, the cause of action did accrue to the complainant at Hazaribagh for filing her complaint in the court at Hazaribagh. The argument does not appear to be persuasive. Though such allegation is stated .in para-13 of the complaint petition and reiterated in the statement of the complainant recorded on solemn affirmation in course of inquiry, but neither the actual contents of the telephonic conversation has been disclosed, nor was any specific date mentioned as to when was any such call made to the complainant. The allegation is basically vague and unspecific. Even otherwise, it is an isolated act that too attributed only to one of the accused persons namely the accused no. 4, brother-in-law of the complainant. Such a vague allegation of isolated act cannot be construed as an act of continuing offence against the accused persons for the purpose of attaching territorial jurisdiction of the court before whom the complaint was filed by the opposite party no. 2. 12. 4, brother-in-law of the complainant. Such a vague allegation of isolated act cannot be construed as an act of continuing offence against the accused persons for the purpose of attaching territorial jurisdiction of the court before whom the complaint was filed by the opposite party no. 2. 12. The ground of want of territorial jurisdiction has been well taken by the petitioners and on this ground alone, the instant application succeeds. In my considered opinion, the court at Hazaribagh before whom the proceeding is pending against the petitioners, has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and to continue the proceeding. 13. As regards the ground of mala fide behind institution of the complaint, it need not be considered in view of acceptance of the first ground relating to want of territorial jurisdiction. 14. For the reasons mentioned above, this application is allowed. The entire criminal proceeding pending against the petitioners in the Court of Shri Manoj Chandra Jha, Judicial Magistrate, Hazaribagh vide complaint case no. 1207 of 2006 including the order dated 23.11.2006 passed in the proceeding, is hereby quashed.