Judgment :- Elipe Dharmarao, J. 1. The Government of Tamil Nadu issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, dated 12. 1995, proposing to acquire the lands of the appellants, for the purpose of providing house sites to Adi Dravidas. Challenging the said notification, the appellants herein have filed W.P. Nos. 3356 and 3766 of 1966. Before the learned Single Judge, as could be seen from Para No.2 of the common order passed by the learned Single Judge, dated, 11. 2000, the following contentions were raised by the appellants/writ petitioners: “(i) Notification published in the District Gazette under Section 4(1) of the Act does not specify the purpose for which the lands are sought to be acquired; (ii) as per the provisions of the Act, particularly in the light of Section 4 of the Act, it is for the District Collector to satisfy and not the Government, but, in the 4(1) Notification, published in the District Gazette, it is stated that the Government of Tamil Nadu is satisfied and needed the lands in question for the purpose of Harijan Welfare Schemes, which cannot be sustained; (iii) The Special Tahsildar, the third respondent herein, failed to serve his report to the petitioners which deprived the petitioners from making further representation.” 2. The learned Single Judge, answering all the said contentions against the writ petitioners, has dismissed both the Writ Petitions. Aggrieved, these Writ Appeals are preferred by the petitioners therein. 3. Before us also, the learned counsel for the appellants has reiterated the contention raised by him before the learned Single Judge that the Special Tahsildar, the third respondent herein, failed to serve his report submitted by him to the district collector containing his recommendations on the cause so shown for the decision of the District Collector, as per Section 4(3)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 to the petitioners which deprived the petitioners from making further representation and would submit that on this sole ground, the entire land acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents are vitiated. 4. 4. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellants has relied on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in R. Pari v. Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Pasumpon Muthuramalinga Thevar District and another, 2006 (4) CTC 609 : 2007 (2) MLJ 706 . In the said judgment, the Full Bench of this Court, placing reliance on a Constitution Bench judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hydrabad v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 , which was delivered in the context of service law, has observed in Para Nos.36, 37 and 38 as follows: “36. It is true that the aforesaid observations relating to various facets of natural justice were made in the context of service law jurisprudence. One of the important as well as apparent tenets of the judgment is to the effect that where the enquiry is conducted by a person other than the deciding authority, furnishing of such report is considered as an important facet of principle of natural justice because at that stage it is not known as to what extent the deciding authority would be influenced or guided by the observations made in the report of the enquiring authority. This aspect of natural justice can be held applicable to the Act as the principle that a person before being deprived of his property should be given a reasonable opportunity, can be considered as part of law recognized under Article 300-A of the Constitution. As already noticed, the statutory provisions contemplate issuance of notice to show cause. The statute does not envisage any embargo regarding the extent and content of natural justice to be followed. Similarly the rules do not specifically contemplate any such embargo and the Form prescribed under the Rules need not be read as limiting the concept of reasonable opportunity which is implicit in the law relating to acquisition of private property by the State. While the superior right of the State to acquire any property in exercise of the concept of eminent domain cannot be denied, it must be considered that such right can be exercised by the State by following reasonable principles of natural justice. The salutary principles made applicable by the Constitution Bench in the matter relating to disciplinary proceedings can also be made applicable to the proceedings for land acquisition under the Act. .37. The salutary principles made applicable by the Constitution Bench in the matter relating to disciplinary proceedings can also be made applicable to the proceedings for land acquisition under the Act. .37. The desirability of furnishing a copy of the report to enable the land owner to make a further representation to the District Collector does not mean that in every case, where such report has not been furnished, the ultimate order passed by the District Collector deciding to acquire the land is automatically vitiated. The scope for judicial interference in the matter relating to acquisition of land obviously being very limited, the Court in each case is required to find out whether non-furnishing of the report in any way has prejudiced the person concerned. The object of furnishing the report and affording further opportunity to the land owner to make a further representation is obviously to pinpoint any deficiency in the report of the authorized officer. If any particular aspect has been highlighted by the land owner and has not been considered by the authorized officer, the land owner would get a further opportunity to highlight such aspect before the District Collector. In other words, if the authorized officer has considered the relevant aspects indicated by the objector and made his recommendation, merely because a copy of such report is not furnished and no further opportunity is given to the land owner, may not be a ground to quash the land acquisition proceedings. On the other hand, if important aspects, which have been highlighted by the land owner, have been ignored by the authorized officer, it may be reasonable to infer non-furnishing of such report and non-offering of opportunity to make further representation might have vitiated the ultimate decision of the District Collector. There are matters to be considered on the basis of the facts and circumstances in each acquisition and it should not be construed that as a matter of law in every case where copy of the report has not been furnished an opportunity of making further representation had been denied, it is sufficient to quash such acquisition. Ultimately the Court has to judge the prejudice caused to such person by keeping in view the facts and circumstances in particular case. 38. So far as Question No.2 is concerned ( viz. Ultimately the Court has to judge the prejudice caused to such person by keeping in view the facts and circumstances in particular case. 38. So far as Question No.2 is concerned ( viz. Is the owner entitled to a copy of the report of the Special Tahsildar or not ?), since it is construed by us that it is necessary for the Collector to give opportunity to the owner to file further representation on the report/recommendation made by the authorized officer, such copy of the report/recommendation is required to be furnished. We also add that in view of the provisions contained in the Right to Information Act, 2005 the owner would be entitled to copy of the report of the authorized office r.” .5. It is to be pointed out that when the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 was struck down as being ultra vires the Constitution of India by this Court, the said decision was challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court by the Government and Their Lordships of the Three Judge Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu and others v. Ananthi Ammal and others, AIR 1995 SC 2114 , considering all the provisions of the Act, have ultimately held that “except for the provisions of Section 11(1) of the said Act insofar as they provide for payment of the compensation amount in instalments, the said Act is intra vires the Constitution.” .6. It has also been held by Their Lordships of the Honourable Supreme Court in Para No.8 as follows: .“.....The provisions of Section 4, therefore, substantially encapsulate the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the only major difference being that, under the said Act, it is the District Collector and not the State Government who must be satisfied that the land is required to be acquired. It does not appear to us that this is a provision which is unreasonable or arbitrary.” 7. In Abdul Hussain Tayabali, etc. v. The State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1968 SC 432 , while considering the question of necessity of a further enquiry by the State at the stage of taking an appropriate decision under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Honourable Apex Court has observed as follows: “16. The last proposition of Mr. In Abdul Hussain Tayabali, etc. v. The State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1968 SC 432 , while considering the question of necessity of a further enquiry by the State at the stage of taking an appropriate decision under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Honourable Apex Court has observed as follows: “16. The last proposition of Mr. Sanghi was that even though an inquiry under Section 5A may be an administrative inquiry, the State Government was bound to give an opportunity to be heard to the appellants after receiving the report thereunder and before making up its mind for the purpose of issuing Section 6 notification. It is not in dispute that during Section 5-A inquiry the appellants were heard and their objections were taken on record. Under Section 5-A, the Collector has to hear the objections of the owner, take them on record and then submit his report to the Government. The Section also requires him to send along with his report the entire record of his inquiry which would include the objections. The report has merely recommendatory value and is not binding on the Government. The record has to accompany the report as it is for the Government to form independently its satisfaction. Both are sent to enable the Government to form its satisfaction that the acquisition is necessary for a public purpose or for the Company. It is then that Section 6 notification which declares that particular land is needed for either of the two purposes is issued. The Government thus had before it not only the opinion of Master but also all that the appellants had to say by way of objections against the proposed acquisition. The appellants therefore had an opportunity of being heard. Neither Section 5-A nor any other provision of the Act lays down that a second opportunity has to be given before the issuance of Section 6 notification.” 8. The said decision was followed in Kalumuya Karimmiya v. The State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1977 SC 497 , wherein it was observed: “6. Neither Section 5-A nor any other provision of the Act lays down that a second opportunity has to be given before the issuance of Section 6 notification.” 8. The said decision was followed in Kalumuya Karimmiya v. The State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1977 SC 497 , wherein it was observed: “6. ....Although ordinarily, there should be not difficulty in furnishing a copy of the report under Section 5-A to an objector, when he asks for the same, it is not a correct proposition that hearing under Section 5-A is invalid because of failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion of the hearing under the said Section. Unless there were weighty reasons, a report in a public enquiry like this, should be available to the persons who take part in the enquiry. But failure to furnish a copy of the report of such an enquiry cannot vitiate the enquiry if it is otherwise not open to any valid objection. Apart from this solitary ground, our attention has not been drawn to any infirmity in the hearing under Section 5-A. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the said enquiry under Section 5-A was invalid. 7. The matter would have been different if a second enquiry were essential under the law at the stage when the State Government was considering the report under Section 5-A for issuing its declaration under Section 6 of the Act. We are, however, clearly of opinion that there is no reason to hold that a second hearing by the State Government at that stage is necessary under Section 6 of the Act. (See Abdul Husain v. State of Gujarat, 1968 (1) SCR 597 : AIR 1968 SC 432 ). Since that is the position in law, failure to furnish a copy of the report under Section 5-A is innocuous...” 9. There is not dispute that neither Section 5-A nor any other provision of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, contemplates second opportunity to be given to the land owners. Since that is the position in law, failure to furnish a copy of the report under Section 5-A is innocuous...” 9. There is not dispute that neither Section 5-A nor any other provision of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, contemplates second opportunity to be given to the land owners. In these circumstances, when their Lordships of the Three Judge Bench of the Honourable Apex Court, have, in no uncertain terms have held that ‘except for the provisions of Section 11(1) of the said Act insofar as they provide for payment of the compensation amount in instalments, the said Act i s intra vires the Constitution’, the Full Bench, going into the other differences between the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 particularly after the amendment of the Act, has observed in Para No.25 as follows: “25 . These being some of the important distinctions, it cannot be said that both the statutes are in pari materia in all aspects and we venture to observe that ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 432 and AIR 1977 SC 497 (cited supra) may not be made applicable and the persons likely to be affected should be given further opportunity of making a further representation to the District Collector on the report/recommendation of the authorized officer.” 10. Since as has already been adverted to supra, neither Section 5-A nor any other provision of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, contemplate second opportunity to be given to the land owners and when Their Lordships of the Three Judge Bench of the Honourable Apex Court have held, in Ananthi Ammal’s case (cited supra), in no uncertain terms have held that ‘the provisions of Section 4, substantially encapsulate the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of the Land Acquisition Act...’ and that ‘... except for the provisions of Section 11(1) of the said Act, insofar as they provide for payment of the compensation amount in instalments, the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 was held to be intra vires the Constitution of India, with respect, we are of the considered view that the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in R. Pari v. spcial Thsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Pasumpon Muthuramalinga Thevar District and another, 2007 (2) MLJ 706 , that too relying on a judgment delivered by the Constitution Bench of the Honourable Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 , in the context of service jurisprudence, which is quite a distinct and separate law from the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978, which was already held to be intra vires the Constitution of India by the Honourable Apex Court, runs counter to the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in State of Tamil Nadu and others v. Ananthi Ammal and others, AIR 1995 SC 2114 . Further more, a similar contention raised by Mr. Sanghi before the Honourable Apex Court in Abdul Hussain Tayabali’s case has been rejected by the Honourable Apex Court in paragraph No.16 of the judgment, which is extracted supra. 11. From the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in Ananthi Ammal’s case , it is clear that whatever the opportunities provided to the land owners, which are provided for in the Act itself, before initiating the land acquisition proceedings, are sufficient to protect their interests and no further opportunity need be given to the land owners regarding the acquisition proceedings. In this backdrop, we are of the considered view that the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court, since runs contrary to the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in Ananthi Ammal’s case , does not seems to be a good law and needs re-consideration by a Larger Bench. In this backdrop, we are of the considered view that the ratio laid down by the Full Bench of this Court, since runs contrary to the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in Ananthi Ammal’s case , does not seems to be a good law and needs re-consideration by a Larger Bench. Therefore, whether the Full Bench is justified in holding to provide a second opportunity, applying the service jurisprudence principle to the land acquisition proceedings is to be decided by a Larger Bench, since the Apex Court in Ananthi Ammal’s case , after rejecting the same contentions raised before it, has upheld the entire provisions of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 as intra vires the Constitution of India, except to the limited extent of Section 11(1) of the Act. 12. At this juncture, it is to be mentioned that the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 is a social Welfare Act and has been enacted with a view to provide for acquisition of land for Harijan Welfare Schemes and the Legislation, in its wisdom, has thought it fit not to provide for any such second opportunity to the land owners and the Honourable Apex Court has also upheld the Act as intra vires the Constitution of India. If, as has been held by the Full Bench, a second opportunity is given to the land owner, to know whether his objections were properly considered by the authorities or not, it will cause unnecessary delay in the land acquisition proceedings, thus the very object of the Act would be defeated. 13. We also place on record that as per the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ramalingam and others v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 (3) CTC 1 , Writ Petition is not maintainable challenging acquisition proceedings, if such Writ Petition was filed after Award has been passed under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act and in these cases, as could be seen from the records produced by the respondents, the Award has been passed on 3. 1996 in Award No.6/95-96 and a sum of Rs.31,832/- has been paid to Mrs. Soundravalli Ammal, the appellant in W.A. No.2050 of 2001 and a sum of Rs.5,865/- has been paid to Mrs. Kanagavalli, the appellant in W.A. No.2051 of 2001. 1996 in Award No.6/95-96 and a sum of Rs.31,832/- has been paid to Mrs. Soundravalli Ammal, the appellant in W.A. No.2050 of 2001 and a sum of Rs.5,865/- has been paid to Mrs. Kanagavalli, the appellant in W.A. No.2051 of 2001. Therefore, we consider it a fit case to be referred to the Larger Bench. Hence, the Registry is directed to place the papers before the Honourable The Chief Justice to refer the matter to a Larger Bench to consider the above issue.