JUDGMENT By means of this petition, moved under Section 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has sought writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 6-8-1982 (Annexure 8 to the petition), whereby an application moved under Section 24 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), is dismissed by respondent no. 1 i.e. District Jude, Nainital. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the affidavits. and counter affidavit filed by them. 3. Brief facts of the case are that petitioner was tenant in a shop situated in Jwala Line, Ramnagar, District Nainital. Respondent No.2 Mohd. Kasim, was his landlord. An application under Section 21 (1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972,was moved by respondent no. 2 Mohd. Kasim before the Prescribed Authority, Kashipur, for release of his shop for setting up business of his son. (Earlier Kahsipur was part of District Nainital). The petitioner contested the application. However, after hearing the parties, said application for release of the shop, was allowed by the Prescribed Authority vide its order dated 5.5.1977. The petitioner preferred an appeal against said order and the same was also dismissed vide order dated 1.7.1977, by third Additional District Judge, Nainital. Para 6 of the Writ Petition shows that after the writ petition of petitioner was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court against said orders, a special leave to appeal was filed before the Apex Court, under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, and the same was also dismissed. However, the Apex Court allowed time to the petitioner up to 30.4.1979, to vacate the shop. The shop was vacated by the petitioner and landlord obtained the possession of the same on 7.5.1979. The allegation of the petitioner (tenant) is that after obtaining possession, the landlord's sons did not start the business within the time allowed under the law i.e. until 26.7.1979. In the circumstances, as alleged by the petitioner, he moved an application under Section 24 of the Act before the Prescribed Authority for restoration of possession to the tenant. The petitioner's case is that he was wrongly advised to moved said application before the prescribed authority and actually the same should have been moved before the appellate court, which dismissed the appeal. The petitioner's case is that he was wrongly advised to moved said application before the prescribed authority and actually the same should have been moved before the appellate court, which dismissed the appeal. Consequently, the ousted tenant (present petitioner) filed another application under Section 24 of the Act to get back possession of the shop, before District Judge, Nainital, in the year 1981. Meanwhile, petitioner' continued to prosecute the similar application filed earlier, before the Prescribed Authority. The Prescribed Authority dismissed the application on merits on 30.01.1982. Before that, Prescribed Authority refused the permission sought by petitioner to withdraw the said application on 16.12.1981. The court of District Judge, Nainital, after hearing the parties also dismissed the application, moved under Section 24 of the Act, on 6.8.1982 (annexure 8 to the petition), on the ground that the same was barred by time. Aggrieved by the same this Writ Petition is filed before Allahabad High Court on 1.12.1982. (The Writ Petition is received by transfer from Allahabad High Court to this Court under Section 35 of U.P. Reorganization Act, 2000). 4. The impugned order is challenged mainly on the ground that benefit of Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 was available to the petitioner for the purpose of condonation of delay under Section 501 said Act, in moving the application before the appellate court. The petitioner has challenged the impugned order, alleging that the view taken by the District Judge, Nainital (the appellate court), in rejecting the application under Section 24 of the Act, as barred by time, is erroneous in law. 5. Before further discussions, it is pertinent to mention here that relevant provision of law applicable to the case. Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) reads as under : "24. 5. Before further discussions, it is pertinent to mention here that relevant provision of law applicable to the case. Sub-section (1) of Section 24 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) reads as under : "24. Option of re-entry by tenant.- (1) Where a building is released in favour of the landlord and the tenant is evicted under Section 21 or on appeal under Section 22, and the landlord either puts or causes to be put into occupation thereof any person different from the person for whose occupation according to the landlord's representation, the building was required, or permits any such person to occupy it, or otherwise puts it to any use other than the one for which it was released, or as the case may be, omits to occupy it within one month of such extended period as the prescribed authority may for sufficient cause allow from the date of his obtaining possession or, in the case a building which was proposed to be occupied after some construction or reconstruction, from the date of completion thereof, or in the case of a building which was proposed to be demolished, omits to demolish it within two months or such extended period as the prescribed authority may for sufficient cause allow from the date of his obtaining possession, then the prescribed authority or, as the case may be, the District Judge, may, on an application in that behalf within three months from the date of such act or omission, order the landlord to place the evicted tenant in occupation of the building on the original terms and conditions, and on such order being made, the landlord and any person who may be in occupation thereof shall give vacant possession of the building to the said tenant, failing which, the prescribed authority shall put him into possession and may for that purpose use of cause to be used such force as may be necessary." 6. Admittedly, the release application of the landlord (respondent no. 2), was allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the appellate court. Admittedly, the release application of the landlord (respondent no. 2), was allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the appellate court. It is also not disputed that the litigation went up to the Apex Court and finally in compliance of the Apex Court's order the delivery of possession was made over by the tenant (petitioner) to the landlord on 7th May 1979. The dispute between parties before this Court is that whether the landlord did not use the shop for the purpose it was released, within the time allowed. If so, whether lower appellate court has erred in law in rejecting the application under Section 24 of the aforesaid Act, moved by the landlord. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is stated that other shop and residential portion of the building was also released. As such, the landlord made necessary repairs in the building before starting business of his sons. It is also stated in the counter affidavit that two sons of respondent no. 2, namely, Mohd. Izhar and Mohd. Anwar, applied in the office of the Department of Labour, for registration certificate for running the shops. It is stated that in the northern shop Mohd. Anwar started the business and eastern shop Izhar, another son of respondent no. 2 started his business. 7. Having gone through the papers on record, it is evident that admittedly petitioner first filed an application before the Prescribed Authority, under Section 24 of the Act, for restoration of the possession, alleging that the sons of respondent no. 2 have not started the business. The case of the respondents is that due to the principle of law laid down in Heera Lal Vs. I Additional District Judge, Meerut and others 1981Allahabad Rent Cases pg. 209, the application was to be moved before the appellate court, as such the petitioner wanted to withdraw his application from the Prescribed Authority. It is further contended that the petitioner allegedly moved fresh application before the appellate authority, which dismissed the application under Section 24 of the aforesaid Act as barred by time. In the opinion of this Court, it is strange that before application is decided by the prescribed authority, the petitioner chose to file fresh application simultaneously before the appellate court. No law permits this kind of window shopping by filing simultaneous petitions in this manner. In the opinion of this Court, it is strange that before application is decided by the prescribed authority, the petitioner chose to file fresh application simultaneously before the appellate court. No law permits this kind of window shopping by filing simultaneous petitions in this manner. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioner's application moved before the Prescribed Authority was dismissed on merits also. However, in this regard, it is stated by the petitioner that the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to decide the petition. Form the bare perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 24, quoted above, it does not appear that the trial court had no jurisdiction at all to entertain the petition. A part from this in the present case, it is also clear that before Heera Lal's case (supra) decided on November 11, 1980 by Allahabad High Court, and the application had already been moved under Section 24 of the Act, by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority. 8. As far as the impugned order dated 6th August 1982, passed by the District Judge, Nainital is concerned, it has rejected the application, moved under Section 24 of the Act, by the tenant, as barred by time ad not accepted the plea of the petitioner that he is entitled to benefit of Section 14 of Limitation Act for the purposes of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the said Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the view taken by the District Judge, is erroneous in law, as Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963, provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 of Limitation Act shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law. However, the said sub-section (2) of Section 29 makes it clear that the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) of Limitation Act shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 9. However, the said sub-section (2) of Section 29 makes it clear that the provisions contained in Section 4 to 24 (inclusive) of Limitation Act shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. 9. In reply to this, learned counsel for the respondents drew attention of this Court to Section 35 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, which provides that the provisions of Section 4,5 and 12 of Limitation Act, 1963, shall mutatis mutandis apply to all proceedings under said Act. The period of limitation for moving the application is provided under Section 24 of the Act. Therefore, it is argued on behalf of the respondents that the application of Section 4 to 24 except the Sections 4, 5 and 12 of Limitation. Act, 1963 stands excluded. 10. This Curt is in agreement with the contention of learned counsel for the respondents as by specifying the particular Sections 4, 5, and 12 of Limitation Act, 1963, in Section 35 of aforesaid U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it has been made clear that the intention of the legislature is not to have application of other sections of the Limitation Act to the proceedings under the local law i.e. UP. Act No. 13 of 1972. 11. Sri Sudhir Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner drew attention of this Court to the principle of law laid down in Mukri Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil. Aboobacker AIR 1995 SC pg. 2272, and submitted that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has its application to the proceedings under Section U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. I have gone through the aforesaid case law Mukri Gopalan (supra). It is not clear from said case law if there is any analogous provision in Kerala local law to the one contained in Section 35 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.Assuming for a moment, that Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has its application to the proceedings under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, since, the petitioner was contesting simultaneously before both the forums at one point of time as such the benefit of Section 14 of the limitation Act, 1963, cannot said to be available to the petitioner. 12. 12. For the reasons as discussed above, this Court is of the view that the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. No order as to costs.