MADHU MITTAL v. VTH ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE GHAZIABAD
2007-12-14
S.U.KHAN
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
S. U. KHAN, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Counsel for the parties. This writ petition was earlier allowed by me on 9. 7. 2004 without hearing any one on behalf of respondents as no one had appeared on their behalf. Thereafter rehearing application was filed which was allowed on 28. 11. 2007 and judgment and order dated 9. 7. 2004 was set aside. On 28. 11. 2007 learned Counsel for both the parties were heard on the merit of the writ petition also. ( 2 ) THIS is landlords writ petition arising out of suit for eviction on the ground of default and for recovery of arrears of rent instituted by original landlord Charan Singh against tenant-respondent No. 2 Smt. Sumar Kaura in the form of S. C. C. Suit No. 14 of 1995. J. S. C. C. , Ghaziabad decreed the suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent though judgment and decree dated 30. 1. 1996. Against the said judgmnt and decree tenant respondent No. 2 filed S. C. C. Revision No. 60 of 1996. During pendency of revision original landlord Charan Singh died and was substituted by petitioner his daughter. Vth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad allowed the revision on 19. 3. 1997, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. Landlord has filed this writ petition against the said judgment and order of the Revisional Court. ( 3 ) THE only question involved in this writ petition is as to whether deposit of rent by the tenant before Munsif/civil Judge (J. D.), Hapur under section 30 (2) of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 even after receipt of two notices dated 27. 1. 1994 and 3. 10. 1994 was valid or not. If the said deposit is held to be valid then tenant can not be evicted as in that eventuality tenant would not be held to be defaulter.
1. 1994 and 3. 10. 1994 was valid or not. If the said deposit is held to be valid then tenant can not be evicted as in that eventuality tenant would not be held to be defaulter. Section 30 (2) of the Act is quoted below : section 30 (2) : Where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances under which such deposit is made and may, until such doubt has been removed or such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settlement between the parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building. ( 4 ) THE occasion to deposit the rent under section 30 (2) according to the tenant arose due to the fact that some times the daughter (i. e. petitioner)received the rent claiming that she was entitled to receive the same and some times father i. e. original plaintiff Charan Singh claimed that he alone must be paid the rent. The order passed under section 30 (2) by Munsif, Hapur has been quoted by the Rcvisional Court. In the said case father and daughter i. e. Charan Singh (original plaintiff) and Smt. Madhu Mittal, petitioner both were made opposite parties. In the said order of the Munsif it is mentioned that opposite parties accepted that Smt. Madhu had been receiving rent from the tenant. It is also mentioned in the said order that the learned Counsel for the opposite parties stated that Smt. Madhu was realising the rent only as agent of Charan Singh. Ultimately application was allowed on the condition that tenant sumar Kaura was entitled to deposit the rent for Charan Singh until opposite parties through registered notice gave their consent (apsi sahmati ). The two notices dated 27. 1. 1994 and 3. 10. 1994 given afterwards are Annexures-7 and 8 to the writ petition. Both the notices are by and on behalf of Charan Singh alone and his daughter-Smt. Madhu Mittal the petitioner did not join in the said notices.
The two notices dated 27. 1. 1994 and 3. 10. 1994 given afterwards are Annexures-7 and 8 to the writ petition. Both the notices are by and on behalf of Charan Singh alone and his daughter-Smt. Madhu Mittal the petitioner did not join in the said notices. ( 5 ) ACCORDINGLY, it could not be said that through agreement dispute had been settled in between father and daughter or doubt in the mind of the tenant with regard to the right of the person to collect rent had been cleared. Section 30 (2) of the Act uses two words doubt and dispute. Even if there is no real dispute still if the situation is such it gives rise to a doubt in the mind of the tenant then he is entitled to deposit the rent tinder section 30 (2) of the Act. After receipt of notice of demand of rent tenants is not entitled to continue to deposit rent under section 30 (1) of the Act where rent is deposited on the allegation of refusal of the landlord to accept the rent. However, if the deposit is under section 30 (2) of the Act then rent may be continued to be deposited until dispute is resolved or doubt is cleared. In case in the two notices Smt. Madhu Mittal had also joined alongwilh his father Charan Singh then doubt would have stood cleared. Even according to the order of Munsif passed in proceeding under section 30 (2) of the Act tenant was entitled to deposit the rent until through registered notice mutual consent was intimated. This mutual consent meant consent in between Charan Singh and his daughter Smt. Sumar Kaura. ( 6 ) ACCORDINGLY, I do not find any error in the judgment and order passed by the Revisional Court holding that deposit under section 30 (2) of the Act was valid and tenant was not defaulter when notice was given or when suit was filed. Writ petition is therefore dismissed. ( 7 ) 1 have held in Khursheda v. A. D. J. , 2004 (55) ALR 586 and H. M. Kichlu v. A. D. j. 2004 (57) AI. R 485.
Writ petition is therefore dismissed. ( 7 ) 1 have held in Khursheda v. A. D. J. , 2004 (55) ALR 586 and H. M. Kichlu v. A. D. j. 2004 (57) AI. R 485. that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covrered by Rent Control act or while maintaining the said relief already granted by the Courts below, Writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. ( 8 ) IN the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M. V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 =1998 SCFBRC 75. where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and Courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. Under U. P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement or rent after October, 1972 (Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (section 9-A) or Government is tenant (section 21 (8 ). In the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in "shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India", AIR 1996 SC 2410 =1996 SCFBRC 472. Paragraph-11 of which is quoted below :- "it is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can lake cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party pri-orly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. " ( 9 ) THEREAFTER in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I held as under :- "rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction.
" ( 9 ) THEREAFTER in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), I held as under :- "rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bona fide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid authority of S. F. P. v. L. I. C. AIR 1996 SC 2410 . has laid down that while granting relief to a party the Writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The writ therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary rejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the un-reason-able benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection from arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act. " ( 10 ) THEREAFTER in H. M. Kitchlu v. A. D. J. , 2001 (57) ALR 485. I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so Writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act against arbitrary eviction granted to the tenant by the Courts below. ( 11 ) RALE of rent of property in dispute is Rs. 300 per month which was settled long before. Property in dispute is a house consisting of one room, store and kitchen. Rent of Rs. 300 is quite on the lower side.
( 11 ) RALE of rent of property in dispute is Rs. 300 per month which was settled long before. Property in dispute is a house consisting of one room, store and kitchen. Rent of Rs. 300 is quite on the lower side. Building in dispute is situate in Hapur District Ghaziabad which is part of N. C. R. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, it is directed that with effect from January, 2008 onward tenant-petitioner shall pay rent to the landlord at the rate of Rs. 850 per month inclusive of water etc. No further amount shall be payable by the tenant over and above Rs. 850 per month. Petition Dismissed, .