J. R. VORA, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these applications and appeals referred above have arisen from the same judgment and order delivered by the presiding Officer, 3rd Fast Track Court, kheda at Nadiad on 6th December, 2004. The present respondents were the accused of Special Atrocity Case No. 23/2002 which was tried by Presiding Officer, 3rd Fast track Court, Kheda at Nadiad as aforesaid and ultimately, accused No. 1-Kanubhai ashabhai Patel came to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 325 of the indian Penal Code and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment of one year and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, while accused No. 2 - Mafatbhai Ashabhai Patel came to be acquitted by the Trial Court and both the accused were charged for the offences punishable under Sections 325, 323, 504 r/w. Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 3 (1) (10) of the scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and under Section 135 of the Bombay Police act. Criminal Appeal No. 1350/2006 is preferred by the State under Section 378 of this Code of Criminal Procedure against the abovesaid judgment and order for acquitting accused No. 2 for the charges levelled against him, except under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code and accused No. 2 came to be acquitted for all charges levelled against him. This appeal is delayed by 443 days and hence Criminal Misc. Application no. 14022/2006 is preferred by the State against the accused No. 1 - Kanubhai ashabhai Patel under Section 377 of the sentence awarded to him by the Trial Court for the offence proved against him under section 325 of the India Penal Code. This appeal is delayed by 473 days and, therefore, Criminal Misc. Application No. 14021/2006 is preferred by the State for condonation of delay. While Criminal appeal No. 1349/2006 is preferred by the state against the accused No. 1 - Kanubhai ashabhai Patel under Section 377 of the code of Criminal Procedure for enhancement of offence proved against him under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code. This appeal is delayed by Application No. 14021/2006 is preferred by the State for condonation of delay. While Criminal appeal No. 1349/2006 is preferred by the state against the accused No. 1 - Kanubhai ashabhai Patel under Section 377 of the code of Criminal Procedure for enhancement of offence proved against him under Section 325 of the Indian Penal Code. This appeal is delayed by Application No. 14021/2006 is preferred by the State for condonation of delay. ( 2 ) AT the outset, we have come across striking illegality committed by the Trial court as it clearly appears from the record that after pronouncing the judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the learned Judge on application, preferred by accused No. 1 at Ex. 55 passed an order for granting probation to accused No. l- kanubhai Ashabhai Patel under Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Firstly. it must be noted that the Probation of offenders Act, 1958 is in force in the State of Gujarat and by virtue of Section 19 of this Act, Section 360 shall cease to apply. This is clearly established by the Supreme court, in the matter of Gulzar v. State of m. P. , as reported in (2007) 1 SCC (Cr.) : 395. It is noted seriously that before pronouncing the judgment of sentencing the accused No. 1-Kanubhai Ashabhai Patel, learned Trial Judge did not consider the request made by accused No. 1, though such 30 request was made by the accused No. 1. However, after pronouncing of judgment for sentencing the accused No. 1 which amounts to refusal to give benefit of probation to the accused No. 1. learned Trial judge passed order below application Ex. 55 preferred by the accused, giving benefit of probation to the accused No. l. when once a judgment pronouncing, the conviction and sentence is given, no application for benefit of probation would lie as it would amount to reviewing the judgment. Therefore, in our humble view, sheer illegality is committed by the Trial court. It is established law that consideration of granting probation to the accused is a matter, post conviction and pre-sentencing procedure as mandated by section 4 of the Probation of Offenders act, 1958. However in committing sheer illegality, learned Trial Judge granted the probation to accused No. 1 by passing order below application Ex. 55 and thereby modified the judgment of sentencing accused No. 1 which was already pronounced. It is noteworthy again that vide order passed below application Ex. However in committing sheer illegality, learned Trial Judge granted the probation to accused No. 1 by passing order below application Ex. 55 and thereby modified the judgment of sentencing accused No. 1 which was already pronounced. It is noteworthy again that vide order passed below application Ex. 55 on 06. 12. 2004, at one hand it was directed that the said order shall come in force only after receiving the report from the probation officer and the report was directed that the said order shall come in force only after receiving the report from the probation officer and the report was directed to be called for. We may repeat here that all this is done by the Trial Court after pronouncing the judgment of conviction and sentencing the accused No. l. The fact come to our knowledge, when we looked at Record and proceedings of the Trial Court as the certified copy of the judgment does not contain this fact. Even though, the law is settled in this respect that the judgment after pronouncing, cannot be altered, except as provided for in Code of Criminal procedure. ( 3 ) BE that as it may, we have heard learned APP Mr.. M. Pandya for the State and learned advocate Mr. Rohit Varma for the respondents in both the matters. For the grounds of delay in both the matters, it has been laboriously put up by the State that in criminal Appeal No. 1349/2006, a proposal was forwarded by Public Prosecutor, nadiad to the Legal Department on 28th january, 2005, which was received in the registry of Legal Department on 15th february, 2005. The file was processed on 16th February, 2005 and on 17th February, 2005. The concerned Deputy Secretary took decision to file an appeal in the High Court of Gujarat on 16th February, 2005. On 23rd february, 2005, Secretary, Legal department approved the proposal and on the same day, the file was returned back to the concerned branch of the Legal department. On 23rd February, 2005 itself a resolution was prepared and was forwarded to Public Prosecutor, High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad on 23rd February, 2005 only with certified copy of the judgment and without the necessary papers. Learned Public Prosecutor through his office attempted to obtain the necessary papers. On 23rd February, 2005 itself a resolution was prepared and was forwarded to Public Prosecutor, High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad on 23rd February, 2005 only with certified copy of the judgment and without the necessary papers. Learned Public Prosecutor through his office attempted to obtain the necessary papers. Learned Public Prosecutor through his office attempted to obtain the necessary papers and materials from the concerned authorities and during which vacation of the high Court of Gujarat intervened, ultimately, the appeal came to be filed on 19th June, 2006 causing delay of 473 days. While in Criminal Appeal No. 1350/2006. same grounds are reproduced and the said appeal also came to be filed on 19th June. 2006 causing delay of 443 days. It is submitted that the delay is not attributable to any carelessness of the Government machinery or any lapse on the part of the office of the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Gujarat. In both the matters, as further ground, it has been submitted that the work in the office of the Public Prosecutor is increasing day-by-day and on account of newly established Fast Track Courts in the state of Gujarat, the Public Prosecutor office is heavily burdened with the work of filing criminal appeals. In the year 2005, at least 1484 resolution were prepared for filing the appeals by the State and about 1500 appeals were filed in that year. However, with the increase of work to cope up with such inflow of work, sufficient paraphernalia have not provided for and the strength of human capacity remains the same of medieval standards. This fact has played great role in causing delay in filing the appeals. On the abovestated grounds, it is mentioned that the delay caused in both the appeals be condoned as in the larger interest of justice, a meritorious matter cannot be thrown away at the initial stage when grounds are shown for condonation of delay in both the matters. ( 4 ) AS against that in both the matters, respondents- Kanubhai Ashabhai Patel and mafatbhai Ashabhai Patel have filed their affidavits, which are taken into consideration. ( 4 ) AS against that in both the matters, respondents- Kanubhai Ashabhai Patel and mafatbhai Ashabhai Patel have filed their affidavits, which are taken into consideration. Learned advocate for the respondents in both the matters vehemently urged that there is severe negligence on the part of the State to deal with the matters as on alacrity was shown which is expected from the State and the State has allowed the period of limitation to expire and then filed the appeals. It is submitted that this is not few days or negligible delay, but huge delay for more than 400 days in each case, for which no proper explanation is shown by the State -particularly the events and circumstances appearing before the limitation period came to be expired, which is requirement of law. It is submitted that the accused, after the decision of the of the trial Court, have changed their position in the society and have settled in life after order of acquittal. When they had acquired certain status in the society after final order of the Trial Court and gained certain rights on account of limitation having been expired, the condonation of huge unexplained delay would cause greater damage to each of the accused. In affidavit- in-reply preferred and as contended by the learned advocate for the respondents, it is commented upon each of the grounds taken by the State saying that when the State has received certified copy of the judgment and order, the appeal could have been filed at once without waiting for unnecessary papers and sending reminders. Learned advocate for the respondents relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the matter of ajit Singh Thakur Singh v. State of Gujarat, as reported in AIR 1981 SC 733 . Para-6 sought to be relied upon wherein the Apex court observed that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must be established to the extent that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired, it was not possible to file the appeal within time. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must be established to the extent that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired, it was not possible to file the appeal within time. Relying upon this observation, it was submitted on behalf of the respondents that in both the matters, applications for condonation of delay in filing the criminal appeals are required to be dismissed. ( 5 ) HAVING heard learned counsels for the parties and having gone through the record of the case, it clearly appears that what has been contended by the State in the shape of grounds for condonation of delay are not only the grounds but they are concrete real facts actually occurred. It appears from the record from what is stated in the applications that, on receiving proposal for filing of appeal, Legal Department processed the matter promptly and by no stretch of reasoning, it could be said that the State machinery acted in a manner so lethargic as to defeat the object of law of limitation and allowed the limitation period to expire without any events and remained inactive. When the matter reached to the office of the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Gujarat, an attempt is made to obtain papers from the concerned department. It could not at all be said that those papers were not material papers and appeal could have been filed only with the judgment and order, copy of which was submitted to the office of the Public Prosecutor, High Court of Gujarat. Those papers were necessary, because the State has very strong case on merits in respect of enhancement of sentence and for acquittal of accused No. 2 as we find that a criminal trial is taken very lightly by the Trial Judge and the judgment at this stage, prima facie appears to be devoid of sufficient and cogent reasons as only in one paragraph,. e. vide para-20 of the judgment, the whole trial in 10 to 15 lines came to be decided by the Trial Court. It appears that for the time being it is forgotten that section 114 or Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is still on the statute book. e. vide para-20 of the judgment, the whole trial in 10 to 15 lines came to be decided by the Trial Court. It appears that for the time being it is forgotten that section 114 or Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is still on the statute book. However, in short, from the contentions and averments made on behalf of the State in both the applications, it could not be said that the State machinery or Public Prosecutor slept over the matter of filing appeals in both the cases and allowed the limitation period to expire as there was no such reason for the office of the Public Prosecutor to do so. So far as the allegation of negligence or severe carelessness is concerned, the fact remains that at no level of the Government machinery, either it be a Court of the office of the Government Pleader and Public prosecutor, sufficient paraphernalia are provided for to cope up with the work and increasing inflow of the work assigned to particular offices. The fact remains that the fast Track Courts have been set up in the state, not only that but an intensive drive of speedy disposal has been solicited as an objective. On account of this, huge disposal is expected and also obtained from Fast track Courts and from other Courts. The result of such achievement has caused in piling of matters to be filed in High Court of Gujarat by way of appeals, etc. Nobody thought perhaps to provide necessary staff, etc. and other basic requirement to cope up the delay which is being caused on account ever increasing work and severe paucity of staff, etc. The question is whether this ground considering with other ground advanced by the State, even including the merits of mattes in consideration of condonation of delay, can be labelled to be severe negligence on the part of office of the Public Prosecutor. In our humble view, unless specific negligence is established in a given case, attribution of severe negligence on the part of the Public prosecutor, particularly in the case of this type, would not be only unreasonable, but against all the cannons of natural justice which is magnified and glorified by the courts of law since years. In our humble view, unless specific negligence is established in a given case, attribution of severe negligence on the part of the Public prosecutor, particularly in the case of this type, would not be only unreasonable, but against all the cannons of natural justice which is magnified and glorified by the courts of law since years. Necessary it is to refer to the basic principles, which are laid down by the Apex Court in respect of the condonation of delay as has been engrafted in Section 5 of the Limitation act. In the matter of Collector, Land acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, as reported in AIR 1987 sc 1353 , the Apex Court observed as under in para-3. "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on merits . The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in the matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that : 1. "any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of 0. XXI of the Code of Civil procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. " 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "every day s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "every day s delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour s delay? Every second s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. ( 6 ) IT must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution ot the appeal. The fact that it was the state , which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the state is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non- grata status. The Courts therefore have tc informed with the spirit and philosophy o1 the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non- grata status. The Courts therefore have tc informed with the spirit and philosophy o1 the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to application to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside, delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the high Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to both the sides. " 6. Having regard to these principles, it is clear that though delay caused in the present matters is more than 400 days, but when as aforesaid, the State has shown sufficient reasons for condonation of delay, we have no hesitation to rule that the delay in these cases is required to be condoned to protect the interest of justice more so when both the appeals are so meritorious as to call for observations from us that firstly, prima facie, the Trial Judge committed illegality in granting probation to the accused No. 1 o as we have already referred the procedure adopted by the Trial Court, and secondly, it clearly appears that Trial Court has taken a serious criminal trial lightly. Interest of justice and technicality are pitted against each other and interest of justice must prevail. Therefore, we are not at all inclined to throw away such meritorious appeals at threshold only because of there is huge delay or for the reasons advanced on behalf o of the respondents. The decision cited of the Apex Court by the learned advocate for the respondents, in the matter of Ajit Singh is on some different facts that in said case, the State, at first instance, decided to file an appeal subsequently and as an afterthought. In those circumstance, the Supreme Court observed that sufficient cause must be established that how the limitation period was allowed to expire. In those circumstance, the Supreme Court observed that sufficient cause must be established that how the limitation period was allowed to expire. Referring to the facts of this case as narrated above, sufficient cause, in our humble view, are established by the State that how the limitation period came to be expired. Therefore, on merits also, these are the good cases for filing appeal, and on that count also, the condonation applications in both the matters are required to be allowed. ( 7 ) IN the result, Criminal Misc. Application No. 14021/2006 is allowed. The delay caused of 473 days in preferring the Criminal Appeal No. 1349/2006 is condoned. Rule is made absolute. Criminal misc. Application No. 14022/2006 is also allowed. The delay caused of 443 days in preferring the Criminal Appeal No. 1350/ 2006 is condoned. Rule is made absolute. Rule made absolute.