S. U. KHAN, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Counsel for the parties. ( 2 ) THIS is tenants writ petition arising out of suit for eviction instituted against him by landlords-respondents 2 and 3 Rajesh Kumar Kaushik and another in the form of S. C. C. Suit No. 5 of 1988. J. S. C. C. /iind Munsif, Bulandshahar dismissed the suit on 28 1. 1992. Against the said judgment and decree landlords-respondent filed S. C. C. Revision No. 20 of 1991 which was allowed by VIIIth Additional District Judge, Bulandshahar on 4. 3. 1991, judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court was set aside and plaintiffs suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent was decreed. Revisional Court allowed the revision on 28. 1. 1992 which judgment and order has been challenged through this writ petition. ( 3 ) TENANCY was entered into through a registered agreement (rent deed) dated 8. 6. 1978 according to which the period of lease was ten years. The ground of eviction taken in the plaint was of default in payment of rent as provided under section 20 (2) (a) Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. There is absolutely no dispute that on the first date of hearing tenant deposited the entire arrears of rent alongwith interest and cost of the suit. By virtue of section 20 (4) of the Act if the tenant on the first date of hearing of the suit deposits entire arrears of rent alongwith interest and cost of the suit then decree of eviction on the ground of default may not be passed. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the tenant had complied with the provisions of section 20 (4) of the Act. However, the Revisional Court decreed the suit on the ground that it had been agreed between the parties that tenancy would be for ten years only hence after ten years tenant was liable to eviction irrespective of any ground mentioned under section 20 (2) of the Act. Revisional Court held that the case was covered by proviso to section 20 (1) of the Act. Revisional Court held that the case was covered by proviso to section 20 (1) of the Act. Section 20 (1) and (2) are quoted below :- 20 (1) : Save as provided in sub-section (2) no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner : provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar a suit for the eviction of a tenant on the determination of his tenancy by efflux of time where the tenancy for a fixed term was entered into by or in pursuance of a compromise or adjustment arrived at with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding, which is either recorded in Court or otherwise reduced to writing and signed by the tenant. (2) A suit for the eviction for a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely: (a) to (g ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . not relevant hence not quoted. ( 4 ) REVISIONAL Court held that as tenancy for a fixed terms was entered into through agreement reduced to wring hence after expiry of the period of the said agreement it was not necessary to show that any of the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) to (g) of section 20 (2) existed and by virtue of proviso to section 20 (1) tenant was liable to eviction simply on the expiry of period fixed through agreement in writing. ( 5 ) IN my opinion Revisional Court was utterly erroneous in law. The words compromise or adjustment reduced to writing relate to the words with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceedings, admittedly agreement of tenancy dated 8,6. 1978 was not with reference to any suit etc. No eviction proceedings in between the parties were pending at that time. Through the said agreement tenancy was for the first time created. The words compromise or adjustment reduced to writing relate to the words with reference to a suit, appeal, revision or execution proceedings, admittedly agreement of tenancy dated 8,6. 1978 was not with reference to any suit etc. No eviction proceedings in between the parties were pending at that time. Through the said agreement tenancy was for the first time created. In the agreement it was mentioned that the tenant was in possession of a house of the Landlady and he had vacated the same and in lieu of the said vacation agreement in question in respect of property in dispute consisting of two shops bearing No. 713 and back portion (khun) of shop No. 715 alongwith open land lying towards back of the said shops was let out. ( 6 ) REVISIONAL Court held that as the consideration for the agreement was vacation of another property (House) hence aforesaid proviso to section 20 (1) was attracted. I do not agree with the reasoning of the Revisional Court. By virtue of the aforesaid proviso only such agreement which is with reference to legal proceedings pending in respect of eviction is covered. In the instant case firstly no legal proceeding in respect of the house which was vacated were pending and secondly the agreement was not in respect of the existing tenanted accommodation i. e. house but in respect of shops which were let out through the said agreement. The proviso therefore had absolutely no application. ( 7 ) THE Revisional Court placed reliance upon the following authorities : 1. Mohan Lal v. VIIIth A. D. J. , 1981 ALJ 239, PARA11. 2. Mod Lal v. Smt. Kanta Garg, 1983 (2) ARC 284. 3. Suresh Chandra v. Gulam Chist, 1990 (16) ALR 228 (SC ). 4. M/s. G. Narayan Jagat Narayan and Co. v. M/s. General Sales, 1980 ALJ 508. 5. Moti Lal v. State of U. P. , 1991 RCJ (2) 641. 6. Prakash Chandra v. Sardar Narendra Singh, 1989 (1) ARC 132. ( 8 ) NONE of these authorities interpreted the proviso to section 20 (1 ). ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY, writ petition is allowed. Judgment and order passed by the Revisional Court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suit for eviction is restored. ( 10 ) I have held in Khursheeda v. AD. J. 2004 (55) FLR 586. ( 9 ) ACCORDINGLY, writ petition is allowed. Judgment and order passed by the Revisional Court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by the Trial Court dismissing the suit for eviction is restored. ( 10 ) I have held in Khursheeda v. AD. J. 2004 (55) FLR 586. and H. M. Kichlu v. AD. J. , 2004 (2) ARC 652. that while granting relief against eviction to the tenant in respect of building covered by Rent Control Act or while maintaining the relief already granted by the Courts below, Writ Court is empowered to enhance the rent to a reasonable extent. ( 11 ) IN the aforesaid authority of Khursheeda (supra), 1 placed reliance upon the Supreme Court authority of M. V. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1998 SC 602 =1998 SCFBRC 75. where it was held that it was essential to provide for periodical enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Acts. The Supreme Court has further held that frozen rents are giving rise to lawlessness and landlords out of frustration are approaching muscle man to get the premises vacated and Courts of law are becoming redundant in this sphere. Under U. P. Rent Control Act, there is no provision of enhancement of rent after October, 1972 (Except where landlord is public charitable or public religious institution (section 9-A) or Government is tenant (section 21 (8 ). In the aforesaid authority of. Khursheeda (supra), I have also placed reliance upon the authority of Supreme Court in "shangrila Food Products Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India", air 1996 SC 2410 =1996 SCFBRC 472, Paragraph 11. of which is quoted below: "it is well-settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire fats and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally execisable keeping in mind the principles of eq-uity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of their High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of their High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. " Thereafter in Para-8 of the aforesaid authority of Khursheedn (supra), I hold as under :-"rent Control Act confers a reasonable advantage upon the tenant of protection against arbitrary eviction. Tenant under the Rent Control Act cannot be evicted except on specific grounds like bonafide need of the landlord, arrears of rent, subletting and material alteration etc. This advantage is also coupled with the advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent. The latter advantage cannot be said to be either reasonable or equitable. The Supreme court in the aforesaid authority of S. F. P. v. L. J. C. AIR 1996 SC 2410 . has laid down that while granting relief to a party the Writ Court can very well ask the said party to shed the unfair advantage which it gained under the impugned order. By slightly extending the said doctrine it may safely be held that while granting the reasonable advantage to the tenant conferred upon him by the Rent Control Act the tenant may be asked to shed the unreasonable arbitrary advantage conferred upon him by the said Rent Control Act. The Writ Court therefore while granting or maintaining the relief against arbitrary ejectment to the tenant can very well ask the tenant to shed the unreasonable benefit of the Rent Control Act granted to him in the form of immunity against enhancement of rent, however, inadequate the rent might be. Tenant will have to shed the undue advantage of immunity from enhancement of rent under the Rent Control Act to barter his protection form arbitrary eviction provided for by the said Act. " ( 12 ) THEREAFTER in H. M. Kitchlu v. A. D. J. , 2004 (57) ALR 485. I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so Writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. I have held that the same principle of enhancement of rent to a reasonable extent may be made applicable while dismissing the writ petition of the landlord for the reason that by doing so Writ Court approves the protection of Rent Control Act granted to the tenant by the Courts below. ( 13 ) PROPERTY in dispute consists of two shops and open land behind the shops. It is situate in Sikandrabad District Bulandshahar which is close to Delhi. Existing rent of Rs, 50 per month is virtually as well as actually no rent. It is rather ridiculous. ( 14 ) ACCORDINGLY, it is directed that with effect from January 2008 onward tenant shall pay rent to the landlord at the rate of Rs. 1,800 per month inclusive of water tax etc. No further amount shall be payable by the tenant over and above Rs. 1,800 per month. Petition Allowed. .