JUDGMENT:- This is an appeal against the order passed by the District & Sessions Judge on an application filed by Respondent under Section 9 of the Arbitration And Conciliation Act directing the appellant to furnish bank guarantee. 2. Facts giving rise to this appeal are as under: Appellant and the respondent are the Companies registered under the Companies Act, 1956. Appellant was incorporated in the year 1979. With the passage of time the condition of the appellant Company deteriorated so much that the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction vide its order dated 04-07 -2000 opined that the appellant Company should be wound up. Appellant Company preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority which dismissed the appeal. While the matter was pending before the Appellate Authority the appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent on 25-01-2001. The terms of the agreement were settled after mutual discussion. It was decided that the appellant should route all its transactions through the respondent and the respondent was to take care of the financial transactions. Thus the respondent was given exclusive right to deal with the parties for and on behalf of the appellant. Respondent was abiding by all the terms of the agreement and performing its part of the contract. After sometime it is alleged that the appellant resiled from the said agreement and started diverting orders to others in violation of the terms of the agreement. Such act of the appellant was malafide and was with an intention to harass the applicant. Since the appellant was repeatedly committing breach of the conditions of the contract, the respondent was constrained to approach the Court under Section 9 of the Act vide M.C.A.No.704/01 for claiming certain interim reliefs before the appointment of an Arbitrator. Certain interim reliefs were granted but the appellant even violated those orders. That petition is still pending before the Court. The respondent thereafter approached the High Court for appointment of Arbitrator and one Mr. Vijay Agrawal, Chartered Accountant was appointed as Arbitrator. The Arbitrator passed an award on 05-03-2003 giving certain reliefs to the respondent. Both the parties have challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. After passing of the award substantial rights have accrued in favour of the respondent and in order to protect those rights the respondent has filed this application under Section 9. The Arbitrator passed an award on 05-03-2003 giving certain reliefs to the respondent. Both the parties have challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. After passing of the award substantial rights have accrued in favour of the respondent and in order to protect those rights the respondent has filed this application under Section 9. It is contended that the appellant has siphoned out the funds. It is alleged that the appellant has to receive huge sum of money from the authorities as mentioned in application and appellant is trying to permit third party to receive the payment. The respondent, therefore, submits that in order to protect his rights it is necessary to make an appointment of Receiver and direct the receiver to receive the amount, including which are due from the authorities as mentioned in para 9 of the application. The respondent also prays that the appellant be directed to route all these transactions through it and not through any other party. 3. This application was resisted by appellant. It is contended by the appellant that this application under Section 9 is not maintainable since similar such application under Section 9 is filed and it is filed as application No.7040f2001. It is also contended that mere passing of an award does not give fresh cause of action. The non-applicant appellant had incurred huge losses amounting to Rs.37,00,000/- during the first three years of its operation. In the year 1995-96 the appellants accumulated losses were 1,47,00,000/- and exceeded the paid up capital of Rs.12,397 lacs. In the year 1996 the appellant company was referred to BIFR under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies Act. On 14-01-1997 the appellant company was declared as sick and the decision to wind up the company was taken. Appeal against the said decision was dismissed. Since the company was ordered to be wound up liquidation proceedings are pending before the High Court being Company Petition No.15 of 2000. Some of the parties namely employees have approached the Hon'ble High Court in Writ Petition Nos.3312/01, 4088/01 and 265/01 challenging the decisions taken by the BIFR and AAIFR. The present winding up proceedings are stayed by the High Court. An over all effect of the aforesaid situation was that the condition of the appellant Company further deteriorated. Some of the parties namely employees have approached the Hon'ble High Court in Writ Petition Nos.3312/01, 4088/01 and 265/01 challenging the decisions taken by the BIFR and AAIFR. The present winding up proceedings are stayed by the High Court. An over all effect of the aforesaid situation was that the condition of the appellant Company further deteriorated. In order to meet the aforesaid situation and to come out of the red the appellant Company was in need of an arrangement to procure raw material and other inputs against the confirmed orders. This culminated into an execution of an agreement with the respondent-company. This arrangement was stipulated to be continued till the proposal of the sister concern of the respondent for revival of the appellant was approved by the AAIFR. However, on 11-09-01 AAIFR has rejected the proposal of the sister concern of the respondent and, therefore, after 11-09-01 the agreement dated 25-01-01 does not subsist. Although the respondent was liable to provide raw material from 25-01-01 to 11-09-01, respondent miserably failed to do so. On the other hand, in the month of September and October respondent had even gone to the extent of withdrawing the raw material and other inputs available for the manufacturing activities against the confirmed orders. It is, therefore, clear that the respondent itself had utterly failed to perform its contractual obligations. It is contended that in fact the respondent has siophoned large amount of advance received from the parties. Such glaring examples of illegality were brought before the Arbitrator. Non applicant submits that for all these reasons the respondent is not entitled to any interim relief. 4. After hearing the parties the learned District and Sessions Judge had found that the applicant appellant should be directed to furnish security by way of bank guarantee of a nationalised bank in the sum of Rs.1,79,40,292/- and being aggrieved by that order this appeal has been preferred. 5. In fact it can be said that almost all facts except a few with regard to siphoning of amount and breach of contract seem to be undisputed. The only thing which is required to be considered is whether the learned District Judge was right in ordering the appellant to furnish bank guarantee. 5. In fact it can be said that almost all facts except a few with regard to siphoning of amount and breach of contract seem to be undisputed. The only thing which is required to be considered is whether the learned District Judge was right in ordering the appellant to furnish bank guarantee. Shri. Mundra the learned counsel for the respondent contended that a protection of interest of respondent is required to be taken care of since the unit has been closed and it is facing winding up. It was contended by him that the funds of the Company are being siphoned by the persons in-charge of the Company. It was also contended that it is for this reason, the application under Section 9 has been filed in order to protect the interest of the respondent Company. Section 9 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act does envisage affording protection as an interim measure. An arbitration award is undisputedly passed in favour of the respondent herein. 6. Shri. Manohar the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order passed by the District Judge cannot be sustained for 4 reasons: Firstly, there was no prayer for direction to give bank guarantee; Secondly, The company is being wound up and losses exceed the worth of the company itself; Thirdly, there is already an order of attachment by the Sales Tax Department; and Fourthly, this Court in W.P.No.265/02 has directed on 23-02-04 that it shall not alienate or create third party interest in the properties of the Company. He submitted that the objective of Section 9 is' in fact attained by the order passed by this Court on 23-02-04 and there was as such no necessity to order to provide bank guarantee. 7. The undisputed fact is that both the parties have filed objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration Award. The provisions of Section 9 can be invoked not only after passing of an award but can be invoked even during the pendency of the proceedings but in any case before enforcement of the award. Section 9, therefore, is in respect of the interim measure. Interim measures relate to preservation, interim custody, sale of goods, securing the amount in dispute, detention, preservation and inspection of the property in dispute. Section 9, therefore, is in respect of the interim measure. Interim measures relate to preservation, interim custody, sale of goods, securing the amount in dispute, detention, preservation and inspection of the property in dispute. Further for the same protection an order such as injunction and appointment of receiver can also be passed besides any other order as may appear to be just to the Court. Basically, therefore, the main object is to secure the amount in dispute in arbitration. 8. It is clear that the Company is under liquidation and is ordered to be wound up. Although this Court has granted stay to the order of the appellate tribunal confirming the winding up, the fact remains that the authorities, competent to order winding up have come to the conclusion that the Company needs to be wound up. It is in the shadow of being wound up. The reasons given are that the Company has suffered huge losses and cannot be revived. It is really very difficult to comprehend as to how a Company which has suffered losses worth more than its own worth could offer a bank guarantee. It is a matter of common knowledge that no bank would stand guarantee for a company which has run into losses and is under shadow of being wound up. The bank would expect that a company for which the guarantee is to be offered has a business potential and would be in a position to repay, if for any reason the guarantee is required to be encashed. It was rightly contended by Shri. Manohar the learned counsel for the appellant that the Company will have to deposit atleast 10% of the amount of guarantee in the bank. Since the production has ceased the company has no source of income at all. It cannot therefore, have even a capacity to deposit that much amount. It would not be in a position to offer security to bank without which bank will certainly in turn not offer guarantee. It is not disputed that the Company is also under attachment of the Sales Tax Department. With such attachment of the entire property the company would not be in a position to offer any security to the bank to enable the bank to offer a bank guarantee for and on behalf of the company. It is not disputed that the Company is also under attachment of the Sales Tax Department. With such attachment of the entire property the company would not be in a position to offer any security to the bank to enable the bank to offer a bank guarantee for and on behalf of the company. Had the learned District Judge atleast forewarned the parties that he intends to direct the party to offer bank guarantee, all these facts could have been brought to the notice of the learned District Judge. He did not do so as a result of which the parties could not put forward these arguments. It was, therefore, an exercise in futility to order the respondent-Company to offer bank guarantee. Assuming that such argument was not put forth before the learned District Judge he should have himself taken into consideration these aspects which were very much before him. 9. Shri. Mundra the learned counsel contended that under Section 9 of the Act, the Court does have a power to make any order which is just and convenient and, therefore, no fault can be found with the order. There is no doubt that the Court has such a power under Clause (e) of Section 9 of the Arbitration Act but then the order must be such which can be complied or the party is capable of complying it. If it is apparent that the party would not be in a position to do a particular thing and yet Court orders, that would be a redundant order. The parties never expect a Court to pass an order which is incapable of being followed. Here in this case even though an order is passed to give bank guarantee the purpose for which such order is made would not be achieved, for if, no guarantee is given by the bank, there would be no protection at all. 10. To my mind there is no case for appointment of receiver also. A receiver can be appointed only when there are allegations of squandering or waste. The Company as is admitted was being run under losses since its inception. It is not that it has run into losses in the near past. The production has been stopped totally and there is only a skeleton staff, as is contended by Shri. Manohar the learned counsel. The Company as is admitted was being run under losses since its inception. It is not that it has run into losses in the near past. The production has been stopped totally and there is only a skeleton staff, as is contended by Shri. Manohar the learned counsel. If the production is stopped and there is only a skeleton staff then there is nothing of which the accounts are required to be maintained. The office is still being run. There are accountants and responsible persons in the Company, who can take care of the money, that the Company may receive. In fact if a receiver is appointed that would add to the burden on the Company. 11. Shri. Manohar the learned counsel invited my attention to the order passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.265 of 2002. Relevant para of the said order is as follows: The Respondent No.4 - Company is directed not to alienate, or create a third party interest in the properties of the company till then. This order would certainly take care of the protection that is sought by the respondent Company. In any case the entire property of the Company is under attachment of the Sales Tax Department. Besides this attachment of the Sales Tax Department the property is virtually under the attachment under the order dated 23-02-04 of this Court since the Company is ordered not to sell and create third party interest. There is, therefore, no possibility of the property being put to danger. The applicant is not a secured creditor. If the Company goes in liquidation subsequently, the liquidator would take care of the amount recoverable by the applicant. In the result, I find that the order directing the appellant Company to furnish bank guarantee was not justified hence that order is set aside. Instead, it would be enough if the respondent Company is directed to act according to the order dated 23-02-04 in Writ Petition No.265 of 2002. Order accordingly. Appeal dismissed.