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2007 DIGILAW 3363 (MAD)

The District Registrar, Tindivanam, Villupuram District & Another v. V. Ranganathan & Another

2007-10-24

A.P.SHAH, RAMASUBRAMANIAN

body2007
Judgment :- V. Ramasubramanian, J. 1. The District Registrar, Villupuram District and the Sub-Registrar, Gingi, have come up with the present Writ Appeal against the order of the learned Judge allowing the Writ Petition with a direction to the second appellant to release a deed of partition presented by the respondents herein on 11. 2006, for Registration, without collecting the deficit stamp duty charged by the appellants. 2. We have heard Mr. P. Raja Kalifulla, learned Government Pleader for the appellants and Mr. P. Srinivas, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The respondents herein are the sons of two brothers by name Varadharaja Nainar and Perumal Nainar. They entered into a deed of partition-dated 11. 2006, in respect of certain properties in Sakkarapuram Village, Gingi Taluk, Villupuram District and presented the same for registration on the same day. The total market value of the properties partitioned between the respondents, was declared to be Rs.3, 01,11,642.50 but the respondents had paid a fixed stamp duty of Rs.20,005/-. Since the second appellant, before whom the document was presented for registration, did not agree with the stamp duty paid on the document, the second appellant assigned P. No.2 of 2006 to the said document, indicating thereby that it was kept as a pending document. 4. Thereafter, the second appellant referred the document to the first appellant, for a clarification. The first appellant passed an order dated 3. 2006 calling upon the respondents to show cause as to why the deficit stamp duty to the tune of Rs.6,16,125/-together with penalty of Rs.1,875/-should not be recovered from them. The respondents submitted their objections on 13. 2006, after considering which, the first appellant passed an order dated 23. 2006 directing the respondents to pay the deficit stamp duty of Rs.6,16,125/- together with a penalty of Rs.1,875/- (totaling to Rs.6,18,000/-). 5. Aggrieved by the said order of the first appellant dated 23. 2006, the respondents filed the Writ Petition, W.P. No.12020 of 2007, praying for the issue of a Writ of mandamus to direct the appellants herein to release the document, pending adjudication proceedings regarding the determination of the actual stamp duty payable on the document in question. The said Writ Petition was ordered on 24. 2006, the respondents filed the Writ Petition, W.P. No.12020 of 2007, praying for the issue of a Writ of mandamus to direct the appellants herein to release the document, pending adjudication proceedings regarding the determination of the actual stamp duty payable on the document in question. The said Writ Petition was ordered on 24. 2007, when it came up for admission, on the basis of a statement made by the Special Government Pleader to the effect that in similar matters this Court had ordered the release of documents pending for registration, subject to certain conditions. 6. The grievance of the appellants is that the case on hand is not similar to the cases where this Court had issued directions for the release of the documents pending for registration. In all other cases, where such directions have been issued for the release of documents, the dispute was only with reference to the market value of the property covered by the document in question. Section 47-A(1) of the Indian Stamp Act enables the Registering Officer to refer a document to the Collector for determination of the market value of such property, if he has reason to believe that the market value of the property has not been truly set forth in the instrument. It is in respect of such cases, where a dispute is raised with reference to the market value of the property covered by the instrument in question that a learned Judge of this Court passed an order in Ponnusamy, M. and others Vs. The District Collector, Erode District and others, 1999 (2) LW 231 , directing the release of documents pending adjudication proceedings. Following the said order, several orders came to be passed directing the release of documents, with a rubber stamp affixed on the documents, indicating the pendency of the adjudication proceedings. 7. But the case on hand is not one where a dispute with reference to the market value of the property has arisen. This case is not one where the document is pending adjudication before the Collector under Section 47-A(1) of the Indian Stamp Act. On the contrary, the present case is one where the dispute is with reference to the charging provision. This case is not one where the document is pending adjudication before the Collector under Section 47-A(1) of the Indian Stamp Act. On the contrary, the present case is one where the dispute is with reference to the charging provision. Therefore, the appellants are right in contending that the Special Government Pleader was in error in reporting before the learned Single Judge that the case is covered by several other orders of this Court. This misconception on the part of the Special Government Pleader, who appeared before the learned Single Judge, has resulted in treating the case on hand as one covered by several earlier orders. 8. Admittedly, the document presented by the respondents, though titled as "partition deed", was not actually a partition deed between two blood brothers. The respondents, even according to them, are the sons of two brothers. In other words, the respondents are first cousins, as between themselves. A deed of partition is covered by Article 45 under Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act. The said Article 45, under Schedule I, in its Application to the State of Tamil Nadu reads as follows: 45. Partition - Instrument of [as defined by Section 2(15)] — Explanation: For the purpose of this Article, the word, "family" shall have the same meaning as defined in the Explanation to Article 58. 9. It is seen from Clause (a) of Article 45 that if an instrument of partition is among family members, the stamp duty payable would be 1% on the market value of the property subject to a maximum of Rs.10,000/- per share. The respondents have claimed their deed of partition to fall under Article 45(a) and they had paid a stamp duty of Rs.20,005/-, at the rate of Rs.10,000/- per share, for both of them (with a small spillover of Rs.5/-). 10. But if an instrument of partition is not among family members, such an instrument would be covered only by Article 45(b), under which the stamp duty payable would be the same as duty payable for a Bottomry a bond falling under Article 16, for the amount of the value of the separated share. Article 16 dealing with Bottomry Bond prescribes a stamp duty of 4%. 11. From the order passed by the first appellant dated 23. Article 16 dealing with Bottomry Bond prescribes a stamp duty of 4%. 11. From the order passed by the first appellant dated 23. 2006, it is clear that while the respondents treated the document as one falling under Article 45(a), the appellants treated the document as one falling under Article 45(b). The said action of the appellants is on the basis of the Explanation to Article 45, which provides that the word, “family” shall have the same meaning as given in the Explanation to Article 58. 12. The Explanation under Article 58, which defines the word, “family”, reads as follows: “Explanation.— For the purpose of this Article, the word “family” means father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, grandchild. In the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption, “father” shall include an adoptive father, “mother” an adoptive mother, “son” an adopted son and “daughter” an adopted daughter.” 13. Thus, it is seen that the word, "family" is given a restrictive meaning, in its Application to Article 58 and the same meaning is imported to the word, "family" appearing in Article 45. Consequently, the respondents would be entitled to claim the benefit of confessional rate of stamp duty under Article 45(a) only if both of them are members of a family, within the meaning of the definition of the word, "family". Obviously, the respondents do not fall within the definition of the word, "family" under Article 45(a). Therefore, prima facie, the objection raised by the appellants with regard to the nature of the document is well founded. Under such circumstances, it is not possible to order the release of the documents, especially after an order has been passed by the first appellant. Admittedly, the respondents have filed an Appeal to the Chief Controlling Authority, viz., Inspector General of Registration, on 14. 2006. Therefore, the respondents will have to await the outcome of the said Appeal and the question of return of documents could be considered only after final orders are passed on the Appeal. 14. In the view of the above, the Writ Appeal is allowed, the order of the learned Judge dated 24. 2007 passed in W.P. No.12020 of 2007 is set aside. However, the Chief controlling Authority, viz., the Inspector General of Registration is directed to dispose of the Appeal filed by the respondents on 14. 2006 against the order of the first appellant dated 23. 2007 passed in W.P. No.12020 of 2007 is set aside. However, the Chief controlling Authority, viz., the Inspector General of Registration is directed to dispose of the Appeal filed by the respondents on 14. 2006 against the order of the first appellant dated 23. 2006 in Na.Ka. No.969/81/06, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity to the respondents to put forth their objections. Connected M.P. is closed. No costs.