JUDGMENT Hon’ble Dilip Gupta, J.—The petitioner who was working as the Special Treasury Accountant in the Government Treasury at District Jalaun has challenged the order dated 26th November, 1988 passed by the District Magistrate, Jalaun dismissing him from service. The order dated 15th July, 1999 passed by the Commissioner, Jhansi Division, Jhansi rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner against the aforesaid order has also been challenged and the consequential relief for disbursement of arrears of salary and arrears of pension has also been sought. 2. A charge-sheet dated 20th July, 1988 containing four charges was served upon the petitioner. The first charge was that even though the pensioner Smt. Beena Devi was receiving extraordinary pension of Rs. 15/- per month yet even in the absence of any order for revision of pension, the petitioner, in clear violation of the rules prepared the pension revision voucher for Rs. 7632/-. The second charge was that even in the absence of the disbursal half slip the petitioner prepared the voucher of Rs. 7632/- merely on the basis of the pensioner half slip. The third charge was that in the pensioner half slip amount of Rs. 1632/- was mentioned whereas in the other document maintained in the office, the petitioner had mentioned an amount of Rs. 7632/-. The last charge was that when the aforesaid facts came to the knowledge of the authorities, the petitioner deposited Rs. 7632/- in the treasury. 3. The petitioner filed a detailed reply to the aforesaid charge-sheet on 5th August, 1988. The Enquiry Officer submitted a detailed Enquiry Report holding the petitioner guilty of all the charges. In respect of the first charge, it was observed that the contention of the petitioner that he was not aware of the fact that the lady pensioner was being given extraordinary pension, the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding that from the various entries made in the pension payment order, it was clear that the pensioner was receiving extraordinary pension. In respect of the second charge the Enquiry Officer recorded a finding that even in the absence of the disbursal half slip, the petitioner had prepared the arrears voucher merely on the basis of the pensioner half slip which was contrary to the rules. In respect of third charge the Enquiry Officer observed that with a view to misappropriate the amount, the petitioner had mentioned an amount of Rs. In respect of third charge the Enquiry Officer observed that with a view to misappropriate the amount, the petitioner had mentioned an amount of Rs. 7632/- in the office records even though in the pensioner half slip, only Rs.1600/- was mentioned and this was the amount which was actually paid to the pensioner instead of Rs. 7632. The fourth charge was also found to be proved inasmuch as the lady pensioner had only returned the amount of Rs. 1600/- and the petitioner himself deposited Rs. 7632/- after making good the deficiency. The appellate authority has, after considering the matter, by a detailed order rejected the appeal. 4. I have heard Sri Khare, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri Piyush Shukla, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 5. Sri Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the entire amount had been deposited, no pecuniary loss was caused to the Government and, therefore, the order of dismissal was bad in law and in any case the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the offence. He also submitted that the allegations made against the petitioner do not constitute a charge of misconduct as it was the case of mere mistake or negligence. Learned Standing Counsel on the other hand submitted that the Enquiry Officer after giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner found all the charges to be proved and it cannot be said to be a case of mere negligence or mistake. He further urged that the act of the petitioner not only caused pecuniary loss to the Government but it also amounted to cheating the illiterate lady pensioner as only Rs. 1600/- was paid to her as against the amount of Rs. 7632/- that was mentioned in the record of the office that had been prepared by the petitioner. He further submitted that mere deposit of amount when the act was noticed by the higher authorities would not absolve the petitioner and in such a case where financial implications are involved, the order of dismissal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of offence. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was a case of mere mistake was not accepted by the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was a case of mere mistake was not accepted by the Enquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. A perusal of the Enquiry Report and the order of dismissal clearly shows that the reply submitted by the petitioner had been carefully examined but was not accepted. There was no occasion for the petitioner to himself revise the pension in the absence of any order and that too in respect of a person who was receiving extraordinary pension of Rs. 15/- per month only. The case set up by the petitioner that the pension payment order did not indicate that it was a case of extraordinary pension was not accepted as the said document clearly exhibited that it was a case of extraordinary pension. In such circumstances it cannot be said to be a case of mere mistake. In fact, there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the petitioner to not only confer benefit upon the lady pensioner but also to confer benefit upon himself as not only was the amount of pension revised at a higher rate but the lady pensioner was also only paid Rs. 1600/- as against the indicated amount of Rs. 7632/-. 7. Regarding re-appreciation of evidence by the High Court, the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar v. Shri Udaysingh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar & Ors., JT 1997 (5) SC 298 clearly held as follows : “..... In judicial review, it is settled law that the Court or the Tribunal has no power to trench on the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own conclusion. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. It is meant to ensure that the delinquent receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the view of the Court or Tribunal. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. When the conclusion reached by the authority is based on evidence, Tribunal is devoid of power to reappreciate the evidence and would (sic) come to its own conclusion on the proof of the charge. The only consideration the Court/Tribunal has in its judicial review is to consider whether the conclusion is based on evidence on record and supports the finding or whether the conclusion is based on no evidence. This is the consistent view of this Court vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan, JT 1994 (5) SC 337 : (1994) 6 SCC 302 (SCC para 7); Union of India v. Upendra Singh, JT 1994 (1) SC 658 : (1994) 3 SCC 357 (SCC para 6); Government of Tamil Nadu v. A. Rajapandian, JT 1994 (7) SC 492 : (1995) 1 SCC 216 (SCC para 4) and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 (at pp. 759-60)” 8. The Supreme Court in Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and others, (1997) 3 SCC 657 held as follows : “Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the High Court would be correct in law to appreciate the evidence and the manner in which the evidence was examined and to record a finding in that behalf. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. The High Court, in the proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority but exercises within the limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. In this case, no such errors were pointed out nor any finding in that behalf was recorded by the High Court. On the other hand, the High Court examined the evidence as if it is a Court of first appeal and reversed the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by disciplinary authority. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.” 9. Under these circumstances, the question of examining the evidence, as was done by the High Court, as a first appellate Court, is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained.” 9. In R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab, (1999) 8 SCC 90 , the Supreme Court observed as follows : “Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the Court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the Court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard.” 10. In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 583 the Supreme Court observed as follows : “While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank & Ors., (2003) 3 SCC 583 the Supreme Court observed as follows : “While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.” 11. The adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the Court in writ proceedings. The High Court in proceedings under Article 226 does not act as an appellate authority. In the present case, the conclusion arrived at by the enquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material and nor is it the case where there has been any non-application of mind by the Enquiry Officer. 12. The Enquiry Officer has carefully considered the reply submitted by the petitioner. Such being the position, in view of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, it is not possible to accept the submissions of Sri Khare, learned counsel for the petitioner that this Court should re-appraise the evidence and record a different finding. 13. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in such matters a sympathetic view should be taken cannot also be accepted. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. This is what was observed by the Supreme Court in Regional Manager, U.P. S.R.T.C., Etawah & Anr. v. Hoti Lal & Anr., (2003) 3 SCC 605 . It was also observed : "Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal.” 14. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court do not appear to be proper. We set aside the same and restore order of the learned Single Judge upholding the order of dismissal.” 14. In Regional Manager, RSRTC v. Ghanshyam Sharma, (2002) 10 SCC 330 the Supreme Court held that bus conductors who by their actions or inactions cause financial loss to the corporations are not fit to be retained in service. 15. In Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti, (2001) 2 SCC 574 the Supreme Court observed that misplaced sympathy was shown by Courts in awarding lesser punishments where on checking it is found that the bus conductors have either not issued tickets to a large number of passengers, though they should have, or have issued tickets of a lower denomination knowing fully well the correct fare to be charged. It is the responsibility of the bus conductors to collect the correct fare from the passengers and deposit the same with the Corporation. They act in a fiduciary capacity and it would be a case of gross misconduct if knowingly they do not collect any fare or the correct amount of fare. 16. In view of the aforesaid decisions it cannot be said that the punishment of dismissal was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. 17. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that as the amount had been deposited, the punishment of dismissal from service was not justified, cannot also be accepted because if such a contention is accepted it would encourage employees to cause financial loss to the employers and whenever such acts are noticed, to deposit the same to avoid punishment. As has been emphasised by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, misplaced sympathy in such matters should not be shown by Courts by awarding lesser punishment. 18. For all the reasons stated above, there is no merits in this petition. It is, accordingly, dismissed. ———