JUDGMENT A. K. GANGULY, CJ. — This writ appeal has been filed against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 13.9.2006 passed in W.P.(C) No.7800 of 2004. By the said order, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ application on two grounds; the first one was that the writ application was filed on 23.7.2004 chal¬lenging the Award dated 30.11.2002 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubaneswar i.e. after a substantial delay and there was no averment in the writ application explaining the delay. The learned Single Judge held that though the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to a writ petition, but it is well settled that the remedy of the writ Court is only available to a litigant who approaches the Court with sufficient prompti¬tude. Stale claims are not to be entertained by a writ Court. It is difficult for this Court to take a view different from the one taken by the learned Single Judge in the facts and circumstances of the case. The other ground taken by the writ Court was that the Pre¬siding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal while passing the Award had taken into consideration all the facts in its proper perspec¬tive and the case by the petitioner-management for non-payment of bonus was rightly rejected. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant while assailing the order of the learned Single Judge has cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr.Kashinath G. Jalmi and another Vrs. The Speaker and others, AIR 1993 SC 1873 in support of his contention that a writ petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of delay. It appears from the judgment of Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi’s case (supra) that the said judgment was delivered consid¬ering different fact situation and on different legal issues involved in that case. In that case, the question was whether the Speaker of a Legislative Assembly can review the earlier order of the Chief Minister on the ground of defection. If the Speaker has no power of review under Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, merely because of the fact that writ petition was filed ten months after the order of review was passed by the Speaker, the writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay. If the Speaker has no power of review under Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, merely because of the fact that writ petition was filed ten months after the order of review was passed by the Speaker, the writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay. Learned Judges of the Supreme Court while coming to the said conclusion found that in that case the relief which was claimed by the writ petitioner was in the nature of class action, without any person¬al relief. As such, the said writ petition should not have been dismissed on the ground of delay. The Supreme Court also observed that since the question raised in the writ petition related to matters of ‘public concern’ and ‘good governance of the State’ itself, such a writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay specifically when the same was filed ten months after the order of review was passed. In the instant case, those considera¬tions are totally absent. The present writ petition has not been filed by the peti¬tioner in public interest, but it was filed in its own interest relating to payment of financial benefits to its employees. The writ petition was filed on 23.7.2004 challenging the Award which was passed by the Tribunal on 30.11.2002. Therefore, here the delay was for about twenty months and the same has not been explained at all in the writ petition. 3. The next question is whether the Tribunal was right in passing the Award. It is trite law to say when a competent fact finding Tribunal, upon hearing the parties/reaches its finding, the writ Court while exercising certiorari jurisdiction should be very slow to interfere with the same unless the finding is pat¬ently perverse or is without jurisdiction. In the instant case none of the above grounds is available to the writ petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the Regional Plant Resource Centre (in short ‘R.P.R.C.’) is not an industry and that this point has not been dealt with by the Tribunal despite the fact that such a point was raised. In sup¬port of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the conclusion reached by the Tribunal under Issue Nos. 4 and 5. In sup¬port of his contention, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the conclusion reached by the Tribunal under Issue Nos. 4 and 5. It is no doubt true that this question was raised before the Tribunal that the writ petitioner is not an industry for which the Tribunal after considering the settlement dated 20.4.1992 with the second party union under Rule 64 of the Orissa Industrial Disputes Rules, 1959, came to the conclusion that such a question need not be gone into in view of the settle¬ment which has been entered by the Management-writ petitioner with the workers under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. This Court on looking into the recitals contained in the said settlement, finds that the Government of Orissa in its Labour and Employment Department in exercise of power under Section 12(5) read with Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 made reference of some industrial disputes to the Labour Court, Bhubaneswar and several other industrial disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, Orissa, Bhubaneswar for adjudication. By order dated 2.5.1988 a dispute was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication. In that proceeding, the writ petitioner was a party. It also appears that in that proceeding the parties including the writ petitioner accepted that its employees are the workmen in an industry. In page-9 of the said settlement, it has been provided under Clause-17 that in case any doubt or difficulty arises as to the interpretation of any provision of this settlement, the matter will be first attempted to be mutually decided between the repre¬sentatives of the Union and of the management. In case, the matter cannot be mutually resolved, the parties will approach the Government to take action as per Section 36-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This being the nature of the settlement to which the writ petitioner was a party, it is no longer available to the writ petitioner to contend that the R.P.R.C. is not an industry. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal does not warrant any interference of the writ Court. 6. This Court also finds from the written statement which was filed by the writ petitioner before the Tribunal that it is supported by various funding agencies. Therefore, the finding of the Tribunal does not warrant any interference of the writ Court. 6. This Court also finds from the written statement which was filed by the writ petitioner before the Tribunal that it is supported by various funding agencies. From the memorandum of the R.P.R.C. which was filed before the Tribunal, it appears from paragraph-4(h) that the objective and function of the Centre will be supplied of authentic nursery stock to Universities, Research Institutes and other agencies for research and commercial utili¬zation. It has also to provide necessary expertise and assistance for Garden lay-out and landscaping, establishment of green belts in the State. From paragraph-4(q) it appears that the objective and function of the Centre is to do all other such things as may be necessary, incidental or conducive to the attainment of all or any of the above objects, with or without collaboration of other Governments or agencies. Similarly, this Court also finds from the Memorandum of understanding between the writ petitioner and the Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur that their objec¬tive was a joint collaborative technology development for commer¬cial exploitation in areas such as Plant Biotechnology, Agro-forestry, Horticulture, Environment and any other areas of mutual interest. Clause-6 of the objectives shows that it is accepting the third party funding. From the terms and conditions of the understanding it appears that the benefits that would accrue from the commercialization of such technologies will be shared on a case to case basis by RPRC and IIT, Kharagpur. 7. All these features clearly establish that the writ petitioner is an industry. In the aforesaid factual background, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Physical Re¬search Laboratory v. K.G.Sharma, AIR 1997 SC 1855 is not applica¬ble. In that case the Supreme Court found that the Physical Research Laboratory is an institution under the Government of India’s Department of Space and not a commercial enterprise. But in the instant case, from the features discussed above, it is clear that the writ petitioner is a commercial enterprise and satisfies the triple tests of systematic activity, organized co-operation between employer and employee for production and dis¬tribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes and comes within the ambit of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply Sewerage Board Vr. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 . A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 . In that judgment the Supreme Court has observed that mere absence of profit motive, is not sufficient to take the institution or organization out of the ambit of industry. For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in the appeal and it is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.