Judgment : P. K. MISRA, J. 1. The unnumbered civil miscellaneous petition is filed by the defendant for transferring O.S. No. 544 of 2006, filed before the I Additional District Court, Coimbatore, to the Principal District Court, Virudhunagar. The relevant portion of the Presidential Order dated 6.7.2004, establishing a Permanent Bench, of the Madras High Court at Madurai, is as follows: “There shall be established a permanent Bench of the Madras High Court at Madurai and such Judges of the Madras High Court, … shall sit at Madurai in order to exercise the jurisdiction and powers for the time being vested in that High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of … (names of the districts are omitted as unnecessary) Provided that the Chief Justice of that High Court may, in his discretion, order that any case or class of cases arising in any such district shall be heard at Chennai.” 2. Thus, as per the Presidential Order, some of the Districts including Virudhunagar have been carved out and come within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai, whereas the other districts including Coimbatore continue to remain within the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench it Chennai. 3. Registry has raised the question of maintainability of such transfer petition as the district of Coimbatore does not come within the territorial jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai. 4. Learned single Judge, before whom Transfer C.M.P. (MD) SR. No. 31306 of 2007 was listed, has referred the matter to be considered by the Division Bench in view of importance of the question raised and also because of some divergence of view in such matter. 5. Keeping in view the importance of the question raised, we have requested Mr. M.M. Vallinayagam and Mr. G. Prabhu Rajadurai, Advocates, to assist the Court as Amicus curiae. Apart from the above counsels, we have heard Mr. S.N. Ravichandran for the petitioner. We place on record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by all the counsels. 6. Sections 22 to 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure hereinafter referred to as “the C.P.C,” deal with the question of transfer. A careful reading of Sections 22, 23 and 24 of C.P.C. makes it clear that the provisions contained in Sections 22 and 23 must be read together. 6. Sections 22 to 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure hereinafter referred to as “the C.P.C,” deal with the question of transfer. A careful reading of Sections 22, 23 and 24 of C.P.C. makes it clear that the provisions contained in Sections 22 and 23 must be read together. Section 22 itself makes it clear that such a petition for transfer can be filed only by the defendant in a case where the suit could have been filed in any one of two or more Courts. It is not applicable where the suit could have been instituted only in one Court. Moreover, such petition has to be filed at the earliest, possible, opportunity and in all cases before settlement of issues. Section 23 lays down the procedure as to how such petition under Section 22 can be filed. As per Section 23(1), where the Courts having jurisdiction are subordinate, to one appellate Court, the petition under Section 22 is to be made before such appellate Court. As per Section 23(2), where such Courts are subordinate to different appellate Courts but to the same High Court, the petition shall be made before the High Court. As per Section 23(3) where such counts are subordinate to different High Courts, the application can be filed before the High Court who has jurisdiction over the Court wherein the suit has been filed. 7. The provisions contained in Section 24 stand on a different footing. While a petition under Section 22 read with Section 23 can be filed only by the defendant and that too before the settlement of issues, an application under Section 24 can be filed by any of the parties, that is to say, either the plaintiff or the defendant. Moreover such application can be filed at any stage. Under Sections 22 and 23, a suit may be transferred from a Court having jurisdiction to a Court having alternative or parallel jurisdiction, whereas under Section 24(2) a suit or proceeding may be transferred to a Court competent to try such suit though such latter Court may not have territorial jurisdiction to try such or proceeding can be transferred from a Court which has no jurisdiction to try it. 8. Section 25 of C.P.C. deals with the power or the Supreme Court to effect transfer of suits or other proceedings. 9. 8. Section 25 of C.P.C. deals with the power or the Supreme Court to effect transfer of suits or other proceedings. 9. The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the Court at Coimbatore being subordinate to Madras High Court, the Permanent Bench of such High Court at Madurai has jurisdiction to exercise the power under Section 24 C.P.C. 10. The moot question is whether a “Court” established in an area beyond the districts allocated to Permanent Bench at Madurai can be termed as “a Court Subordinate” to such Permanent Bench. Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that for the purpose of the Code District Court is subordinate to High Court and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to the District Court is subordinate to the District Court and every Court of small causes is subordinate to the High Court and the District Court. Keeping in view the context in which such expression is used, it is obvious that the District Court is subordinate to High Court of the concerned State, the Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court is subordinate to the District Court of that district and the Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the concerned High Court or District Court. By applying such meaning in a generic sense it is self-evident that all the Courts within the State of Tamil Nadu are subordinate to the High Court of Madras, whether such High Court of Madras sits as the Principal Bench at Madras or Permanent Bench at Madurai inasmuch as the decision rendered at either place is binding on all the Courts within the territory of Tami Nadu. So far so good. 11. So far so good. 11. However, in the decision of a learned single Judge reported in K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others (2007) 5 MLJ 417 , a doubt is expressed that since Appeals, and Revisions from such Courts within the fold of Principal Bench at Madras cannot be filed before the Permanent Bench at Madurai and can be filed only before the Principal Bench as per the “territorial nexus” so to say, it cannot be said that the District Court or any other subordinate Court at a place coming within the fold of Principal Bench at Madras (Chennai) is a Court subordinate to such Permanent Bench, at Madurai. 12. It is true that appeals from the matters arising in the districts allotted to the Permanent Bench at Madurai have to be filed only at Madurai, whereas the appeals relating to suits decided by the Courts in the rest of the districts are to be filed before the Principal Bench at Chennai. In a very restrictive senses strictly speaking, for the purpose of entertaining appeals or revisions, it cannot be said that the Permanent Bench at Madurai has got “appellate or revisional jurisdiction” over the matters arising within the districts, which are coming within the jurisdiction of Principal Bench at Chennai. Similarly applying the same logic, the Principal Bench does not have “appellate or revisional jurisdiction” for entertaining matters arising within the districts coming within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai. But, merely because an appeal cannot be filed before one Bench of the High Court in respect of matters arising from the districts allotted to another “Bench” does not mean that such District Courts and other inferior Courts are not “Subordinate” to the very same High Court. But, merely because an appeal cannot be filed before one Bench of the High Court in respect of matters arising from the districts allotted to another “Bench” does not mean that such District Courts and other inferior Courts are not “Subordinate” to the very same High Court. For the purpose of Code of Civil Procedure, keeping in view the provision contained in Section 3 of C.P.C., there cannot be escape from the conclusion that every Civil Court (or for that matter criminal Court) within the State of Tamil Nadu and Union Territory of Puducherry is subordinate to High Court of Madras irrespective of the seat of its sitting though appeals can be filed before Principal Bench at Chennai or before the Permanent Bench at Madurai, as the case may be, depending upon the situs. 13. The matter can be viewed from another angle. An appeal filed against the decision of a Court situate within the territory earmarked for the Principal Bench can be transferred by the Honourable the Chief Justice to the Bench at Madurai and vice versa. The decisions rendered by either the Principal Bench or the Permanent Bench are equally binding on all Courts within the State. If the Court at Coimbatore is not “subordinate” to the Permanent Bench of the High Court at Madurai, then how can such appeal be decided by such Benche By applying the same logic, if the District Court or any other inferior Court coming within the areas earmarked for Permanent Bench, at Madurai is not “subordinate” to the Principal Bench of the Madras High Court, how such appeals, or revisions filed before the Permanent Bench at Madurai can be disposed of by the Principal Bench at Madras. It is not that there is any supremacy of Principal Bench at Madras, over the Permanent Bench at Madurai. Both the Benches are part of the very same High Court, which is one. 14. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat AIR 1970 SC 1 : (1969) 2 SCC 74 considering the true nature of the right of appeal it was observed: “5. … Such a right was one of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. 14. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat AIR 1970 SC 1 : (1969) 2 SCC 74 considering the true nature of the right of appeal it was observed: “5. … Such a right was one of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which were required to constitute appellate jurisdiction were the existence of the relation of superior and inferior Court and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter.” 15. Since an appeal or revision filed before the Principal Bench against the decision of a Court within the area, earmarked for such Principal Bench can be placed for disposal before the Permanent Bench at Madurai and similarly an appeal or revision filed before the Permanent Bench at Madurai from a matter coming within the territorial jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench can be placed for disposal before the Principal Bench and the decisions rendered by either the Principal Bench at Chennai or the Permanent Bench at Madurai are equally binding on all the Courts within the State, it is axiomatic that all the Courts must be taken to be subordinate .to the Permanent Bench or the Principal Bench as the case may be. 16. In the very same decision of K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others ( supra) the learned single Judge has observed at p. 423 of MLJ: “ 23. … that the establishment of a permanent Bench with powers to exercise jurisdiction over defined areas shall virtually effect a bifurcation of the State for the exercise of jurisdiction of the benches of the High Court, (Bench at Principal Seat and Permanent Bench at another places), I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the term High Court appearing in Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be taken to mean the High Court as a whole that is inclusive of the Principal Bench at Chennai and the Permanent Bench at Madurai, for the purpose of exercising jurisdiction in transfer of cases.” 17. For the aforesaid purpose, the learned single Judge had placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik AIR 1983 SC 46 : (1982) 3 SCC 519 , Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India AIR 2001 SC 416 : (2001) 2 SCC 294 : (2000) Supp MLJ 57 and had also referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal AIR 1976 SC 331 : (1975) 2 SCC 671 and U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhiykari Parisahad v. State of U. P U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhiykari Parisahad v. State of U. P U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhiykari Parisahad v. State of U. P AIR 1995 SC 2148 : (1995) 4 SCC 738 : (1995) 2 MLJ 93. 18. In State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik ( supra), the question cropped up in relation to Bombay High Court on the establishment of a Bench at Aurangabad when the Chief Justice of High Court in exercise of power under Section 51(3) of the States Re-organisation Act, 1956 issued a notification specifying Aurangabad “ as a place at which the Honourable Judges and the Division Courts of High Court of Judicature at Bombay may also sit.” Upholding the validity of such notification, the Supreme Court observed: “ 25. It is clear upon the terms of Section 51 of the Act that undoubtedly the President has the power under 3ub section (1) to appoint the principal seat of the High Court for a new State. Likewise, the power of the President under sub-section (2) thereof, after consultation with the Governor of a new State and the Chief Justice of the High Court for the State, pertains to the establishment of a permanent Bench or Benches of that High Court of a new State at one or more places within the State other than the place where the principal seat of the High Court is located and for any matters connected therewith clearly confer power on the President to define the territorial jurisdiction of the permanent Bench in relation to the principal seat as also for ;the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction to such permanent Bench to hear cases arising in districts falling within its jurisdiction. The creation of a permanent Bench under sub-section (2) of Section 51 of the Act must therefore bring about a territorial bifurcation of the High Court.” 19. While disapproving the view expressed by Kerala High Court reported in Manickam Pillai Subbayya Pillai v. Assistant Registrar, High Court, Kerala, Trivandrum AIR 1950 Kerala 188 the Supreme Court proceeded to observe: “ 27. … Chagla, Chief Justice rightly observes that the Judges and Division Courts at a temporary Bench established under sub-section (3) of Section 51 of the Act function as Judges and Division Courts, of the High Court at the principal seat, and while so sitting at such a temporary Bench they may exercise the jurisdiction and power, of the High Court itself in relation to all the matters entrusted to them.” 20. In Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India ( supra) while referring to and placing, reliance upon the above decisions of the Supreme Court it was observed at pp. 59 & 63 of MLJ: “ 11. The establishment of a permanent Bench at Jaipur and defining its territorial jurisdiction brought out a bifurcation of State of Rajasthan into two for the purpose of division of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court between the principal seat and the permanent Bench seat. …… 18.… Clauses 1 & 2 of Article 226 of the Constitution provide how territorial jurisdiction shall be exercised by any High Court. Although, the said clauses do not deal with principal seat or permanent Bench of any High Court but in our opinion, there is no reason why the principle underlying thereunder cannot be applied to the functioning of the bifurcated territorial jurisdiction between the principal seat and permanent Bench seat of any High Court. In case of a dispute arising whether an individual case or cases should be filed and heard at Jodhpur or Jaipur, the same has to be found out by applying the test from which district the case arises, that is, in which district the cause of action can be said to have arisen, and then exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 21. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik ( supra) and Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India ( supra) had expressed that Presidential Notification has the effect of bifurcation of the State defining and delineating the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench or the Permanent Bench in relation, to matters from the respective areas, but it does not mean that the Madras High Court has been bifurcated and divided into two separate High Courts. We do not think, it can be said that the Madras High Court having its Principal Bench at Chennai is a different High Court from the Madras High Court having its permanent Bench at Madurai. What was observed by Chief Justice CHAGLA (and approved by the Supreme Court) in connection with a temporary Bench constituted under Section 51(3) of the States Reorganisation Act applies with more vigour if one may say so, to the Permanent Bench established under Section 51(2). Notwithstanding the bifurcation of territory, the High Court continues, to be one. The decision rendered by the Bench at Madurai is no less applicable to the entire State of Tamil Nadu and the Union Territory of Pondicherry than the decision rendered by the Principal Bench at Chennai. Any principle of law decided by either the Principal. Bench at Chennai or the Permanent Bench at Madurai is equally binding on all subordinate Courts in the State. In such a sense, it can be said that the Court at Coimbatore is also a Court subordinate to the Permanent Bench of the Madras High Court at Madurai. 22. In the case relating to K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramanian @ V. S. Mani and Others ( supra) learned, single Judge observed that invocation of jurisdiction of the Court for transfer of a case can be considered similar to invocation of the appellate jurisdiction. 23. 23. The moot question is whether for the purpose of filing transfer petition the principle relating to filing of appeal can be applied, or the principle relating to filing of original proceeding like a writ petition can be appliede If it is considered invocation of jurisdiction under Section 24 is similar to invocation of appellate jurisdiction, it can be reasonably argued that since no appeal from a decision of a Court at Coimbatore can be filed at Madurai Bench, an application to transfer a proceeding or suit pending in the Coimbatore Court cannot be filed before the Permanent Bench of the Madras High Court at Madurai. However, in the context of transfer, a proceeding under Section 23 or 24 partakes the character of an “original proceeding” rather than an appellate proceeding. 24. In this context, it is necessary to indicate that in several decisions it has been recognised that the proceedings under Section 24 CPC are original proceedings in nature. 25. It has been observed in Alla Subbareddi and Others v. Lankireddi Narayanaswami - reddi and Others Alla Subbareddi and Others v. Lankireddi Narayanaswami - reddi and Others Alla Subbareddi and Others v. Lankireddi Narayanaswami - reddi and Others 1949 Mad 283 that petition for transfer under Section 24 CPC is in the nature of an original proceeding. 26. Subsequently, in a Division Bench, decision in Srirangam Municipality, rep. by its Executive Authority The Commissioner v. R. P. Palaniswami Pillai (1951) 1 MLJ 281 the Chief Justice Rajaraannar observed at p. 283 of MLJ: “ 4. …. It may be true, as was held in Subba Reddi v. Narayanaswami Reddi Subba Reddi v. Narayanaswami Reddi Subba Reddi v. Narayanaswami Reddi AIR 1949 Mad 283: (1948) 2 MLJ: 251 that an application under Section 24 is in the nature of an original proceeding to which Section 141, C.P.C. may apply: but to say that, la far from saying, that the application is one made on the Original Side of this Court.” 27. In view of the above conclusion, the concept of cause of action or the “reason for filing” can be examined to find out where such an application can be filed. In view of the above conclusion, the concept of cause of action or the “reason for filing” can be examined to find out where such an application can be filed. If a litigant seeks transfer of a suit from a Court at Coimbatore to a Court at Madurai, it can be reasonably construed that the cause of action or the reason for seeking transfer arises partly within the territorial jurisdiction of Principal Bench and partly within the territorial jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench and he can file the petition at either place. Where a party wants a suit, to be transferred to a particular place, either because such a party is a resident of such place or may be because such place would be more convenient as most of the witnesses are from such places, it can be said that cause of action or the reason for filing a transfer petition has atleast arisen partially in such place and therefore the petition for transfer can be filed as per convenience of the litigant seeking transfer. 28. In Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal ( supra), while considering the question regarding the jurisdiction of Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court, it was observed as under: “ 36. … the expression “cause of action” in an application under Article 226 would be as the expression is understood and if the cause of action arose because of the appellate order or the revisional order which came to be passed at a place outside the areas in Oudh. It may be that the original order was in favour of the person applying for a writ. In such case an adverse appellate order might be the cause of action. The expression “cause of action” is well known. If the cause of action arises wholly or in part at a place within the specified Oudh areas, the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action arises wholly within the specified Oudh areas, it is indisputable that the Lucknow Bench would have exclusive jurisdiction in such a matter. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. If the cause of action arises in part within the specified areas in Oudh it would be open to the litigant who is the dominus litis to have his forum conveniens. The litigant has the right to go to a Court where part of his cause of action arises. In such cases, it is incorrect to say that the ligitigant chooses any particular Court. The choice is by reason of the jurisdiction of the Court being attracted by part of cause of action arising within the jurisdiction of the Court. Similarly, if the cause of action can be said to have arisen partly within specified areas in Oudh and partly outside the specified Oudh areas, the litigant will have the choice to institute proceedings either at Allahabad or Lucknow. The Court will find out in each casae whether the jurisdiction of the Court is rightly attracted by the alleged cause of action. 37.… the expression “cause of action” with regard to a civil matter means that it should be left to the litigant to institute cases at Lucknow Bench at Allahabad Bench according to the cause of action arising wholly or in part within either of the areas. If the cause of action arises wholly within Oudh areas then the Lucknow Bench will have jurisdiction. Similarly, if the cause of action arises wholly outside the specified areas in Oudh then Allahabad will have jurisdiction. If the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action arises outside the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad.” (emphasis added) 29. In U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P AIR 1985 SC 2148 after extracting and relying upon the observation of the Supreme Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal ( supra), from paras 35 and 36, it was observed: “14. While reaching the above conclusion this Court kept in view the plain language of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure was noticed, referred to or taken into consideration directly or indirectly. While reaching the above conclusion this Court kept in view the plain language of Clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order. No provision of the Code of Civil Procedure was noticed, referred to or taken into consideration directly or indirectly. The territorial jurisdiction of a Court and the “cause of action” are interlinked. To decide the question of territorial jurisdiction it is necessary to find out the place where the “cause of action” arose. We, with respect, reiterate that the law laid down by a Four Judge Bench of this Court in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal AIR 1976 SC 331 holds good even today despite the incorporation of an Explanation to Section 141 to the Code of Civil Procedure.” 30. It is no doubt true that in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another AIR 2004 SC 2321 : (2004) 6 SCC 254 while referring to the above decision, it was observed: “ 26. The view taken by this Court in U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P ( supra) that the situs of issue of an order or notification by the Government would come within the meaning of the expression “cases arising” in clause 14 of the (Amalgamation) Order is not a correct view of law for the reason hereafter stated and to that extent the said decision is overruled. … In other words, framing, of a statute, statutory rule or issue of an executive order or instruction would not confer jurisdiction upon a Court only because of the situs of the office of the maker thereof. 27. When an order, however, is passed by a Court or tribunal or an executive authority whether under provisions of a statute or otherwise, a part of cause of action, arises at that place. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. Even in a given case, when the original authority is constituted at one place and the appellate authority is constituted at another, a writ petition would be maintainable at both the places. In other words, as order of the appellate authority constitutes a part of cause of action, a writ petition would be maintainable in the High Court within whose jurisdiction it is situate having regard to the fact that the order of the appellate authority is also required to be set aside and as the order of the original authority merges with that of the appellate authority.” 31. The position is very much clear in view of he observation made in Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal ( supra). The subsequent decisions in U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P U. P. Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U. P ( supra), AIR 2001 SC 416 ( supra) and (2007) 6 SCC 769 Ambica Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (2007) 6 SCC 769 also recognize the aforesaid position. In a very recent unreported decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Sanjos Jewellers and 2 Others v. Syndicate Bank and Another Sanjos Jewellers and 2 Others v. Syndicate Bank and Another Sanjos Jewellers and 2 Others v. Syndicate Bank and Another (2007) 6 MLJ 755 W.P. No. 4682 of 2007, dated 14.9. 2007, the above position has been reiterated. 32. In K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramaniam @ V. S. Mani and Others K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramaniam @ V. S. Mani and Others K. Kavitha and Others v. Subramaniam @ V. S. Mani and Others (supra), the learned single Judge of this Court also expressed the opinion that the procedure similar to Section 23 can be invoked and an appropriate application can be filed before the Bench having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the suit is instituted. However, as already pointed out the provisions contained in Sections 22 and 23 are applicable only to the defendant; whereas Section 24 is available to any party to the suit or proceeding. The principle contained in Section 23 C.P.C cannot be transposed to an application under Section 24 C.P.C. 33. However, as already pointed out the provisions contained in Sections 22 and 23 are applicable only to the defendant; whereas Section 24 is available to any party to the suit or proceeding. The principle contained in Section 23 C.P.C cannot be transposed to an application under Section 24 C.P.C. 33. An apprehension was expressed in the above decision that if it is held that both the Benches may have jurisdiction, there is possibility of conflicting decisions. We do not think such an. apprehension can be said to be reasonable. A transfer petition when taken on the judicial side, under, Section 24 C.P.C is required to be disposed of only after giving opportunity of hearing to both parties. Therefore, if a particular Bench has already passed an order regarding transfer in a particular matter, it is obvious that such order is required to be brought to the notice of the other Bench. It is no doubt true that the principle of res judicata is not applicable to such orders relating to transfer. In fact, Section 24 itself contemplates that a case transferred, can also be retransferred. Since the matter is required to be disposed of after giving notice, the possibility of passing any order inadvertently in conflict with an, earlier order, of a different Beach, has to be discounted, Further, if parallel proceedings are Initiated, simultaneously, in two places It is obvious that the matter can always be brought to the notice of the Hon‘ble Chief Justice so that both the applications can be taken up at one place. 34. It is no doubt true that a learned single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the decision in Smt. Geetha Kathpalia v. Hemant Kathpalia AIR 1992 MP 281 has taken a view that such transfer petitions can be filed no t before any Permanent Bench but only before the Principal Bench. With respect, we are unable to persuade ourselves to follow such decision. If the Permanent Bench does not have appellate jurisdiction over a Court, beyond its territorial jurisdiction, by the same logic, the principal Bench, would not have appellate jurisdiction over the districts not coming within its fold. With respect, we are unable to persuade ourselves to follow such decision. If the Permanent Bench does not have appellate jurisdiction over a Court, beyond its territorial jurisdiction, by the same logic, the principal Bench, would not have appellate jurisdiction over the districts not coming within its fold. In such an event, the power of transfer under Section cannot be invoked at all and a party would be forced to approach the Supreme Court under Section 25 C.P.C when, two Benches of the same High Court are functioning separately in two different places. 35. In the decision in T. Kamatchi v. S. Murali @ Kanagasabapathy, Village Administrative Officer, Ettivayal Village, Pattukottai Taluk 2006 (2) CTC 131 : (2006) 1 MLJ 418 the learned single Judge, while accepting the contention that the Principal Bench at Madras can transfer the case pending before and Court coming within the jurisdiction of Madurai Bench to a Court coming within the jurisdiction of the Principal Seat at Madras, has referred to the proviso to the Presidential Order and observed at p. 422 of MLJ: “ 17. … It is thus the Principal Seat at Madras is delegated, with the power of appellate authority over cases arising from the Districts allotted to Permanent Bench at Madurai. When once this, element is proved, then both the Presiding Officers and the Courts of the Districts falling within the Territorial jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai will be considered as subordinate also to the Principal Seat at Madras.” 36. It is necessary to add a clarificatory note. The proviso, to the Presidential Order should not be construed as conferring a new power on the Chief Justice to direct that any case or class of cases rising in any of the district within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai shall be heard in the Principal Bench of Madras. It only reiterates the pre-existing powers of the Chief Justice for distribution of the business of the High Court. To put it differently, the Chief Justice is the Master of the roaster. He has absolute power in the matter of allocation of work. The proviso had been included to reaffirm such position test it may be construed that on establishment of the Bench at Madurai all the matters arising within such districts have to be heard only at Madurai and cannot be heard at Madras. He has absolute power in the matter of allocation of work. The proviso had been included to reaffirm such position test it may be construed that on establishment of the Bench at Madurai all the matters arising within such districts have to be heard only at Madurai and cannot be heard at Madras. The proviso also does not affect in any manner the plenery power of the Chief Justice to allocate any case to any Judge. 37. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the observation of the Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gulabchand Kapurchand Jain v. Rukmanidevi AIR 1971 M.P. 40 to the following effect: “It would appear that there is nothing in this notification which precludes the Judges, constituting for the time being the permanent Bench at Indore from hearing cases other than those indicated in the notification. For example, if a case which should ordinarily, be heard, at the main seat of the High Court, is directed by the Chief Justice to be heard by the Permanent Bench at Indore, the notification cannot stand in the way of the Bench hearing it. In other words, the notification purports to provide that the power and jurisdiction in regard to certain cases therein specified would be exercisable, unless the Chief Justice acting under the proviso otherwise directs by the permanent Bench sitting at Indore. But it is silent about the power and jurisdiction off that Bench in regard to all other cases and those must, therefore, be regarded as remaining unaffected and unimpaired.” 38. A Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court in the decision in Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India and Others Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India and Others Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India and Others AIR 1977 Raj. 243 drew inspiration from the aforesaid observation. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, speaking through A.P. SEN, J (as His Lordship then was), observed: “ 33. It is wrong to attribute to the proviso of the Presidential Order a meaning which is not intended. The proviso carves out an exception from the main enacting part. 243 drew inspiration from the aforesaid observation. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, speaking through A.P. SEN, J (as His Lordship then was), observed: “ 33. It is wrong to attribute to the proviso of the Presidential Order a meaning which is not intended. The proviso carves out an exception from the main enacting part. It declares that notwithstanding the establishment of a permanent Bench at Jaipur, the Chief Justice shall have the power to direct that any case or class of cases arising in any of the districts falling within the jurisdiction of the Jaipur Bench, shall be heard at the main seat at Jodhpur. The proviso, therefore, reaffirms the pre-existing power of the Chief Justice for distribution of the business of the High Curt under Section 44(2) of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949…” 39. In other words, the Chief Justice of the High Court in exercise of his administrative power has jurisdiction to direct that any matter coming within the jurisdiction of the Principal Benah at Madras can be heard before the Principal Bench at Madurai and vice versa. The proviso to the Presidential Order only seeks to reaffirm the above position lest it may be construed that matters coming within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai can only be heard at Madurai, As, already indicated, the very fact that an appeal from the decision of a Court lying within the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench can be heard by the Permanent Bench at Madurai and similarly an appeal against the decision of a Court coming within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai can be heard by the Principal Bench at Madras, if so directed by the Honourable the Chief Justice, only strengthens the conclusion that all such Courts are subordinate to the High Court of Madras irrespective of the place of sitting of particular Judges. 40. An unreported order of a learned single Judge in W.P. No. 1950 of 2005 dated 16.9.2007 was brought to our notice. In the said case, the petitioner s school which was in Cuddalore district filed writ petition, challenging the notice issued by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner notice issued by the Assistant was situated in Trichy District. 40. An unreported order of a learned single Judge in W.P. No. 1950 of 2005 dated 16.9.2007 was brought to our notice. In the said case, the petitioner s school which was in Cuddalore district filed writ petition, challenging the notice issued by the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner notice issued by the Assistant was situated in Trichy District. Such writ petition, which was filed before the Principal Bench at Madras, was transferred to Permanent Bench at Madurai on the rooting that the respondent, namely, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner was situated, in Trichy District coining within the jurisdiction of the Permanent Bench at Madurai. Learned single Judge observed that the petitioner s school was situated at Cuddalore district and the Enforcement Officer was also, in the same, district which was within the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench, of Madras High Court. Learned single Judge by relying upon the observation of Rajasthan High Court in Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India and Others Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India and Others Ram Rakh Vyas v. Union of India and Others ( supra) held that the matter would come within the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench. 41. In our considered opinion, the order of the learned single Judge retransferring the matter to the Principal Bench only or the basis that the petitioner s school was situated at Cuddalore may not be correct in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engg. Enterprises (P) Ltd. (1994) 4 SCC 710 and National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Haribox Swalram AIR 2004 SC 1998 : (2004) 9 SCC 786 . These two decisions were subsequently relied upon by the Supreme Court in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Another ( supra). Mere residence of the petitioner cannot clothe the Court with jurisdiction unless part of cause of action had arisen in the said place. On the other hand, it is evident, that part of the cause of action has arisen within Trichy District in as much as the impugned notice was issued by the Assistant Provident Commissioner at Trichy. Mere residence of the petitioner cannot clothe the Court with jurisdiction unless part of cause of action had arisen in the said place. On the other hand, it is evident, that part of the cause of action has arisen within Trichy District in as much as the impugned notice was issued by the Assistant Provident Commissioner at Trichy. To the above extent, it must be observed that the order passed by the learned single Judge, in W.P. No. 1950 of 2005 was not correct. 42. From the above discussion and analysis of various, provisions and decisions of several Courts, including the Supreme Court, our conclusions are as follows: (1.) Establishment of a Permanent Bench has the effect of bifurcation of the State into two for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court between the Principal Bench at Chennai and the Permanent Bench at Madurai. (2.) The District Courts and all ether Courts inferior to that of the District Courts are subordinate to Madras High Court irrespective of its place of sitting. (3.) Appeal or Revision can be filed before the Principal Bench at Chennai or Permanent Bench at Madurai depending upon the situs of the Court against whose decision the Appeal or Revision is sought to be filed. An appeal or revision against the decision of a Court situate within the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench at Chennai has to be filed before the said, Principal Branch whereas the appeals and revisions arising from the orders of Courts coining within the districts earmarked for the permanent Bench at Madurai have to be filed at Madurai. (4.) Writ petitions can be filed before the Principal Bench at Madras or Permanent Bench at Madurai depending upon the place where the cause of action has arisen. If the cause of action has arisen wholly within the jurisdiction of the Principal Bench or the Permanent Bench, obviously such writ petition can be filed only a the seat of the Principal Bench or of the Permanent Bench as the case may be. On the other hand, if the cause of action arises either wholly or in part within the areas allotted to the Principal Bench at Chennai and the Permanent Bench at Madurai, the writ petition can be filed at any of the places. On the other hand, if the cause of action arises either wholly or in part within the areas allotted to the Principal Bench at Chennai and the Permanent Bench at Madurai, the writ petition can be filed at any of the places. (5.) A proceeding for transfer under Sections 22 to 24 of the C.P.C., partakes the character of an original, proceeding and can be filed before the Principal Bench or the Permanent Bench depending upon the “cause of action” or “the reason” for filing such transfer petition. In order to avoid any possible confusion in such matter relating to filing of transfer position, we make it clear that where a person seeks transfer of a case from a place to another place coming within the jurisdiction of one Bench, such transfer position has to be filed before the very same Bench. On the Other hand, where transfer is sought from a Court coming within the jurisdiction of the other Bench, such transfer petition can be filed before either Bench, obviously depending upon the cause of action for such transfer petition and the convenience of the petitioner. (6.) The Honourable the Chief Justice has discretion to direct that any waiter filed or pending before the Principal Bench or the Permanent Bench can be taken up for disposal before the Permanent Bench or the Principal Bench, as the case may be. It is accordingly held that the Transfer Civil Miscellaneous Petition is maintainable.