ORDER This writ petition is directed against the award dated 18-5-2006 passed in Reference No. 282 of 2001 on the file of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gulbarga. 2. On a reference under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Labour Court passed an award inter alia directing the respondents to reinstate the claimant into service as daily wage worker on prevailing daily wages within a period of 3 months from the date of award coming into force i.e., on its publication and denied continuity of service and back wages for any period. 3. The case of the respondent is that he is a graduate in Engineering and he has worked as a daily wage employee with effect from 16-6-1984 continuously till 1-9-1985 and he had completed 240 days of continuous service in a year and denial of work to him amounts to violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and sought for conciliation of the dispute. On failure of the conciliation, the Conciliation Officer is stated to have reported the same to the Government and the State Government by its order dated 13-9-2001 referred the dispute to the Labour Court. The Labour Court on appreciation of the evidence held that the respondent has completed 240 days of continuous service in a year and denial of work to him amounts to violation of Section 25-F of the LD. Act and the respondent is entitled for reinstatement. 4. The petitioners had filed a counter-statement to the claim petition of the respondent and have raised a specific plea that the respondent is not a workman and he is not entitled for the benefit under Section 25-F of the LD. Act and further it is specifically stated that the respondent cannot seek re-employment after a lapse of 16 years and there is inordinate delay in filing the claim petition. 5. The Labour Court at paragraph 16 observed that 15 years delay in raising the dispute itself cannot be concluded that dispute had become stale and further observed that disputes become stale when person gets better service or some other avocation and loses interest in the job he had lost sometime earlier and further observed that the respondent is aged around 42 years and is unemployed and also observed that the problem of unemployment is rampant and it was more among Civil Engineers for years. By these observations, the Labour Court observed that as there is a delay, it would not disentitle the respondent seeking adjudication of the dispute. 6. Sri Jagadish Mundargi, learned Additional Government Advocate for the petitioners submitted that the dispute had become stale and the Government at the first instance had not even referred the dispute to the Labour Court. He also submitted that the;-e is no industrial dispute existing as on the date of seeking conciliation of the dispute by the respondent. He further submitted that when a specific plea is raised regarding the delay, the Labour Court ought to have considered the delay before granting the relief. The observation of the Labour Court that the respondent was not employed is not a ground for entertaining the dispute even after 15 years. In support of his contention that the delay has become fatal to the Government, he relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.G. Chandrappagol v The Assistant Executive Engineer, Ghataprabha Right Bank Canal Construction, Sub-Division, Hidkal, Belgaum Districtl and submitted that the delay of 13 years in making an application before the Labour Officer seeking conciliation and reference of dispute to the Labour Court is held to be fatal and the Division Bench of this Court has held that such dispute becomes stale. He further submitted that at such a distance of time, the Government will not be having necessary records or the persons who have dealt with such matters and particularly, in view of the long lapse of time, he would work disadvantageous to the Government to defend the case. He also submitted that in this case also there is a delay of 15 years and reference itself is sought after 15 years as admittedly the respondent's case itself is that there was denial of work with effect from 1-9-1985 and the reference is dated 13-9-2001 which is more than 15 years. He also submitted that the Assistant Executive Engineer, PWD Sub-Division, who was examined as M.W. 1 has stated in his evidence that the respondent has not worked from 1-6-1984 to 1-9-1985 and there is no letter received by his office as alleged by the workman as per Ext. W. 1. He also submitted that the Labour Court based on the evidence of M.W. 1 and relying on Exts. W. 1. He also submitted that the Labour Court based on the evidence of M.W. 1 and relying on Exts. W. 1 and W. 2 has held that the respondent was working during 1-6-1984 to 1-9-1985. He submitted that there was no conclusive evidence showing that the respondent had worked for 240 days continuously in a year. 7. He also relied on another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, C.A.D. Kota v Dhan Kunwar and submitted that the Labour Court should not have granted relief as the delay in seeking reference is not only unexplained and no justifiable reasons are either stated by respondent-workman or by the Labour Court. He submitted that the Apex Court in the matter of Assistant Engineer, C.AD. Kota has relied on the judgment of Nedungadi Bank Limited v K.P. Madhavan Kutty and has also considered the judgment in the matter of S.M. Nilajkar and Others v Telecom District Manager, Karnataka. After considering the said judgments, the Apex Court held that the Labour Court should not grant the relief by not considering the issue relating to delay in its proper perspective and arrive at abrupt conclusion without indicating justifiable reasons. He also relied on another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v Babu Ram and submitted that the respondent is required to raise the dispute within a reasonable time and the State Government cannot mechanically refer the dispute nor the Labour Court cannot entertain the dispute after a long time on the basis of surmises and conjectures. He also pointed out that the Apex Court in Babu Ram's case has considered the earlier decisions viz., S.M. Nilajkar's case and Nedungadi Bank's case and other decisions. He further, submitted that the Division Bench of this Court in AG. Chandrappagol's case has also considered Sapan Kumar Pandit v Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board and Others4 and earlier decisions. After considering the said decisions, this Court formulated the principle in the matter of entertaining delayed references. . 8. Sri KB. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the respondent has stated the reasons for the delay at paras 12 and 13 of the claim petition. He further submitted that the Labour Court at paragraph 16 has considered the aspect of delay. . 8. Sri KB. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the respondent has stated the reasons for the delay at paras 12 and 13 of the claim petition. He further submitted that the Labour Court at paragraph 16 has considered the aspect of delay. In support of his contentions, he relied on the decision in the case of Sapan Kumar Pandit and submitted that if the dispute exists as on the date of conciliation, then the delay would not be fatal and further submitted that what is required to be seen is whether the dispute is existing during the long interval or not and the dispute cannot be termed as stale only on the basis of length of time. He further relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shahaji v Executive Engineer, P. W.D. and submitted that, if the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the termination is illegal, the Labour Court can suitably mould the relief by taking into consideration of the delay and further submitted' that even in the case of delay, it is always open to the Court to mould the relief. He also relied on the decision in the case of Ajaib Singh v Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Limited and Another and submitted that the Labour Court can appropriately mould the relief in the case of admitted delay. On merits he submitted that Exts. W: 1 and W. 2 are the proof of the fact that the respondent had worked for 240 days and the Labour Court taking into consideration of the services rendered by the respondent and also taking into consideration the delay has moulded the relief by directing reinstatement of the respondent as a daily rate employee on daily wages. 9. From the above submissions, the point for consideration that arises is; "Whether the Labour Court can entertain the reference in case of delay and grant relief?" 10. The facts which are not in dispute in this case are that the respondent claims that he had worked as daily rated employee between 16-6-1984 to 1-9-1985. It is not in dispute that the reference is made to the Labour Court by the Government by order dated 13-9-2001. It is also not in dispute that the reference is after nearly 15 years. It is not in dispute that the reference is made to the Labour Court by the Government by order dated 13-9-2001. It is also not in dispute that the reference is after nearly 15 years. Now the short question for consideration that arises is, as to whether the said delay is satisfactorily explained by the respondent in his claim petition. In the claim petition the respondent has stated that he was making representations to the authorities and further he was under the impression that the respondent cannot raise a dispute after a lapse of 5 years. Further, he was also under the impression that the matter was required to be adjudicated before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and further stated that false assurance and promise were made to the respondent which prevented the respondent from seeking conciliation of the dispute at the earliest point of time. These are the explanations offered by the respondent for seeking reference. 11. The petitioners in their objections to the claim petition have raised a specific plea regarding the delay at paras 8 and 9. 12. The Labour Court has considered the delay of 15 years and has held that the delay would not come in the way of granting the relief and held that in case a person gets better service or some other avocation and loses interest in the job he has lost some time earlier, in such cases, the dispute would become stale and in the background of problem of unemployment being rampant, the delay is not fatal. 13. In the case cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent Sri KB. Narayanaswamy in the case of Ajaib Singh, the Apex Court at paragraph 11 has found that, the respondent-management in the said cases had not raised the plea regarding the delay and there was no such issue before the Labour Court. Further, the Apex Court has observed that in such cases the Labour Court can mould the relief by considering the delay. 14. In the case of Shahaji, the Apex Court has again reiterated the view taken in Ajaib Singh's case and observed that the plea regarding the delay is required to be raised by the management and in case of delay, the Labour Court can mould the relief suitably. 15. 14. In the case of Shahaji, the Apex Court has again reiterated the view taken in Ajaib Singh's case and observed that the plea regarding the delay is required to be raised by the management and in case of delay, the Labour Court can mould the relief suitably. 15. In Sapan Kumar Pandit's case, the Apex Court on interpretation of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act has observed that at any time the Government can make a reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication. That is it can be done only so long as the dispute exists. In other words, the period envisaged by the enduring expression "at any time" terminates with the eclipse of the industrial dispute. It therefore means that if the dispute existed on the day reference was made by Government, it is idle to ascertain the number of years which eclipsed since the commencement of the dispute to determine whether the delay would have extinguished the power of the Government to make the reference. At paragraph 15 of the said judgment, the Apex Court observed that if no body had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons, it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. The judgment of the Apex Court in Sapan Kumar Pandit's case; Ajaib Singh's case; Nedungadi Bank's case and other judgments were considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.G. Chandrappagol and this Court at paragraph 9 has observed as under: "9. The following principles emerge from the aforesaid decisions: (i) In regard to an 'indusbial dispute' between the employer and workmen in regard to terms of employment or conditions of labour (other than deemed industrial disputes relating to individual workman), normally the claims do not become stale. But in the case of deemed industrial disputes relating to termination of individual workman, it is necessary to examine in every case whether the dispute exists or has become stale. The appropriate Government should do it before exercising the power under Section 10(1). The Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal can also examine it when considering the reference. But in the case of deemed industrial disputes relating to termination of individual workman, it is necessary to examine in every case whether the dispute exists or has become stale. The appropriate Government should do it before exercising the power under Section 10(1). The Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal can also examine it when considering the reference. (ii) The Labour Court is not precluded from examining whether the reference should be rejected on the ground that the' dispute ceased to exist or became stale on account of the long unexplained delay on the part of the workman or the Union of workmen in raising the dispute. The mere fact, that the appropriate Government has made a reference under Section 10 of the Act does not mean that the 'dispute' exists or in apprehended. If the Labour Court concludes that, the claim dispute has become 'stale' or 'ceased to exist' on account of inordinate delay, the reference can be rejected on that ground. (iii) The employer can challenge a reference, on the ground that there is no 'existing' dispute that could be referred by filing a petition under Article 226. Instead of filing a writ petition, the employer can also seek rejection of the reference before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court on the ground of unexplained delay rendering the claim stale. (iv) The period of delay to be considered to decide whether a claim is stale or not, is the period between the date of alleged termination and the date on which the process for conciliation/reference is set in motion by or on behalf of the workman. The period spent in conciliation and in the process of making the reference will not be taken into account for determining the period 'of delay. (v) The question whether a dispute or claim has become 'stale' has to be decided by the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court with reference to the facts and circumstances of the case. Any unexplained long delay will render a claim stale. Where the relationship of 'employer' and 'employee' is seriously in dispute, or where there is a dispute as to whether the employee served for the minimum period required under law for any purpose, necessitating production of records by the employer, any delay would make it difficult or impossible for the employer to let in evidence to establish the true facts. Where the relationship of 'employer' and 'employee' is seriously in dispute, or where there is a dispute as to whether the employee served for the minimum period required under law for any purpose, necessitating production of records by the employer, any delay would make it difficult or impossible for the employer to let in evidence to establish the true facts. In such circumstances, the claim may become stale even by passage of three to four years". 16. By referring to the earlier decisions of the Apex Court, this Court has enunciated the principle in the matter of entertaining of references or the powers of the Government to refer the disputes. The facts and circumstances of the said case are identical to the facts and circumstances of this case. In the said case, there was 13 years delay in seeking reference and this Court as regards the said delay has held that the dispute has become a stale dispute on account of long lapse of time in seeking reference. Admittedly in this case, there has been a delay of 15 years even for seeking conciliation of the dispute. 17. As regards the judgment referred to by the learned Counsel for the respondent Sri K.B. Narayanaswamy in the case of Shahaji is concerned, in the said decision the Apex Court has observed that there is no ground urged by the management. The Apex Court in the case of Assistant Engineer, C.A.D. Kota considering the earlier judgment's has held that the issue regarding delay is required to be considered by the Labour Court and the Labour Court cannot abruptly arrive at a conclusion as regards the delay without any justifiable reasons. 18. Sri K.B. Narayanaswamy has also referred to an unreported judgment of this Court in Rasool Khan v The Assistant Executive Engineer and Others1 and he has drawn the attention of this Court to paragraph 9 inter alia pointing out that 18 years delay has been condoned by the Division Bench. He further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court has observed that the said delay is not fatal to the case of reinstatement and it may only disentitle him to any monetary benefits viz., back wages from the date of refusal of work, continuity of service or any consequential benefits. - 19. He further submitted that the Division Bench of this Court has observed that the said delay is not fatal to the case of reinstatement and it may only disentitle him to any monetary benefits viz., back wages from the date of refusal of work, continuity of service or any consequential benefits. - 19. The facts as stated above would indicate that the respondent has not sought for conciliation of the dispute for 15 years. The explanation given by the respondent is not supported by any evidence. Further the Labour Court's observation on the question of delay is that if the workman has no better avocation or has not been employed or lost interest, only in such cases, the delay becomes fatal. The Apex Court and this Court have considered the question of delay and in categorical terms have held that, the delay is required to be explained and based on justifiable reasons, the dispute can be entertained only in the event such a dispute did exist on the date in which the dispute is raised. 20. In this case, after 15 years period in seeking conciliation it cannot be termed as an industrial dispute did exist even after 15 years particularly, when there is no evidence or material to show that there has been any proceeding before the Conciliation Officer or the dispute was alive during this period. If the dispute itself is not in existence, the Government exercising power under Section 10 does not arise and this view is supported by the view taken by the Apex Court. All disputes cannot automatically be entertained unless there exists an industrial dispute and the Division Bench of' this Court has enunciated the principle in the matter of seeking reference of the dispute. Any unexplained long delay will render the claim as stale. 21. I am of the considered view that the Labour Court on surmises and conjecturers and on hypothetical grounds cannot entertain a dispute admittedly where the conciliation is sought for after a lapse of 15 years. Insofar as the decision of the Division Bench is concerned, this Court on the facts and circumstances of the case has held that the delay is not fatal. Insofar as the decision of the Division Bench is concerned, this Court on the facts and circumstances of the case has held that the delay is not fatal. As referred to above, the Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court have held that the unreasonable delay in seeking reference would become fatal particularly when the distance of time may result in denial or production of material evidence by the management and the employer. The Labour Court was not justified in allowing the reference without any valid justification for the delay of 15'years. 22. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The award dated 18-5-2006 is quashed. However, this order will not preclude the Government from continuing or accepting the respondent as daily rated employee if the services of the employee is needed. 23. With this observation, the writ petition stands disposed of.