Judgment :- 1. This Criminal Revision Case is focussed to get set aside the judgment in S.C.No.69 of 2005 dated 29.12.2005 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate cum Assistant Sessions Judge, Karur, confirmed by the learned Principal District Judge, Karur, in C.A.No.8 of 2006 dated 27.09.2006. 2. I am of the considered opinion that this matter could be disposed of at the admission stage itself. 3. The background facts which are absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this criminal revision case would run thus: The police registered the case in Cr.No.64 of 2005 for the offences punishable under Section 394 read with Section 397 I.P.C. After investigation, the police laid the police report before the learned Magistrate concerned who took it on file as P.R.C.No.18 of 2005 and committed to the Court of Session. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge after conducting trial, convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 394 read with Section 397 I.P.C and sentenced to undergo seven years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-in default to undergo three months rigorous imprisonment. 4. Being aggrieved by, the said order, Crl.A.No.8 of 2006 has been preferred by the accused before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Karur, who confirmed the conviction and sentence in toto. 5. Being dissatisfied with, such concurrent findings of both the Courts below, this Criminal Revision Case is focussed on the following main grounds among others: The trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence before recording convictions under Sections 394 and 397 I.P.C. In the absence of credible evidence, the trial Court simply recorded the conviction. The trial Court convicted the accused and the appellate Court without analysing the facts and evidence confirmed the conviction as well as the sentence. The identification of the accused through photographs and through computer, are all far from satisfactory and they cannot constitute evidence in stricto sensu. No identification parade was conducted. There was long delay in preferring the complaint also. Accordingly, the petitioner prays for setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed. 6. Heard both sides. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused would submit that in the F.I.R, there is no description about the accused. As such, the subsequent identification by seeing photographs as well as the image in the computer would be of no vail. Accordingly, the petitioner prays for setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed. 6. Heard both sides. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused would submit that in the F.I.R, there is no description about the accused. As such, the subsequent identification by seeing photographs as well as the image in the computer would be of no vail. In support of his contention, he would rely upon the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in D.Gopalakrishnan v. Sadanand Naik and others reported in (2005) 1 Supreme Court Cases 85. I am of the considered opinion that in this case, at the time of the police getting clue from P.W.1, the victim, the accused was not present. Obviously, no identification parade was also conducted. No doubt, in the F.I.R, the victim failed to describe in detail the general description of the accused even though there was some general description about the accused. However, the police by showing the photographs of the suspect and the suspects image in the computer, got clue and subsequently, arrested the accused on 07.03.2005 at 06.30 a.m., while the accused was found proceeding along the road on his motorcycle with the stolen property to wit, the chain. In view of the ratiocination set out supra, I am of the considered opinion that the cited decision of the Honourable Apex Court relating to Identification Parade coupled with Photo identification, is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also cited the following decisions: (i) Choraria v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1968 Supreme Court. (ii) N.J.Suraj v. State reported in (2004) 11 Supreme Court Cases 346. 9. For the very same reasons set out supra, those precedents could be taken as ones cited out of context. 10. I would like to refer fruitfully to the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in Daya Singh v. State of Haryana reported in (2001) 3 Supreme Court Cases 468. An excerpt from it, would run thus: "13. The question, therefore, is – whether the evidence of injured eyewitnesses P.W.37 and P.W.38 is sufficient to connect the appellant with the crime beyond reasonable doubt. An excerpt from it, would run thus: "13. The question, therefore, is – whether the evidence of injured eyewitnesses P.W.37 and P.W.38 is sufficient to connect the appellant with the crime beyond reasonable doubt. For this purpose, it is to be borne in mind that the purpose of test identification is to have corroboration to the evidence of the eyewitnesses in the form of earlier identification and that substantive evidence of a witness is the evidence in the court. If that evidence is found to be reliable then absence of corroboration by test identification would not be in any way material. Further, where reasons for gaining an enduring impress of the identity on the mind and memory of the witnesses are brought on record, it is no use to magnify the theoretical possibilities and arrive at conclusion – what in present-day social environment infested by terrorism is really unimportant. In such cases, not holding of identification parade is not fatal to the prosecution. The purpose of identification parade is succinctly stated by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh as under: (SCC p. 478, para 22) "We remind ourselves that identification parades are not primarily meant for the court. They are meant for investigation purposes. The object of conducting a test identification parade is twofold. First is to enable the witnesses to satisfy themselves that the prisoner whom they suspect is really the one who was seen by them in connection with the commission of the crime. Second is to satisfy the investigating authorities that the suspect is the real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection with the said occurrence." (emphasis added) 11. A mere reading of the aforesaid decision has enabled this Court to have the following approach. 12. It has to be seen whether P.W.1 is a reliable witness and if she had the opportunity of seeing the accused for a considerable time to observe the identification of the accused and retaining his image in her memory. In this case, the deposition of P.W.1 would clearly show that the occurrence took place during evening time at about 05.30 p.m., when there was sufficient light. The accused who came on M.O.2, the motorcycle, attempted to snatch away P.W.1s gold chain M.O.1 by using M.O.3 knife and also in that process, he inflicted injuries on her. In this case, the deposition of P.W.1 would clearly show that the occurrence took place during evening time at about 05.30 p.m., when there was sufficient light. The accused who came on M.O.2, the motorcycle, attempted to snatch away P.W.1s gold chain M.O.1 by using M.O.3 knife and also in that process, he inflicted injuries on her. It is therefore crystal clear that she had the opportunity of seeing the accused in close quarters and retain his image in her memory. 13. Trite, the proposition of law is that the High Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction, should be circumspect to see that the concurrent findings based on facts are not disturbed. 14. Both the Courts below believed the evidence of P.W.1. In paragraph No.19 of the judgment of the trial Court, the trial Judge discussed convincingly relating to the fact of P.W.1s ability to identify the accused. The perusal of the F.I.R would show that she to some extent had described the accused also. In my opinion, this itself would show that she grasped the identity of the accused and that she was capable of identifying the accused. When the police confronted her with the photographs as well as the image of the suspect in the computer, she correctly identified. 15. In the wound certificate issued by the Doctor concerned, P.W.1 narrated the history correctly. The following injuries are found specified therein and an excerpt from the wound certificate would run thus: "1.Incised wound 13 cm X 1.5 cm X 1.5 cm midline of scalp. 2. V shaped incised wound 7.5 cm X 3 cm X 1 cm right arm exposing the muscle. 3. Transverse incised wound 7.5 cm X 1.5 cm X 1 cm vertral aspect of right forearm. I am of the opinion that the Injury 1, 2 and 3 are simple in nature." 16. P.W.1 was having noaxe to grind in the matter so to say, to implicate falsely the accused and there was no previous enmity between P.W.1 and the accused. I do not think that this is a case in which the police is interested in securing a conviction by hook or by crook as against the accused and that too at the behest of P.W.1 who is an ordinary coolie. 17. I do not think that this is a case in which the police is interested in securing a conviction by hook or by crook as against the accused and that too at the behest of P.W.1 who is an ordinary coolie. 17. Hence, in this view of the matter, non-conducting of the identification parade is not fatal to the case and her evidence cannot be thrown away as false. 18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would try to impeach the evidence relating to arrest and recovery of M.O.1, on the ground that the occurrence is alleged to have taken place on 23.02.2005 , whereas he was arrested on 07.03.2005. He would also raise a doubt that no accused after committing the theft of a gold chain on 23.02.2005, would continue to keep it with him till 07.03.2005 for the police to come and recover it. No doubt, this aspect seems to be some what murky, but P.W.1 clearly identified her chain and even though, initially she may say that it was purchased earlier by her and subsequently she stated that it was given to her by her relative. The prosecution relied on P.W.9, Subramani who is admittedly a member of the Friends of Police group. According to him, he accompanied the police in search of the accused based on the identification of the accused as already divulged by P.W.1. When they came across, the accused who was coming on the motorcycle M.O.2, they caught him, whereupon he made a voluntary confession and handed over M.O.1 chain, the police also recovered M.O.1 along with the motorcycle M.O.2. The over all perusal of the evidence would enable this Court to understand that P.W.1 is a witness of truth who clearly deposed that M.O.1 was her chain only. 19. However, the episode relating to the recovery of knife appears to be doubtful. The police who tried to project the case as though the knife was recovered in pursuance of the confession made by the accused as per Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act from a fence and the evidence relating to that is not convincing. 20. In pursuance of the confession given by the accused, M.O.3 knife which according to P.W.1, measuring 1/4th feet was allegedly recovered from a fence beside Kalvarpatti - Kuruppampatti road, Sellivagai junction after one month of the occurrence. 20. In pursuance of the confession given by the accused, M.O.3 knife which according to P.W.1, measuring 1/4th feet was allegedly recovered from a fence beside Kalvarpatti - Kuruppampatti road, Sellivagai junction after one month of the occurrence. Relating to M.O.1, chain and M.O.2 Motorcycle, P.W.1 identified and because of the peculiar features of those objects, P.W.1 might not have had any difficulty in identifying them and as such, the Courts below also believed her version. 21. It is a trite proposition of law that the ladies would have uncanny sense of identifying their jewels. However, M.O.3 knife, is alleged to have been recovered in pursuance of the confession made by the accused as aforesaid. Section 397 I.P.C would contemplate deadly weapon. Here, Ex.P.7, mahazar for recovery of M.O.3 would describe the knife having wooden handle of 13 cms in length with 26 cms length of sharp-edged iron piece attached to it. As such, the evidence of P.W.9 is quite contrary to what is found specified in the mahazar for recovery of weapon M.O.3. Invoking Section 397 I.P.C is a serious one and it cannot be lightly viewed. On the one hand, P.W.9 would state that the knife was 1/4th (quarter of a foot) foot in length, whereas the aforesaid description of M.O.3 would speak differently. Owing to such discrepancy in the evidence, the benefit should necessarily be given in favour of the accused. 22. I am of the considered opinion that the benefit of doubt could be given to the accused relating to recovery of weapon of offence, M.O.3., as per Ex.P.7, mahazar. 23. To attract Section 397 I.P.C., the weapon has to be proved and simply because, the medical evidence refers to some cut injury, the Court cannot jump to the conclusion that dangerous weapon as contemplated under Section 397 I.P.C was used at the time of commission of the offence. 24. Hence, to that much extent, the benefit of doubt could be given to the petitioner and accordingly, the conviction recorded under Section 397 I.P.C should be set aside. However, the conviction recorded under Section 394 I.P.C stands. In view of the discussion supra, the accused cannot simply be left out as though he is having nothing to do with the crime. 25. However, the conviction recorded under Section 394 I.P.C stands. In view of the discussion supra, the accused cannot simply be left out as though he is having nothing to do with the crime. 25. Accordingly, I do not want to disturb the conviction recorded by the trial Judge and as confirmed by the appellate Judge for the offence punishable under Section 394 I.P.C. However, for the reasons adverted to supra, I set aside the conviction recorded under Section 397 I.P.C. 26. Relating to the sentence portion is concerned, the injuries inflicted were not on the vulnerable parts of the body of P.W.1. Hence, in these circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that sentence of four years rigorous imprisonment would meet the ends of justice. The fine, already imposed shall remain unaltered under Section 394 I.P.C and accordingly, the sentence of imprisonment for seven years rigorous imprisonment is reduced to four years rigorous imprisonment. This Criminal Revision Case is disposed of accordingly.