Judgment :- S.R. Singharavelu, J. 1. There was an order dated 18.04.2002 in this Criminal Appeal No.696 of 1997 by the Division Bench of this Court while dismissing the above Criminal Appeal preferred by the appellant accused by name one Nallakannu @ Muthu, and a part thereof is as follows: "35.We are of the view that this is a fit case where we have to direct the prosecution of Murugan as well as Popular Muthiah; and the learned State Public Prosecutor shall advise the State as to under what section they have to be charged and tried. We direct the C.B.C.I.D., to take over the matter and re-investigate and prosecute the said Murugan and Popular Muthiah." 2. It is against the said order the affected parties Popular Muthiah and Murugan preferred the appeals in Crl.A.Nos.107 and 108 of 2003 before the Apex Court. In the said appeals, a common order was passed on 04.07.2006 whereby the impugned judgment of this Division Bench of this Court was set aside and the matter was remitted back to this Court for consideration afresh. 3. Before going to the proposition of law by which the above order of remand was made by the Honble Supreme Court, it is worth mentioning the reasons given by this Court for making an order of reinvestigation in order to reinvestigate and prosecute the said Murugan and Popular Muthiah that reason is found in Paragraph 33 of the judgment of this Court in the following lines: "The witnesses P.Ws.1 and 2 have given evidence implicating Murugan and Popular Muthiah and P,.Ws.3 and 4 have given evidence against Murugan and hence in conformity with the provision of the Act, the trial Judge should have proceeded against Murugan and Popular Muthiah by framing necessary charges and trying them along with the appellant herein." 4. At this stage, it will be worthwhile to mention a few facts of the prosecution case, which are as follows: "On 13.03.1992, the brother of Nallakannu @ Muthu was said to have fatally been attacked in Maruthur village. A case was registered against P.W.3, the brother of P.W.1, Arasappan, the father of P.W.1 Vanumamalai, brother-in-law of P.W.3 Raja, Son of P.W.3, Raj son of P.W.1s sister Ganambal and George (deceased) son of P.W.1s sister Ganambal. They were arrested and released on bail subject to certain conditions. A case was registered against P.W.3, the brother of P.W.1, Arasappan, the father of P.W.1 Vanumamalai, brother-in-law of P.W.3 Raja, Son of P.W.3, Raj son of P.W.1s sister Ganambal and George (deceased) son of P.W.1s sister Ganambal. They were arrested and released on bail subject to certain conditions. P.W.1 and her relatives after the said incident allegedly shifted to another village Palayamkottai. The father-in-law of P.W.1 was a homoeopathic doctor. He was having a medical shop. He was also having a hotel commonly known as Hare Krishna" hotel. The medical shop and the hotel were situate opposite to each other near Palayamkottai bus stand and were at a distance of 6 furlongs from the house of P.W.1. On 11.07.1992 at about 3.00 pm., PW.3 – brother of P.W.1 Arasappan-father of P.W.1, Vanumamalai brother-in-law of P.W.3, Raj-Son of P.W.1s sister Ganambal and George (deceased) son of P.W.1s sister Ganambal came to the house of P.W.1. As P.W.1 was not feeling well, she came to the medical shop of her father-in-law to purchase medicines. Nallakannu @ Muthu, Murugan and Popular Muthiah came behind him in a Rajdoot motorcycle. They stopped them near the Palayamkottai bus stand. The appellant Popular Muthiah allegedly shouted to kill George – son of P.W.1s sister Gananmbal and left the scene on the motorcycle leaving behind Nallakannu and Murugan. Nallakannu took a sickle which is said to have been hidden in his shirt and assaulted George on the left side of his neck. The deceased who received bleeding injury left his chappals there and started to run from the said place. Nallakannu and Murugan allegedly chased him. The deceased ran inside Hare Krishna hotel which, as noticed hereinbefore, owned by father-in-law of P.W1. At that time, P.W.3 – brother of P.W.1 and P.W.4 Ashokan, brother-in-law of P.W.1 were inside the hotel. Upon noticing that the deceased was being chased, P.W.3 and Ashokan came out of the hotel. Inside the hotel, Murugan is said to have assaulted the deceased on his chest. Nallakannu @ Muthu also assaulted him on the left side of his chest. The deceased also received injuries at their hands on his shoulder and on the left ear. The deceased thereafter fell down whereupon Nallakannu again is said to have assaulted the deceased on the left side of his chest with the sickle. Thereafter, Nallakannu came out of the hotel and went towards west. The deceased also received injuries at their hands on his shoulder and on the left ear. The deceased thereafter fell down whereupon Nallakannu again is said to have assaulted the deceased on the left side of his chest with the sickle. Thereafter, Nallakannu came out of the hotel and went towards west. The deceased was taken to the Government Hospital, Palayamkottai in an auto-rickshaw by P.W.3 along with P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 where he was declared dead by the doctor. A First Information Report in respect of the said incident was lodged by P.W.1." 5. Before the learned Trial Judge Nallamuthu @ Muthu alone was charge sheeted and after trial, he convicted for commission of the said offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. Even though all the eye-witnesses allegedly took the names of Popular Muthiah and Murugan as having played an active role in the entire episode, the powers exerciseable under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not made. 6. An appeal made by him before this Court, the Division Bench of this Court examined the materials brought on record by the prosecution in detail besides confirming the conviction and sentence of Nallakannu @ Muthu which has not been assailed, had opined that "i) the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 unimpeachably show the involvement of Popular Muthiah (abetting), Murugan and the accused in inflicting the fatal injuries to the deceased; ii) the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 show the role played by Murugan and the accused and iii) in Ex.I, all the evidences were found fully reflective” 7. The Division Bench of this Court had also opined that the action on the part of the investigating officers viz., P.W.17 and P.W.18 leaving out the names of Popular Muthiah and Murugan from the array of accused was not a bona fide error. It was observed as follows: "As we feel that Murugan and Popular Muthiah had been left out willfully by the Investigating Agency, we direct the Director General of Police to seriously probe into it and take follow-up action in accordance with law. The fact that the occurrence took place in 1992 and we are in 2002 should not be taken as a reason for taking a lenient view by all those concerned including the Court. The fact that the occurrence took place in 1992 and we are in 2002 should not be taken as a reason for taking a lenient view by all those concerned including the Court. If the instances of this nature are allowed to happen, certainly the people will lose faith in Police force and in turn in the State Administration as well as in the administration of justice by Courts. In view of our conclusion that since there is evidence at every stage implicating Murugan and Popular Muthiah in the crime relating to the murder of George, justice requires that the Investigating Agency must have a fresh look on the materials already available on record and the materials to be collected pursuant to this order in the re-investigation connecting Popular Muthiah and Murugan also with the crime. Therefore, we order fresh investigation by the Investigating Agency so far as Popular Muthiah and Murugan are concerned. Consequently, the Director General of Police is directed to entrust the investigation in this case relating to the involvement of Popular Muthiah and Murugan to CBCID. The Director General of Police is also directed to nominate an officer, not below the rank of Superintendent of Police, to monitor the investigation to be done by CBCID. The Director General of Police is also directed to deeply probe into the lapses on the part of P.W.17 Rajaram and P.W.18 Thondiraj in the Investigation conducted with reference to the murder of George, so also in the prosecution and take follow-up action in accordance with law." 8. The High Court also felt that the District Judge ought to have conducted himself fairly in the matter of exercising his jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, based upon these materials reinvestigation in order to prosecute the said Popular Muthiah and Murugan was ordered by this Court. 9. While passing such order of reinvestigation to prosecute the above two individuals this Court had exercised its inherent jurisdiction in order to secure justice in terms of Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. As against the said order of the Division Bench of this Court, Popular Muthiah and Murugan preferred the appeal before the Honble Apex Court. 9. While passing such order of reinvestigation to prosecute the above two individuals this Court had exercised its inherent jurisdiction in order to secure justice in terms of Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure. 10. As against the said order of the Division Bench of this Court, Popular Muthiah and Murugan preferred the appeal before the Honble Apex Court. While dealing with such appeals, the following issues were formulated by the Honble Apex Court: "i) Whether the High Court while exercising its appellate jurisdiction under Section 374(2) read with 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could direct further investigation of the case against the persons whom the High Court felt should have been included in the challan on the basis of the materials on record available before the appellate Court? ii)Whether only because of the fact that the appellate power of the High Court in terms of Sections 374(2), 386 and 391 does not contain any specific power to direct further investigation, the High Court lacked jurisdiction from seeking recourse to its inherent and supervisory powers under Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a case of this nature? iii) Whether the impugned judgment is wholly unsustainable as prior to issuing the impugned direction, the principles of natural justice had not been complied with?." 11. In the judgment of the appeals on the file of the Honble Apex Court, it was observed that "the High Court was not correct in issuing a direction to the State to take advice of the State Public Prosecutor as to under what Section the appellant has to be charged and tried or directing the CBCID to take up the matter and re-investigate and prosecute the appellant herein. Such a power does not come within the purview of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Investigation of an offence is a statutory power of the police. The State in its discretion may get the investigation done by any agency unless there exists an extraordinary situation. Yet again, it is for the public prosecutor to discharge his duties in terms of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court, thus has no role to play in such matters. The State in its discretion may get the investigation done by any agency unless there exists an extraordinary situation. Yet again, it is for the public prosecutor to discharge his duties in terms of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court, thus has no role to play in such matters. Ordinarily, it is for the public Prosecutor himself to see to whom and how to render his advice or as to whether the State would like to proceed against an accused or not.... It went beyond its jurisdiction in directing the prosecution of the appellant before us.....". 12. The following is the further observation made by the Apex Court: "In a case of this nature, therefore, in our opinion, it would have been in the fitness of things, the appellant should have been heard by the High Court.".... Had an opportunity of hearing been given, the State also could have shown that for valid reasons the investigating officer did not think it fit to proceed against the appellant and that there was otherwise justifiable reasons to file the final form." 13. It was further observed that so far as inherent power of the High Court is concerned, indisputably the same is required to be exercised sparingly. The High Court may or may not in a given situation, particularly having regard to lapse of time, exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. For the said purpose, it was not only required to apply its mind to the materials on records but was also required to consider as to whether any purpose would be served thereby. In that context, the matter was remitted back for fresh disposal. 14. In view of the observations, we have issued notice to the State Public Prosecutor, the appellant Nallakannau @ Muthu who is undergoing sentence and also the appellants before the Supreme Court namely Popular Muthiah and Murugan. That notice was served to the counsel for Popular Muthiah as well as the counsel for Murugan. 15. We have heard Mr.Raja Elango, learned Public Prosecutor, Mr.K.Chellapandian, learned counsel appearing for Popular Muthiah and Mr.V.Kathirvelu, learned counsel appearing for Murugan. 16. Sofar as the exercise of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction of this Court as observed by the Apex Court, it is not trammelled by procedural restrictions. By relying upon the decision reported in 1983 1 SCC 1 (Municipal Corporation of India Vs. 16. Sofar as the exercise of the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction of this Court as observed by the Apex Court, it is not trammelled by procedural restrictions. By relying upon the decision reported in 1983 1 SCC 1 (Municipal Corporation of India Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and others) it was observed by the Apex Court that such a power can be exercised even after the trial is over. It was further found that such a power can be exercised also as against persons who were not the accused at the stage of trial. Further it was observed by the Apex Court that the issuance of a direction to the State Public Prosecutor as to what Section the appellants namely Popular Muthiah and Murugan have to be charged and tried or directing the CBCID to take up the matter and reinvestigate and prosecute the said persons was not correct. It was held that such a power does not come within the purview of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Investigation of an offence is a statutory power of the police. The State in its discretion may get the investigation done by any agency unless there exists an extraordinary situation. Further while expressing powers under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court ordinarily should not interfere with the statutory power of the investigating agency. 17. Thus it has been laid down by the Apex Court that by exercise of Section 482 Cr.P.C, this Court may not order for re-investigation and that no specific agency of investigation could also be prescribed as it amounts to interference into the statutory power of the State. The next alternative is the remedy spoken to under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 18.So far as the exercise of powers under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure is concerned, the Apex Court has observed as follows: "Similarly, the power of the Sessions Judge to summon a person to stand trial with the other accused in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also limited inasmuch as from the evidences of the witnesses, it must clearly be found that the proceedee had a role to play in the commission of an offence". 19.There is evidence to hold that materials are available to involve Popular Muthiah and Murugan. 19.There is evidence to hold that materials are available to involve Popular Muthiah and Murugan. They are as follows: "i) the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 unimpeachably show the involvement of Popular Muthiah (abetting), Murugan and the accused in inflicting the fatal injuries to the deceased; ii) the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4 show the role played by Murugan and the accused and iii) in Ex.I, all the evidences were found fully reflective”. 20.The term “evidence” as contemplated in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C., may refer the chief examination of the witness, it was held in 2007(3) Crimes 111 (Ramavatar and another Vs. State of M.P.,) that the uncrossed testimony of witness could be used for exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., against some other accused sought to be impleaded. Further, it was held that the term “evidence” occurring in sub-Section (1) is used in a comprehensive and broad sense which would also include the material collected by the investigating officer and the material or evidence which comes before the Court and from which the Court can prima facie conclude that the person not arraigned before it is involved in the commission of the crime. 21.Now, we have to see as to whether instead of re-investigation, direction for denovo trial under Section 319 Cr.P.C against Popular Muthiah and Murugan could be ordered, in view of the fact that there is abundant material available against them as seen in evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.4(chief examination and in Ex.P.1. 22. We will now see what Section 319 Cr.P.C., provides:- "319.Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence:- 1)Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. 2)Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. 3)Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by a such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. 3)Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by a such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. 4)Where the Court proceeds against any person under Sub-Section (1) then- a)the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the witnesses reheard: b)subject to the provisions of Cl(a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced." 23. As was held in (Md.Muzaffar Khan Vs. State of Orissa (78 (1994) C.L.T 1055) the power exercise able under Section 319 Cr.P.C.,is an extraordinary power conferred on the Court to do real justice. It should be used with caution and only if compelling reasons exist for proceeding against a person against whom action has not been taken. The Court is not required to evaluate or appraise evidence as it would amount to prejudicing the issue. 24. It has been held in 2005 (12) SCC 327 (Palanisamy Gounder and another Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police) as follows: “The power under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised so as to conduct a fishing inquiry. We have already noticed the observations of the learned trial Judge that though the case against the appellants was not on solid foundation but it was felt that to find out the real truth they deserved to be added as accused.” 25. It was further held in 2005 (12) SCC 432 (Kavuluri Vivekananda Reddy and another Vs. State of A.P. and another) as follows: “The manner of exercise of the power said provision has been explained by this Court in Krishnappa Vs. State of Karnataka wherein it has been held that it has to be kept in view that the power under Section 319 of the Code is discretionary and has to be exercised only to achieve criminal justice and that the Court should not turn against another whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. The provisions of Section 319 of the Code are required to be used sparingly....”. 26. The provisions of Section 319 of the Code are required to be used sparingly....”. 26. Regarding the essential conditions for exercise of power under Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the following observation was made in (Michael Machado and another Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another) reported in 2000(3) SCC 262 . “The basic requirement of Section 319 Cr.P.C is that the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected during trial or in the inquiry regarding two aspects: First, that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case has committed an offence. Second, that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused. It is not enough that the Court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence...... A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons......The whole proceedings must be recommenced from the beginning of the trial summon the witnesses once again and examine them and cross-examine them in order to reach the stage where it had reached earlier. If the witnesses already examined are quite large in number the court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise are worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. Unless the court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly-brought accused ending in being convicted of the offence concerned, the court should refrain from adopting such a course of action.” 27. In that case, the order of the trial Court in exercising the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., was interfered with for enabling trial to proceed to its normal culmination. In that case, the order of the trial Court in exercising the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., was interfered with for enabling trial to proceed to its normal culmination. As the Court was found to have spent enormous time for recording the bulk evidence from large number of witnesses and as it was also found that in all practical purposes exercise of Section 319 Cr.P.C., was a colossal waste at the belated stage to bring to more additions to array of the accused at the cost of denovo trial especially when the massive evidence already collected against the existing accused would become a stand still. 28. However, the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., was countenanced in 2007 (2)Crimes 531 (Raj) (Jafar Mohd.Shah Vs. State of Rajasthan & Another). It was disclosed during trial that upon examination of Jafar Ali (P.W.10) in chief, the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. for taking cognizance against one Amin Shah. As there was material available on record which showed his involvement in the offence. However, the trial Court rejected the application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C., The Court has observed as follows: “It is true that at the time of deciding application under Section 319 Cr.P.C., only the material on record can be seen and if prima facie case appear to be peeping through the evidence suggesting involvement of such person sought to be tried together with the accused then cognizance is required to be taken. At the stage, it is not required to weigh the merit of the evidence to finally conclude whether such person against whom cognizance is sought to be taken will face conviction or not. Such a consideration of the evidence in its deeper aspects is prejudicial to the trial and therefore, the apex Court has considered and observed that the term “evidence” occurring in sub-Section (1) is used in a comprehensive and broad sense which would also include the material collected by the investigating officer and the material or evidence which comes before the Court and from which the Court can prima facie conclude that the person not arraigned before it is involved in the commission of the crime.” 29. Even in the case of Murali alias Muraleedharan Vs. Even in the case of Murali alias Muraleedharan Vs. State of Kerala reported in 1999 Crl.L.J 1670 although it was stated that the newly arrayed accused under Section 319(1) Cr.P.C., should be tried along with the other accused in the very same case. But the trial against him should be denovo and no separate trial against the accused so added is contemplated under law. It was further held that the situation is different when the newly impleaded accused did not appear even though coercive steps by issuing N.B.W was resorted to. In that context, the lower Court had no other alternative but to split up his case, refile and proceed against the other accused. Therefore, it cannot be said that the direction of the Magistrate make a separate trial against the newly added accused is illegal. It was thus observed as follows: “Therefore, due to the non-appearance in Court when he was added as an accused in the case, the learned Magistrate was forced to split up the case against the petitioner, to refile the same and proceed against the other accused already on record. Under the circumstances, the order passed by the learned Magistrate splitting up the case against the petitioner, refiling the same and directing the petitioner to stand trial separately from the other accused already in the party array, is perfectly justified and cannot be characterised as illegal or improper.” 30. The words “Could be tried together with the accused” is directory whereas requirement under sub-section (4) of S.319 regarding denovo trial of such person is mandatory. This was held in 2002 SCC (Cri) 1203 (Shashikant Singh Vs. Tarkeshwar Singh and another) in the following lines: “The intention of Section 319 is that where in the course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence, the Court may proceed against him for the offence which he appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a denovo trial against him. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a denovo trial against him. The provision of denovo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the Court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross-examination of such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross-examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of Section 319(4). The words “could be tried together with the accused” in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. “Could be” cannot under these circumstances be held to be “must be”. The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a person who was before the court has concluded with the result that the newly added person cannot be tried together with the accused who was before the court when order under Section 319(1) was passed, the order would become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the Court on the basis of the evidence before it that the newly added person appears to have committed the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the Court.... On facts, the court could not have intended while concluding the trial against C, to nullify its earlier order directing issue of warrants against Respondent.1. The construction to be placed on a provision like this has to commend to justice and reason. It has to be a reasonable construction to promote the ends of justice. The words” could be tried together with the accused” in Section 319(1) cannot be said to be capable of only one construction.....That being the position, a reasonable and common sense approach deserves to be adopted and preferred rather than a construction that would lead to absurd results of Respondent-1 escaping the trial despite passing of an order against him on the courts satisfaction under Section 319(1) and despite the fact that the proceedings against him have to commence afresh. In this view, the fact that trial against C has already concluded is of no consequence insofar as Respondent 1 is concerned.” 31. In this view, the fact that trial against C has already concluded is of no consequence insofar as Respondent 1 is concerned.” 31. So far as taking cognizance of the offence against them, it will be presumed that newly added person had been an accused person when the court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. Such legal fiction was created as was held in 2006 (10) SCC 192 (Lok Ram Vs. Nihal Singh and another) wherein the observation made is as follows: “Under Sub-Section (4)(1)(b) of Section 319 Cr.P.C., it is specifically made clear that it will be presumed that newly added person had been an accused person when the court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. That would show that by virtue of sub-Section (4)(1)(b) a legal fiction is created that cognizance would be presumed to have been taken so far as newly added accused is concerned.” 32. The same position was approved in 2007 (4) SCC 773 (Y.Saraba Reddy Vs. Puthur Rami Reddy and another). 33. Although Section 319 Cr.P.C is to be sparingly used as there are enough materials in this case against Popular Muthaiah and Murugan and there was already some mala fide attributed to the investigating agency in excluding them from the charge sheet and as there is no investigation at all forth coming from the State justifying the exclusion of the above said two persons. Then in order to avoid failure of justice, it was very much necessary to direct the Trial Court to have a denovo trial as per law against Popular Muthiah and Murugan upon summoning them and treating them as accused and they should be tried as per the procedure which was vividly laid down in 2002 SCC (Cri) 1203 (Shashikand Singh Vs. Tarkeshwar Singh and another) and also applying legal fiction contemplated in 2006 (10) SCC 192 (Lok Ram Vs. Nihal Singh and another) which was subsequently approved in 2007 (4) SCC 773 (Y.Saraba Reddy Vs. Puthur Rami Reddy and another). Tarkeshwar Singh and another) and also applying legal fiction contemplated in 2006 (10) SCC 192 (Lok Ram Vs. Nihal Singh and another) which was subsequently approved in 2007 (4) SCC 773 (Y.Saraba Reddy Vs. Puthur Rami Reddy and another). Therefore, we instead of ordering for reinvestigation in the interest of justice would like to direct the learned Judicial Magistrate, Palayamkottai to issue summons to the accused Popular Muthiah and Murugan and then following the procedures under Section 207 Cr.P.C., to commit the case to Court of Sessions under Section 209 Cr.P.C., and the trial is to be expedited. 34. With the above observations, it is ordered accordingly in the appeal originally disposed.