Judgment Vinod K.Sharma, J. 1. The present revision petition has been filed against the order dated 25.7.2003 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Ludhiana dismissing the application moved by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 60 days in filing the appeal. 2. The decree against the petitioner was passed on 27.3.2002 and the case of the petitioner was that he was not aware of the decree till 26.6.2002 and he came to know about this fact only when the decree-holder respondent had tried to take possession and he had to report the matter to the police. It was further case of the petitioner that he engaged Shri Banarsi Dass, Advocate to represent him along with his other co-defendant and he was given an assurance by his counsel that he would be called for hearing as and when required and thereafter no information was ever received by the petitioner. He has further alleged that even the written statement filed on his behalf was signed by the counsel and he has not signed the same. On these pleadings, the petitioner pleaded total ignorance about the passing of the decree. 3. The application was contested by the plaintiff-respondent and a specific stand was taken that the petitioner had been appearing on each date of hearing and was even present on the date of passing of the decree. It is not even disputed by the petitioner that on the date of passing of the decree his counsel Shri Banarsi Dass was present. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned lower appellate Court was pleased to frame the following issue: Whether there are sufficient grounds to condone the delay in filing the present appeal? OPA 4. In support of his contention, the petitioner appeared in the witness box and reiterated the averments made in the application, whereas plaintiff respondent appeared as his own witness and reiterated the stand taken in the written statement. 5. The learned lower appellate Court, keeping in view the fact that the counsel for the petitioner was present on the date of passing of the decree, contributed the knowledge to the petitioner of the passing of the decree and thereby rejected the application. 5. The learned lower appellate Court, keeping in view the fact that the counsel for the petitioner was present on the date of passing of the decree, contributed the knowledge to the petitioner of the passing of the decree and thereby rejected the application. The petitioner has also taken a positive stand in the evidence that he had filed a case titled Resham Singh v. Gurmail Singh and others in the Court of Civil Judge, Ludhiana. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent stales that the said suit has also been dismissed. On appreciation of evidence and material available on the record the learned appellate Court has come to the conclusion that there was no sufficient cause for condonation of delay. 6. Mr. Amit Rawal, learned Counsel for the petitioner by making a reference to the evidence led by the petitioner contends that his statement that he had no knowledge of the proceedings and further that the matter came to his knowledge when the matter was reported to the police, is unrebutted and therefore, should have been believed by the Court. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the party should not suffer for misdemeanor or inaction of his counsel and in support of this contention placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq and Anr. v. Munshilal and Anr. 8. I find no force in the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. In the present case there is no fault of the counsel, rather the material on record proves that the counsel for the petitioner had been attending the proceedings through out. In order to protect the interest of the petitioner the written statement was also filed under his signatures. The stand of the petitioner that he was misled due to withdrawal of the suit against the co-defendant, is also of no help and does not stand to logic when it has been proved in the evidence that the suit was withdrawn against co-defendant after two years of initiation of the suit and if the statement of the petitioner is to be believed he chose not to put appearance in the Court in spite of service. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Dilbag Singh V/s. Collector Land Acquisition, Industries Department, Punjab, Chandigarh (2002-2)131 P.L.R. 775 to contend that Court must take liberal view while construing sufficient cause. This contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner has no force as in the said case the delay of 54 days was condoned, keeping in view the fact that appeal arising out of the same award in other cases was pending and, therefore, the delay was condoned in the interest of justice. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition, Anantanag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors., to contend that Courts should adopt liberal approach in condoning the delay. For this he has made reference to the following criteria laid down by the Honble Supreme Court: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated- As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence or on account of maladies. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. The case of the petitioner cannot be said to be covered by the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. The case of the petitioner cannot be said to be covered by the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (supra) as in the present case it has been proved on record that the petitioner was negligent in prosecuting his case. He chose not to appear in the suit in spite of notice. The decree was passed by the Court in the presence of the counsel for the petitioner and no negligence can be attributed to the counsel as is sough! to be pleaded. The grounds set up by the petitioner, therefore, for condonation of delay could not be said to be sufficient ground for condonation of delay. It may be noticed that the petitioner was in fact depending upon the suit filed by him against the plaintiff-respondent and , therefore, intentionally chose not to file the appeal within the period of limitation. The exercise of jurisdiction, in the circumstances, by the learned lower appellate Court cannot be said to be perverse nor there is any error of jurisdiction which may call for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Dismissed.