JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. The judgment dated 9.9.2005 in RFA No. 25 of 2004 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and order dated 17.11.2004 passed by ADC, Aizawl in TS No. 15 of 1988 stands impugned in the present second appeal. 2. I have heard Mr. C. Lalramzauva, learned Counsel for the Appellant and Mr. N. Sailo, learned Addl. Advocate General, for the Defendant/Respondents. 3. This second appeal has been preferred by the legal heir of Bualsailovi, who originally instituted Title Suit No. 15 of 1988. Her case is that her husband late Dr. Pika was the owner of certain lands located at Kulikawn, Aizawl. After his death the Director of Health Services, Mizoram (6th Defendant herein) approached her to donate a portion of her land under Pass No. 181/57 for construction of a Civil Hospital. She agreed and donated 58.77 bighas on condition that the name of the hospital would be Dr. Pika Memorial Hospital. The Defendants took over her land accepting the condition and paid her compensation for the crops standing on the said land. Adjacent to her land were the lands of one Lalchhunga. The Defendants acquired 11.42 bighas of his lands. Her grievance is that while preparing the Sketch Map demarcating the lands the Defendants secretly included a portion of land reserved for her own use and when she constructed a house on the said land Revenue authority dismantled the same at the instance of the Directorate of Health Services. Aggrieved, she filed a title suit on 18.11.1986, which, however, had to be withdrawn due to certain defects with leave of the court to institute the suit afresh. Accordingly the instant suit was filed contending, inter alia, that, between the boundary line of the land acquired for hospital and the road known as Bungkawn-Saikhama Kawn Road there is left a patch of land which she continued to own, use and possess. This patch of land measuring 261-1/4 ft. in breadth runs from Pillar No. 1 to Pillar No. 2 of the Map. She made a prayer to the trial court to decree the suit declaring her title in the lands between the Pillar No. 1 and Pillar No. 2 as shown in the enclosed schedule 1A and to restrain the Defendants by a temporary injunction from disturbing her peaceful possession therein. She made a prayer to the trial court to decree the suit declaring her title in the lands between the Pillar No. 1 and Pillar No. 2 as shown in the enclosed schedule 1A and to restrain the Defendants by a temporary injunction from disturbing her peaceful possession therein. Her further prayer was for a decree of damage to the tune of Rs. 50,000 for dismantling her house and Rs. 20,000 as cost of the suit. The suit land described in schedule 1A are bounded on the east by the lands of Thanruma and another, on the west by the lands of Hrama's Garden and hospital compound, on the north Pillar to motorable road and on the south Rosiama's Garden and Nallah. She, thus, tried to assert that there exist lands in between the road and Pillar No. 1-2 (boundary line) which was never donated by her and continued to be in her possession. 4. The State Respondents/Defendants contested the suit by filing written statement contending, inter alia, that the Plaintiff Appellant never donated any land and there was no condition of naming the hospital after her late husband. On the contrary, the land was acquired and she was paid compensation. The measurement and demarcation of the acquired lands were done in her presence and in the presence of her representative. The acquired lands were allotted to Health Department on 2nd August, 1975 with clear boundary description and sketch map, which would show that the said lands included the portion of the land from the road downwards. When re-measurement of the land allotted to Health Department was done on 4th September, 1986 in accordance with the department pass boundary description and sketch map issued on 2.8.1975. Mr. K. Lalchhuana representing the Plaintiff was present. She had most illegally constructed a hut on a portion of the suit land, which had to be dismantled. The Defendants prayed for dismal of the suit. 5. The suit was decreed ex parte, but later restored and given a full dressed trial. The judgment delivered on 23.7.2003 specifically dealt with the issue whether the land claimed by the Plaintiff was included in the land acquired for the Health Department, The State Defendants in the said suit heavily relied on Ext. 9(A) (description of the boundaries of the acquired lands), Ext D-2 (no objection certificate duly signed by K. Lalchhuana) and Ext. The judgment delivered on 23.7.2003 specifically dealt with the issue whether the land claimed by the Plaintiff was included in the land acquired for the Health Department, The State Defendants in the said suit heavily relied on Ext. 9(A) (description of the boundaries of the acquired lands), Ext D-2 (no objection certificate duly signed by K. Lalchhuana) and Ext. 9(B) (rough sketch map of the acquired land), Ext. 9(A) states that Pillar No. 1 is posted where Ramapalui and a footpath meets at the edge of the C.P. Road. Pillar No. 2 is posted at the source of Damlui and the distant between the two stations is 840 ft. Ext D-2 indicates that on 4.9.1986 the land was measured in presence of the Plaintiff who raised no objection. Ext.9-B is the sketch map, which again shows that the Plaintiff had no land between boundary line of the acquired land and the C.P. Road. But, giving more weightage to the depositions of the witnesses examined by the Plaintiff the trial court came to hold that the suit land is outside the area acquired by the Government of Mizoram. 6. The said decree was put under challenge in an appeal before the ADM (J), Aizawl. The appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree was set aside and quashed with direction to the trial court to have a spot verification in presence of the parties to verify whether there is any land claimed by the Plaintiff between the hospital boundary and the road. On remand the trial court again entered into the issues raised and made a spot verification, In para 16 of the judgment the trial court recorded the results of his spot verification, which was done in presence of the counsels for the parties and others. From the spot verification, particularly the position of the two pillars it was evident that there cannot be any land between the C.P. Road and the boundary Pillar No. 1 and 2, It was found that some individuals built building within the land occupied by the Health Department, which was done unauthorisedly. Along the edge of the C.P. Road some buildings of the Health Department were also found. On the basis of the spot verification and other materials on record including Ext. Along the edge of the C.P. Road some buildings of the Health Department were also found. On the basis of the spot verification and other materials on record including Ext. 9(A) and 9(B) the trial court held that the Plaintiff had no claim to any land between the edge of C.P. Road and the boundary line between Pillar Nos. 1 and 2. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. 7. Aggrieved by the dismissal of her suit she preferred an appeal the Judgment of which has been impugned herein. In the said appeal (RFA 25 of 2004) the learned first appellate court recorded a concurrent finding after observing that as both the parties have agreed to the boundary description in Ext. 9A, it has been clearly established from the spot verification that there is no space between the C.P. Road and the boundary line shown by the Plaintiff Appellant. It is found that the boundary line runs closely along the C.P. Road, which substantiate the contention of the State Defendants/Respondents that she had no land in between. The appeal has been dismissed accordingly. 8. From what has been discussed above it is very much clear that the controversy is confined to only one issue whether there exist any land in between the edge of the C.P. Road and the admitted boundary line between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. This having been decided on the basis of the admitted position of the two pillars and the spot verification, the question is whether the concurrent findings of the courts below on this factual aspect can be interfered with in the second appeal. Unlike a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure which has to be heard only on substantial question of law, the present second appeal has been preferred under Rule 18 of the Administration of Justice Rules, 1937. The relevant part of the Rule 18 provides: An appeal shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner against any decision of any of his assistant, and to the High Court against a decision of the Deputy Commissioner, original or appellate, if the value of the suit be rupees five hundred or over, or, if the suit involves a question of tribal rights or customs, or of right to, or possession of, immovable property. Thus, there is no doubt that against the appellate order of the Deputy Commissioner a second appeal will lie to the High Court as has been done in the case on hand. The question now poses is about the limited jurisdiction of the court, whether the second appeal can be heard only on substantial question of law. On this question an old decision of 1957 rendered by the Assam High Court in Mrs. Sukriti Bala Dutta v. Hemanta Kumar Nag Choudhury and Anr. AIR 1957 Gau 153 has been brought to notice. The relevant part appearing in the Mizoram Compendium of Laws, Vol. II reads as follows: The High Court may exercise, the same power under Rule 18 of these Rules and under Order 6 of the Assam High Court (Jurisdiction over District Council Courts) Order, 1954, as in the case of a first appeal, and it is held competent to re-appreciate the evidence with a view to examine the records of the case to see whether there was any manifest error of fact or law in reaching the conclusion, and consequently a flagrant miscarriage of justice. (emphasis mine). Much water has flown down the river after the said decision in 1957 and, therefore, the principle regulating a second appeal, which now crystallizes after amendment of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be fully ignored. Even if the ratio in Sukriti Bala (supra) is to be followed, the principles underlying Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure notwithstanding, this Court in second appeal can be said to be competent to re-appreciate the evidence only to see whether there is any manifest error of fact or law in reaching the conclusion, causing thereby a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Indisputably, the quarrel here is on the question of fact which is whether there exist any land in between the C.P. Road and the boundary line drawn between Pillar No. 1 and Pillar No. 2 and whether such line fell into the lands acquired for the Health Department. As the trial court in its first judgment decreed the suit only on the basis of the depositions of witnesses produced by the Plaintiff without making any spot verification, the first appellate court dismissed the said decree and directed the trial court to make a spot verification and then record the findings. As the trial court in its first judgment decreed the suit only on the basis of the depositions of witnesses produced by the Plaintiff without making any spot verification, the first appellate court dismissed the said decree and directed the trial court to make a spot verification and then record the findings. The same was done in presence of the witnesses and the learned Counsel for the parties and the results of the physical verification is that no such land outside the boundary line between Pillar No. 1 and Pillar No. 2 exist. As a matter of fact it was found that the said admitted boundary line between Pillar No. 1 and 2 runs closely along the edge of the C.P. Road. On the basis of this spot verification and other documents like Exts. 9A and 9B, the learned trial court dismissed the suit and in appeal preferred by the Appellant herein the findings of the learned trial court have been fully confirmed. Admittedly, the lands of the Appellant were acquired in 1974 and the suit was filed only in 1985 after a period of 14 years with insufficient description of the suit land in schedule 1A. The schedule mentioned 54 bighas acquired lands followed by the boundaries. On East, West and South are shown the lands of three private individuals. The dispute being only on the North, the schedule describes Pillar No. 1 to motorable road as the northern boundary. Therefore, if northern boundary is Pillar and motorable road the southern boundary must be the hospital boundary, i.e., the boundary of the acquired lands for the reason that the disputed land, according to the Appellant is situated between the road and the boundary line between Pillar No. 1 and Pillar No. 2 which demarcates the lands acquired. Thus, the schedule of the suit land, without any mention about its area and with incorrect description about boundaries is misleading. This necessitated a spot verification as has been directed by the first appellate court. The verification so done has made it clear that in between the road and the admitted boundary line between Pillar No. 1 and 2 there exist no land outside the acquired land. This being the position there is no reason to take a view that the concurrent findings of the courts below suffer from any manifest error causing failure of justice. 9. This being the position there is no reason to take a view that the concurrent findings of the courts below suffer from any manifest error causing failure of justice. 9. For the reasons and discussions aforementioned this second appeal has no merit and, therefore, the same is dismissed. No cost. Appeal dismissed