1. This MAC Appeal is directed against the award in respect of the respondent No. 1 in the common judgment and award dated 16.6.2006 and the order dated 4.7.2006 in MAC Case Nos. 65 to 68 of 2003 and MAC Case No. 17 of 2004. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that on 29.11.2003, when the respondent No. 1 was driving the Maruti Car No, ML-05-D-1228 from Shillong to Guwahati along with the owner of the said vehicle and her relatives as occupants, one TATA Sumo vehicle bearing No. AS-25-B-1146 coming from the opposite direction dashed against his car at a place called 17th Mile, Byrnihat. As a result of the accident, all the occupants of the car including himself sustained injuries. The respondent No. 1 filed a claim petition under the. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 ("WC Act" for short) being W.C. Case No. M. 18/WC/20/2003 before the learned Commissioner. East Khasi Hills, Shillong for payment of compensation from the owner of the Maruti car driven by him, i.e., the respondent No. 3 and the respondent No. 4, which is the insurer of the Maruti Car. The learned Commissioner by his judgment and award dated 18.3.2004 assessed the compensation amount at Rs. 1,15,284, interest at Rs. 2,305 and the Medical expenditure incurred by him at Rs. 1,00,000, the total whereof comes to Rs. 2,17,589 and directed the New India Assurance Company Ltd., i.e., the respondent No. 4 herein to payment the same to the respondent. This judgment and award was promptly challenged by the respondent No. 4 in RFANo. 1(SH) of 2004 before this court. 3. In the meantime, the respondent No. 1 also filed a claim petition under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 CM.V. Act') being MAC 17 of 2004 before the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong claiming compensation for the injuries caused to him in the same accident from the owner of TATA Sumo vehicle bearing No. AS-25-B-1146, i.e., the respondent No. 2, which was insured with the appellant-insurance company. While this claim petition was pending before the Tribunal, this court dismissed RFA No. 1 (SH) of 2004 by the judgment and order dated 2.6.2004. While this claim petition was pending before the Tribunal, this court dismissed RFA No. 1 (SH) of 2004 by the judgment and order dated 2.6.2004. While upholding the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Commissioner, WC Act, 1923, this court, nevertheless, observed therein that "since MAC Case No. 17 of 2004 is now pending before the Tribunal, the petitioner shall be entitled to compensation as provided under the Motor Vehicles Act against the tortfeasors, and, as such, the amount paid to the petitioner under the WC Act shall be adjusted against the amount to be awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal". This court further observed that the petitioner should not withdraw himself from prosecuting with the said MAC Case No. 17 of 2004 pending before the Tribunal and in case the petitioner without any reason withdrew himself from the said case, the Tribunal should allow the present appellant to prosecute the case by stepping into the place of the respondent-claimant in the case. The grievance of the appellant herein on this aspect of the matter will be examined shortly hereafter. Anyway, to complete the narrative of the case, the Tribunal thereafter proceeded with the trial of the MAC Case Nos. 65 to 68 of 2003 and disposed of all the cases by the impugned common judgment and award by awarding a sum of Rs. 4.33.248 with a simple interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the claim petition in favour of the respondent No. 1. The Tribunal also awarded compensation of varying amounts to the other claimants therein, with which we are not concerned in this appeal. 4. The Tribunal recorded the findings that the respondent No. 1 was the driver of the Maruti car and was earning Rs. 3,500 per month by way of salary; that he was declared to be disabled to the extent of 40% in the lower limb, which incapacitated him from driving a vehicle and, as such, should be duly compensated for the loss of income and future income ; that his loss of income while undergoing treatment was to the tune of Rs. 21,000 while his prospective loss of income would be Rs. 79, 251; that his pain and suffering were to be assessed at-Rs. 20,000 and further that a sum of Rs. 20,000 was payable to him for loss of expectation of life. 21,000 while his prospective loss of income would be Rs. 79, 251; that his pain and suffering were to be assessed at-Rs. 20,000 and further that a sum of Rs. 20,000 was payable to him for loss of expectation of life. The total amount of compensation so awarded thus come to Rs. 4,33,248. In pursuance of the order dated 2.6.2004 passed by this court, the Tribunal deducted a sum of Rs. 2,17,589 already paid to him under the WC Act, 1923 while he directed the appellant to pay Rs. 2,15,659 along with the interest to the respondent No. 1. Subsequently, on the application of the respondent No. 4 herein, i.e., the New India Assurance Co. Ltd., the Tribunal by the second impugned order modified the said judgment and award in the following terms : - "That as for the award in MAC 17 of 2004 is concerned, the OP/Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. is hereby directed to pay a sum of Rs. 4,33.248 to this Tribunal for payment of Rs. 2,15,659 plus interest @ 6% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim application till payment, and the balance of Rs. 2,17,589 to be paid to the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. as reimbursement for payment of award in the WC Act to the claimant, Shri Sudip Ranjan Deb. No interest is awarded towards this reimbursement as the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. does not stand in the same footing as the claimant in the MACT Case No. 17 of 2004". 5. The first question for determination in this appeal is whether the respondent No. 1, who filed a claim petition under the WC Act against his employer and was so awarded the compensation, is barred by section 167 of the MV Act from filing a claim petition under the provisions of the MV Act. Section 167 of the MV Act pertains to option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases, which reads, thus : - "167. Option regarding claim for compensation in certain cases. Section 167 of the MV Act pertains to option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases, which reads, thus : - "167. Option regarding claim for compensation in certain cases. -Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1928 (8 of 1923) where death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both." 6. It is submitted by Ms. G. Purkayastha, the learned counsel for the appellant-insurance company, that the learned Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has completely overlooked the provision of Section 167 of the MV Act, which clearly bars the claimant-respondent from claiming compensation under both the MV Act and the WC Act. In support of her contention, she heavily relies on the decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan, (2006) 2 SCC 641 . Section 167 of the Act thus plainly indicates that if the claim for compensation is made both under the MV Act and Workmen's Compensation Act against two different persons, i.e., the owner of the vehicle and the employers, it would not be maintainable in view of the bar of section 167 of the MV Act. If there is still any doubt in this behalf, the Apex Court in Mastan case (supra) has now firmly settled the legal position in the following terms : - "33. On the establishment of Claims Tribunal in terms of section 165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the victim of a motor accident has a right to apply for compensation in terms of section 166 of that Act before that Tribunal. On the establishment of the Claims Tribunal, the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a claim for compensation arising out of a motor accident, stands ousted by section 175 of that Act. Until the establishment of the Tribunal, the claim had to be enforced through the civil court as a claim in tort. The exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is taken away by section 167 of Motor Vehicles Act in one instance, when the claim could also fall under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Until the establishment of the Tribunal, the claim had to be enforced through the civil court as a claim in tort. The exclusiveness of the jurisdiction of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is taken away by section 167 of Motor Vehicles Act in one instance, when the claim could also fall under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. That section provides that death or bodily injury arising out of a motor accident which may also give rise to a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, can be enforced through the authorities under that Act, the option in that behalf, being with the victim or his representative. But section 167 makes it clear that a claim could not be maintained under both the Acts in other words, a claimant who becomes entitled to claim compensation both under Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and under the Workmen's Compensation Act, because of a motor vehicle accident has the choice of proceeding under either of the Acts before the concerned forum. By confining the claim to the authority or Tribunal under either of the Acts, the Legislature has incorporated the concept of election of remedies, insofar as the claimant is concerned. In other words, he has to elect whether to make his claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The emphasis in the section that a claim cannot be made under both the enactments is a further reiteration of the doctrine of election incorporated in the scheme for claiming compensation. The principle "where, either of two alternative Tribunals are open to a litigant, each having jurisdiction over the matters in dispute and he resorts for his remedy to one of such Tribunals in preference to the other he is precluded, as against his opponent, from any subsequent recourse to the latter" is fully incorporated in the scheme of section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, precluding the claimant who has invoked Workmen's Compensation Act from having resort to the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, except to the limited extent permitted therein. The claimant having resorted to the Workmen's Compensation Act, is controlled by the provisions of that Act subject only to the exception recognized in section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act." 7. Confronted with this situation, Mr. The claimant having resorted to the Workmen's Compensation Act, is controlled by the provisions of that Act subject only to the exception recognized in section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act." 7. Confronted with this situation, Mr. L. Lyngdoh, the learned counsel for the respondent-claimant, however, desperately tries to distinguish Mastan case (supra) by contending that where, in a case of this nature, the employer and the wrongdoer are two different and distinct persons, there is no question of exercising the option and the claim lie under both the Acts; there is no rationale for exonerating the tortfeasor from the claim being pout against him just because the employer has been fastened with the liability to pay compensation under the social security legislation like the WC Act. To buttress his contention, the learned counsel relies on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Mahebubanbibi & Ors., 2002 (II)ACJ 1017 and that of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajesh Holmandge, 2002 (II) ACJ 1328. I have carefully gone through those decisions cited at the bar and am unable to persuade myself to hold that the said decisions are authorities for the proposition that where the employer and the tortfeasor are different and distinct persons, the claimant need not at all, exercise any option under section 167 of the MV Act and can very well proceed to claim compensation from both the employer and the tortfeasor under the two Acts simultaneously. Even if the claimant has already been paid compensation under the WC Act, the question of creating an anomaly of the tortfeasor escaping his liability under either of the Acts cannot arise in view of section 13 of the WC Act. Section 13 of the WC Act provides the machinery for indemnifying an employer, who by virtue of the Act, is forced to pay compensation to his employee, which reads, thus: - "13. Remedies of employer against stranger. Section 13 of the WC Act provides the machinery for indemnifying an employer, who by virtue of the Act, is forced to pay compensation to his employee, which reads, thus: - "13. Remedies of employer against stranger. - Where a workman has recovered compensation in respect of any injury caused under circumstances creating a legal liability of some person other than the person by whom the compensation was paid to pay damages in respect thereof, the person by whom the compensation was paid and any person who has been called upon on to pay an indemnity under section 12 shall be entitled to be indemnified by the person so liable to pay damages as aforesaid." 8. Thus, section 13 of WC Act recognizes the claim of the employer to be indemnified for the compensation paid by him to his injured/death employee from the tortfeasor, who was liable to pay compensation in respect of the same injury. This takes care of the apprehension of the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent that the tortfeasor would escape his liability under both the Acts if the injured is barred from claiming compensation from both his employer and the tortfeasor. Section 13 of WC Act clearly indicates that there is no statutory scheme whittling down the liability of the tortfeasor arising under the MV Act even when compensation is paid by the employer under the provisions of WC Act. By virtue of this provision, the employer who has paid the compensation under the WC Act, will step into the shoes of the claimant and be entitled to recover that much amount from the tortfeasor. The tortfeasor cannot, therefore, take the plea that he cannot be held liable for compensation since the injured has already claimed and was paid the compensation by his employer under WC Act. This is what has been explained by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gujarat High Court in Mahebubanbibi case (supra), the case cited by the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent; how this can be of any assistance to his case is incomprehensible. Section 13 of WC Act only enables the employer to get himself indemnified for the compensation paid by him to the injured employee from a stranger including the tortfeasor and does not confer any right upon the injured-employee himself to proceed against the insurance company for recovery of damages. Section 13 of WC Act only enables the employer to get himself indemnified for the compensation paid by him to the injured employee from a stranger including the tortfeasor and does not confer any right upon the injured-employee himself to proceed against the insurance company for recovery of damages. However, it is for the employer to proceed against the tortfeasor in an independent proceeding for recovery of the compensation already paid by him to the injured by invoking section 13 of WC Act. Thus, the provision of section 13 of the WC Act is apparently engrafted in the statute book to prevent unintended benefit to the tortfeasor of retaining the portion of compensation which was paid by the employer. In my judgment, the foregoing discussion completely dealt with the contention of the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent on the possibility of the tortfeasor from escaping his liability to pay compensation already received by the employee from his employer. 9. The next question which falls for consideration is whether the claimant-respondent, who has been paid compensation under WC Act in terms of the order/award date 18.3.2004 of the learned Commissioner in WC Case No. M.18/WC/20/2003, can at this stage exercise the option to abandon his claim petition under the WC Act and proceed with his claim petition under section 166 of MV Act ? Section 167 of MV Act obviously does not prescribe the period within which the person entitled to compensation should exercise his option to claim compensation under either of the two enactments. It may be noted that the order/award dated 18.2.2004 passed by the learned Commissioner has now attained finality when the appeal against the said order was dismissed by this court in its order dated 2.6.2004 in RFA No. 1(SH) of 2004. Therefore, no further proceeding is pending before any Tribunal or court in connection with the claim petition filed by the claimant-respondent under the provisions of WC Act. It is only with respect to the claim petition filed by the claimant-respondent under the MV Act that an appeal is pending before this court, namely, this appeal filed by the appellant-insurance company herein. The appeal before the High Court is a continuation of the original proceeding. It is only with respect to the claim petition filed by the claimant-respondent under the MV Act that an appeal is pending before this court, namely, this appeal filed by the appellant-insurance company herein. The appeal before the High Court is a continuation of the original proceeding. In the instant case, as noted earlier, not even an appeal in respect of the claim petition under WC Act is pending, though the appeal in respect of the claim petition under MV Act is pending before this court. In this view of the matter, there is no difficulty in holding that the claimant-respondent has already exhausted the option open to him to elect his claim petition under the MV Act. No more choice is open to him at this stage. If both the claim petitions under the two Acts are still pending for adjudication either at the appellate stage or otherwise, it can somehow be said that the claimant-respondent has the choice to opt for one of the pending proceedings. This is sufficiently indicated by the Apex Court in Mastan case (supra) at paragraph 35 of the judgment as under : - "35. Coming to the facts of the case, the claimant has not chosen to withdraw his claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act before it reached the point of judgment, (emphasis mine) with a view to approach the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. What he has done is to pursue his claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act till the award was passed and also to invoke a provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, not made applicable to claims under Workmen's Compensation Act by section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Claimant-respondent is not entitled to do so. The High Court was in error in holding that he is entitled to do so." 10. It is next contended by Mr. L. Lyngdoh, the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent, that when this Court in its order dated 2.6.2004 in RFA No. l(SH) 2004 has already held that claimant-respondent is entitled to compensation under the MV Act as against the tortfeasor, against which no appeal was preferred by the appellant herein, the claimant-respondent could maintain his claim petition under the MV Act, notwithstanding the final disposal of the claim petition filed by him under WC Act. This contention of the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent cannot be accepted for more than one reason. This contention of the learned counsel for the claimant-respondent cannot be accepted for more than one reason. In the first place, the appellant herein was not admittedly a party to RFANo. 1 (SH) of 2004 and, therefore, cannot be bound by the decision rendered therein. Secondly, with respect, the observations by this Court in the order dated 2.6.2006 were apparently made without reference to section 167 of MV Act and contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mastan case (supra) and such decision must be treated as rendered per incuriam having no precedential value. It is a well-settled proposition of law that per incuriam decisions are not binding upon courts [see Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of MP, (2004) 7 SCC 558 ]. 11. The offshoot of the foregoing discussion is that this appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and award dated 16.6.2006 and the order dated 4.7.2006 emanating there from, in so far as the claimant-respondent herein is concerned, be and are hereby set aside. Resultantly, the claimant-respondent is not entitled to compensation under the MV Act. The statutory deposit made by the appellant shall now be refunded to it forthwith. However, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs of throughout. Send down the LC records.