JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sabhajeet Yadav, J.—By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 4.10.2007 passed by Revisional Authority/State Government contained in Annexure-1 of the writ petition seeking relief of writ of certiorari for quashing the said order and a further relief in the nature of mandamus has been sought for restraining the respondent No. 2 from making any further allocation of sugar cane to the respondent No. 3 on the basis of impugned order dated 4.10.2007. 2. The relief sought for in the writ petition rest on the assertion that petitioner and respondent No. 3 are companies incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 and they are running sugar mill units. The crushing capacity of respondent No. 3 in the crushing season 2005-06 was 4200 TCD and before start of crushing season 2006-07 it has expanded its crushing capacity to 7000 TCD. Cane Commissioner, U.P. in exercise of power under Section 12 of U.P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act 1953’) estimates the requirements of every sugar mill for the purpose of allocation of sugarcane for crushing. For the crushing season 2006-07, the requirement of respondent No. 3 was fixed by Cane Commissioner, U.P. as 81.72 lakhs quintals vide order dated 5.8.2006. In revision filed by respondent No. 3, against the aforesaid order the State Government has revised the requirement under Section 12(3) of the Act. It is stated that the requirement was fixed by the Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh treating the capacity of respondent No. 3 as 6000 TCD instead of 7000 TCD claimed by it. However, the requirement was enhanced by the revisional authority by treating its capacity as 7000 TCD. It is stated that the requirement was fixed by Revisional Authority on the basis of policy framed by the Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh for fixing the requirements. The policy for fixing the requirements was actually based on the capacity of 2005-06 season on the basis of maximum average per day crushing in a month + 80% of the increased capacity. On the basis of revised requirement, sugarcane was allocated to the respondent No. 3 in the last crushing season by Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh vide order dated 12.10.2006. 3. On the basis of revised requirement, sugarcane was allocated to the respondent No. 3 in the last crushing season by Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh vide order dated 12.10.2006. 3. It is further stated that for present crushing season the Cane Commissioner, U.P. has again fixed the requirement of sugar mills and for fixing the requirements, the Cane Commissioner has divided the sugar mills into five categories vide Circular dated 27.7.2007. A true copy of the said Circular dated 27.7.2007 is on record as Annexure-5 of the writ petition. In the first category those sugar mills were placed which had not done any expansion and their requirement is to be fixed on the basis of maximum average of per day crushing in a month during last crushing season multiplied by 180/160 days as the case may be. The crushing season for sugar mills of Western U.P. is 180 days whereas for Eastern U.P. is 160 days. It is stated that although the respondent No. 3 was a sugar mill of first category as it had not done any expansion during the last crushing season but it deliberately applied under category III for fixing its requirement which is the category for sugar mills which have done expansion after closure of mills during last crushing season i.e. 2006-2007. As per policy framed by the Government, inspection was done by a Committee constituted by Cane Commissioner for verifying the expansion and it submitted its report that no expansion has been done by the sugar mill of respondent No. 3 after crushing season 2006-07. It may be mentioned that for verifying expanded capacity the Cane Commissioner vide his order dated 26.7.2007 has also constituted a Committee. After having report of the said Committee, the requirement of respondent No. 3 has been fixed by the Cane Commissioner, U.P. vide order dated 24.9.2007 on the basis of maximum average of per day crushing in a month during last crushing season multiplied by 180 days which comes to 79.20 lakh quintals. A true copy of the said order dated 24.9.2007 passed by Cane Commissioner, U.P. is on record as Annexure-7 of the writ petition. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated 24.9.2007 passed by Cane Commissioner, U.P., respondent No. 3 filed revision before the State Government under Section 12 (3) of the Act 1953. A true copy of the said order dated 24.9.2007 passed by Cane Commissioner, U.P. is on record as Annexure-7 of the writ petition. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order dated 24.9.2007 passed by Cane Commissioner, U.P., respondent No. 3 filed revision before the State Government under Section 12 (3) of the Act 1953. During the pendency of revision on 1.10.2007 the petitioner moved an application for impleadment in the said revision as it was to be affected directly in case the revision is allowed. However, the said application has been rejected by the Revisional Authority vide its order dated 3.10.2007 holding that the petitioner was neither necessary party nor there is requirement under law to implead adjoining mill as necessary party. A true copy of the said order dated 3.10.2007 passed by Revisional Authority is on record as Annexure-10 of the writ petition. After rejecting the application for impleadment filed by the petitioner, Revisional Authority allowed the revision of respondent No. 3 vide its order dated 4.10.2007 contained in Annexure-1 of the writ petition fixing/revising its requirement from 79.20 Lakhs quintals to 115.92 lakhs quintals, hence this petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that from a perusal of impugned order dated 4.10.2007 it indicates that Revisional Authority has decided the revision on assumption that the respondent No. 3 has done its expansion from 4200 TCD to 7000 TCD and thereafter 80% of the enhanced capacity i.e. 2800 TCD has also been taken into consideration for fixing its requirement. The aforesaid approach of Revisional Authority is wholly illegal and contrary to the own admission of respondent No. 3 to the effect that whatever expansion that was done before the start of last crushing season and therefore, on the basis of this admission it was not covered under category III and its requirement was rightly fixed by Cane Commissioner treating it under category I. The Revisional Authority has also ignored the fact that in the last crushing season allocation of sugar cane was done to the respondent No. 3 on the basis of its revised capacity of 7000 TCD after order dated 4.9.2006 referred above and there was no occasion for reconsidering the said enhancement for determining the requirement for the present crushing season again treating the respondent No. 3 in category III. The report dated 29.6.2006 and inspection said to have been done by National Sugar Institute (NSI) on 13.7.2007 which has been taken into consideration by Revisional Authority for deciding the matter are wholly irrelevant in view of order passed by Revisional Authority in the last crushing season treating its capacity as 7000 TCD. The Revisional Authority has illegally revised the requirement of respondent No. 3 giving it benefit of expansion in the present crushing season though the same was done before start of last crushing season. Thus, the findings arrived at by Revisional Authority are totally perverse and contrary to the record, admitted facts as well as under own judgement and order passed in the revision in the last crushing season. Even otherwise the fixation of requirement by the Revisional Authority is wholly illegal as the same has been calculated on the basis of installed capacity of 4200 TCD+80% of enhanced capacity i.e. 2800 TCD. Though, according to policy framed by Cane Commissioner, U.P. for old capacity the maximum per day average of crushing in a month is to be considered and not installed capacity, therefore, the conclusion given by Revisional Authority on the face of it is absurd as the requirement of respondent No. 3 has rightly been fixed by the Cane Commissioner, U.P. on the basis of its maximum per day crushing in a month which is 4200 TCD which itself indicates that expansion was done before the start of last crushing season. 5. On the basis of assertions made in paragraph 29 and onward in the writ petition, learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri Raghavendra Singh has submitted that the reservation order on the basis of requirement fixed by Cane Commissioner, U.P. has already been issued on 3.10.2007 for the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3. A true copy of the reservation order dated 3.10.2007 issued with respect of the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 are on record as Annexures-11 and 12 respectively to the writ petition. The reserved area assigned for the petitioner’s Unit is just adjoining to the area of respondent No. 3. A true copy of the reservation order dated 3.10.2007 issued with respect of the petitioner as well as respondent No. 3 are on record as Annexures-11 and 12 respectively to the writ petition. The reserved area assigned for the petitioner’s Unit is just adjoining to the area of respondent No. 3. In fact, the Unit of respondent No. 3 was established in the reserved area of petitioner and its huge area has been given to the respondent No. 3 after its establishment and if any allocation of sugarcane is done to the respondent No. 3 on the basis of Revisional order/revised capacity, the petitioner’s area would necessarily be taken out and it would be directly affected. It is also submitted that allocation of sugarcane to the petitioner’s Unit has been done at drawl percentage of 80.68%, whereas it has been done to the respondent No. 3 on 63.71% of drawl. In case any further diversion of cane from petitioner’s area is done, its drawl percentage would further increase and it would be impossible for it to achieve the same and it would face heavy shortage of sugarcane in the present crushing season. 6. Learned Senior Counsel Sri S.P. Gupta assisted by Sri P. Bist appearing for caveator respondent No. 3 in the writ petition while raising preliminary objection about the maintainability of writ petition has contended that the writ petition can be dismissed in limine without going into merits merely on two counts. Firstly, it is premature and secondly, the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the order impugned in the writ petition. While substantiating his first ground of attack against maintainability of instant petition learned Senior Counsel Sri S.P. Gupta has argued that by the impugned order dated 4th October, 2007 passed in revision filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 12 (3) of the Act the requirement of sugar mill of respondent No. 3 for current crushing season has been increased/enhanced from 79.20 Lakhs quintals to 115.92 Lakhs quintals. After such determination of the requirement under Section 12 of the Act, the Cane Commissioner is required to reserve any area (hereinafter called as ‘reserved area’) and assign any area (hereinafter called as ‘assigned area’) under Section 15 (1) of the Act for the purpose of supply of cane to factory in accordance with the provisions of Section 16 during one or more crushing seasons as may be specified and may likewise at any time Cane Commissioner can cancel such order or alter boundaries of an area so reserved or assigned. The consequence of declaration of reserved area and assigned area are only this much that where any area has been declared as a reserved for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall, if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, purchase all cane grown in that area which is offered for sale to the factory and where an area has been declared as assigned area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall purchase such quantity of cane grown in that area which is offered for sale to the factory as may be determined by Cane Commissioner. However, at any time such order can be cancelled and modified by the Cane Commissioner whereby the boundaries of the reserved and assigned area can be altered and modified. Against such declaration of reserved area and assigned area made by the Cane Commissioner, the aggrieved person can also prefer an appeal to the State Government under sub-section (4) of Section 15 of the Act, therefore, the submission of learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 in nut-shell is that since the State Government has determined the requirement of respondent No. 3 under Section 12(3) of the Act for the purpose of Section 15 of the Act on the basis of which the proceeding before Cane Commissioner is going on under Section 15 of the Act, therefore, in case the petitioner would have any grievance against the order passed by Cane Commissioner under Section 15 (1) of the Act, it has remedy to file appeal under Section 15(4) of the Act before the State Government against such order to be passed by the Cane Commissioner under Section 15(1) of the Act on the basis of revised requirement fixed by the State Government in revision filed by the respondent No. 3 under Section 12(3) of the Act. Thus, at this stage the writ petition filed by the petitioner on the basis of speculation and apprehension that its reserved area is bound to be reduced on the basis of revised requirement fixed by the State Government in revision filed by the respondent No. 3 under Section 12(3) of the Act is misplaced and writ petition is liable to be dismissed as premature. 7. Sri S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that even on the basis of enhanced quantity of requirement fixed by the State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act in respect of sugar mill unit of respondent No. 3, the petitioner cannot be held to be aggrieved person, as on account of enhancement of requirement of respondent No. 3 under Section 12(3) by State Government, the petitioner has not been deprived of any legally protected right and has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest, therefore, the petitioner cannot approach this Court to seek writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In support of his submission learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 has placed reliance upon a decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, (1976) 1 SCC 671 : AIR 1976 SC 578 and a decision of Delhi High Court rendered in Simbhaoli Sugar Mills Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, A.I.R. 1993 Delhi 219 and a Division Bench decision of this Court rendered in M/s. Triveni Engineering Works Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1996 All 420. 8. While refuting the submission of Sri S.P. Gupta, learned senior Counsel for the respondent No. 3, Sri Raghavendra Singh learned Counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that on account of illegal estimation of requirement of sugar factory of respondent No. 3 by the State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act, it is petitioner which is to be affected in the allocation of sugarcane for current crushing season in respect of reservation and assignment area already allocated to it under Section 15(1) of the Act and it is petitioner’s sugar factory which would be seriously affected to its prejudice. Therefore, the contention of learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 that the petitioner is not aggrieved person and has no locus standi to file the instant writ petition inasmuch as writ petition is premature at this stage is wholly misplaced and has to be rejected. He has further submitted that it is, no doubt, true that petitioner can seek the remedy of appeal under Section 15(4) of the Act in respect of declaration of reserved and assigned area to its sugar factory and sugar factory of respondent No. 3 but once the requirement of sugar factory of respondent No. 3 is enhanced illegally and wrongfully for the current crushing season by the State Government under Section 12 (3) of the Act, the determination of requirement of sugar unit of respondent No. 3 cannot be called in question in appeal under Section 15(4) of the Act, as the same can be restricted to declaration in respect of reserved and assigned area only and it cannot be extended to illegal enhancement of requirement of respondent No. 3 fixed by the State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act, therefore, it cannot be said at all that the petitioner’s writ petition at this stage is premature and liable to be rejected on the aforesaid grounds. While substantiating his argument, learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out various discrepancies and irregularities committed by the State Government while estimating the requirement of sugar unit of respondent No. 3 inasmuch as learned Counsel for the petitioner has tried to distinguish the cases cited by learned Senior Counsel Sri S.P. Gupta on the ground that decisions cited by Sri S.P. Gupta are pertaining to establishment of New Sugar Mills or industrial establishments, and in respect of commercial and business competitions with the existing industrial establishments, whereas in case of petitioner, there is no such dispute and instead thereof it is case of illegal estimation of requirement of respondent No. 3 which would adversely affect the petitioner, therefore, the law laid down in aforesaid cases are clearly distinguishable on facts and do not lend any support to the case of respondent No. 3. In support of his contention he has also placed reliance upon decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and others, (2002) 1 SCC 33 and in Sai Chalchitra v. Commissioner, Meerut Mandal and others, (2005) 3 SCC 683 . 9. Having heard rival submissions of learned Counsel for the parties, before going into merit of the case, it would be appropriate to decide the preliminary objection raised by learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 3 Sri S.P. Gupta first. 10. In order to appreciate the controversy, it would be useful to extract the provisions of Sections 12, 15 and 16 of the Act inasmuch as Rules 21 to 23-A contained in Chapter VI of the U.P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 1954 Rules) as under : “12. Estimates of requirements.—(1) The Cane Commissioner may, for purposes of Section 15, by order, require the occupier of any factory to furnish in the manner and by the date specified in the order to the Cane Commissioner an estimate of the quantity of cane which will be required by the factory during such crushing season (or crushing seasons) as may be specified in the order. (2) The Cane Commissioner shall examine every such estimate and shall publish the same with such modification, if any, as he may make. (3) An estimate under sub-section (2) may be revised by an authority to be prescribed. 15. Declaration of reserved area and assigned area.—(1) Without prejudice to any order made under Clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 16 the Cane Commissioner may, after consulting the Factory and Cane-growers’ Cooperative Society in the manner to be prescribed : (a) reserve any area (hereinafter called the reserved area); and (b) assign any area (hereinafter called an assigned area), for the purpose of the supply of cane to a factory in accordance with the provisions of Section 16 during (one or more crushing seasons as may be specified) and may likewise at any time cancel such order or alter the boundaries of an area so reserved or assigned. (2) Where any area has been declared as reserved area for a factory the occupier of such factory shall, if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, purchase all the cane grown in that area, which is offered for sale to the factory. (2) Where any area has been declared as reserved area for a factory the occupier of such factory shall, if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, purchase all the cane grown in that area, which is offered for sale to the factory. (3) Where any area has been declared as assigned area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall purchase quantity of cane grown in that area and offered for sale to the factory as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner. (4) An appeal shall lie to the State Government against the order of the Cane Commissioner passed under sub-section (1). 16. Regulation of purchase and supply of cane in the reserved and assigned areas.—(1) The State Government may, for maintaining supplies, by order, regulate— (a) the distribution, sale or purchase of any cane in any reserved or assigned area; and (b) purchase of cane in any area other than a reserved or assigned area. 16. Regulation of purchase and supply of cane in the reserved and assigned areas.—(1) The State Government may, for maintaining supplies, by order, regulate— (a) the distribution, sale or purchase of any cane in any reserved or assigned area; and (b) purchase of cane in any area other than a reserved or assigned area. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers such order may provide for— (a) the quantity of cane to be supplied by each Cane-grower or Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society in such area to the factory for which the area has so been reserved or assigned; (b) the manner in which cane grown in the reserved area or the assigned area, shall be purchased by the factory for which the area has been so reserved or assigned and the circumstance in which the cane grown by a cane-grower shall not be purchased except through a Cane-growers’ Cooperative Society; (c) the form and the terms and conditions of the agreement to be executed by the occupier or manager of the factory for which an area is reserved or assigned for the purpose of cane offered for sale; (d) the circumstances under which permission may be granted— (i) for the purchase of cane grown in reserved or assigned area by a [Gur, Rab or Khandsari Manufacturing Unit or any person or factory] other than the factory for which area has been reserved or assigned; (ii) for the sale of cane grown in a reserved or assigned area to a [Gur, Rab or Khandsari Manufacturing Unit or any person or factory] other than the factory for which area has been reserved or assigned; (e) such incidental and consequential matters as may appear to be necessary or desirable for this purpose.” Chapter VI Reservation and Assignment of Area 21. (1) The occupier of a factory shall by August 31, each year apply to the Cane Commissioner, in Form 1, Appendix HI for the reservation or assignment of an area for supply of cane to the factory during the ensuing crushing season. (2) The Cane Commissioner may, for any special reason, entertain an application for reservation or assignment of an area, made after the commencement of a crushing season. (3) Every such application shall be accompanied by a Treasury receipt showing that a fee of rupees two has been deposited in the local treasury. 22. (2) The Cane Commissioner may, for any special reason, entertain an application for reservation or assignment of an area, made after the commencement of a crushing season. (3) Every such application shall be accompanied by a Treasury receipt showing that a fee of rupees two has been deposited in the local treasury. 22. In reserving an area for or assigning an area to a factory or determining the quantity of cane to be purchased from an area by a factory, under Section 15, the Cane Commissioner may take into consideration— (a) the distance of the area from the factory, (b) facilities for transport of cane from the area, (c) the quantity of cane supplied from the area to the factory in previous year, (d) previous reservation and assignment orders, (e) the quantity of cane to be crushed in factory, (f) the arrangement made by the factory in previous years for payment of cess, cane price and commission, (g) the views of the Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society of the area, (h) efforts made by the factory in developing the reserved or assigned area. 23. Appeal against an order of the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 shall be to the State Government within 14 days of the publication of the order at the office of the Collector : provided that the State Government may, for any special reason, entertain an appeal made after the expiry of the above period; The appeal made under this rule shall be submitted to the State Government in triplicate. 23-A. The State Government shall be the authority empowered to revise the estimates under Section 12(3) and an application for revision of estimates published by the Cane Commissioner under Section 12 (2) shall be made to the State Government within fourteen days from the publication of the estimates.” 11. At this juncture it would be useful to examine the case laws cited by learned Senior Counsel Sri S.P. Gupta, in support of his contention and some other case laws having material bearing with the question in issue. In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702 , the question whether the Bar Council of State was a ‘person aggrieved’ to maintain an appeal under Section 38 of Advocate Act, 1961, was under consideration before a Seven Judges Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court which was answered in affirmative. In Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar, (1975) 2 SCC 702 , the question whether the Bar Council of State was a ‘person aggrieved’ to maintain an appeal under Section 38 of Advocate Act, 1961, was under consideration before a Seven Judges Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court which was answered in affirmative. In the aforesaid case the observations made by Hon’ble A.N. Ray C.J.I. (as he then was) on question in issue as to how the expression ‘person aggrieved’ is to be interpreted in context of a statute in paras 28, 30, 31 and 32 of the decision are quoted as under : “28. Where a right of appeal to Courts against an administrative or judicial decision is created by statute, the right is invariably confined to a person aggrieved or a person who claims to be aggrieved. The meaning of the words “a person aggrieved” may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that a person will be held to be aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, one is required to establish that one has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make one “a person aggrieved”. Again a person is aggrieved if a legal burden is imposed on him. The meaning of the words “a person aggrieved” is sometimes given a restricted meaning in certain statutes which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of legal rights. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with property rights but deal with professional conduct and morality. The role of the Bar Council under the Advocates’ Act is comparable to the role of a guardian in professional ethics. The words “person aggrieved” in Sections 37 and 38 of the Act are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restricted interpretation of possession or denial of legal rights or burdens or financial interests. The test is whether the words “person aggrieved” include “a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.” It has, therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional conduct and etiquette. 30. The test is whether the words “person aggrieved” include “a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.” It has, therefore, to be found out whether the Bar Council has a grievance in respect of an order or decision affecting the professional conduct and etiquette. 30. The interest of the Bar Council is to uphold standards of professional conduct and etiquette in the profession, which is founded upon integrity and mutual trust. The Bar Council acts as the custodian of the high traditions of the noble profession. The grievance of the Bar Council is to be looked at purely from the point of view of standards of professional conduct and etiquette. If any decision of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India is according to the State Bar Council such as will lower the standards and imperil the high traditions and values in the profession, the State Bar Council is an aggrieved person to safeguard the interests of the public, the interests of the profession and the interests of the Bar. 31. The Bar Council is “a person aggrieved” for these reasons. First, the words “person aggrieved” in the Act are of wide import in the context of the purpose and provisions of the statute. In disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary committee there is no lis and there are no parties. Therefore, the word “person” will embrace the Bar Council which represents the Bar of the State. Second, the Bar Council is “a person aggrieved” because it represents the collective conscience of the standards of professional conduct and etiquette. The Bar Council acts as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession. Third, the function of the Bar Council in entertaining complaints against advocates is when the Bar Council has reasonable belief that there is a prima facie case of misconduct that a disciplinary committee is entrusted with such inquiry. Once an inquiry starts, the Bar Council has no control over its decision. The Bar Council may entrust it to another disciplinary committee or the Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India. This indicates that the Bar Council is all the time interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline, dignity and decorum of the profession. The Bar Council may entrust it to another disciplinary committee or the Bar Council may make a report to the Bar Council of India. This indicates that the Bar Council is all the time interested in the proceedings for the vindication of discipline, dignity and decorum of the profession. Fourth, a decision of a disciplinary committee can only be corrected by appeal as provided under the Act. When the Bar Council initiates proceedings by referring cases of misconduct to disciplinary committee, the Bar Council in the performance of its functions under the Act is interested in the task of seeing that the advocates maintain the proper standards and etiquette of the profession. Fifth, the Bar Council is vitally concerned with the decision in the context of the functions of the Bar Council. The Bar Council will have a grievance if the decision prejudices the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics. 32. For these reasons we hold that the Bar Council is an aggrieved person to maintain an appeal under the Act.” 12. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai’s case (supra) the question in controversy was that whether proprietor of a Cinema Theatre holding a licence for exhibiting cinematography films is entitled to invoke certiorari jurisdiction against no objection certificate granted under Rule 6 of Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 by District Magistrate in favour of rival in the trade brought up before Hon’ble Apex Court? The facts in brief of the aforesaid case was that respondents No. 1 and 2 were owner of a site in town of Mohamadabad. They made an application to the District Magistrate for grant of certificate that there was no objection to the location of cinema theatre at this site. The District Magistrate after taking necessary steps in this regard and considering objections raised against such application by other persons of locality has recommended that no objection certificate should be refused to the respondents. However appellant did not raise any objection before District Magistrate in this regard. The State Government did not agree with the recommendation of District Magistrate and directed the letter to grant the certificate, accordingly, the District Magistrate granted no objection certificate on November 27, 1970 to the respondents No. 1 and 2. However appellant did not raise any objection before District Magistrate in this regard. The State Government did not agree with the recommendation of District Magistrate and directed the letter to grant the certificate, accordingly, the District Magistrate granted no objection certificate on November 27, 1970 to the respondents No. 1 and 2. Appellant filed writ petition in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and main grounds of the challenge were that the impugned certificate has been issued by District Magistrate not in exercise of his own discretion with due regard to the principles indicated in Bombay Cinematography Act, 1918 and Rules but mechanically at the dictates of the State Government. The Government had no power to grant or refuse no objection certificate. Such power belonged to the District Magistrate who was the Licensing Authority and had to be exercised by him objectively in a quasi judicial manner in accordance with statutory principles. Since, it was not so exercised, the grant of certificate in question suffers from lack of jurisdiction. The High Court, however, dismissed the writ petition on the ground that no right vested in the appellant had been infringed or prejudiced or adversely affected as direct consequence of the order impugned by him and as such he was not an aggrieved person having a locus standi in the matter. 13. In para 34, 35, 36 and 39 of the said decision Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the law on question in issue in quite details as under : “34. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter. (see State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 ; Calcutta Gax Co. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter. (see State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 ; Calcutta Gax Co. v. State of W.B., AIR 1962 SC 1044 ; Ram Umeshwari Suthoo v. Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa, (1967) 1 SCA 413; Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of A. P., AIR 1966 SC 828 ; State of Orissa v. Rajasaheb Chandanmall; Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. M/s. S. Lal & Co., (1973) 2 SCC 696 ). 35. The expression “ordinarily” indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it. 36. In the United States of America, also the law on the point is substantially the same. No matter how seriously infringement of the Constitution may be called into question, said Justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. Miller, (1939) 307 US 433: "....this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those who have some specialised interest of their own to vindicate apart from a political concern which belongs to all. To have a “standing to sue”, which means locus standi to ask for relief in a Court independently of a statutory remedy, the plaintiff must show that he is injured, that is, subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. Courts can intervene only where legal rights are invaded. “Legal wrong” requires a judicially enforceable right and the touchstone to judiciability is injury to a legally protected right. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse effect on the interest or right of a person has been held to be insufficient to give him the “standing to sue” for judicial review of administrative action. Again the “adverse affect” requisite for “standing to sue” must be an “illegal effect”. A nominal or a highly speculative adverse effect on the interest or right of a person has been held to be insufficient to give him the “standing to sue” for judicial review of administrative action. Again the “adverse affect” requisite for “standing to sue” must be an “illegal effect”. Thus, in the undermentioned cases, it was held that injury resulting from lawful competition not being a legal wrong, cannot furnish a “standing to sue” for judicial relief." 39. To distinguish such applicants from ‘strangers’, among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are : whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words “person aggrieved” is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?" 14. While applying the law enunciated hereinbefore, in given facts and circumstances of the aforesaid case in paras 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 51 and 52 of the decision the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “40. Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. While applying the law enunciated hereinbefore, in given facts and circumstances of the aforesaid case in paras 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 51 and 52 of the decision the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under : “40. Now let us apply these tests to the case in hand. The Act and the Rules with which we are concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for the community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular business on his propriety. In this context, the expression “person aggrieved” must receive a strict construction. 41. Did the appellant have a legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law which has been subjected to or threatened with injury? The answer in the circumstances of the case must necessarily be in the negative. 42. The Act and the Rules do not confer any substantive justiciable right on a rival in cinema trade, apart from the option, in common with the rest of the public, to lodge an objection in response to the notice published under Rule 4. The appellant did not avail of this option. He did not lodge any objection in response to the notice, the due publication of which was not denied. No explanation has been given as to why he did not prefer any objection to the grant of the no-objection certificate before the District Magistrate or the Government. Even if he had objected before the District Magistrate, and failed, the Act would not given him a right of appeal. Section 8A of the Act confers a right of appeal to the State Government, only on any person aggrieved by an order of a licensing authority refusing to grant a license, or revoking or suspending any licence under Section 8. Obviously, the appellant was not a “person aggrieved” within the contemplation of Section 8A. 43. Section 8B of the Act provides that the State Government may either of its own motion, or upon an application made by “an aggrieved person”, call for and examine the record of any order made by a licensing authority under this Act, and pass such order thereon as it thinks just and proper. 43. Section 8B of the Act provides that the State Government may either of its own motion, or upon an application made by “an aggrieved person”, call for and examine the record of any order made by a licensing authority under this Act, and pass such order thereon as it thinks just and proper. Assuming that the scope of the words “aggrieved person” in Section 8B is wider than the ambit of the same words as used in Section 8A, then also, the appellant cannot, in the circumstances of this case, be regarded as a “person aggrieved” having the requisite legal capacity to invoke certiorari jurisdiction. 47. Thus, in substance, the appellant’s stand is that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large. 48. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a ‘person aggrieved’ and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the no-objection certificate. 51. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a ‘person aggrieved’ and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the no-objection certificate. 51. The instant case falls well-nigh within the ratio of this Court’s decision in Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T. Gowda, (1970) 3 SCR 846 : (1970) 1 SCC 575 , wherein it was held that a rice mill owner has no locus standi to challenge under Article 226, the setting up of a new rice mill by another—even if such setting up be in contravention of Section 8(3)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958—because no right vested in such, an applicant is infringed. 52. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the appellant had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we answer the question posed at the commencement of this judgment, in the negative, and on that ground, without entering upon the merits of the case, dismiss this appeal with costs.” 15. The aforesaid decision has been followed in subsequent decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India and others, AIR 1992 SC 443 , wherein the petitioners were existing operators holding stage carriage permit under the scheme of old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and have challenged the procedure for grant of permit under Liberalised scheme under new Act. The challenge against the liberalised scheme for grant of stage carriage permit under the new Act was on the ground of violation of Article 19 Clause (1) (g) and (14) of the Constitution was based on the allegation that the right of existing operators to file objection and provisions to impose limit on the number of the permits have been taken away under the new Act. While placing reliance upon earlier decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai’s case (supra) in para 9 of the decision Hon’ble Apex Court has held that we, therefore, see no justification for the petitioners to complaint against the liberalised policy for grant of permit under the Act. 16. In Simbhaoli Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra) a challenge was made to the letter of intent granted by Union of India to one Mr. 16. In Simbhaoli Sugar Mills Ltd. case (supra) a challenge was made to the letter of intent granted by Union of India to one Mr. K.K. Baijoria respondent No. 5 in the said writ petition for the purpose of establishing a new sugar factory at a place called Agauta District Bulandshahr, U.P. with crushing capacity of 25,000 tones crushing per day (T.C.D.) on the ground that petitioner is a registered company under the Companies Act having a sugar factory at Simbhaoli, District Ghaziabad U.P.. Prior to 1982 the licence of crushing capacity of petitioner’s factory was 2000 TCD. In the year 1982 his crushing capacity was raised to 2750 TCD. On 29th December, 1989 the Government of India granted licence to the petitioner for extension of its crushing capacity from 2750 TCD to 5000 TCD. The petitioner had filed an application for further extension of its crushing capacity from 5000 TCD to 10,000 TCD and this application was pending for consideration with the Government of India. On 5th April, 1990 respondent No. 5 of the aforesaid writ petition applied for grant of licence for installing the sugar factory with a crushing capacity of 4500 TCD at a place called Agauta district Bulandshahr. After processing of aforesaid application of respondent No. 5 of the aforesaid case the Government of India, Ministry of Industry vide letter dated 7th August, 1990 granted an industrial licence to the respondent No. 5 for establishment of a sugar factory at Agauta district Bulandshahr for crushing capacity of 2500 TCD. The aforesaid grant of licence has been challenged by the petitioner in the aforesaid writ petition. 17. While dealing with almost similar question involved in the aforesaid case a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in paras 14, 15, 16 and 39 of the decision has held as under : “14. The submission made by Mr. Desai appears to have force. In the present case the impugned press note dated 23rd July, 1990 like the earlier press notes on the subject contained guidelines for licensing of new and expansion of existing sugar factories and is purely a policy matter of the Government before issuance of which no existing factory owner is entitled to any hearing. This press note will have to be read along with the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder. This press note will have to be read along with the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder. Further the letter of intent issued in favour of respondent No. 5 does not contravene any provision of the Act or Rules framed thereunder or any guidelines mentioned in the press note. The apprehension of the petitioner that 13 of the purchasing centres of the reserved area of the petitioner shall be affected by grant of the letter of intent in favour of respondent No. 5 is also premature. The letter of intent nowhere mentions that by grant of this licence respondent No. 5 will be entitled to purchase sugar cane from those 13 purchasing centres belonging to the reserved area of the petitioner. The petitioner will, however, be entitled to hearing only before the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as U.P. Act of 1953) when respondent No. 5 claims his right to purchase sugarcane from those centres. It will be relevant to point out here that the party aggrieved by the decision of the Cane Commissioner has also a right to appeal to the State Government under Section 15 of the said Act. The interest of the petitioner, if at all, is of commercial nature to ensure that other persons are not granted any licence for establishment of a new sugar factory in the vicinity of the sugar mill of the petitioner. In fact the petitioner has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. 15. The present case is covered on all fours by the ratio of a Supreme Court decision in Nagar Rice & Flour Mills v. T.N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros., AIR 1971 SC 246 wherein it was held that rice mill owner has no locus standi to challenge under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India the setting up of a new rice mill by another even if such setting up be in contravention of Section 8(iii)(c) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958ùbecause no right vested in such an applicant is infringed. It may be pointed out here that the aforesaid decision has been followed recently by the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, (1992)1 SCC 168 : AIR 1992 SC 443 . 16. It may be pointed out here that the aforesaid decision has been followed recently by the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India, (1992)1 SCC 168 : AIR 1992 SC 443 . 16. For the aforesaid reasons we are of the opinion that the petitioner has not locus standi to invoke the special jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, we hold that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this short ground. 39. ..... These interveners, like the petitioner, will be entitled to hearing only before the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 of the U.P. Act of 1953 as and when respondent No. 5 claims any right to purchase sugarcane from any of the purchasing centres belonging to the interveners. The party aggrieved of the decision of the Cane Commissioner has also a right to appeal to the State Government under Section 15(4) of the said Act.” 18. Similar question has again been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Triveni Engineering Works Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1996 All 424, wherein the existing sugar mills had filed writ petition against the grant of letter of intent to different industrial undertaking for setting up new sugar mills at different places in State of Uttar Pradesh. In para 13 of the said decision the main contention against the grant of new licence for establishment of new sugar factory was that the new unit would pounce upon the reserved area of Khatauli Sugar Factory and would thereby adversely affect their production and in para 15 of the decision in respect of another writ petition it was contended that if such new factory is allowed to be set up at the chosen site, the supply of sugar cane to the existing factory of petitioners would be seriously affected to prejudice of petitioners. 19. In para 34 and 35 of the said decision while dealing with the provisions of Section 15 of the Act, a Division Bench of this Court has been pleased to observed as under : "34. The word “reserved area” also occur in the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 and Section 15 thereof has been quoted in toto in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment. The word “reserved area” also occur in the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 and Section 15 thereof has been quoted in toto in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment. This reserved area is to be declared by the Cane Commissioner for the purpose of supply of cane to a factory during one or more crushing seasons. The Cane Commissioner has also been given the right to cancel the order declaring the reserved area or to alter the boundaries thereof at any time. Once an area is declared reserved area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall, if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, purchase of the cane grown in that area which is offered for sale to the factory. Section 15 indicates that when the Cane Commissioner exercises his power under sub-section (1), that is, when he makes an order declaring any reserved area, an appeal would lie to the State Government against such order of the Cane Commissioner. 35. The above provisions would indicate that a reserved area is not anything in the nature of a permanent lease or permanent arrangement of any type for any sugar mill. The purpose of declaring a reserved area is only to see that the sugarcane produced by the cane growers is not wasted and a factory may be asked by the Cane Commissioner to purchase all the sugarcane that is offered for sale in the factory. The law is clear on the point that the Cane Commissioner retains the authority to change the boundaries of a reserved area or even to cancel the declaration of any area as a reserved area for a factory. The only purpose of this last mentioned power of the Cane Commissioner is, as appears to us, the proper consumption of the sugarcane produced in an area. The only purpose of this last mentioned power of the Cane Commissioner is, as appears to us, the proper consumption of the sugarcane produced in an area. In any view of the matter, if an area is once declared as a reserved area and, subsequently, is cancelled or modified, the order of the Cane Commissioner has been made appealable to the State Government and the mere apprehension that an establishment of a new factory may curtail the reserved area of a particular mill, may not give rise to any legal right to the existing sugar mills for moving a writ petition as it would always be open for the mill in case of any change in reserved area to file an appeal before the State Government. In this view also, the writ petitions are premature on the ground of apprehended change in the reserved area of the particular sugar mills.” 20. From a close analysis of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in cases referred hereinbefore, it would be seen that in the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra (supra) Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the meaning of words ‘a person aggrieved’ or a person who claims to be aggrieved may vary according to the context of the statute. One of the meanings is that person will be held aggrieved by a decision if that decision is materially adverse to him. Normally, he is required to establish that he has been denied or deprived of something to which one is legally entitled in order to make a person aggrieved. Again a person is aggrieved if legal burden is imposed on him. It was further observed that the meaning of words ‘a person aggrieved is sometime given a restricted meaning in certain statute which provide remedies for the protection of private legal rights. The restricted meaning requires denial or deprivation of a legal right. A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with the property rights, but deal with professional conduct and morality. Aforesaid Seven Judges Constitution Bench decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court has been noticed in para 28 of the decision rendered subsequently in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai’s case (supra). A more liberal approach is required in the background of statutes which do not deal with the property rights, but deal with professional conduct and morality. Aforesaid Seven Judges Constitution Bench decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court has been noticed in para 28 of the decision rendered subsequently in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai’s case (supra). After referring several other decisions of Hon’ble Apex Court in para 34 of the decision, in para 39 the Hon’ble Apex Court has laid down various test for determination of aggrieved person, thereafter applied the aforesaid test in context of statute concerned, which was under consideration in the aforesaid case. In para 47 of the said decision, it was held that setting up of rival cinema house in town, though adversely affected the monopolistic commercial interest of the appellant causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition, but such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law because it does not result any injury to a legal right or legally protected interest. The business competition is lawful activity, juridically harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria. The term injuria was used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The harm of this description caused by a person upon another does not hold him accountable to such harm. In the aforesaid case reliance was also placed upon earlier decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Nagar Rice and Flour Mill’s case (supra). The view taken in Jaisbhai Motibhai’s case has also been reiterated in Mithilesh Garg’s case. 21. In view of aforesaid settled legal position, now it has to be examined that in present statutory backdrop of the case, as to whether the petitioner can be held to be an aggrieved person and order dated 4.10.2007 passed by Rivisional Authority/State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act can be challenged at the instance of the petitioner seeking relief of certiorari for quashing the said order? 22. In this connection, it is necessary to point out that before applying the aforesaid test laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in context of the statute in question with which I am concerned, it is necessary to examine true content and import thereof. 22. In this connection, it is necessary to point out that before applying the aforesaid test laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in context of the statute in question with which I am concerned, it is necessary to examine true content and import thereof. Under Section 12 of the Act, the Cane Commissioner for the purpose of Section 15 of the Act, by order, require the occupier of any factory to furnish an estimate of quantity of cane which will be required by the factory during such crushing seasons as may be specified in the said order. Thereafter, he is required to examine every such estimate and shall publish the same with such modification, if any, as he may make. Under sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act an estimate under sub-section (2) may be revised by an authority to be prescribed. Under Rule 23-A of 1954 Rules the State Government has been prescribed as an authority empowered to revise the estimates under Section 12(3) of the Act and an application for revision of estimates published by Cane Commissioner under Section 12(2) shall be made to the State Government within 14 days from the publication of estimates. From a joint reading of provisions of Section 12 of the Act and Rule 23-A of the 1954 Rules, there is nothing to indicate that at whose instance the order of Cane Commissioner published under Section 12(2) of the Act, shall be revised by the State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act? Similarly, there is nothing to indicate that as to whether any adjoining sugar factory has any right to file objection against estimate of requirement of another sugar factory and has any right of hearing in respect of such requirement estimated by the Cane Commissioner? Similarly, there is nothing to indicate that as to whether any adjoining sugar factory has any right to file objection against estimate of requirement of another sugar factory and has any right of hearing in respect of such requirement estimated by the Cane Commissioner? In this connection, it is necessary to point out that since there is no express provision in the statute to the effect that at whose instance such revision shall lie to the State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act read with Rule 23A of 1954 Rules against the publication of estimate of requirement made by the Cane Commissioner, therefore, the same can be ascertained by necessary implication of scheme of statute concerned and while doing so, I find that except occupier of a factory whose requirement has been modified by the Cane Commissioner under Section 12(2) of the Act, no other person can file revision before the State Government under Section 12(3) read with Rule 23A of 1954 Rules. 23. In my opinion, occupier of any adjoining sugar factory cannot file any objection against requirement of another factory under the scheme of the Act and rules framed thereunder, likewise cannot file revision against the publication made by Cane Commissioner under Section 12(2), that is why it appears that application for impleadment moved by the petitioner in revision filed by respondent No. 3 has been rejected by the State Government and in my opinion rightly so. It is also because of simple reason that on account of such enhancement of estimate of requirement of respondent No. 3, petitioner’s requirement has neither been reduced nor his any legally protected right has been infringed nor any injury has been caused to his legally protected interest. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the petitioner cannot be held to be aggrieved person so as to have locus standi to challenge the impugned order passed by State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act in revision filed by the respondent No. 3 under the aforesaid provisions of the Act. 24. Now looking to the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of the Act and Rules 22 and 23 of the 1954 Rules, it appears that they are enacted to regulate the supply, distribution, sale or purchase of Cane to factory in any reserved or assigned area and purchase of cane in any area other than reserved or assigned area. 24. Now looking to the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of the Act and Rules 22 and 23 of the 1954 Rules, it appears that they are enacted to regulate the supply, distribution, sale or purchase of Cane to factory in any reserved or assigned area and purchase of cane in any area other than reserved or assigned area. Section 15 (1) stipulates that without prejudice to any order made under clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 16, the Cane Commissioner may after consulting the factory and cane growers’ Co-operative Society reserve and assign any area for the purpose of supply of cane to a factory in accordance with the provisions of Section 16 during one or more crushing season as may be specified and may likewise at any time cancel such order or alter the boundaries of an area so reserved or assigned. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 15 provide consequences ensuing from such reservation and assignment of such areas, which postulate that where an area has been declared as reserved area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall, if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, purchase all cane grown in that area which is offered for sale to the factory. And where an area has been declared assigned area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall purchase such quantity of cane grown in that area which is offered for sale to the factory, as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner. Sub-section (4) of Section 15 provides for appeal against order of Cane Commissioner made under sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act. Such appeal shall lie to the State Government under Rule 23 of 1954 Rules. 25. While reserving an area or assigning an area to a factory for determining the quantity of cane to be purchased from an area by a factory under Section 15 of the Act, under Rule 22 of 1954 Rules, the Cane Commissioner is required to take into consideration, inter alia, quantity of cane to be crushed in factory; efforts made by factory in developing the reserved or assigned area and the views of cane growers’ Co-operative Society. Under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 15 of the Act the occupier of a factory is under statutory duty to purchase all the cane grown in reserved area, if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, which is offered for sale to the factory and shall purchase such quantity of cane grown in the assigned area which is offered for sale to the factory as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner. Therefore, in my opinion, the provisions of Section 15 (2) and (3) of the Act do not confer any right or privilege upon the occupier of the factory, rather they cast aforesaid duties upon the occupier of a sugar factory and are meant to ensure that the cane grown in the reserved area and assigned area is not wasted. The reserved and assigned area to a sugar factory are also not like a lease or licence granted to such sugar factory, the same can be cancelled by Cane Commissioner at any time and its boundaries can be altered or modified by him or superior authority in appeal under Section 15(4) of the Act. 26. Besides, there is nothing to indicate from the pleadings of the writ petition that the petitioner has made any effort in developing the reserved area and assigned area to its sugar factory. It is also not in dispute that petitioner has no grievance against estimated requirement made by the Cane Commissioner or revisional authority so far as its sugar factory is concerned. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioner could not have any legitimate grievance against the increase of requirement of respondent No. 3 in revision filed by it under Section 12(3) of the Act as merely due to such increase of requirement of respondent No. 3, the petitioner’s requirement has not been reduced or decreased. At the most, in case the petitioner would have any grievance in respect of anticipated alteration and modification in reserved area and assigned area on account of enhancement of requirement of respondent No. 3, it has a remedy of appeal under Section 15 (4) of the Act but at this stage merely on account of enhancement of estimate of requirement of respondent No. 3, the petitioner can have no legitimate grievance against it, therefore, in my considered opinion, the writ petition would be premature. 27. 27. Now viewing the matter from another angle and applying the aforesaid tests in context of the statute in question, it would be seen that the Act and Rules with which I am concerned, are not designed to set norms of moral or professional conduct for community at large or even a section thereof. They only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular business on his property. In this context, the expression “person aggrieved” must receive a restricted construction. Now further question arises for consideration as to whether the petitioner has any legal right under statutory provisions or under the general law which has been subjected to or threatened with injury? In this connection, it is necessary to point that Act and Rules do not confer any substantive and justiciable rights on a rival occupier of sugar factory to lodge any objection against the estimate of requirement of quantity of cane furnished by another occupier of any factory before Cane Commissioner under Section 12(1) of the Act. Contrary to it, individual occupier of a sugar factory is required to furnish to the Cane Commissioner an estimate of requirement of quantity of cane which will be required by factory during such crushing seasons as may be specified in the order of Cane Commissioner. Thereupon the Cane Commissioner is required to examine every such estimate and publish the same with such modifications, if any, as he may make under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act. Besides aforesaid provisions under the Act, in respect of estimation of quantity of requirement of cane for a crushing season to sugar factory, there appears nothing about the same under the 1954 Rules. It is no doubt true that under sub-section (3) of Section 12 of the Act, Revisional Authority i.e. State Government under Rule 23A of 1954 Rules, is empowered to revise the estimate made under Section 12(2) of the Act, but there is nothing to indicate at whose instance? 28. Although the phraseology used under Section 12(3) and Section 15(4) of the Act are of different nature but it implies that only aggrieved person having regard of the scheme of the aforesaid sections can file revision under Section 12(3) of the Act, inasmuch as appeal under Section 15(4) of the Act. 28. Although the phraseology used under Section 12(3) and Section 15(4) of the Act are of different nature but it implies that only aggrieved person having regard of the scheme of the aforesaid sections can file revision under Section 12(3) of the Act, inasmuch as appeal under Section 15(4) of the Act. From perusal of sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act, it appears that after examining every such estimate of quantity of cane which will be required by a factory during such crushing season, the Cane Commissioner is required to publish the same with such modification, if any, as he may make, therefore, it implies that if Cane Commissioner has modified the estimate of quantity of cane required by the factory submitted to him on publication of such estimate, no other person except to the occupier of a factory, whose estimate has been modified by the Cane Commissioner, can file revision before the Revisional Authority i.e. State Government and no other person. Therefore, on this count also it was not open to the petitioner either to raise any objection before the Cane Commissioner with regard to the requirement of cane furnished by respondent No. 3 nor he has any locus standi to be impleaded as necessary party in the revision filed by respondent No. 3 against the requirement estimated by the Cane Commissioner and in my opinion, the impleadment of petitioner has rightly been rejected during the pendency of aforesaid revision filed by the respondent No. 3 before the State Government and accordingly the petitioner cannot be held to be aggrieved person to have any locus standi to challenge the impugned order passed by Revisional Authority under Section 12(3) of the Act. 29. Further in view of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra (supra), Jaisbhai Motibhai Desai (supra), Mithilesh Garg and Nagar Rice and Flour Mill’s case (supra), I am of the considered opinion that in any view of the matter on account of increase in estimate of requirement of respondent No. 3, if at all any harm or loss would be caused to the petitioner in its commercial or business activity, such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law because it does not result in injury to a legal right or legally protected interest. The business competition being a lawful activity causing any harm to the petitioner can be called as damnum sine injuria, without holding accountable to the person causing such harm. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held to be aggrieved person so as to entitle it to approach this Court seeking relief of certiorari against the impugned order, accordingly has no locus standi to file instant writ petition challenging the impugned order passed by the State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act. 30. Now, it is necessary to examine the cases cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner. In Ghulam Qadir’s case (supra) the observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in para 38 of the decision appears to have been applied in context of the facts stated in para 39 and 40 of the decision. The aforesaid observations are extracted as under : “38. There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in our country and the constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical grounds. If a person approaching the Court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to adversely affect his right which is shown to be having source in some statutory provision, the petition filed by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of his not having the locus standi. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi. 39. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi. 39. The allottee of a property, under the Act, cannot be held to be having no right enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The scheme of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, as noticed hereinabove, would establish that an allottee of an evacuee property in the State of Jammu & Kashmir is a quasi-permanent allottee who cannot be evicted from the premises unless the conditions specified under the Act and the Rules are shown in existence and has a legal right to remain in possession unless evicted by the Custodian under the law. Any action initiated by a person other than the Custodian would give such allottee a legal right to defend his possession as an allottee by opposing the claim of the person intending to dispossess him by obtaining orders under the Act which are likely to adversely affect his possessory interests in the said property. Such allottees of the property in the State of Jammu & Kashmir have acquired quasi-permanent rights and are entitled to protection of the constituted authorities and the Courts. Even though such an allottee does not have a right to the evacuee property as contemplated under Article 31 of the Constitution, yet it cannot be disputed that he has a legal right to remain in possession under the Act. 40. .......Even despite the existence of any of the grounds justifying the eviction, the allottee has a right to be served with a notice for a period of not less than six months and afforded reasonable opportunity to show cause. The allottee of an evacuee property, therefore, cannot be equated with a contractual lessee. Having acquired statutory rights, the allottee of the evacuee property cannot be said to be a stranger having no locus standi to challenge an order which, if not prevented, is sure to affect his quasi-permanent rights...........” 31. The allottee of an evacuee property, therefore, cannot be equated with a contractual lessee. Having acquired statutory rights, the allottee of the evacuee property cannot be said to be a stranger having no locus standi to challenge an order which, if not prevented, is sure to affect his quasi-permanent rights...........” 31. Now from a close analysis of decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Ghulam Quadir’s case (supra) it appears that in para 39 of the decision the Hon’ble Apex Court has clearly held that allottee of a property under the Act under consideration before Hon’ble Apex Court cannot be held to be having no right enforceable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The scheme of the Act and rules made thereunder would establish that allottee of a evacuee property in the State of Jammu & Kashmir is quasi permanent allottee who cannot be evicted from the premises unless the conditions specified under the Act and Rules are shown in existence and has legal right to remain in possession unless evicted by custodian under the Act. Any action initiated by a person other than custodian would give such allottee a legal right to defend his possession as an allottee by opposing the claim of person intending to dispossess him by obtaining orders under the Act which are likely to adversely affect his possessory interest in the said property. In para 40 of the said decision, the Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed that even despite the existence of any ground justifying the eviction, the allottee has a right to be served with notice for a period not less than six months and afforded reasonable opportunity to show cause. It was further observed that allottee of evacuee property, therefore, cannot be equated with contractual lessee. Having acquired statutory rights the allottee of evacuee property cannot be said to be a stranger having no locus standi to challenge an order which if not prevented is sure to affect his quasi permanent right. Therefore, in my opinion, the observation made by Hon’ble Apex Court in para 38 of the aforesaid decision has to be understood in context of further observation made in para 39 and 40 of the said decision as referred above. Therefore, in my opinion, the observation made by Hon’ble Apex Court in para 38 of the aforesaid decision has to be understood in context of further observation made in para 39 and 40 of the said decision as referred above. The aforesaid decision of Hon’ble Apex Court is clearly distinguishable on the facts of the case in context of statutory scheme under consideration in the case in question and in my opinion, cannot lend any support to the case of the petitioner. 32. In Sai Chalchitra’s case (supra) the appellant was running a Cinema Hall. He filed a writ petition before the High Court challenging the order passed by Commissioner wherein the Commissioner had set aside the order passed by District Magistrate cancelling the licence given to the respondent No. 3 to run a video parlour. The main grievance of the appellant before the High Court was that the video parlour of respondent No. 3 was situated within 350 metres from his cinema hall and hence no licence could be granted to respondent 3 to run a video parlour under the U.P. Cinema (Regulation of Exhibition by Means of Video) Rules, 1988. It was also submitted that the grant of licence in favour of respondent 3 was in violation of the provisions contained in Sections 7(1-A) (a), (b) and (c) of the U.P. Regulation of Cinema Act, 1955. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the locus standi of the appellant to file the writ petition. It observed that the appellant could not raise a grievance against his rival in the trade particularly when the rival in trade, as in the instant case, was exhibiting cinematograph films much before the appellant was granted the licence. It was held that the appellant had not been denied or deprived of his legal right to exhibit the films and, therefore, he had not sustained any legally protected interest. It was also observed that the order of the Commissioner did not operate as a decision against the appellant as the appellant had not suffered any legal wrong. 33. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 5 of the decision as under : “5. It was also observed that the order of the Commissioner did not operate as a decision against the appellant as the appellant had not suffered any legal wrong. 33. Allowing the appeal and setting aside the judgment of the High Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 5 of the decision as under : “5. After hearing the Counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court clearly erred in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground of locus standi. The appellant being in the same trade as respondent 3 has a right to seek the cancellation of the licence granted to respondent 3 being in violation of the Act and the Rules.” 34. So far as the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Sai Chalchitra’s case (supra) cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner is concerned, in this connection, it is to be pointed out that the aforesaid decision may be understood in context of statutory scheme under consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in aforesaid case and same cannot be said to have laid down any broad proposition of law having universal application in all the cases despite different contextual statutory backdrop of the case. It is no doubt true that the decision rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in Sai Chalchitra’s case, later in point of time, than that of cited by learned Counsel for the respondent No. 3 but has been rendered by Smaller Bench without considering the earlier decisions rendered by Larger Benches of Hon’ble Apex Court in Jaisbhai Motibhai Desai’s case (supra), Mithilesh Garg’s case (supra) and Bar Council of Maharashtra’s case (supra) and in case of Nagar Rice and Flour Mill v. T.N. Gowda which have material bearing on the question in issue. Therefore, the decisions rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court by Larger Benches, though earlier in point of time, which have not been considered by subsequent Smaller Bench, have binding effect upon this Court, even if law laid down by Smaller Bench subsequently is contrary to the law laid down by earlier Larger Benches of Hon’ble Apex Court and in my opinion such earlier decision of Larger Bench has binding effect upon this Court and law laid down by subsequent Smaller Bench cannot be read in variance to law laid down by earlier Larger Bench of Hon’ble Apex Court. Therefore, petitioner can have no assistance from the aforesaid decision. 35. Thus, in view of foregoing discussions, I am of the considered opinion that the petitioner has no locus standi to challenge the impugned order dated 4.10.2007 passed by Revisional Authority/State Government in revision filed by respondent No. 3 under Section 12(3) of the Act and accordingly the petitioner cannot seek a writ of certiorari to quash the said order passed by the State Government. In case, the petitioner would have any grievance against the reservation/assignment of area to its factory under Section 15 (1) of the Act on account of enhanced estimate of requirement of respondent No. 3 made by the State Government under Section 12(3) of the Act, it is open for the petitioner to challenge such order by filing appeal under Section 15(4) of the Act but the instant writ petition moved by the petitioner under apprehension that on account of such increase of estimate of requirement of respondent No. 3, the petitioner would be adversely affected appears to be misconceived and misplaced, therefore, the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner has to be rejected. In my considered opinion, the writ petition filed by the petitioner, at this stage, is also premature and liable to be dismissed on this count also. The view taken by me also finds support from the decision rendered by Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Simbhaoli Sugar Mill’s case (supra) and a Division Bench of this Court in Triveni Engineering Works Ltd. and another’s case (supra). 36. Besides this, on merits too the submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that while revising the estimate of requirement of respondent No. 3 the State Government did not take into account the admission made by the respondent No. 3, inasmuch as policy framed by the Cane Commissioner, U.P. for estimating the requirement for sugar factories for current crushing season also appears to be misplaced for the simple reason that the policy framed by the Cane Commissioner for estimating the requirement of sugar factories as contained in Circular dated 27.7.2007 (Annexure-5 of the writ petition) is not statutory in nature, rather it has been formulated by Cane Commissioner as working formula to determine the requirement of quantity of sugarcane to be crushed and supplied to the sugar factories during ensuing crushing season. It has no binding effect upon the State Government in revision under Section 12(3) of the Act. That apart, the impugned order passed by the State Government appears to have taken note of relevant factors ought to be considered by it and there appears nothing to indicate that the impugned order passed by the State Government is either arbitrary or based on some irrelevant considerations. It is decision making process, which can be subject matter of judicial review if found contrary to parameters and norms of such judicial review. The correctness of such decision cannot be gone into judicial review. Learned Counsel for the petitioner could not successfully point out such illegality in the decision making process of State Government and that the decision is vitiated on other grounds available for judicial review. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the State Government cannot be held to be erroneous in the process of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, accordingly, in my considered opinion, the writ petition is also liable to be dismissed on merits. 37. Therefore, in view of foregoing discussions, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed in limine. Accordingly, the same is hereby dismissed. Interim order granted earlier stands discharged. ————