JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajesh Tandon, J. Heard Mr. Ramji Srivastava, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Alok Singh, Senior Advocate for the respondent. Factual Matrix of the Case 2. By the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 18.10.2003 passed by the Addl. District Judge / IIIrd Fast Track Court, Dehradun (Appellate Authority) by which R.C.A. No. 87 of 1998 has been allowed releasing the accommodation in dispute in favour of the landlord (respondent). Prescribed Authority, vide judgment dated 12.05.1998, dismissed the release application of the landlord and the Appellate Court, on an appeal filed by landlord, set aside the judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority and allowed the release application. Bonafide Need 3. Briefly stated, the respondent has filed a release application under Section 21(1) (a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which was registered as P.A. Case No. 62 of 1997 praying for the release of the residential premises, under the tenancy of petitioner, situated at 30 Dilaram Bazar, Dehradun. 4. According to the case of the respondent (landlord), the petitioner is the tenant of the said premises at the rate of Rs. 31.37 /- per month. The respondent has further stated in the release application that he was working in the Railway Workshop and now he is retired ad he is getting only Rs. 2200 /- as pension. It was further stated that besides the premises in dispute, the respondent (landlord) is having a joint property with one Balbir Singh in which three small rooms are in his possession. The family of the respondent consists of self, his wife Smt. Urmila and two sons namely Sunil and Anil. His son Anil has got married on 11.10.1997 and he is employed in Regional Manager, Pharmaceuticals. Respondent’s other son Sunil is also working in Pharmaceuticals as Sales Executive and he is also going to be married shortly as was stated in the release application. Apart from this, respondent is having two daughters, who are married. It was stated by the respondent (landlord) in the release application that both his daughters used to visit Dehradun along with their husbands and other family members and therefore, the respondent requires sufficient accommodation to accommodate them. 5. Apart from this, respondent is having two daughters, who are married. It was stated by the respondent (landlord) in the release application that both his daughters used to visit Dehradun along with their husbands and other family members and therefore, the respondent requires sufficient accommodation to accommodate them. 5. Respondent (landlord) has further stated in his release application that the family of the petitioner (tenant) consists of self, his wife, two sons and his widow daughter in law. It was stated that the petitioner has constructed a house in Arya Nagar, Dehradun and his widow daughter in law is living separately. Besides this, petitioner has constructed another house at Rajpur Road, Dehradun in which his son Rajesh is living and his other son Vijay is living in the disputed premises along with his parents. The houses which the petitioner has constructed at Arya Nagar and Rajpur Road are very big and the petitioner can easily shift himself to one of those houses. It has further been stated in the release application that the petitioner has retired from ONGC and he is running a General Store from which he is earning Rs. 20,000 /- per month. It was, therefore, prayed in the release application by the respondent (landlord) that the accommodation, which is under the tenancy of the petitioner (tenant), may be released in favour of the respondent (landlord) for fulfilling his own requirement. 6. The petitioner (tenant) has filed a written statement denying the averments made in the release application. The petitioner has not denied that he has already got constructed a house for his son Rajesh in Rajpur Road, Dehradun Paragraph 32 of the written statement filed by the petitioner is quoted below: ß32- ;g fd lEifÙk la[;k 93 iqjkuk uañ 168@44 jktiqj jksM+ ¼fnykjke cktkj½ nsgjknwu esa Hkwry ij ,d nqdku o mlds ihNs ,d xksnke gS ftlesa foi{kh dk iq= jkts”k dqekj lksy izksijkbVj ds :i esa xqIrk tujy LVksj ds uke ls viuk dkjksckj djrk gS rFkk nqdku ds Åij vkoklh; Hkou esa jkts”k dqekj mldh iRuh o nks cPps jgrs gSa vkSj mlh edku ds irs ij jkts”k dqekj o mlds ifjokj dk jk”kudkMZ cuk gqvk gSAÞ 7. During the course of proceedings, various affidavits were filed on behalf of the landlord and the tenant. 8. Prescribed Authority, vide its order dated 12.05.1998, has rejected the release application. During the course of proceedings, various affidavits were filed on behalf of the landlord and the tenant. 8. Prescribed Authority, vide its order dated 12.05.1998, has rejected the release application. Aggrieved by the order of the Prescribed Authority, the landlord went in appeal before the Addl. District Judge/FTC IIIrd, Dehradun. The Appellate Court has considered the evidence on the record as well as the pleadings of the parties. The Appellant Court has referred the affidavits of the landlord to the following effect: ß;g “kiFk i= 26d fnukad 24-3-2003 dks izLrqr fd;k x;k vkSj bldk dksbZ vfHk[k.Mu Hkh izR;FkhZ us izLrqr ugah fd;k gSA lEifÙk lañ 93@168 jktiqj jksM+ nsgjknwu fufoZokfnr :i ls izR;FkhZ dh iRuh ds uke gS] ftl ij fuf”pr :i ls izR;FkhZ o mldh iRuh dk Hkh vkUof;d :i ls v/;klu gS vkSj og izR;FkhZ ds fu;a=.kk/khu gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa izLrqr ekeys esa fuf”pr :i ls mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 21¼1½ dk Li’Vhdj.k ¼1½ ykxw gksrk gS vkSj D;ksafd izR;FkhZ us fjDr voLFkk esa gh nsgjknwu uxj ikfydk dh lhek ds vUrxZr lEifÙk vftZr dh gS] tks mldh iRuh ds uke gS] blfy, izLrqr ekeys esa izR;FkhZ fdjk;snkj dh dksbZ vkifÙk xzkg~; ugha gks ldrh gSAÞ 9. The inspection by the Prescribed Authority has also been referred by the Appellate Court, the same is quoted below: ßfo}ku fu;r izkf/kdkjh }kjk izLrqr ekeys esa LFky fujh{k.k fd;k x;k vkSj bl gjs jax ls nf”kZr lEifÙk ds ckjs esa fy[kk x;k] ftlls ;g Li’V gS fd ;g lEifÙk vkokl ;ksX; ugha gSA iz”u ;g gS fd ;fn vihykUV dks o’kZ 1990 esa gjs jax ls nf”kZr rRdkyhu fdjk;snkj Mhñihñ xqIrk ds vè;klu okys ifjlj dh vko”;drk Fkh rks os rRle; ml ij D;ksa ugha x;s D;ksa mUgksaus mls /oLr gksus fn;k\ ;g euksn”kk tks vihykUV ds fo#) tkrh gS] ysfdu blh vk/kkj ij Hkh rks orZeku fueZqfDr izkFkZuk i= [kkfjt ugha fd;k tk ldrkA o’kZ 1997 esa orZeku fueqZfDr izkFkZuk i= izLrqr fd;k x;k vkSj o’kZ 1990 esa tks ifjlj vius i{k esa vihykUV us fueqZDr djk;k Fkk og th.kZ “kh.kZ voLFkk esa gSA ,slh voj U;k;ky; dh fujh{k.k fVIi.kh gS rFkk vihy ds Øe ij tks QksVksxzk¶l izLrqr fd;s x;s gsa] muls nf”kZr gks jgk gSA bl ifjlj dk gh ,d dejk iz;ksx ;ksX; fo}ku voj U;k;ky; us fy[kk gSA fo}ku voj U;k;ky; us ;g vo/kkfjr fd;k fd vihykUV ds ikl ikap dejs miyC/k gSaA ;g er lk{; ij vk/kkfjr ugha dgk tk ldrk] D;ksafd la;qDr lEifÙk esas rks vihykUV ds nks cSM:e] ,e Mªkb±x :e o ,d doMZ cjkenk gS rFkk iwoZ esa fueqZDr djk;s x;s ifjlj esa ,d dejk iz;ksx ;ksX; fy[kk gSA ;g fu’d’kZ ;qfDr ;qDr ugha dgk tk ldrkAÞ 10. As will appear from the aforesaid inspection, for a family consisting of two married sons and two daughters, the accommodation of two rooms is hardly sufficient for the requirement of the landlord. 11. I, therefore, find that the Appellant Authority has rightly come to the conclusion that the accommodation in dispute is bonafidely required by the landlord for his personal use. 12. So far as Comparative Hardship is concerned, it has come on record that the premises at Rajpur Road, Dehradun is already in possession of the petitioner and therefore, Comparative Hardship lies in favour of the respondent (landlord). 13. 12. So far as Comparative Hardship is concerned, it has come on record that the premises at Rajpur Road, Dehradun is already in possession of the petitioner and therefore, Comparative Hardship lies in favour of the respondent (landlord). 13. However, the tenant cannot be allowed to object in view of Explanation (i) to Section 21 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, which reads as under: “(i) where the tenant or any member of his family (who has been normally residing with or is wholly dependent on him) has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application under this sub-section shall be entertained. 14. So far as the Bonafide Need is concerned, it has been held that landlord is the best judge of his requirement. 15. In the case of Ragavendra Kumar V. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 67, it has been held:- “It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. [See-Prativa Devi (Smt.) V. T.V. Krishnan] In the case in hand the plaintiff landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted. 16. In the case of Bega Begum reported in 1979 AIR SC 272, the Apex Court has observed that in case of eviction in every case the tenant has to suffer hardship and that cannot be a ground for refusing the release application. The observations of the Apex Court are quoted below: “13. Moreover, Section 11(1)(h) of the Act uses the words reasonable requirement which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire of wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term ‘need’ or ‘requirement’ should not be artificially extended to its language so unduly stretched or strained so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other States in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word ‘requirement’ and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need. 9. In this connection our attention was drawn to the evidence led by the defendants that the main source of their income is the hotel business carried on by them in the premises and if they are thrown out they are to likely to get any alternative accommodation. The High Court has accepted the case of the defendants on this point, but does not appear to have considered the natural consequences, which flow from a comparative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant if a decree for eviction follows. It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section 11(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction. 26. Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantage and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweight the prejudice or the inconvenience which will be caused to the defendants. The High Court has unfortunately to weighed the eviction from that point of view.” 17. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweight the prejudice or the inconvenience which will be caused to the defendants. The High Court has unfortunately to weighed the eviction from that point of view.” 17. Following the decision of Bega Begum (supra), in the case of Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002 SC & FB, Rent Cases, 388, the Apex Court has held as under:- “5. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. V. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 1) this Court emphasized the need of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance between rival interests so as to be just to law. “The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society”. While the shortage of accommodation makes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from exploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenant is coupled with an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a benefit disproportionately larger than the one needed. Socially progressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a shortsighted parochial approach. Power to legislate socially progressive legislation is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and unreasonability. A legislation impregnated with tendency to give undue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing shackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice but may also in constitutional invalidity. 8. The need for reasonable interpretation of rent control legislations was emphasized by this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan 1979 A.I.R. SC page 272. Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as a ground for eviction, the Court guarded against any artificial extension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti this Court has observed, while the rent control legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants, it should not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it seeks to give to the landlord also. For instance, one of the grounds for eviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the country is the question of landlord’s bona fide personal necessity. The concept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as to make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical. Recently in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta 8 the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. An approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 9. The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords – both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. 30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context in which it is set has significance. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble. 30. In providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the context in which it is set has significance. Colour and context in which it is set has significance. Colour and context emanating from context may permit sense being preferred to mere meaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is sought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the expression. Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an expression capable for attributing an intention to the legislature that what was intended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the landlord to have the premises vacated by the tenant, to forego the rental income, and to put the premises to such use as the landlord would deem to be his own use and in the given facts and circumstances of a contradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant. The legislature intending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when it is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to suc use as he intends, away from leasing it out. 31. If we do not meaningly construe the concept of requirement the provision may suffer from the risk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled for and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and use his property. We cannot place a construction on the expression ‘for his own use’ in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict his tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle himself well in his life. We have to give colour and content to the expression and provide the skin of a living thought to the skeleton of the words, which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words ‘for his own use’ in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. The Indian society, its customs and requirements and the context where the provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to acceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the words ‘for his own use’ in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act. 32.(v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’ within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii).” 18. In the case of Prem Prakash Gupta and others Vs. Second Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others – Allahabad Rent Cases 1993 (1) page 77, it has been held that no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from a house, if a decree of eviction has been passed, yet such an event by itself will not be a valid ground for refusing a decree for eviction. The observation in the case of Prem Prakash Gupta (supra) is quoted as below : “as observed by this Court in its decision in the case of Rajeshwari Prasad Vs. Fateh Bahadur Chaturvedi and others reported in 1984 (1) A.R.C. 387, the bona fide need is the foundation of application for eviction of a tenant without which it cannot be allowed. Hardship is relative word”…………… 19. The Apex Court in G.C. Kapoor v. Nand Kumar Bhasin, 2001 (2) Allahabad Rent Cases Page No. 603 has relied upon the judgment of Datta Laxman as well as Raghunath Pale and has come to the conclusion as under :- “9. It is settled opposition of law that bona fide requirement means that requirement must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive and is not a mere desire or wish. In Dattaraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde and Another, [1999 (4) SCC 1], this Court while considering the bona fide need of the landlord was of the view that when a landlord says that he needs the building for his own occupation, he has to prove it but there is no warrant for ‘presuming that his need is not bona fide’. It was also held that while deciding this question, court would look into the broad aspects and if the Court feels any doubt about bona fide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt. 10. In Raghunath G. Panhale (D) By LRs. It was also held that while deciding this question, court would look into the broad aspects and if the Court feels any doubt about bona fide requirement, it is for the landlord to clear such doubt. 10. In Raghunath G. Panhale (D) By LRs. V. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co. [1999 (8) SCC 1] this Court inter alia held that it was not necessary for landlord to prove that he had money to invest in the new business contemplated not that he had experience of it. It was a case for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for non-residential purpose, as he wanted to start a grocery business in the suit premises to improve his livelihood.” 20. In the case of Gaya Prasad V. Pradeep Shrivastava reported in AIR 2001 SC 803, the Apex Court has observed in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 18 as under : “10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post-petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow-process system subsists. During 23 years, after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. 11. We cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord the crucial date is the date of petition. In Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram 1 a two-Judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachaliah, J., as he then was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when the lis commenced and the only exception is that the court is not precluded from moulding the reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations. What the learned Chief Justice observed therein is this (SCC pp. 626-27, para 6) “6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a ‘cautious cognizance’ of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief”. 12. This Court reiterated the same principle in Kamleshwar Prasad v. Pradumanju Agarwal2 that the crucial date normally is the date of filing the petition. In that case, a two-Judge Bench (K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JK.) has held that even the subsequent event of death of the landlord who wanted to start a business in the tenanted premises is not sufficient to dislodge the bona fide need established by him earlier. This is what Patanaik J. has observed for the Bench : (SCC p. 415, para 3). This is what Patanaik J. has observed for the Bench : (SCC p. 415, para 3). “That apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises in question for starting a business which fact has been found by the appellate authority, in the eye of the law, it must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business in question can be carried on by his widow or any other son.” 13. In our opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent events. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders3 which pointed to the need for remoulding the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges of the Bench said then : (SCC pp. 772-73, para 4). “We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding pro 15. The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject-matter of the lis. If the casue of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused. 16. If the casue of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant, despite the impairment already caused. 16. Of course a two-Judge Bench (K. Ramaswamy and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.) pointed out in another case Ansuyasben Kantilal Bhatt v. Rashiklal Manilal Shah5 that the pendency of a lis for a record period of thirty-one years has transformed a middle-aged landlord to an advanced stage of gerenry (sic geriatry) and at that stage he could not start a new business venture. After lamenting over the system which caused a whopping delay of thirty-one years the Bench made two directions. The first was that the son of the landlord who by that time had four-and-a-half years more to go for reaching the superannuation age could consider starting the business in the tenanted premises after retirement. The second was that in the meanwhile the rent for the building would stand enhanced from “Rs. 101 to Rs. 3500 per month. 17. Considering all the aforesaid decisions, we are of the definite view that the subsequent events pleaded and highlighted by the appellant are too insufficient to overshadow the bona fide need concurrently found by the fact-finding courts. 18. We wish to add, as an epilogue, that this case can provide a catalytic agent for the High Courts to evolve some concrete scheme for winching to the fore similar long pending matters, lying in torpidity at the bottom of the crammed list of pending cases in the High Court after passing the initial orders, keeping the operative part of decrees in abeyance. It is worth considering whether a cell can be set up in each of such High Courts where the piles of backlog are a stirring problem, to pick out such cases to be brought to the notice of the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned so that he could take appropriate steps in the matter.” 21. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I decide this point in favour of the landlords. The need is bonafide. Comparative Hardship 22. So far as the Comparative Hardship is concerned, the petitioner has failed to show that he has made any efforts to search out any alternative accommodation. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I decide this point in favour of the landlords. The need is bonafide. Comparative Hardship 22. So far as the Comparative Hardship is concerned, the petitioner has failed to show that he has made any efforts to search out any alternative accommodation. Moreover, it has come on record that the petitioner has constructed a house at Rajpur road, Dehradun for the use of his son. The petitioner can very easily shift himself to that house. 23. In the case of Bega Begum reported in 1979 AIR SC 272, the Apex Court has observed that in case of eviction in every case the tenant has to suffer hardship and that cannot be a ground for refusing the release application. The observations of the Apex Court are quoted below : “9. …It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section 11(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction. 26. Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantage and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweight the prejudice or the inconvenience which will be caused to the defendants. The High Court has unfortunately to weighed the eviction from that point of view.” 24. In the case of Shushila v. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda and others reported in 2003 (1) A.I.R. Page 256, it has been held as under :- “Greater the justification to allow the application. Availability of another suitable accommodation to the tenant, waters down the weight attached to the longer period of tenancy as a factor to be considered as provided under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 16. Yet another factor which may in some cases be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business to bed set up, there would be lesser justification to allow the application. Yet another factor which may in some cases be relevant under clause (c) is where the existing business of the landlord is quite huge and extensive leaving aside the proposed business to bed set up, there would be lesser justification to allow the application. The idea behind sub-clause (c) is apparent i.e. where the landlord runs a huge business eviction may not be resorted to for expansion or diversification of the business by uprooting a tenant having a small business for a very period of time. In such a situation if eviction is ordered it is definitely bound to cause greater hardship to the tenant.” 25. In the case of Arvind Kumar Vs. IInd ADJ Etawah reported in Allahabad Rent Cases 1997(1) Page 304, Rule 16(2)(a) has been interpreted and it has been held as under : “A suitable alternative accommodation which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also in the comprehension of the expression and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it has been held that the petitioner was wanting in earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, notwithstanding the fact that the litigation between the parties had protracted to considerable stretched.” 26. In the case of Bhagwan Das v. Smt. Jiley Kaur and others reported in 1991 (1) A.R.C. Page 377, the Apex Court has held as under :- “Thirdly, it was a case where was even this additional circumstance that the appellant had brought no material on record to indicate that at any time during the pendency of this long drawn out litigation he made any attempt to seek an alternative accommodation and was unable to get. In Mst. Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahmad Khan, (1979) 1 SCC 273; 1986 SCFBRC 346 (SC), it was held that in deciding the extent of the hardship that may be caused to one party or the other, in case a decree for eviction is passed or is refused, each party has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the defendants and that they were remediable.” 27. Rule 16 of the Act No. XIII of 1972 has been interpreted in the case of Munni Lal Gupta Vs. 7th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aligarh reported in 1997 (1) A.R.C. 301. Rule 16 of the Act No. XIII of 1972 has been interpreted in the case of Munni Lal Gupta Vs. 7th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Aligarh reported in 1997 (1) A.R.C. 301. After relying upon the judgment of Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Krishan and other, A.I.R. 1995 Allahabad 82, it has been held that suitable alternative accommodation, which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also a factor to be considered and want of earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, disentitles protection given to the tenant while considering the comparative hardship of the parties. The observations in the decision of Munni Lal Gupta (supra) are quoted below :- “A suitable alternative accommodation which may become available on an effort being made in that direction is also in the comprehension of the expression and in the fact and circumstances of the case, it has been held that the petitioner was wanting in earnest efforts in looking for suitable alternative accommodation, notwithstanding the fact that the litigation between the parties had protracted to considerable stretched., In Rajendra Kumar Gupta Vs. Gopal Kishan and Others, AIR 1995 Alld. 82: 1994 ARC 11, it has been held by Sudhir Narain, J. and I concur with the view taken therein that “one of the principles for considering comparative hardship of the parties is to find out as to whether the tenant had made a sincere efforts to find out alternative accommodation and had placed materials before the authorities to come to their conclusions that he made such an effort”. The fact that earlier application for release, met the fact of rejection some 10 years ago, could not be projected backward to operate as an obstacle in the way of the release application being allowed as with the passage of time, the situation has undergone considerable change. Indubitable, landlord Sanjai Gupta did his M.A. after rejection of the earlier applications and his failure to secure employment for himself, lends congency to his moving the present application.” 28. Further there being no material on record to indicate that the petitioner has made any efforts to search out the accommodation during the pendency of the case, this factor also goes against the petitioner (tenant). 29. In view of the above, the comparative hardship lies in favour of the landlord. Findings of Fact 30. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Further there being no material on record to indicate that the petitioner has made any efforts to search out the accommodation during the pendency of the case, this factor also goes against the petitioner (tenant). 29. In view of the above, the comparative hardship lies in favour of the landlord. Findings of Fact 30. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander SCC 2003 Vol. 6 675, the Apex Court has held as under :- “Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirement are satisfied : (i) The error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings is an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and or early disposal of the suit of proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that every moment, may become incapable of correction at a letter stage and refused a intervene would result in stravesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis.” The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.” 31. Relying upon the Judgment of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chandra 2003 (6) SCC 675, the Apex Court in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash 2004 (3) SCC 682, has held as under :- “As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 32. In view of the judgment of Apex court reported in 2004 ARC (3) 6892, Ranjeet Singh V. Ravi Prakash, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is limited to the extent that the finding of fact recorded by the court below cannot be interfered. The court below has recorded concurrent findings of fact and High Court cannot act like an appellate Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 33. In the case of M/s India Pipe Fitting Co. Vs. The court below has recorded concurrent findings of fact and High Court cannot act like an appellate Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 33. In the case of M/s India Pipe Fitting Co. Vs. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and another reported in 1978 A.I.R. (S.C.) Page 45, the Apex Court has held as under :- “The limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Art. 227 of the Constitution is well settled. Power under Art. 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions of facts however, erroneous those may be. It is well settled and perhaps too late in the day to refer to the decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath 1954 SCR 565; (AIR 1954 SC 215) where the principles have been clearly laid down as follows :- (at p. 217 of AIR). “This power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is. As pointed out by harries C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. V. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep to Subordinate Courts within the boundary of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.” 34. In Piper v. Harvey (1958) 1 All E.R. Page 454, it has been held as under : “I have in mind what this court has said in Coplans v. King (1) [1947] 2 All E.R. 393) to the effect that the decision of the county court judge, when considering the balance of hardship, is to all intents and purposes final. It is not for the Court of Appeal to interfere when there is evidence on which the judge can reasonably come to the conclusion which he did.” 35. In Whitley V. Whitley 1946 (2) All England Law Reports Annoted 726, it has been held as under :- “In the present case the judge decided in favour of the land, and I can see no ground for saying that he did not arrive at his conclusion on the issue raised under para (h) on ample evidence. If there was any evidence to support his decision we cannot interfere with it. It is most important in these cases that this court should not interfere with findings of fact where there is evidence to support them.” Conclusions 36. If there was any evidence to support his decision we cannot interfere with it. It is most important in these cases that this court should not interfere with findings of fact where there is evidence to support them.” Conclusions 36. In view of the aforesaid, I am of the view that Bonafide Need and Comparative Hardship, both, lies in favour of the Landlord-Respondent. It is a case where the respondent requires the premises in dispute for satisfying his family requirements. The litigation is pending since 1997. Therefore, I see no reason to reject the release application, when in point of fact, the petitioner (tenant) has available with him alternative accommodation and he is debarred from raising any objections. Apart from the explanation, I have also considered the pleadings which justifies the claim of the landlord for the release of the accommodation. Further more, the petitioner (tenant) should have made efforts during this period to search out some other accommodation. Therefore, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the judgment passed by the Appellate Court. 37. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed and the order dated 18.10.2003 passed by Addl. District Judge/FTC IIIrd, Dehradun (Appellate Authority) in R.C.A. No. 87 of 1998 is hereby affirmed. 38. However, petitioner prayed for some time to vacate the premises. He, therefore, is allowed time up to 31st May, 2007 to vacate the premises in question provided : a. he gives the undertaking by 28th February, 2007 to vacate the premises on or before 31st May, 2007. b. the petitioner pays the entire rent and damages due up to date by 28th ‘February, 2007 along with the undertaking. c. the petitioner pays regularly the damages by first week of every month. d. in case of failure of the aforesaid conditions, the respondent Landlord shall be at liberty to execute the decree forthwith.