Judgment : The petitioner in both the writ petitions is one and the same company and it is a partnership company by name ABCOY. The challenge is made to the order dated 31.5.2004 for levying damages under Section 14-B of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. 2. Heard the arguments of Mr. M. Aravind Subramaniam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. V.S.V. Venkateshwaran, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the records. 3. In W.P. No. 2274 of 2004, the petitioner in attacking the impugned order, submitted that the impugned order is unreasonable and is not a speaking order. In support of his contention, he relied upon a judgment MMRDA Officers Assn. Kedarnath Rao Ghorpade v. Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (2005) 2 SCC 235 . Learned counsel refers to para 5 of the judgment, which is as follows: “Even in respect of administrative orders LORD DENNING, M.R. in Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union Breen v. Amalgamated Engg. Union observed (All ER 1154h) “The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.” In Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, it was observed: “Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. Reasons are live links between the mind of the decision-taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at.” Reasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording reasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system. Another rationale is that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking- out. The “inscrutable face of the sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P. C. Kakkar.” 5. One of the salutary requirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a speaking- out. The “inscrutable face of the sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial performance Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v. P. C. Kakkar.” 5. Thereafter, the learned counsel also referred a judgment Kasthuri Mills (P) Limited v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Office of the Provident Commissioner , (2007) 7 MLJ 975 : 2007 (1) CTC 201 , wherein the Division Bench of the Madras High Court referred to the earlier Supreme Court decision Organo Chemical Industries and Another v. Union of India and Others Organo Chemical Industries and Another v. Union of India and Others Organo Chemical Industries and Another v. Union of India and Others AIR 1979 SC 1803 : (1979) 4 SCC 573 : 1979-II-LLJ-416. Para 38 of the judgment is as follows: 38. “The contention that Section 14-B confers unguided and uncontrolled discretion upon the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose such damages‘ as he may think fit‘ is, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. Nor can it be accepted that there are no guidelines provided for fixing the quantum of damages. The power of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose damages under Section 14-B is a quasi-judicial function. It must be exercised after notice to the defaulter and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The discretion to award damages could be exercised within the limits fixed by the statue. Having regard to the punitive nature of the power exercisable under Section 14-B and the consequences that ensure therefrom, an order under Section 14-B must be a speaking order‘ containing the reasons in support of it. The guidelines are provided in the Act and its various provisions, particularly in the word ‘damages‘ the liability for which in Section 14-B on the ‘making of default‘. The guidelines are provided in the Act and its various provisions, particularly in the word ‘damages‘ the liability for which in Section 14-B on the ‘making of default‘. While fixing the amount of damages, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration, as he has done here, various factors, viz., the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of defaults and the amounts involved.” “The facts of the present case is illustrative one as on the one hand, the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner had given an opportunity to the petitioner to appear before him for personal hearing within the period of 15 days, on the other hand, has passed the order determining the quantum of contribution even within the said period of fifteen days. The opportunity that was given in the impugned order, appears to have been given only for the purpose of record. Such practice cannot be accepted and it should be deprecated. As the impugned order was passed even without compliance of the provision of Section 14-B in relation to the failure to provide opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner, we are of the view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and accordingly, it is set aside. We are informed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that infact, in one Region, similar orders are passed frequently in disregard to the provisions of Section 14-B. We take judicial notice of the said fact and accordingly, direct the copy of the order along with suitable instructions should be communicated to all Regional Provident Fund Commissioner for compliance of the same in future.” 6. Therefore, the learned counsel argued that in spite of direction given by the Division Bench to follow the guidelines in future, the impugned order is passed unmindful of the legal provisions as well as judicial precedents in this regard. Levying of damages is penal in nature and when the petitioner has submitted that they are having financial crisis and hence, they could not pay the amount in time, the authority did not even refer to the said fact and rejected it. On the contrary, awarded damages for various periods. Levying of damages is penal in nature and when the petitioner has submitted that they are having financial crisis and hence, they could not pay the amount in time, the authority did not even refer to the said fact and rejected it. On the contrary, awarded damages for various periods. Even though an appeal lies to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 7-I of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, since the matter has been admitted and pending before this Court for more than three years and as rightly pointed out, the authority had not exercised their discretion in the matter of awarding of damages. It is a fit case to be allowed following the earlier decisions cited supra. 7. Accordingly, the impugned order stand quashed and W.P. No. 2274 of 2004 is allowed. The respondent is directed to give an opportunity to the petitioner and after considering their objection, pass appropriate speaking order. No costs. Consequently, connected MP is closed. 8. In respect of W.P. No. 2276 of 2004, the learned counsel fairly submitted that his clients are willing to pay the interest in terms of the impugned order. Accordingly, recording the said statement, W.P. No. 2276 of 2004 stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected MP is dismissed.