JUDGMENT:- The appellants/plaintiffs have filed this revision against the order passed by Additional District Judge, Washim on application under Section 4 of the Places of Worship Act filed by the respondent. 2. The facts giving rise to this revision are as follows: There is a temple at village Shirpur in Washim Taluka of Akola District, in which an idol of God Shri. Antariksha Parshwanath 23rd Jain Tirthankar is installed. It is said that the said temple and the idol is in existence since time immemorial. It was noticed by the devotees of God Antariksha Parshwanath that Polkars were usurping the management of the temple. As a result of this the devotees belonging to Digambari and Shwetambarisect came together in the year 1901 to oust the Polkars. In the year 1905 a meeting of the two sects held and it was decided that both the sects shall worship the idol of God Antariksha Parshwanath according to the time table as settled between them. This arrangement continued until 1908. It was decided in the year 1908 by both the sects together that a new plaster (Lep) should be applied to the idol and they accordingly authorised one Kalyanchand Lalchand Yewalkar a Shwetambai devotee to undertake the job. Under the directions of Kalyanchand it is alleged that the artists who were to apply the plaster started making unauthorised additions and alterations to the idol and with a view to create and establish that it was an idol of Shwetambari sect. The difference between the two sects is that the Digambari Jains worship a totally nude idol while the Shwetambaris worship an idol with a Kati Sutra and Kachota. Digambaris refuse to worship an idol with Kati-Sutra and Kachota while Shwetambari refuse to worship a totally nude idol. In the year 1910 one Harakchand Gulabchand and others belonging to the Shwetambari sect filed Civil Suit No.4 of 1910 praying that the idol and the temple be declared as belonging to the Shwetambaris only. The matter went up to the Privy Council and the Privy Council held that the parties should continue to worship the idol according to old time table. It recognised the rights of the Digambaris to worship the idol and both parties were directed to maintain harmonious relations. 3. This judgment of the Privy Council was rendered on 09.07.1929. The matter went up to the Privy Council and the Privy Council held that the parties should continue to worship the idol according to old time table. It recognised the rights of the Digambaris to worship the idol and both parties were directed to maintain harmonious relations. 3. This judgment of the Privy Council was rendered on 09.07.1929. It is not in dispute that according to this judgment the Digambaris and Shwetambaris continued to worship the idol and there was no dispute what so ever until 1959. It is alleged that in the year 1959 the existing plaster was removed and it was found that idol was a Digambari idol and not Shwetambari idol. It is alleged that the idol is made out of a stone and not out of sand and that would also show that the idol is totally nude and belongs to Digambari sect. The dispute, therefore, arose between the parties in the year 1959. Some proceedings under Section 145 Criminal Procedure Code were also initiated. Subsequently, the Digambari devotees instituted a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, at Washim in 1960 which later came to be numbered as 2 of 1992. The said suit came to be dismissed and an appeal No.7 of 1995 came to be filed. The suit has essentially been filed with a view to declare that the decree obtained in Civil Suit No.4 of 1910 has been f obtained by fraud. 4. The suit was resisted by the defendants on several grounds. 5. While the appeal was pending the respondents/defendants moved an application Ex.30 under Section 4 of Places of Worship Act, 1991. It was contended by the defendants in this application that plaintiffs by this suit sought to convert the idol and temple into Digambar idol and temple which is prohibited by Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Places of Worship Act. 6. This application was resisted by the plaintiffs by filing a reply. They denied the allegations made by the defendants. They denied that the Antariksha Parshwanath temple has been existing as a Shwetambari temple. It is in fact a temple belonging to the Digambari sect and there is, therefore, no question of converting it. It was contended that the provisions of Section 4 of Places of Worship Act do not apply to the instant proceedings. 7. They denied that the Antariksha Parshwanath temple has been existing as a Shwetambari temple. It is in fact a temple belonging to the Digambari sect and there is, therefore, no question of converting it. It was contended that the provisions of Section 4 of Places of Worship Act do not apply to the instant proceedings. 7. The learned Judge of the First Appellate Court heard the parties and found that the plaintiffs sought to convert the place of worship into exclusively a place of worship meant for Digambaris and, therefore, he held that the suit is liable to be abated under the provisions of the Act. Being aggrieved by this order the plaintiffs have filed this revision: 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners and the respondents. The main controversy is whether the idol of God Antariksha Parshwanath is a Digambari idol or Shwetambari idol. It is no more in dispute that the temple as such is under the management of the Shwetambaris. 9. The dispute is still unresolved and this is a second round of litigation though the matter was decided by the then existing Highest Court i.e. the Privy Council. I do not intend to go into the question as to whether it is Digambari idol or a Shwetambari idol or whether the decree that was obtained in Civil Suit No.4 of 1910 was obtained by practicing fraud. 10. The new Act i.e. the Places of Worship Act 1991 (hereinafter referred to as P.W. Act) came into effect to maintain the status quo and not to convert any place of worship at all. The next thing that we have to see is if the present place of worship falls within the exception as provided in the Act. P.W. Act consists of only 8 Sections, out of which first 4 Sections are relevant for our purpose. It would be desirable to reproduce Sections 3 and 4 here: "Sec.3 : Bar of conversion of places of worship- No person shall convert any place of worship of any religious denomination or any section thereto into a place of worship of a different section of the same religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof. It would be desirable to reproduce Sections 3 and 4 here: "Sec.3 : Bar of conversion of places of worship- No person shall convert any place of worship of any religious denomination or any section thereto into a place of worship of a different section of the same religious denomination or of a different religious denomination or any section thereof. Sec.4 : Declaration as to the religious character of certain places of worship and bar of jurisdiction of Courts, etc.(1) It is hereby declared that the religious character of a place of worship existing on the 15th day of August, 1947 shall continue to be the same as it existed on that day. 2. If, on the commencement of this Act, any suit, appeal or other proceeding with respect to the conversion of the religious character of any place of worship, existing on the 15th day of August, 1947, is pending before any Court, tribunal or other authority, the same shall abate, and no suit, appeal or other proceeding with respect to any such matter shall lie on or after such commencement in any Court, tribunal or other authority: Provided that if any suit, appeal or other proceedings, instituted or filed on the ground that conversion has taken place in the religious character of any such place after the 15th day of August, 1947, is pending on the commencement of this Act, such suit, appeal or other proceeding shall not so abate and every such suit, appeal or other proceeding shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of subsection (1). 3. Nothing contained in sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) shall apply to (a) any place of worship referred to in the said sub-section which is an ancient and historical monument or an archaeological site or remains covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958 or any other law for the time being in force; (b) any suit, appeal or other proceeding, with respect to any matter referred to in subsection (2), finally decided, settled or disposed of by a Court, tribunal or other authority before the commencement of this Act. (c) any dispute with respect to any such matter settled by the parties amongst themselves before such commencement; (d) any conversion of any such place effected before such commencement by acquiescence; (e) any conversion of any such place effected before such commencement which is not liable to be challenged in any Court, tribunal or other authority being barred by limitation under any law for the time being in force." With this it would also be necessary to look into the relevant pleadings of the plaintiffs in Civil Suit No.2 of 1992. In para 5 of the plaint the plaintiffs specifically admit that by virtue of Privy Council judgment the Shwetambaris are in exclusive management of the temple. In para 8 of the plaint it is alleged that during a joint meeting of bother sects in 1905, it was decided that both the sects would worship the God according to their tenets turn by turn. This arrangement according to them continued till 1908. In para 29 of the plaint it is alleged that the idol has a legal right and status and it has a right to have its worship conducted according to Digambari tenets and without there being any Kachota and Kati-Sutra on the idol. In para 39 it is contended that in 1959 is was discovered by the plaintiffs that the original form of the idol was Digambar i.e. totally nude and there was no Kati-Sutra and Kachota on the idol. Finally plaintiffs pray that it be declared that the idol is entitled to be worshiped according to Digambari tenets only and Shwetambaris be compelled to remove the plaster which conceals the original form. 11. Virtually the plaintiffs seek to declare the idol exclusively as Digambari idol. It is not in dispute that normally the Digambaris would not worship the idol which has a KatiSutra and Kachota while the Shwetambaris would not worship the totally nude idol. It is also not in dispute that Jains are divided into two sects i.e. Digambaris and Shwetambaris. Why this is being mentioned here is because Section 3 of the Places of Worship Act relates to different sections of the same religion. Before dilating further on this aspect, it would be necessary to reproduce here the decision and directions given by the Privy Council in its judgment: "But the question is not only one of form or of pleading. Before dilating further on this aspect, it would be necessary to reproduce here the decision and directions given by the Privy Council in its judgment: "But the question is not only one of form or of pleading. It is also one of substance. The appellants' case forcibly presented to the Board was that the facts found by the learned Trial Judge imported an agreement between the two sects as definite and permanent in the matter of joint management, as the time table in the matter of worship was not admitted to be. No such agreement however is pleaded even in the alternative. No issue with regard to it was directed. No such issue could have been directed as the existence of such an arrangement was entirely contrary to the only pleaded case either of the plaintiffs or of the defendants. Moreover the evidence taken was not pointed to any such issue, and, as it stands, is, in all its prolioxity on this issue, incomplete. In saying this, their Lordships have specially in mind the absence of Kalyanchand from the witness box an absence only justifiable by the fact that this matter on which his evidence must have been so direct was not in issue at the trial. Lastly, the concession of the time table now made by the respondents does not, as it seems to their Lordships, carry with it any admission of a right on the part of the Digambaris to participate in the management. No one has, in fact, suggested that the time table without management is value less. On the contrary, the evidence shows that this has been the prevailing order since the final rupture between the parties took place in 1908. Their Lordships need hardly affirm that what they may call the Digambari right to the time table as now declared, with all its implications, is in no sense a matter of favour. It is a matter of right capable of being enforced in execution. The Shwetambaris will understand that any interference with the full enjoyment of that right at the Digambaris will bring them into conflict with the Courts. Nor will they forget that, by the admission or their learned counsel before the Board, they make no claim to the collections of money and offerings made by worshippers during the Digambari periods of worship. The Shwetambaris will understand that any interference with the full enjoyment of that right at the Digambaris will bring them into conflict with the Courts. Nor will they forget that, by the admission or their learned counsel before the Board, they make no claim to the collections of money and offerings made by worshippers during the Digambari periods of worship. With these matters kept fully in mind by the Shwetambaris, there seems to, their Lordships to be no reason why under this arrangement, the relations between the two sects should not in this matter be in the future entirely harmonious." This decision as on today is a final decision since Civil Suit No.2 of 1992 having been dismissed, the decree in the first suit stands as it is. To my mind, therefore, the parties are very much bound by the arrangement as suggested in the above paragraphs of the judgment of the Privy Council. We have seen that plaintiffs certainly want the idol to be declared as Digambari idol and want to worship the idol all the time according to their tenets and not according to tenets of Shwetambari sets. They want, for that purpose, the plaster to be removed and Kati-Sutra and Kachota also to be removed. If that is so, then Shwetambaris would be permanently deprived of their rights to worship the idol according to their tenets. Undisputed fact is that the idol as on today has a plaster with Kati-Sutra and Kachota. One does not know for certain, if it is a nude idol or otherwise, but if it is found to be nude idol that would 'certainly result into conversion falling within the scope of Section 3 of the Act. 12. Which of the places of worship are exempted is given in Section 4(3) of the P.W. Act. If the case does not fall in any of the exemptions the Act would apply and the suit abates and the order of the lower Court will have to be affirmed. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs contended that the case falls under Clause (a) and (b) of Sub-section 3 of Section 4 of the P.W. Act. I shall deal with the provisions of Clause (a). 13. The learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs contended that the case falls under Clause (a) and (b) of Sub-section 3 of Section 4 of the P.W. Act. I shall deal with the provisions of Clause (a). Clause (a) grants exemption to those places of worship which are ancient and historical monuments, archaeological sites and remains which are covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites And Remains Act. Ancient Monument has been defined as follows in the Ancient Monuments And Archaeological Sites And Remains Act, 1958: "Ancient monument" means any structure, erection or monument, or any tumulus or place of interment, or any cave, rock sculpture, inscription or monolith, which is of historical, archaeological or artistic interest and which has been in existence for not less than one hundred years, and includes- (i) the remains of an ancient monument, (ii) the site of an ancient monument, (iii) such portion of land adjoining the site of an ancient monument as may be required for fencing or covering in or otherwise preserving such monument, and (iv) the means of access to, and convenient inspection of an ancient monument. One of the conditions is that it must be a monument which is 100 or more years old. It is not in dispute that the present temple is more than 200 years old. Besides this it should also be of a historical, archaeological and artistic interest. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs/ petitioners submitted that enough evidence has been produced to show that-it is a historical site and therefore, covered by Clause (a). He invited my attention to the copies of Gazetteers. The notes in the Gazetteers do suggest that it is a monument of great religious importance. There are inscription etc. on the temple which are usually found on all temples. It is in fact observed on page 7 as follows: It is not a striking building but the image which looks as if it was made of a kind of black stone and has the peculiarity that it is so supported as barely to touch the ground at a single point. A cloth can be passed almost entire under it. Obviously, it is not a monument of archaeological or artistic interest. I, therefore, do not find that it is a temple which falls in that category. 14. A cloth can be passed almost entire under it. Obviously, it is not a monument of archaeological or artistic interest. I, therefore, do not find that it is a temple which falls in that category. 14. The learned counsel for the defendants/respondents contended that the Court in fact should not consider this aspect at all since there is no contention in the reply of Ex.33 filed in the lower Court that it is an ancient monument and is therefore exempted. After having gone through this reply it is clear that no exemption is pleaded. On the other hand in para 19 of the reply it is contended that suit does not fall within the mischief of Section 4 at all. The learned counsel Shri. Bhangade submitted that since there is no such plea in the revision, such a plea cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time. This is also not a plea purely of law. In support of the proposition two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Madan Mohan Kotal Vs. Gobinda Kotal And Another, (2002)9 Supreme Court Cases 457 and Amla Chakravarty (Dead) through Lrs. Vs. Ranjit Kumar Choudhary, (2000)10 Supreme Court Cases 339 were placed before me. It is certainly held in Amla Chakravarty's case that unless a foundation is laid in the pleadings in respect of a contention, the High Court in revision cannot entertain it at all. In this case there is not only no pleadings but there is a positive pleading that the case is not covered by Section 4. With this argument as advanced that the case falls under Section 4(3)(a) by the plaintiffs has to be negatived. In fact, the other leg of argument that the case falls under Section 4(3)(b) has to be negatived for the very same reason. 15. Although the second contention can be rejected out right, I propose to consider it. Sub-section 1 of Section 4 says that the religious character of any place existing on 15th day of August, 1947 shall continue to be the same as it existed on that day, while Sub-Section 2 says that if any suit is pending on commencement of the Act with regard to conversion of religious character existing on 15.08.1947 the same shall abate. To my mind the case would and could fall in both categories i.e. first round of litigation upto Privy Council the last and the Highest Court, it came to an end on 09.07.1929. The new litigation commenced in 1960 when a fresh suit was filed to set aside the decree in the old suit of 1910. As on 15.08.1947 no litigation was pending, the present suit and the appeal therefrom in which the impugned order is passed was pending on commencement of this P.W. Act. We have seen that the relief as claimed in the new suit seeks to convert the place of worship into one exclusively worshipped by the Digambaris. Hence it would fall under SubSection 2 of Section 4 and the suit or appeal shall abate. Clause (b) of Sub-Section 3 says that nothing contained in Sub-Sections 1 and 2 of Section 4 shall apply to any suit, appeal with respect to any matter referred to in Sub-Section 2 which are finally decided or disposed of. The present case cannot fall under exemption in Clause (b) because the suit or appeal seeking conversion was pending on the date of commencement of the Act. 16. Shri. Bhangade the learned counsel invited my attention to the Statement of Objects and Shri. Dharmadhikari the learned counsel also had partly relied upon the Statement of Objects for interpreting the provisions of the Act. The question as to whether the Statement of Objects of the Act could be looked into for interpretation of the provisions of the Act, need not be gone into. As a result it is not necessary for me to refer to a decision reported in S. S. Bola And Others. Vs. B. D. Sardana And Others, 1997(8) Supreme Court Cases 522. I do not intend to look into that because I do not find that any of the provisions in the Act is ambiguous. 17. Shri. Dharmadhikari the learned counsel contended that first decree in Civil Suit No.4 of 1910 was obtained by fraud. He submitted that the decree obtained by fraud is a nullity. This proposition of law cannot be disputed at all. Shri. Dharmadhikari the learned counsel had referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. And Others, (1994)1 Supreme Court Cases 1. He submitted that the decree obtained by fraud is a nullity. This proposition of law cannot be disputed at all. Shri. Dharmadhikari the learned counsel had referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. And Others, (1994)1 Supreme Court Cases 1. Although a decree obtained by fraud is a nullity, until a declaration is so obtained, the decree stands, although a declaration' may relate back. Assuming that the decree in Civil Suit No.4 of 1910 was obtained by fraud I do not think that, that would make any difference so far as these proceedings are concerned. First suit in any case was decided in 1929. As per Section 4(1) of the P.W. Act the position as it existed on 15.08.1947 has to be maintained. I would reproduce here the pleadings in para 22 of the plaint in Civil Suit No.2 of 1992 : In pursuance of the said judgment and decree of the Privy/council, the Shwetambaris on or about 1947, completed the first plastering (lep) the defendant no.8 with the configuration or Kati-Sutra and Kachota and the said sect continued to worship the defdt. no.8 in accordance with the said time table (The Shwetambaris exclusively managing the affairs of the said temple and defendant no.8). This would certainly go to show that in 1947 the idol had Kati-Sutra and Kachota. Prayer clause (b) in plaint of 2 of 1992 is to the following effect : (b) that pending the hearing and final disposal of suit that the defendants of Shwetambari sect, their agents and servants may be compelled by an order and mandatory injunction of this Hon 'ble court to remove the plaster which conceals the said original Digambari form of the first plaintiff defendant no.8 and particularly the said configuration of the Kachota, Katisutra and other configurations which are contrary to and/or repugnant to the Digambari ceremonies, -------- rites and practices. "In order to restore the condition of the image as seen at end of November 1959". Obviously the plaintiffs want to remove the plaster on the idol and expose it. Thus they want the primafacie character of the idol to be changed which would lead to the conversion, if at all the idol is found to be Digambari upon removal of the plaster. Obviously the plaintiffs want to remove the plaster on the idol and expose it. Thus they want the primafacie character of the idol to be changed which would lead to the conversion, if at all the idol is found to be Digambari upon removal of the plaster. Law does not permit that as Section 3 prohibits at any kind of conversion or alterations. The case, therefore, falls under Section 4(1) and (2) and as such the learned Judge of the first appellate Court rightly held the suit to have abated. There is, therefore, no substance in the Revision Application No. 1148 of 1977. It is dismissed. Consequent upon the fact that the suit stands abated, Civil Revision No.582 of 1995 and Appeal No.49 of 1995 become infructuous. Revision dismissed.